Indefinitely Jailed For Web Rant
from the watch-what-you-say... dept
Free speech apparently doesn't mean what it used to. A guy in Seattle who complained about the administrators of a residence for senior citizens has been put in jail indefinitely for his website critizing the home and the judge. He had originally sued to stop the place from preventing a newsletter he gave out to the residents there. Apparently, the judge didn't like him. Not only did he not grant the injunction - he told the home that he would grant an injunction the other way, forbidding Paul Trummel from publishing his newsletter and "harassing" the home. In response, Trummel put up a website - which the judge considered "harassment", and made him take it down. When he modified it, the home realized that he had put a similar site up with all the original info in the Netherlands - saying that it was not subject to US law. The judge decided that Trummel was in contempt and tossed him in jail - until he takes down the site. Of course, he's in jail, with no internet access, which makes it a bit difficult to take down the site (if he wanted to, which he doesn't). It seems the judge may have overstepped his bounds in saying that website with details about the case would be considered "harassment".
Thank you for reading this Techdirt post. With so many things competing for everyone’s attention these days, we really appreciate you giving us your time. We work hard every day to put quality content out there for our community.
Techdirt is one of the few remaining truly independent media outlets. We do not have a giant corporation behind us, and we rely heavily on our community to support us, in an age when advertisers are increasingly uninterested in sponsoring small, independent sites — especially a site like ours that is unwilling to pull punches in its reporting and analysis.
While other websites have resorted to paywalls, registration requirements, and increasingly annoying/intrusive advertising, we have always kept Techdirt open and available to anyone. But in order to continue doing so, we need your support. We offer a variety of ways for our readers to support us, from direct donations to special subscriptions and cool merchandise — and every little bit helps. Thank you.
–The Techdirt Team
Reader Comments
Subscribe: RSS
View by: Time | Thread
Socialism in the US
[ link to this | view in thread ]
This is getting scary
Granted, he could instruct someone to take the site down, but if the site owner decides to "see who dies first and let my estate pursue it", this judge could be in for a problem.
What's with judicial review board in Seattle anyway?
[ link to this | view in thread ]
fruitcake
[ link to this | view in thread ]
Re: fruitcake
Trummel is a human fake. HE IS NOT as he pretends a University Professor, never was.
He holds a Press Card issued by an outfit in Brussels (you can one by simple asking) it does not make him a journalist.
[ link to this | view in thread ]
Re: This is getting scary
[ link to this | view in thread ]
"Poor,Beleaguered Paul Trummel"per Mike 3.28.2002
[ link to this | view in thread ]
Re: Paul Trummel
Paul Trummel's First Amendment rights are yours. Take away his and you throw away your own.
see www.freepaultrummel.com
[ link to this | view in thread ]
Help---Freedom of Speech and Civils Rights are "GO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEVEN L. REED, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 01-3634-CV-S-4-ECF
)
SOUTHWEST MISSOURI )
STATE UNIVERSITY, )
Defendant. )
PLAINTIFF’S ANSWER WITH SUGGESTIONS OPPOSING DISMISSAL ORDER
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Steven L. Reed, hereafter Plaintiff, to obey this Court’s
ORDER of April 30, 2002 to answer Defendant Southwest Missouri State’s (hereafter SMSU) frivolous and malicious continual requests for unlawful dismissal.
Plaintiff didn’t answer the groundless and frivolous ‘Suggestions’ purporting to support Defendant SMSU’s ongoing and never-ending ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of April 10, 2002 because of its idiotic and fraudulent assertions that Attorney Hammons was, for some reason, incompetent to read the police reports and e-mails which supported Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint of March 29, 2002, and understand how these genuine material facts supported both amendment of the complaint, and joinder of additional parties as well. It was as if, Attorney Hammons, facing a deadline to respond to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, simply decided to throw enough half-baked and ridiculous claims to the wall and hope that something would proverbially stick somehow. Attorney Hammons even put in a Table of Contents and a Table of Authorities, to lend a superficial air of legitimacy to his pleadings, yet neglected to include an elemental case, such as Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 243, 106 S.Ct. 2505, which would have shown dismissal in the face of genuine material facts to be unlawful. Plaintiff has demonstrated genuine material fact exists by showing the Springfield police reports and quoting from them in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Joinder of Parties of March 29, 2002. Therefore, Plaintiff suspects Attorney Hammons of both incompetence and dishonesty, and resents having to answer Defendant SMSU’s frivolous and fraudulent ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of April 10, 2002. However, Plaintiff obeys all of these Court’s ORDERS, and if necessary, shall make his points known to the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
Arguments of Fact and Law Opposing Dismissal of Case
On page 1, of Attorney Hammon’s ‘Suggestions’ of April 10, 2002 (Hereafter ‘Suggestions’), Attorney Hammons merely claims that Plaintiff did not obey this Court’s ORDER of March 14, 2002. Attorney Hammons then goes on to make the assertion that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCivProc) Rule 12(b)(6). In the alternative, Attorney Hammons then idiotically and frivolously begs for relief under the old dodge of 11th Amendment Immunity, although Plaintiff obeyed this Court’s ORDER of March 14, 2002, and in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with Joinder of Additional Parties of March 29, 2002, took great care to sue Defendant SMSU and joindered Defendants John Groves, Earle Doman, and Rick Chastain as officials of SMSU under the allowed seeking of no damages, merely injunctory and declarative relief, as already determined by this Court. Plaintiff did not altogether agree with this Court as to SMSU Defendant’s ‘absolute immunity,’ but Plaintiff chose to let the matter lie upon appellate review, and in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint of March 29, 2002, obeyed this Court’s interpretation scrupulously, suing SMSU Defendants, both the original institutional SMSU defendant, and the newly joindered Defendants Groves, Doman, and Chastain for injunctive and declaratory relief ONLY. It is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. Goering v. Wright, 858 F. Supp. 989, 993 n. 4. However, Attorney Hammons has crossed the line by trying to deceive this Court with his never-ending claim of 11th Amendment Immunity, when there are no longer any monetary damages sought by Plaintiff. That this fraud is evident can be inferred in that Attorney Hammons, in footnote 2 of page 2 of his ‘Suggestions’ takes great pains to point out that SMSU notes at the outset that John Groves, Earle Doman, and Rick Chastain, collectively referred to as the “SMSU Defendants” are not parties to this motion.”
Plaintiff knows that since the case has in fact been dismissed by this Court, and a new Amended Complaint was ORDERED, Plaintiff simply sought, as an in forma pauperis and pro se Plaintiff, to have this Court have the U.S. Marshals serve the additional defendants via certified mail. Attorney Hammons initially whined in the first of his Motions to Dismiss of Jan. 15, 2002, that Plaintiff hadn’t sued flesh-and-blood SMSU Defendants or the SMSU Board of Regents, only SMSU as a Defendant, (‘Suggestions to Dismiss,’ p. 1, 2 of January 15, 2002) and was slapped down by this Court (Order, p2, of Feb 5, 2002). Plaintiff seeks this resolution as a matter of both judicial economy and his own, as Plaintiff has not funds for service himself. This economy of procedure is not forbidden by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but can rather be inferred as economical and straightforward, albeit brash, by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and arising from this Court’s ORDER(s) to Amend.
As to whether SMSU Defendants might want a better lawyer than Attorney Hammons is neither the concern of Plaintiff nor this Court. Perhaps SMSU Defendants Groves, Doman, and Chastain don’t much care to pursue an appeal based upon inadequate and incompetent representation by Attorney Hammons, even one for ‘declaratory and injunctive relief’ only.
On Page 2, footnote 2, of Attorney Hammons’ ‘Suggestions,’ Attorney Hammons makes the complaint that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was not in the form of “consecutively numbered paragraphs.” Plaintiff will give Attorney Hammons credit for “consecutively numbering” seven paragraphs on pages 2-3 of his ‘Suggestions’ of April 10, 2002, but then Attorney Hammons’ zeal in so numbering seems to have petered out. Perhaps Attorney Hammons is in ignorance as to what number follows “seven,” or, more likely, it simply doesn’t make sense to sustain an argument in which numbered paragraphs are not called for. Attorney Hammons then seems to simply ‘number’ his paragraphs, like Plaintiff, under Roman numerals in which the paragraphs flow based upon main arguments. It seems apparent that Attorney Hammons simply couldn’t help himself in trying to advance silly and frivolous complaints as to how Plaintiff pro se writes his briefs.
I. Plaintiff Has Provided Additional Facts To Support His Cause of Action
From Pages 1 to 3 of Attorney Hammons’ ‘Suggestions,’ Attorney Hammons and his precious consecutively numbered paragraphs simply does a selective cut and paste of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Joinder of Additional Parties of March 29, 2002 (Hereafter ‘Amended Complaint and Joinder’) without any mention whatsoever of the genuine material facts accompanying Plaintiff’s Arguments in which Plaintiff quotes at length from the Springfield Police Department’s police reports of August 31, 2000 and Sept. 6, 2000, in which Plaintiff was arrested while conducting a ‘motor-voter’ voter registration drive on the SMSU campus for ‘trespassing’ on the malicious complaints of SMSU Defendants Groves, Doman, and Chastain. These are genuine material facts, which Attorney Hammons has made no legitimate effort whatsoever to controvert or disclaim because there simply is no controverting or disclaiming these genuine material facts. Since there are these genuine material facts, evidenced by Plaintiff’s including them in his Amended Complaint and Joinder, then this case simply cannot be dismissed, and certainly not prior to the discovery process, according to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 243, 106 S.Ct. 2505, which Attorney Hammons had excellent reason for not bringing up in the Table of Contents and Table of Authorities in his massive work of fiction, i.e. ‘Suggestions’ of April 10, 2002.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 “by no means authorizes trial on affidavits.” It is on such fraudulent pleadings that Attorney Hammons would prevail – and before discovery no less! Plaintiff has shown his legal papers to his friends, both Democratic and Republican political activists, and in both cases they look at Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Joinder and the exhibits attached, and they think that Plaintiff has a serious case. A Democratic Congress passed, with Republican opposition, the ‘motor-voter’ federal legislation, put it within the authority and jurisdiction of Article III federal courts to enforce, and that they as Republicans shall simply have to get used to the law of the land regardless of whether or not they like being reduced to a minority bloc of votes in a democracy. So too shall the Republican Party defendants of SMSU and County Clerk Struckoff. The Springfield Police Department shall have to learn, maybe the hard way, that they simply cannot arrest under color of a trespassing complaint those who conduct voter registration drives to enroll such Democratic-Party minority voters.
Now these Republican Party voters don’t like the federal law, but they eventually have to agree that in a nation of laws, not of men, that Plaintiff has a right to pursue civil rights and voting rights litigation against these Defendants. Plaintiff is thus confident, that upon showing the evidence, even merely that evident in the police reports and e-mails to the then current Secretary of State’s Office from early September 2000, evidence alluded to already by Plaintiff prior to discovery process, that an unbiased jury, certainly one drawn from inner-city Kansas City or Springfield, will find, as a matter of both genuine material fact and of law in favor of Plaintiff.
Therefore, this Court has no basis whatsoever for summary dismissal of this case.
Attorney Hammons’ quasi-legal arguments and speculations have no authority to decide this matter. It is forbidden for this case to degenerate into a ‘Trial by Affidavit.’ And certainly not now that Plaintiff in amending did so with an eye towards joindering additional parties, and in order to convince this Court to initiate service for in forma pauperis pro se Plaintiff upon these new defendants, showed by means of evidence in police reports and e-mails to the Secretary of State’s Office that there was plenty of cause for doing so. And this all before the discovery process has been officially set forth, and thus this case is unable to be dismissed according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. Ibid. Anderson, p 2511, n 5. In fact, Attorney Hammons has not provided any evidence whatsoever other than speculation and argument on behalf of his motion for dismissal. This is contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. Ibid. Anderson, p 2511, n 4.
Additional Comments by Plaintiff concerning the facts
Attorney Hammons argues for his client Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F. 2d 1106, 1110
(10thth Cir. 1991) states in footnotes---A pro se litigant pleadings are to be construed
liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Plaintiff Reed is not an attorney yet he has clearly pointed out facts and the law
supporting this case.
Haynes v. Kerner, concludes that even with a pro se complaint the court need not
consider irrelevant facts or conclusory allegations. Yet Plaintiff Reed has only submitted
a small portion of the evidence concerning the case asking that it will all be presented in a
timely fashion during the discovery stage. If the judge would like Plaintiff could turn
over more evidence at this time to show there is much more proof to Civil Rights
Violations that are clearly more than irrelevant facts and conclusory allegations.
Attorney Hammons says under Elements of S1995 that Plaintiff must allege facts
that show an inference that there was an agreement between the alleged conspirators.
The truthful facts will bear out during discovery that the arresting officer who called in a
back up officer during the arrest process had discussions with Greene County Clerk
Richard Struckoff, SMSU officials, and finally City Prosecutor Ron Derickson. Phone
discussions that are listed in the Official Police Reports clearly show things picking up
steam and finally reaching a boiling point. Prosecutor Derickson was very aggressive in
telling officer----to arrest Plaintiff Reed on site if he came back. When a Kansas City
Star reporter ask what was happening he was told to leave the area right away. . Official
Police reports state that Police Officer J. Matthews Badge # 743 spoke with SMSU
officials who said they wanted Plaintiff Reed arrested if he came back and then to
Springfield Prosecutor Ron Derickson who gave the green light to arrest Plaintiff Reed
on site for his VOLUNTEER VOTER REGISTRATION DRIVES. Discovery will also
allow other areas to be explored including the fact that the special voter drives are
appreciated by the students who have busy school and job schedules and they many times
forget to register. In this case when students learned that Plaintiff Reed was be forced to
leave they went to Dr. John Keiser’s office and said how much they appreciated the drive.
The facts that come out during discovery will show students were very appreciative of
Plaintiff Reed actions and the respect and courtesy he shows them as our future leaders.
Many times college students are too busy to remember to register to vote because of
classes and work. Plaintiff argues that such special drives are very helpful and
appreciated by the college students.
Attorney Hammons argues for Defendant SMSU that no violation of 42 U.S.C.A.,
section accured. He says Plaintiff must show that: (1) two or more persons conspired;
(2) for the purpose of – and he list a, b, c, and d. (a) says depriving Plaintiff of the equal
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the law; . Plaintiff Reed
argues that if Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Gore, Mr. Bush or Mr. Carter would have wanted to
register voters that day they would have been allowed to with NO QUESTIONS.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F. 2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) The term frivolous refers to
the inarguable conclusion…The purpose of 1915(d) is to discourage the filing of, and
waste of judicial and private resources…. Plaintiff Reed argues that the
Freedom to Register Voters goes to the Pillar and Root of what our Nation stands for
around the world and in no way be considered frivolous.
Gordon v. Crouchley, 554 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D.R.I. 1982) To prevent a dismissal
of a complaint upon **5 violation of a civil rights statute, the pleadings must do more,
however than state naked conclusions; the complaint must outline the facts---
Plaintiff believes the facts are there and will become even more clear during discovery
and the trail stage.
Andrews v. Fowler , 98 F. 3rd 1069, 1079 (8th Cir. 1996) States that to prove a §
1985(3) claim: [A] complaint must allege the defendants did (1) “conspire…”(2) “for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” It
must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, “any
act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,” whereby another was (4a) “injured in
his person or property” or (4b) “ deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States.”
Plaintiff Reed claims in his person and property for a list of items some of which
include: Loss of employment because of case, personal stress and mental stress, United
States postage, phone bills, $150.00 paid to Attorney Craig Hosmer of Springfield and
other bills associated with the case.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants Attorney John D. Hammons fails to see the gravity/
seriousness of this case not only to the Human and Civil Rights of Plaintiff Reed but also
to college students across the nation. Attorney Hammons appears to be writing a book
with a table of contents. Plaintiff Reed wants to make it clear that additional pages can be
added to show that this case should proceed forward right away so the proper discovery
can take place. Attorney Hammons not only can not grasp the facts surrounding this case
he can not spell President of Southwest Missouri State University Dr. John H. Keiser’s
name correctly.
In a criminal pre-trail hearing it has to be proven there is reasonable doubt to
whether the accused should be bound over for trial. In the civil case at hand the only
requirement should be is that there is reasonable evidence showing Human and Civil
Rights violations to send the case to trail.
Plaintiff Reed wants to include the following legal arguments also:
PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER ET v. ROBINS ET AL.
No. 79-289
Supreme Court of the United States
Security stopped high school students from petitioning.
THE DECISION OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE PRUNEYARD MAY RESTRICT EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY BY ADOPTING TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER REGULATIONS THAT WILL MINIMIZE ANY INTERFERENCE WITH ITS COMMERCIAL FUNTIONS. APPELLEES WERE ORDERLY, AND THEY LIMITED THEIR ACTIVITY TO THE COMMON AREAS OF THE SHOPPING CENTER. In these circumstances, the fact that they may have "physically invaded" appellant's property cannot be viewed as determinative. There is also little merit to appellant's argument that they have been denied their property without due process of law. In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), this Court stated:
"[Neither] PROPERTY RIGHTS NOR CONTRACT RIGHTS ARE ABSOLUTE....EQUALLY FUNDAMENTAL WITH THE PRIVATE RIGHT IS THAT OF THE PUBLIC TO REGULATE IT IN THE COMMON INTEREST
The shopping center by choice of its owner is not limited to the personal use of the appellants. It is instead a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please. Plaintiff Reed argues that if private property is open to petitioning and voter registration then surely SMSU property i.e. declared public speaking area should be availed the same privileges.
"We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized property rights not their First Amendment rights have been infringed upon by the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing a right of applellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants property. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore Affirmed.
General facts Plaintiff Reed includes to prove the facts of this case:
The Supreme Court has ruled several times on which property is open to the public and which is not. In recent years, they have narrowed this interpretation, but the base has remained the same, namely that the court now engages in a "forum" approach. First, they classify the area that is disputed as a certain kind of "forum"- then the activities that allowed follows automatically:
from that designation. Some practical examples:
a. Traditional Public Forums: Those areas that are traditionally held places in which democratic conversation and solicitation have taken place.
Activities allowed: Any as long as they do not interfere with public health or safety. These public forums would be open for any type of petitioning, especially because the courts have been especially careful to safeguard "political speech" which goes to the core beliefs of our government-open and accessible political systems. Plaintiff Reed argues that this case of Voter Registration falls in this category. Discovery will show the SMSU time place and policy actually says it applies to students and staff. So Plaintiff argues that the Public Speaking is the right place to do Volunteer Voter Registration and his efforts did NOT ENTERFERE with the regular activities of the college campus.
b. Limited Public Forums: These are areas in which the local government or agency has chosen to make available as a "forum" area, and has opened up the area to other groups and individuals.
Activities Allowed: Petitioning would be allowed in these areas, if these areas have been opened up to other speakers or other petitioners. An example would be the KKK requesting the use of a school cafeteria in which to hold a rally at night. This would have to be allowed if the school regularly opens the cafeteria up for the use of other groups and organizations. In other words, if the forum is opened up to one group, it must be opened to all groups---to do otherwise would be an infringement on free speech rights of the group that is denied access.
c. Nonpublic Forums: Any area not traditionally opened up for pubic use, and any area not designated as a public forum. I.E. if the area does not qualify for the above, then it falls in this category.
Activities Allowed: Only those which are not excluded by regulations. These regulations must pass a simple test: they must be "viewpoint neutral" (not discriminatory) and must only regulate the time, place, and manner of the speech. Petitioning would probably not be allowed in these areas.
A. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint showed evidence to back up Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Against SMSU and Joindered SMSU Defendants.
While Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, there is no need for this Court to read Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Joinder ‘broadly’ or any other which way other than in conjunction with the exhibited evidence of the Springfield Police Department’s police reports of August 30 and Sept. 6, 2000. In it, the arresting officer makes note that he was called by SMSU Defendants to arrest Plaintiff for ‘trespassing’ while conducting a lawful ‘motor-voter’ registration drive. This evidence, taken with the complaint, is probably adequate in itself for a directed verdict by this Court against SMSU Defendants. And yet Attorney Hammons goes on for pages and pages of witless and dishonest drivel about how nothing has been proven to Attorney Hammons’ personal satisfaction. It is not necessary for Plaintiff to prove anything to Attorney Hammons’ satisfaction. Plaintiff wishes to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, already damning enough already, the genuine material fact that Plaintiff was falsely arrested and imprisoned at the instigation of SMSU Defendants for conducting a legal ‘motor-voter’ registration drives. This is a genuine material fact, which Attorney Hammons, if he were honest, would have to stipulate in any case. This genuine material fact ensures that this case cannot be dismissed sua sponte prior to jury trial.
Attorney Hammons on Page 4 of his ‘Suggestions’ misquotes both facts and law. Insofar as Plaintiff’s complaint of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Plaintiff’s evidence of the police reports of August 30, 2000, show that the arresting Springfield police officer, Officer J. Matthews, Badge # 743, had a conversation with Greene County Clerk Richard Struckoff concerning the legality of Plaintiff’s ‘motor-voter’ registration. In it, County Clerk Struckoff insinuates that Plaintiff was doing something illegal – the exact same thing that Clerk Struckoff is so very sleek about in his response to the Secretary of State’s Office upon a complaint as to Struckoff’s behavior via e-mail a few days after Plaintiff’s false arrest on Sept. 6, 2000. Plaintiff went into detail in his Amended Complaint and Joinder as to how there was indeed a seeming conspiracy between SMSU Defendants and Struckoff to falsely give the impression to a police officer that Plaintiff was conducting an illegal voter-registration drive, thus allowing Officer Matthews to arrest Plaintiff on Sept. 6, 2000.
It is indeed common knowledge in Greene County as to how SMSU Defendants and joindered Defendant Struckoff and the lengths they shall go to prevent the ‘motor-voter’ registration of minority voters likely to vote Democratic. The police reports, furnished prior to discovery hints as to their motivation. However, upon the discovery process, Plaintiff shall call and subpoena witnesses for trial who will testify that they have heard SMSU Defendants and Clerk Struckoff saying that they will do anything possible, legal or otherwise, to defeat 42 U.S.C. § 1973 – commonly referred to as ‘motor-voter.’ The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for subpoenaing such testimony prior to trial, where such testimony on behalf of Plaintiff can be presented.
Elements of § 1983 and § 1985.
Through pages 5-7 of his ‘Suggestions,’ Attorney Hammons dishonestly and witlessly protests that Plaintiff hasn’t in Plaintiff’s Amendment of Complaint and Joinder shown genuine material fact that Plaintiff was falsely arrested for ‘trespassing’ by a Springfield police officer at the instigation of SMSU Defendants while conducting a volunteer ‘motor-voter’ registration drive and that the arresting officer, wary that Plaintiff might have been acting legally, made a telephone call to joindered Defendant Richard Struckoff, Greene County Clerk and thus Chief Election Official for Greene County and that Struckoff gave the arresting officer the week previously the impression that Plaintiff was doing something illegal.
In fact, Plaintiff is indebted to Attorney Hammons for pointing out the criminal elements necessary for his clients to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1985, especially sub-section (C) in that SMSU Defendants prevented “any citizen” from being entitled to vote, courtesy of 42 U.S.C. § 1973, from motor-voter registration conducted by Plaintiff for an elector for President or Vice-President, or a Member of Congress of the United States. This in addition to violations of sub-sections (A), (B), and (D). For these reasons alone this case should move forward since a jury would likely agree there was no reasonable reason to arrest and detain someone for doing a volunteer voter registration drive. Police reports shoe Plaintiff was told to move his “operation” to the speaking area where he was setting up when arrested.
Even though the parties who had Plaintiff arrested were apparently concerned about how the students would vote---Plaintiff Reed was simply registering anyone who wanted to vote without stating any preference whatsoever.
Plaintiff has shown his legal papers to his friends, both Democratic and Republican political activists, and in both cases they look at Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Joinder and the exhibits attached, and they think that Plaintiff has a serious case, although some of the Republicans think that Plaintiff is being mean to SMSU Defendants and joindered Defendant County Clerk Struckoff because they “Don’t want Negroes and Mexicans registered to vote!” any more than SMSU Defendants and County Clerk Struckoff do, because of fear of how such voters would vote Democratic. If there is indeed an effort to “keep southwest Missouri” voting mainly republican that could have an impact on representation in the United States Congress and who is elected President.
Insofar as Attorney Hammon’s claiming that SMSU Defendants are smart enough to cover their tracks by not having a signed contract with County Clerk Struckoff to obstruct 42 U.S.C. § 1973, it simply doesn’t matter because Plaintiff in showing the Aug. 30 and Sept. 6, 2000 police reports written by the unknowing police officer they used as their catspaw for false arrest and imprisonment shows that a conspiracy might well indeed exist between SMSU Defendants and Greene County Clerk Struckoff.
Sub-Section (d) states---injuring any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy---
Plaintiff Reed claims in his person and property for a list of items some of which
include: Loss of employment because of case, personal stress and mental stress, United
States postage, phone bills, $150.00 paid to Attorney Craig Hosmer of Springfield and
other bills associated with the case.
Attorney Hammons points to Dill v. Village of Gowanda, 952 F. Supp. 989, 993
(W.D.N.Y. 1997)(holding that the plaintiff could not bring a 1983 action for
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment when his conviction had not been reversed,
expunged, declared invalid or called into question by writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff
points out that public records show that State Representative and Attorney Craig Hosmer
of Springfield had the criminal charges dropped with a one-year probation period, which
is now over.
Elements of § 1973gg
Plaintiff has shown copies of e-mails sent to the Missouri Secretary of State’s Office as exhibits in his Amended Complaint and Joinder. Attorney Hammons has not contested the validity of these sent and received e-mails. Rather Attorney Hammons quotes and misquotes legalities, which he imagines will help his clients in his attempted Paper-Trial by Affidavit and Motion.
The fact of the matter is that Plaintiff has standing to sue because as a Community Activist he was trying to register voters so they can help decide heir and the community’s future. Plaintiff can produce, if necessary, people who were annoyed that SMSU Defendants violated their rights under § 1973 at trial as well. However, it is Plaintiff’s contention that in trying to subvert the language and intent of § 1973, Defendants violated his rights under § 1973, § 1983 and § 1985.
It is irrelevant as to the form of Plaintiff’s complaint to the Secretary of State’s Office with specificity as to the violations by Defendants SMSU and Struckoff in large part because this violation of Plaintiff’s rights under § 1973 continues today, as Plaintiff is banned for life from conducting motor-voter registration drives on SMSU campus. Therefore, each and every time Plaintiff would want to conduct a motor-voter registration drive, Plaintiff could make a detailed report to the Secretary of State’s Office, and each such complaint would be as a new civil-rights violation, each instance a matter for this District Court to resolve.
Rather than complicate the existence of this Court with hundreds of separate complaints, Plaintiff has asked for declarative and injunctive relief against SMSU Defendants, and part of this relief shall be for SMSU Defendants to stop violating federal law and the rights of Plaintiff by making SMSU rescind this illegal ban of theirs. Therefore, even if Attorney Hammon’s ‘Suggestions’ had merit -- akin to a sex-offender’s notions that he gets to sodomize the six-year-old unable to formulate what they would call a ‘proper complaint’ until the exact same moment of an adverse jury trial decision that they’re guilty and have to stop -- this Court would still have to entertain this lawsuit because of the jurisdiction that Congress assigned it under § 1973.
Attorney Hammons’ Assertions that Plaintiff Has Failed To State a Claim, Sovereign Immunity, Dismissal Sua Sponte, etc. etc.
These claims from pages 9-11 are ridiculous on their very face, and have already been addressed by Plaintiff’s specific Amendment of Complaint and Joinder of New Parties, along with the exhibits provided of March 29, 2002.
SMSU Defendants have been granted 11th Amendment Immunity from monetary damages by this Court. Plaintiff didn’t even bother to contest this matter in his Amendment of Complaint and Joinder, asking instead merely for declarative and injunctory relief. The ban on Plaintiff for ‘motor-voter’ registering drives shall in any case have to be lifted by an injunction from this Court. So Attorney Hammons is simply beating a straw man to death. Plaintiff has a valid claim against Attorney Hammons’ client(s). They already have as much 11th Amendment Immunity that this Court can give them. Attorney Hammons is simply yapping some more lies and deceit and if this Court would send him the word that it is time to move on to discovery and then trial, Plaintiff would be indebted.
Conclusion: Plaintiff is obeying this Court’s ORDER of April 30, 2002 to respond to Attorney Hammons’ ridiculous suggestions. Plaintiff obeyed this Court’s ORDER of March 14, 2002, and provided an Amended Complaint and took the opportunity to joinder some additional defendants, given that the original complaint of Plaintiff’s was dismissed. Plaintiff sees no reason why this Court shouldn’t simply serve the newly joindered Defendants, both SMSU Defendants John Groves, Earle Doman, and Rick Chastain, the Springfield Police Department and its Officers J. Matthews, Badge # 743 and his supervisor, Sgt. T. Revell, and Greene County Clerk Richard Struckoff by means of certified mail from the U.S Marshall’s Service as Plaintiff is still pro se and in forma pauperis. The SMSU Defendants still have their immunity, and the Springfield police department defendants and Clerk Struckoff have no asserted immunity. Nothing is harmed by this Court making it possible for Plaintiff to enjoy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure due-process of joindering guilty defendants. The Clerk of the Federal Courthouse won’t allow Plaintiff to service these new defendants unless this Court gives her instruction and permission to do so.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court entertain Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint With Joinder Of Additional Defendants of March 29, 2002 according to [this Court’s] Judicial Order of March 14, 2002. Plaintiff requests that this Court have the U.S. Marshall’s Office serve the newly joindered Defendants. Plaintiff requests that there be no further delay and that this matter go to trial. Plaintiff is willing to get this trial back on track with a new proposed Scheduling Order and asks that this case proceed to discovery and then trial by jury.
_____________________________
Steven L. Reed, Plaintiff,
P.O. Box 581
Springfield, Missouri 65801
Certificate of Service
A copy of the foregoing was mailed by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on May 15, 2002 to: Attorney John D. Hammons, Jr., appearing for the Defendant: Southwestern Missouri State University, and presumably for Defendants John Groves, Earle Doman, and Rick Chastain at Ellis, Ellis, Hammons & Johnson, PC, 901 St. Louis Street, Suite 600, Springfield Missouri 64806.
A copy of the foregoing was mailed by certified U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on May 15, 2002 to: Greene County Clerk Richard T. Struckoff, Greene County Courthouse, 940 Boonville, Springfield, Missouri 65802.
A copy of the foregoing was mailed by certified U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on May 15, 2002 to: The Springfield Police Department, 321 East Chestnut Expressway, 65802
[ link to this | view in thread ]
Huh?
Become politically active and speak out against this type of tyrany,campaign for good judges (preferably constructionists)and vote for them.
I believe we can truly restore America to the land history has proven she can be.
Please excuse my ramblings but this is an issue close to my heart and I do so hate the enemies of the U.S. foreign and domestic.
[ link to this | view in thread ]