ATMs Aren't So Secure Either
from the transparency dept
Back in March, I responded to the common argument that since automatic teller machines are widely used and seem to be secure, secure electronic voting must be doable as well. I pointed out a couple of problems with this argument, but I took as a given that ATM machines are in fact, secure. But Matt Blaze recently discovered that ATMs aren't that secure either. When Blaze tried to withdraw cash from a Philadelphia cash machine, he encountered a bunch of problems. The information on the screen was screwed up, the machine gave him $10 more than he'd requested, and the machine failed to give him his receipt. Even more worrisome, when he went into the bank to suggest that they check out the machine and see what might have been wrong with it, the assistant manager actually argued with him, assuring him that the machine was working just fine and Blaze must be imagining things. Incredibly, when he tried to show her a screenshot he had taken with his cell phone, she cut him off by pointing out that photography isn't allowed in the bank.
Obviously, part of the problem here is a bank employee who has a bad attitude. But it also illustrates a couple of additional problems with the "ATMs work so why can't e-voting?" argument. First, people have a habit of trusting machines more than people. When elections are conducted with pencil and paper, everyone understands that some of the human beings might have hidden agendas and need to be watched closely. In contrast, people tend to assume that machines are completely objective and unbiased, and so they're less likely to notice problems with machines even when (as in the case of this bank manager) the evidence is staring them in the face. Second, if it turns out that the ATM screwed up, Blaze will at some point get a statement from his bank telling him how much money the bank thinks he withdrew, and he can object if it differs from what he actually got. There isn't (and due to voter privacy concerns, can't be) a similar process for e-voting. If a paperless voting machine screws up, there's no way to double-check the results after the fact.
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Filed Under: atms, reliability, security, verification
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ATMs Secure?
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Hey Now
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Anyone notice the new BofA Diebold machines?
Other than that, these new machines are much slower than the older versions.
Anyways, I just thought it was ironic that you mention voting machine security and ATMs in this article now that diebold is neck deep in the ATM machine business.
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Fact of the matter...
Besides, for humans, the first (and most difficult) half of accomplishing anything is knowing it can be done.
Therefore, electronic voting can only be viewed as an inevitability.
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This is about security?
It's not security, "it's are you smart enough to know when to walk away?"
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Re: ATMs Secure?
You say that as though it is a bad thing...
I feel compelled to point out OS/2 has true protected memory, is stable as a rock, and is not a common target of script kiddies and the scripters that script for them, to name just a few points in its favor.
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Re: ATMs Secure?
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Re: ATMs secure?
What about an open source voting solution? Make both the hardware and software public and let a world full of hackers and conspiracy theorists try to break it. It might or might not pan out, but if it does the result would be far better than vendor proprietary solutions.
Now we just need a complementary business model...
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re: I got ripped off by ATM/bank
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Not a Prob - Ya right
one month later ......
Bank: and if you do not return the stolen ten dollars we will be forced to contact the DA, oh and you owe us interest.
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the cassettes that are put into them have ID tabs in the back. So if a 10.00 cassette gets charged with 20 dollar bills the machine does it job perfectly, it’s just the person the loaded the cassette that made the mistake. There is a electronically journal that will tell the bank who got the extra cash and the will ask for it back
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Re: Re: ATMs Secure?
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Way to lose customers
And @12 - are you saying that ATM's are bug-free?
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=>12
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Secure my a**
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Preventing errors
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I refuse to use the damn things and from the looks of it, I am justified in this conviction.
Oh - one more thing - get off my lawn !
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Re:
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Re: Fact of the matter...
If we were to invest into "democracy" just a teeny-tiny fraction of the money put into things like "security", then cost wouldn't be an issue.
Now it is a matter of having a transparent process for development and implementation of the machines. This is one project that might, just might, be better taken on by the public sector for the "Greater Public Good", if no private organization is willing to work in the open.
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Re:
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Re: Secure my a**
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Sure there is. The voting machine can print a receipt that doesn't identify you, but identifies the vote (machine sn + transaction #). Publish the tallies for each machine after the election on a web site so voters can check against their receipt.
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Re:
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RE: #24
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