Sheriff Uses Unconstitutional Law To Raid Home And Seize Electronics Belonging To Watchdog Blogger

from the bad-laws-used-most-efficiently-by-bad-people dept

A Louisiana sheriff has just inserted himself into a mess of First and Fourth Amendment violations by using his power to go after an anonymous blogger who claimed he was corrupt. Naomi LaChance of The Intercept has more details.

After a watchdog blog repeatedly linked him and other local officials to corruption and fraud, the Sheriff of Terrebone Parish in Louisiana on Tuesday sent six deputies to raid a police officer’s home to seize computers and other electronic devices.

Sheriff Jerry Larpenter’s deputies submitted affidavits alleging criminal defamation against the anonymous author of the ExposeDAT blog, and obtained search warrants to seize evidence in the officer’s house and from Facebook.

The target of this raid -- supposedly the blog's author (although he denies being behind it) -- is another law enforcement officer. Wayne Anderson works for the Houma Police Department. Taken from his home during the raid were five cell phones and two computers -- including his children's laptop.

Sheriff Larpenter is trying to use Louisiana's criminal defamation law to prosecute Anderson. Unfortunately for the overreaching sheriff, that law isn't going to work.

The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled the criminal defamation law unconstitutional "insofar as it attempts 'to punish public expression and publication concerning public officials, public figures, and private individuals who are engaged in public affairs.’”

Larpenter is trying to get around this by claiming the "investigation" was prompted by a citizen's complaint -- that of Tony Alford, an insurance agent named in the blog's posts. The blog's author alleges impropriety related to Alford's no-bid contract to provide insurance coverage for the parish via the agency he works for, Alford, Staples, Lapeyre & Robichaux. The corruption hook here is that Sheriff Larpenter's wife also works for the same insurance agency.

So, it's not really about Tony Alford. It's about Larpenter and his wife. The blog has also made allegations about improper relationships between the department and the town's most powerful government officials, including District Attorney Joe Waitz, Jr. Unsurprisingly, this is the same DA Larpenter wants to prosecute the case.

When Larpenter was asked whether there is a conflict in him investigating an alleged crime involving himself, he replied, "If you're gonna lie about me and make it under a fictitious name, I'm gonna come after you."

He went on to say that once he finished investigating the blog, he would turn the case over to District Attorney Waitz to determine if Waitz wanted to prosecute it or “hand it off.”

Waitz, to his credit, has recognized the conflict of interest and has chosen to pass it on to another office for possible prosecution. But the charge is unlikely to stick, even with Sheriff Larpenter's maneuvering. Larpenter's comments make it clear this attempted prosecution is personal ("lie about me") and is willing to use an unconstitutional statute to justify a search/seizure of personal electronics. But even his invocation of a supposed "private" individual (the insurance agent) to obtain search warrants isn't going to be enough to salvage this blatant attempt to shut down a critic. As the parish's main insurance provider, Alford is very definitely a "private individual engaged in public affairs." Beyond that, he's a public figure in his own right.

In addition to holding public contracts, Tony Alford is also the acting President of the Terrebonne Parish Levee and Conservation District Board of Commissioners, a public position that requires him to file annual personal financial disclosures with the Louisiana Board of Ethics.

Even the process used to obtain the search warrant to seize Anderson's devices was a bit shady.

The one they used to search Anderson’s home was signed Tuesday by Judge Randall Bethancourt, who was not serving as the on-duty judge for criminal cases that day.

This suggests a bit of magistrate shopping by the Sheriff's Office. Now that the warrant has been executed and devices seized, a motion to quash is in place. But that does little for Officer Wayne Anderson. Not only has he been suspended (with pay) by the Houma Police Department while this farce plays out, but the court is holding onto his computers and phones until a hearing on the motion can take place.

The First Amendment implications of Sheriff Larpenter's raid are clear. That the search warrant -- in pursuit of bogus criminal defamation charges -- has already been carried out means Sheriff Larpenter will be facing Fourth Amendment violations claims as well in the inevitable civil rights lawsuit that will follow this debacle. Sheriff Larpenter should have had no problem fighting speech he didn't like with speech of his own -- especially considering his position as a public figure who holds a powerful office. Instead, he has chosen to abuse his position and power to silence a critic, something that's not exactly helping him look any less corrupt.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, anonymity, corruption, critics, free speech, jerry larpenter, louisiana, searches, terrebone parish, warrants, wayne anderson

New Law In Illinois Restricts Stingray Use, Requires Court Orders For Deployment

from the the-warrant-that-dare-not-speak-its-name dept

Roughly eight years after information about law enforcement use of Stingray devices began slowly making its way into the public sphere, positive changes are being made. While the government has often argued it can be the "Third Party" in "Third Party Doctrine" by inserting itself warrantlessly between people's cell phones and their carriers' towers, its assertions are being met with increased judicial skepticism.

Two judges -- one state, one federal -- have reached the same conclusion in recent months: using a cell tower spoofer to locate suspects by dragging information out of their phones is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Warrants are required.

A few state legislatures have gotten into the act as well, proposing laws that create a warrant requirement for Stingray deployment. Illinois is the latest to do so (and the law actually passed), creating a new set of guidelines for law enforcement Stingray device use, including limits on data retention. It doesn't go quite so far as to mandate warrant acquisition, but it does force law enforcement to specify the equipment used in their applications, which also serves to create a paper trail that can be examined by defendants and members of the public.

This is the new quasi-warrant requirement recently signed off on by the governor.

Provides that an application for a court order to use a cell site simulator device, including an emergency application under the Freedom From Location Surveillance Act, must include a description of the nature and capabilities of the cell site simulator device to be used and the manner and method of its deployment, including whether the cell site simulator device will obtain data from non-target communications devices. Provides that an application for a court order to use a cell site simulator device, including an emergency application under the Freedom From Location Surveillance Act, must also include a description of the procedures that will be followed to protect the privacy of non-targets of the investigation, including the immediate deletion of data obtained from non-target communications devices.

The presentation of probable cause basically makes it a warrant requirement, even if the word "warrant" appears nowhere in the legislation.

The other positive here is that very strict controls on the use and retention of non-hit data are being instituted as well.

Provides that if the cell site simulator device is used to locate or track a known communications device, all non-target data must be deleted as soon as reasonably practicable, but no later than once every 24 hours. Provides that if the cell site simulator device is used to identify an unknown communications device, all non-target data must be deleted as soon as reasonably practicable, but no later than within 72 hours of the time that the unknown communications device is identified, absent a court order preserving the non-target data and directing that it be filed under seal with the court.

An additional nice touch is that requests and orders aren't considered "sealed" by default and that any seal request granted only lasts six months, and extension requests must be accompanied by a certification indicating the documents are part of an ongoing investigation or a "showing of exceptional circumstances." The last one is a little worrying as it could be used to maintain seals indefinitely if the court is inclined to believe law enforcement claims about "exposing law enforcement means/methods."

This show of "support" from local law enforcement indicates the law isn't as far-reaching as privacy activists might have hoped, but it isn't exactly just a bundle of concessions to LEO interests either.

The Illinois State Police has taken a neutral position on the law and the Chicago Police Department did not take a position.

Expect this trend to continue. More courts and legislators are going to realize that tracking a person's location by forcing their cell phone to connect with law enforcement technology is in no way analogous to gathering phone records with a pen register order or subpoenaing historical cell site data from third-party carriers.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, court orders, illinois, imsi catcher, stingray, third party doctrine, warrants

DEA Finally Decides To Do Something About Its Wiretap Warrant Abuses

from the Re:-Something:-Will-this-do? dept

The DEA will no longer be able to waltz into Riverside County (CA) judge Helios Hernandez's chambers and walk out with signed wiretap warrants. I mean, they'll still be able to get Judge Hernandez to sign warrants. After all, no one does it better:

Nearly all of that surveillance was authorized by a single state court judge in Riverside County, who last year signed off on almost five times as many wiretaps as any other judge in the United States.

He's so efficient even the DEA can't quite wrap its mind around it.

Hernandez approved 20 times as many wiretaps as his counterparts in San Bernardino County. DEA officials said they could not explain that difference.

The DEA never let Rule 41 jurisdiction limitations bother them. Agents used wiretap warrants to track suspects all over the nation. The DEA also didn't let the DOJ's hesitancy to condone its actions/warrants get in the way of its drug warring. DOJ lawyers heavily hinted that if the DEA wanted to use questionable wiretap warrants, it had better not be dragging its raggedy affidavits into federal court.

But drag those affidavits into federal court it did, forcing the DOJ to defend the very warrants it told the DEA to stop dropping off at its place. The DOJ's lawyers said the toxic, possibly illegal warrants were actually 100% legal, perfectly compliant with federal and state law -- even though they were missing the signature of the local District Attorney, as required by federal law.

The DEA -- having had its bogus warrant assembly line exposed by USA Today's Brad Heath and Brett Kelman -- is finally moving towards curbing its wiretap abuse.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has ordered its agents to seek input from federal prosecutors before tapping Americans’ phone calls or text messages, months after it came under fire for a vast and legally questionable eavesdropping program in the Los Angeles suburbs.

The rules are a significant change for the drug agency, which had dramatically increased its use of wiretaps over the past decade by seeking authorization from state judges and prosecutors who were willing to approve the surveillance more quickly and with less scrutiny.

In theory, this means DEA agents will have to have federal prosecutors sign off on affidavits/warrants before running them past whoever happens to be manning the desk at the local DA's office. This won't necessarily make them more compliant with federal law, as it has historically been truly rare to find the local DA actually in his office, but it does mean there will finally be some oversight in place. To date, the only "oversight" the DEA has had to endure is the occasional DOJ lawyer telling agents "no fucking way" (ACTUAL QUOTE) whenever they approached federal prosecutors with a drug bust.

And, unless DEA brass is really serious about changing the agency's shady methods, it's likely nothing will change. Drug warriors, like water, seek their own level, running downhill against the least resistance.

Wiretaps are considered so intrusive that federal law requires approval from a senior Justice Department official before agents can even ask a federal court for permission to conduct one. The law imposes no such restriction on state court wiretaps, even when sought by federal agents.

Unless the DEA (or Congress) closes this loophole, nothing will change. There may be a temporary improvement, but it will be just that: temporary. The DEA has long been used to jumping zero hurdles on its way to intercepting communications. There's no reason to believe it won't revert to form unless steps are taken to prevent it. In fact, the DEA's actions will probably have less effect on its wiretap abuse than the installation of a new district attorney. As of the end of February, DA Mike Hestrin had only approved 14 wiretap warrants -- a huge decrease from the 126 approved over the same two-month period last year.

Filed Under: abuse, dea, helios hernandez, riverside, warrants, wiretaps

Senator Wyden Puts A Hold On Intelligence Authorization Bill To Block FBI Warrantless Surveillance

from the there-goes-that-wyden-guy-again dept

As we've discussed, some surveillance/law enforcement hawks have tried to rush through a law to expand the power of national security letters (NSLs) to paper over the long standing abuse of NSLs, by saying that they can use those documents (which have basically no oversight and don't require a warrant) to collect a ton of private info, including email info and web browsing histories. The rushed vote on this -- stupidly citing the Orlando attacks, despite the fact it would have done nothing to stop that -- failed but just barely. Basically, if Senator Dianne Feinstein were able to attend the vote, it likely would have passed. The support for it was one vote shy, and then Sen. Mitch McConnell changed his vote for procedural reasons to be able to bring it back for a quick follow up vote.

Now, as Congress rushes towards that vote, Senator Ron Wyden stepped up today to use his power as a Senator to put a hold on the entire Intelligence Authorization bill. He gave a short floor speech explaining his reasons.

I certainly appreciate the FBI’s interest in obtaining records about potential suspects quickly. But Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judges are very capable of reviewing and approving requests for court orders in a timely fashion. And section 102 of the recently-passed USA FREEDOM Act gives the FBI new authority to obtain records immediately in emergency situations, and then seek court review after the fact. I strongly supported the passage of that provision, which I first proposed in 2013. By contrast, I do not believe it is appropriate to give the government broad new surveillance authorities just because FBI officials do not like doing paperwork. If the FBI’s own process for requesting court orders is too slow, then the appropriate solution is bureaucratic reforms, not a major expansion of government surveillance authorities.

The fact of the matter is that ‘electronic communication transaction records’ can reveal a great deal of personal information about individual Americans. If government officials know that an individual routinely emails a mental health professional, or sends texts to a substance abuse support group, or visits a particular dating website, or the website of a particular political group, then the government knows a lot about that individual. Our Founding Fathers rightly argued that such intrusive searches should be approved by independent judges.

It is worth noting that President George W. Bush’s administration reached the same conclusion. In November 2008, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel advised the FBI that National Security Letters could only be used to obtain certain types of records, and this list did not include electronic communication transaction records. The FBI has unfortunately not adhered to this guidance, and has at times continued to issue National Security Letters for electronic communications records. A number of companies that have received these overly broad National Security Letters have rightly challenged them as improper. Broadening the National Security Letter law to include electronic communication transaction records would be a significant expansion of the FBI’s statutory authority.

And unfortunately, the FBI’s track record with its existing National Security Letter authorities includes a substantial amount of abuse and misuse. These problems have been extensively documented in reports by the Justice Department Inspector General from 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2014. As one of these reports noted, “the FBI [has] used NSLs in violation of applicable statutes, Attorney General guidelines, and internal FBI policies.” No one in the Senate should be surprised by this pattern of abuse and misuse, because this is unfortunately what happens when federal agencies are given broad surveillance powers with no judicial oversight. In my judgment, it would be reckless to expand this particular surveillance authority when the FBI has so frequently failed to use its existing authorities responsibly.

Of course, to some extent, this is little more than show. It's pretty clear that McConnell has the votes to get this passed, which is why Wyden has now taken the dramatic step of putting a hold on the bill. But the 60 votes here are usually what is necessary to break a hold (which remains a widely used, but informal, Senate rule). So in the end this won't mean much, but we've been here before again and again and again. And by now it should be clear: When Ron Wyden says that the government is abusing laws to spy on Americans, he's not lying. We shouldn't then paper over that abuse and give the FBI or the NSA or anyone else greater powers to spy on Americans. Because they use that power and they don't tend to use it wisely and judiciously.

Can anyone explain, seriously, why the emergency powers that allow the FBI to do the search in an emergency and then get the warrant after are somehow too problematic? Or why the FBI can't go and get a warrant at all? It's a petty quick process for them these days. This whole effort seems designed solely to wipe out what little oversight there is of the FBI and its use of national security letters.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, hold, intelligence authorization, mitch mcconnell, national security letters, nsls, ron wyden, warrants

Senate Just Barely Rejects Plan To Expand FBI Surveillance Powers

from the two-votes dept

Just yesterday we wrote about how the Senate was, somewhat ridiculously, rapidly pushing forward plans on a vote for an amendment to the laws concerning what information the FBI can gather using National Security Letters (NSLs). Despite the fact that the big push for this bill began a few weeks ago, and the fact that it had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the Orlando shooting, cynical Senators including John McCain and Mitch McConnell pointed to the shootings in Orlando as a reason that this expansion of FBI surveillance powers was needed. Of course, the reality is that it wasn't needed, and the law is really there to paper over the fact that the FBI has already been widely abusing its NSL powers to get information it's not allowed to request.

After a vocal debate this morning, the measure (somewhat surprisingly) failed to pass, but by just two votes. It need 60 votes to move forward (it was a vote for "cloture" on debate, which requires 60 votes), and it only received 58. But McConnell already made it clear that the amendment will be reconsidered soon, which means he's likely going to be pushing strongly to get those two remaining votes.

In other words, this particular debate is far from over, and thus it's important to make sure your Senator knows not to support this. You can see the roll call on the votes here to see what your Senators voted. Somewhat surprisingly, neither of my Senators in California voted for it. Feinstein didn't vote or wasn't present and Boxer voted against. I'm guessing that Feinstein would likely vote for it in a revote, given her willingness to support greater surveillance, so it's possible that McConnell really only needs one more vote, unless people can convince some of the "Yea" voters to change their mind.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, doj, fbi, john mccain, mitch mcconnell, national security letters, nsls, politics, warrants

DOJ Insists That Rule 41 Change Is Not Important, Nothing To See Here, Move On Annoying Privacy Activist People

from the try-that-one-again? dept

We've been talking a lot about Rule 41 lately around here. As we've discussed, the DOJ had pushed for an update to the rule, basically granting the FBI much greater powers to hack into lots of computers, including those abroad (possibly creating diplomatic issues). We've been discussing the problems with the DOJ's proposed change for years, and we haven't been alone. Civil liberties groups and tech companies have both blasted the plans, but to no avail.

Back in March, a judicial panel approved the DOJ's proposed changes, and the Supreme Court gave its blessing a month later. The rule changes are set to go into effect on December 1st if they're not stopped. Senators Ron Wyden and Rand Paul have introduced a bill to block them, while the EFF, Tor and friends have kicked off a big No Global Warrants campaign, encouraging Congress to block this change.

The DOJ is being fairly proactive in trying to brush aside concerns about the Rule 41 change, and earlier this week put up a blog post insisting that there's nothing to see here at all, and everyone who's worried should just move along already.

The amendments do not change any of the traditional protections and procedures under the Fourth Amendment, such as the requirement that the government establish probable cause. Rather, the amendments would merely ensure that at least one court is available to consider whether a particular warrant application comports with the Fourth Amendment.

The amendments would not authorize the government to undertake any search or seizure or use any remote search technique, whether inside or outside the United States, that is not already permitted under current law. The use of remote searches is not new and warrants for remote searches are currently issued under Rule 41. In addition, most courts already permit the search of multiple computers pursuant to a single warrant so long as necessary legal requirements are met.

This is... skirting the truth, at best. Under the existing Rule 41, there are clear limits on warrants that are outside the jurisdiction of the court (see 41(b)). The new Rule 41 wipes away many of those restrictions by adding an entirely new form of warrants for "remote access to search electronic storage media." This is the kind of thing that Congress is supposed to decide upon, not the courts at the behest of the DOJ. If Congress hasn't granted this authority, it's pretty ridiculous for the courts to just do it on their own, and, furthermore, to insist this is little more than an administrative change.

The DOJ also leaves out that the new rules also effectively wipe out the requirement to give a copy of the warrant to the person whose computers are being hacked. Yes, the new rules require a "receipt" but they switch to a "reasonable efforts" standard, rather than the current standard, which is that they must give it to the person or "leave a copy" where the property was taken. That pretty much guarantees that some of the people who are hacked following this won't even know about it.

And if it were really true that this new rule doesn't change anything, then why is the DOJ pushing so hard for it? Remember that a bunch of courts have been throwing out some of these searches as being illegal, so clearly there's an issue here.

The DOJ insists that the new rules only apply in narrow cases WHERE YOU SHOULD ALL BE AFRAID because EXPLOITED CHILDREN ARE AT RISK IF YOU DON'T ALL SHUT UP.

First, where a suspect has hidden the location of his or her computer using technological means, the changes to Rule 41 would ensure that federal agents know which judge to go to in order to apply for a warrant. For example, if agents are investigating criminals who are sexually exploiting children and uploading videos of that exploitation for others to see—but concealing their locations through anonymizing technology—agents will be able to apply for a search warrant to discover where they are located. A recent investigation that utilized this type of search warrant identified dozens of children who suffered sexual abuse at the hands of the offenders. While some federal courts hearing cases arising from this investigation have upheld the warrant as lawful, others have ordered the suppression of evidence based solely on the lack of clear venue in the current version of the rule.

I'm all for the DOJ going after people sexually exploiting children. It seems like a pretty good use of their time. But we should always be skeptical when law enforcement starts throwing out "sexually exploited children!" and "terrorism!" as reasons to upend existing rules. Especially when they cover something as important as how broadly the FBI and DOJ can hack into people's computers.

The FBI has a rather long history of abusing its surveillance powers, and especially seeking to avoid strict oversight. Approving such a change just because the DOJ is insisting it's "FOR THE CHILDREN, WON'T YOU PLEASE THINK OF THE CHILDREN!" isn't a particularly good reason. If the DOJ really thinks this kind of expansion of its ability to hack computers both at home and overseas (again: this is a diplomatic nightmare waiting to happen) is really so important, then it should have Congress pass a law, rather than insisting that it's nothing more than an administrative change to clarify a rule.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, fud, hacking, jurisdiction, privacy, rule 41, warrants

Court Tells Cops They Can't Seize Luggage And Send It Hundreds Of Miles Away In Hopes Of Generating Probable Cause

from the Fourth-Amendment-also-deals-with-seizure dept

There's no universal law enforcement "best practices" for searches and seizures, but simply respecting the Fourth Amendment would seem to be a good base guideline. However, that baseline is rarely used. Far too often, searches and seizures seem to be officers seeing what they can get away with -- and expecting the legal system to assist in applying "good faith" to unconstitutional searches after the fact.

Ethan Moore landed at the Dillingham, Alaska airport, where he was met by two police officers. According to the officers, informants claimed Moore was transporting marijuana. They seized his luggage and took it to the local police station while they sought a search warrant. (via FourthAmendment.com)

This effort failed.

After hearing the warrant application, the magistrate concluded that there was no probable cause for the search, so he refused to issue the search warrant. More specifically, the magistrate concluded that the officers had failed to provide sufficient proof of their informants’ credibility to satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test.

When the magistrate issued this ruling, he invited the officers to present more information to corroborate their informants.

The Aguilar-Spinelli test basically states informants -- if used to support probable cause claims -- must be shown to be reliable and credible. The three informants relied on here weren't. Rather than follow up with the informants or simply return Moore's luggage, the officers went with option C.

Instead, the officers kept Moore’s luggage overnight and then, the next morning, they shipped it to the Alaska State Troopers in Anchorage. After the luggage arrived in Anchorage, it was subjected to sniffing by a drug-detection dog. The dog alerted to the luggage, and the troopers then applied for a search warrant, this time in front of an Anchorage judge. The warrant was granted.

Armed with this warrant, issued by another judge in another city after being "pre-searched" by a drug dog, the officers opened the suitcase and found seven ounces of marijuana. Moore challenged the search and the court finds the officers' decision to do something no one recommended violated Moore's Fourth Amendment rights.

We therefore hold that the police violated Moore’s rights under the Fourth Amendment when they continued to hold his luggage after the magistrate denied their application for a search warrant. All evidence derived from the later search of that luggage must be suppressed.

The state did try to save the search with some pretty bad arguments. For one, it argued that because officers told Moore they were going to perform some questionable actions in search of a warrant, the warrant and search should be valid. The court disagrees.

[E]ven though the police may have accurately informed Moore that they were going to ship his luggage to Anchorage, and that he would be deprived of his luggage at least until the next day, the fact that the police communicated this information to Moore could not turn an unconstitutional seizure into a lawful one. In other words, the police could not obtain a license to violate Moore’s Fourth Amendment rights merely by informing Moore that they intended to do so.

In addition, the court informs the state that it cannot do whatever it wants with seized items just because it feels it may eventually reach a point where it will have enough probable cause to obtain a search warrant.

The State is effectively arguing that if the police have probable cause to believe that an article of luggage contains evidence of a crime, the police may seize the luggage, hold it for as long as is reasonably necessary to complete any desired additional investigation or testing, and even ship the luggage hundreds of miles to accomplish this additional investigation or testing — all without seeking a judicial warrant until the additional investigation is done.

We are aware of no legal authority to support this argument.

The seizure of Moore's luggage should have ended when the magistrate denied the warrant. The US Supreme Court has held that people and their belongings cannot be unreasonably detained just so officers can attempt to sniff up some probable cause (in the context of traffic stops and drug dogs). The magistrate -- while noting the severe deficiencies in the hearsay presented as "probable cause" -- gave the officers a few options. Because they chose "none of the above," their drug bust has vanished.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, ethan moore, law enforcement, probable cause, seizures, warrants

Senator Jeff Sessions Looks To Blast A Giant Hole In The 4th Amendment For 'Emergency' Response

from the yikes dept

Yesterday we wrote about an already troubling attempt by Senator John Cornyn to attach a dangerous amendment to the Senate's ECPA reform bill that would massively expand what kinds of electronic communications the FBI has access to (as we noted, the FBI already pretends it has access to this very info, so really this law would be papering over the FBI's illegal collection of this info). But there's another amendment, put forth by Senator Jeff Sessions, that is just as, if not more, troubling. It's basically creating a massive loophole in the 4th Amendment, saying that any and all basic oversight can be tossed out the second the FBI declares the situation to be an "emergency."

The amendment would allow the government to bypass the warrant requirement in times of claimed emergency. Specifically, it would mandate that providers turn over sought-after data in response to a claimed emergency from federal, state, or local law enforcement officials. Under current law, companies are permitted, but not required, to comply with such emergency — and warrantless — requests for data.

There are two huge problems with this proposal. First, it appears to be responding to a problem that doesn’t exist. Companies already have discretion to make emergency disclosures to governmental officials, and proponents of the legislation have failed to identify a single instance in which providers failed to disclose sought-after information in response to an actual, life-threatening emergency. To the contrary, the data suggest that providers do in fact regularly cooperate in response to emergency requests. (See the discussion here.)

Second, and of particular concern, the emergency disclosure mandate operates with no judicial backstop. None. Whatsoever. This is in direct contrast with the provisions in both the Wiretap Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that require companies to comply with emergency disclosure orders, but then also require subsequent post-hoc review by a court.

Even a long-term law enforcement guy, James Trainum, is worried about the impact of such a law:

In my 27 year career in law enforcement, the majority of which I spent as a homicide detective with the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., I sought and obtained communication records in the majority of my investigations.  I encountered no problems obtaining these records under the current law and in the rare, truly emergency situation, the law posed no undue burden.  I have found that complying with the requirements to obtain records in a non-emergency situation actually helped me build stronger cases because, by following the rules, the evidence was unassailable in court.  Unfortunately, too many of my colleagues, for whatever reason, would try to take the shortcuts that the new law would encourage. 

Changing the emergency exception law is unnecessary.  The law permits providers to disclose private communications to the government whenever they have a good-faith belief that such disclosure is required to respond to an emergency.  Furthermore, emergency exceptions are quite uncommon.  For example, in 2014 Google received only 342 emergency requests, compared to 20,280 subpoenas and search warrants, and information was provided in response to the vast majority of those emergency requests.  If a provider finds a problem with the request, law enforcement can always revise it to address concerns.

As we've discussed, back in April the House voted unanimously to fix ECPA. And while the Senate has dragged its feet until now, it's disappointing to see Senators like Sessions and Cornyn now try to attach dangerous amendments to ECPA reform that basically destroy whatever good that is in there. Both of those Senators should be ashamed -- and their colleagues should reject these proposals.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, ecpa, ecpa reform, emergencies, jeff sessions, warrants

4th Circuit Appeals Court Rolls Back Its Warrant Requirement For Cell Site Location Info

from the the-'summer-of-the-Fourth-Amendment'-is-so-last-year dept

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was one of the few appeals courts to rule on the constitutionality of obtaining cell site location info without a warrant. And it was -- was -- the only appeals court to find warrantless access violated the Fourth Amendment. The decision was limited to the collection of historical cell site data for extended periods of time (the court appeared to believe anything beyond two weeks was questionable), mainly because there was a good chance the records would contain considerable detail about a person's movements in private places.

The government immediately requested an en banc hearing by the Appeals Court. The hearing was granted and the court has patched up its split with the other circuits by finding in favor of the government and the Third Party Doctrine. [PDF link]

We now hold that the Government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from Defendants’ cell phone provider did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Supreme Court precedent mandates this conclusion. For the Court has long held that an individual enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection “in information he voluntarily turns over to [a] third part[y].” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). This rule -- the third-party doctrine -- applies even when “the information is revealed” to a third party, as it assertedly was here, “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).

All of our sister circuits to have considered the question have held, as we do today, that the government does not violate the Fourth Amendment when it obtains historical CSLI from a service provider without a warrant. In addition to disregarding precedent, Defendants’ contrary arguments misunderstand the nature of CSLI, improperly attempt to redefine the third-party doctrine, and blur the critical distinction between content and non-content information.

The Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate, the third-party doctrine. Congress may act to require a warrant for CSLI. But without a change in controlling law, we cannot conclude that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.

The nod to 1979's Smith v. Maryland is back in place, setting this decision firmly in Third Party Doctrine territory. If it's "voluntarily conveyed" to a third party, the government doesn't need a warrant to access it. The key, though, is the "voluntary" part. While the majority finds the collection of cell site location data by service providers to be somehow a "voluntary" conveyance by customers, the three dissenting judges aren't as impressed by this argument.

The dissenting opinion (starting at p. 47) goes through the majority decision's citations and sees a whole lot more voluntary effort being made by citizens than what happens during the automatic acquisition of cell site info by phone companies.

The Supreme Court, then, has intentionally employed the “voluntary conveyance” concept in every relevant case to limit the reach of an otherwise sweeping per se rule that denies Fourth Amendment protection. It seems therefore crucial here to ask: what, precisely, did the Court mean when it chose those words, in the context of those cases?

Here is what those various defendants actually did to “voluntarily convey” information. One used his finger to dial, one by one, the numerical digits of a telephone number. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (highlighting that pen registers disclose “only the telephone numbers that have been dialed” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977))). Another submitted multiple checks and deposit slips—each presumably bearing a date, a dollar amount, a recipient name, and a personal signature. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. The others actually spoke. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47 (conversations with a bugged government informant related to narcotics transactions); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296 (statements to an associate “disclosing endeavors to bribe [jury] members”); Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 (conversations with an undercover law enforcement agent in the course of executing a narcotics sale).

In all of these cases—the only cases that can bind us here— “voluntary conveyance” meant at least two things. First, it meant that the defendant knew he was communicating particular information. We can easily assume Miller knew how much money he was depositing, that Smith knew the numbers he was dialing, and that Hoffa, Lewis, and White knew about the misconduct they verbally described to another.

Second, “voluntary conveyance” meant that the defendant had acted in some way to submit the particular information he knew. Crucially, there was an action—depositing, dialing, speaking— corresponding to each piece of submitted information. And where many data pieces were compiled into records—financial records in Miller, phone records in Smith—there was presumptively a discrete action behind each piece of data. The Court never suggested that the simple act of signing up for a bank account, or a phone line, was enough to willingly turn over thousands of pages of personal data.

The dissent goes on to point out that CSLI -- unlike other "voluntarily conveyed" third-party records -- isn't even made available to the customers that generate it. Customers have access to call records, bank statements, and other information collected under the Third Party Doctrine, but there's no easily-accessible way for citizens to view the location records they're conveniently generating for the government. This lack of access to information strongly suggests the collection of cell site location data by phone companies has nothing to do with voluntary conveyance.

The majority believes that if a "fix" is required, it should be left to legislators.

The legislative branch is far better positioned to respond to changes in technology than are the courts.

This is said with a straight face before using the Electronic Communications Privacy Act as an example of legislators' prowess: a law gives the government access to the contents of any electronic communications older than 180 days -- and which has yet to be updated in any serious form by legislators over the past 30 years, even as the tech landscape surrounding it has experienced monumental changes.

The majority maintains Congress "has not been asleep at the switch" since the ECPA's institution. And it's somewhat correct. Attempts have been made to rewrite the law in reaction to the explosion of electronic communications since the mid-80s, but forward motion has been stalled by government agencies unwilling to cede ground to shifting expectations of privacy. So, yes, Congress can fix it, but it needs to run a gauntlet of agencies it's in no hurry to anger and administrations that overwhelmingly oppose any minimal contractions of government reach or power. And if Congress hasn't made any significant progress towards trimming back the Third Party Doctrine's overgrowth since 1979's Smith v. Maryland decision, it's tough to believe that this is the decade where it will finally make its move.

Filed Under: 3rd party doctrine, 4th amendment, cell site location info, csli, location, privacy, warrants

Senate Intelligence Committee Expands FBI NSL Powers With Secret Amendment To Secret Intelligence Bill

from the you'll-find-out-about-the-additions-when-you're-told-you-can't-talk dept

The annual intelligence authorization is under way, with the Senate deciding how much money the nation's spy agencies will receive next year, along with anything else they can slip in while no one's looking. The entire discussion takes place behind closed doors, so there's very little stopping the Intelligence Committee's many surveillance fans from amending the bill to increase intelligence agencies' powers.

Fortunately, there's still one person on the inside who continues to perform his oversight duties.

A provision snuck into the still-secret text of the Senate’s annual intelligence authorization would give the FBI the ability to demand individuals’ email data and possibly web-surfing history from their service providers without a warrant and in complete secrecy.

If passed, the change would expand the reach of the FBI’s already highly controversial national security letters.

[...]

The spy bill passed the Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday, with the provision in it. The lone no vote came from Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., who wrote in a statement that one of the bill’s provisions “would allow any FBI field office to demand email records without a court order, a major expansion of federal surveillance powers.”

Wyden did not disclose exactly what the provision would allow, but his spokesperson suggested it might go beyond email records to things like web-surfing histories and other information about online behavior. “Senator Wyden is concerned it could be read that way,” Keith Chu said.

The FBI's history of abusing NSLs is well-documented. These letters allow the agency to route around judicial oversight by chanting "national security" while composing their requests. (Bonus feature: recipients are forbidden from talking about them... indefinitely.) Increasing the FBI's access with no corresponding increase in oversight is definitely not a good idea, considering it has never shown interest in self-restraint.

The FBI historically has not had access to email records via NSLs, although it did spend several years doing exactly that before being shut down by the DOJ. It obviously wants that access again and FBI Director James Comey claims the only thing standing between it and the access it always thought it had is a "typo."

If this secret amendment passes along with the authorization bill, it would weaken attempts to reform the ECPA -- the 1986 law that gives the government warrantless access to emails and other online documents more than 180 days old. But rather than fix the Senate intelligence authorization bill, legislators are looking to carve a hole in the recently (and unanimously) passed Email Privacy Act.

Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, is expected to offer an amendment that would mirror the provision in the intelligence bill.

Privacy advocates warn that adding it to the broadly supported reform effort would backfire.

“If [the provision] is added to ECPA, it’ll kill the bill,” Gabe Rottman, deputy director of the Center for Democracy and Technology’s freedom, security, and technology project, wrote in an email to The Intercept. “If it passes independently, it’ll create a gaping loophole. Either way, it’s a big problem and a massive expansion of government surveillance authority.”

The FBI should be sending out fruit baskets to the Senate Intelligence Committee for both expanding its surveillance reach and undercutting a much-needed reform effort. Secret laws made by secretive committees during closed-doors sessions doesn't seem very "American," but much like the super-secretive NSLs the FBI loves so much, the routine invocation of "national security" tends to ward off the scrutiny this process desperately needs.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, appropriations, ecpa, ecpa reform, fbi, national security letters, nsls, senate intelligence committee, surveillance, warrants