A lawsuit filed against President Trump alleges a host of First Amendment violations stemming from Trump's Twitter blocklist. According to the suit filed by the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, an official government account shouldn't be allowed to block users from reading tweets. Sure, there's an actual official presidential Twitter account, but nothing of interest happens there. Everything from retweets of questionable GIFs to arguable threats of nuclear war happen at Donald Trump's personal account. But everything's all mixed together because the president insists on using his personal account (and its blocklist) to communicate a majority of his thoughts and opinions.
The government's lawyers are now forced to defend the president (and his blocklist) from these allegations. It's not an easy job. In fact, as Alison Frankel reports, it requires a significant amount of cognitive dissonance.
First, the government has argued the Twitter account President Trump uses most is not a publicly-owned (read: government) Twitter account.
The brief’s primary argument is that @realdonaldtrump is not a public forum. It’s a private platform governed by the rules of a private company, the Justice Department said. The president opened his account before he was an elected official, the brief said, and his continued operation of the account is not a right conferred by his election to the presidency. “The president does not operate his personal Twitter account by virtue of federal law, nor is blocking made possible because the President is clothed in Article II powers,” the brief said.
This makes some sense, even if Trump's use of this account to announce positions on issues and potential government action undermine the "not a public forum" argument. He did have this account prior to the presidency, but perhaps he should have abandoned it for the official presidential account once he took office. Even though this argument is somewhat credible, the next argument from the government almost completely undermines it.
President Trump, in other words, is not flexing his presidential power when he tweets as @realdonaldtrump, according to the Justice Department. But at the same time, Justice argued in the summary judgment brief, the president can’t be sued for posting to his private account because he’s acting as the president.
He's not the president (so to speak) when he tweets from his personal account. But he is the president, so he can't be sued. No matter how many accounts he blocks. The president, according to White House counsel, is able to occupy two states simultaneously thanks to the magical powers of Twitter.
It sounds ridiculous (and it is), but as Frankel points out, seemingly contradictory arguments are made all the time at this point in the pleadings. The judge is one that decides which arguments move forward -- sometimes even without calling out lawyers for arguing against their own arguments.
Stripping the case of all legalese, the account Trump prefers to use should be considered an official account. And if it's an official account, Trump needs to lay off the "block" button. You can't force citizens to jump through hoops to view proclamations made in a de facto public square. Even if Trump can't be sued, he should at least lift the blocks. It's not very presidential to pointedly lock certain people out of public discussions.
By now, you've almost certainly heard about President Trump's multiple tweet attack on NBC for having a story he didn't like. A few times, Trump has suggested that NBC should "lose its license" because he doesn't like the company's reporting.
Separately, he said during a press conference the rather insane comment: "It's frankly disgusting the way the press is able to write whatever they want to write, and people should look into it." Again, the First Amendment is a big part of why the press is allowed to write whatever they want to write.
As plenty of people have pointed out -- including FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel -- this is not how it works... on multiple levels. First of all, NBC doesn't have a license that can be revoked. Local affiliates have the licenses, but that's different -- and those licenses are effectively impossible to revokebecause the system was set up to avoid situations like a President trying to censor a TV news station.
But there are some much larger issues here, and a big one is that merely having the President threaten to punish a news organization itself may very well be a First Amendment violation. Now, some people will argue that Trump has his own First Amendment rights to whine about anyone he wants... but courts have already noted that if done as part of their role as a government official, that power is limited. Back in 2015, for example, we wrote about a fantastic 7th Circuit ruling by Judge Richard Posner in which he slammed Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart for using his position to threaten payment companies into not working with Backpage.com.
Posner lays out, in great detail, how a government official, making threats, can violate the First Amendment.
“The fact that a public-official defendant lacks direct regulatory or decisionmaking authority over a plaintiff, or a third party that is publishing or otherwise disseminating the plaintiff’s message, is not necessarily dispositive .... What matters is the distinction between attempts to convince and attempts to coerce. A public-official defendant who threatens to employ coercive state power to stifle protected speech violates a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, regardless of whether the threatened punishment comes in the form of the use (or, misuse) of the defendant’s direct regulatory or decisionmaking authority over the plaintiff, or in some less-direct form.”
And this:
The First Amendment forbids a public official to attempt to suppress the protected speech of private persons by threatening that legal sanctions will at his urging be imposed unless there is compliance with his demands....
Posner also dispenses with the argument that a person is free to say what he wants here, noting that when he speaks, he's using his position in the government to enforce silencing of speech.
As a citizen or father, or in any other private capacity, Sheriff Dart can denounce Backpage to his heart’s content. He is in good company; many people are disturbed or revolted by the kind of sex ads found on Backpage’s website. And even in his official capacity the sheriff can express his distaste for Backpage and its look-alikes; that is, he can exercise what is called “[freedom of] government speech.”... A government entity, including therefore the Cook County Sheriff’s Office, is entitled to say what it wants to say—but only within limits. It is not permitted to employ threats to squelch the free speech of private citizens. “[A] government’s ability to express itself is [not] without restriction. … [T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government’s speech.”
And to make the point even clearer on where the line is drawn:
Sheriff Dart has a First Amendment right to publicly criticize the credit card companies for any connection to illegal activity, as long as he stops short of threats”
Trump has complained about news stations in the past -- and that's his right. But when he threatens to silence them by pulling their license (even if that's impossible) he is now directly using the power of government to threaten someone for protected expression. That's... violating the Constitution that the President has taken an oath to uphold.
Of course, that's just a recent 7th Circuit ruling. There are other circuits with similar rulings, such as the 2nd Circuit's Okwedy v. Molinari case, in which the court found that Staten Island Borough President sent a letter to a billboard company to complain about some billboards with anti-gay bible verses. In that case, amazingly, there wasn't even a real threat of action -- just a letter which called the billboards "unnecessarily confrontational and offensive" and said that "this message conveys an atmosphere of intolerance which is not welcome in the Borough." There was no direct legal threat, even, just a request to discuss and to act "as a responsible member of the business community." In that case, the court found that even without the explicit threat, it was a First Amendment violation:
Thus, the fact that a public-official defendant lacks direct regulatory or decisionmaking authority over a plaintiff, or a third party that is publishing or otherwise disseminating the plaintiff's message, is not necessarily dispositive in a case such as this. What matters is the distinction between attempts to convince and attempts to coerce. A public-official defendant who threatens to employ coercive state power to stifle protected speech violates a plaintiff's First Amendment rights, regardless of whether the threatened punishment comes in the form of the use (or, misuse) of the defendant's direct regulatory or decisionmaking authority over the plaintiff, or in some less-direct form.
That could certainly apply to Trump's statements.
There are some Supreme Court cases that are on point as well. The most famous is the classic 1963 free speech case Bantam Books v. Sullivan. In that case, the Supreme Court found that a Rhode Island commission focused on stamping out obscene/indecent/impure images and language in publications was unconstitutional. The Commission didn't have the direct power to censor -- but rather would create lists of items the majority of the Commissioners deemed objectionable, and then (1) notify the publisher, (2) notify retailers and (3) pass along a recommendation of prosecution. The state argued that since there was no direct power to censor, there was no First Amendment violation. The court disagreed, noting that mere intimidation was violating the First Amendment rights of the publishers.
It is true, as noted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, that Silverstein was "free" to ignore the Commission's notices, in the sense that his refusal to "cooperate" would have violated no law. But it was found as a fact—and the finding, being amply supported by the record, binds us— that Silverstein's compliance with the Commission's directives was not voluntary. People do not lightly disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not come around, and Silverstein's reaction, according to uncontroverted testimony, was no exception to this general rule. The Commission's notices, phrased virtually as orders, reasonably understood to be such by the distributor, invariably followed up by police visitations, in fact stopped the circulation of the listed publications ex proprio vigore. It would be naive to credit the State's assertion that these blacklists are in the nature of mere legal advice, when they plainly serve as instruments of regulation independent of the laws against obscenity
In short, there's a pretty broad range of case law both at the appeals court level and at the Supreme Court saying that merely threatening action to suppress protected speech is, in fact, a First Amendment violation. Would NBC actually have the guts to sue over this? That's much harder to say -- but it sure would make for an interesting case.
As you will recall, the trademark dispute between the San Diego Comic Convention and the Salt Lake Comic Con is now in full swing. Thus far, the action has been somewhat strange, with the SLCC getting some pushback from the court based on what looks to be a flipflopping of exactly what defense it is claiming. That flipflopping has mostly amounted to varied claims by SLCC, run by Dan Farr Productions, that San Diego Comicon trademark for "comicon" was either generic at the time it was granted the mark or has become generic since being granted the mark. Due to that, Judge Anthony Battaglia has allowed the jury trial to move forward instead of issuing a judgment. But before he did so, Battaglia also issued a somewhat strange gag order on the Salt Lake Comic Con, prohibiting it from putting information about the case on its website, engaging the press regarding the trial, and even requiring Dan Farr Productions to put a disclaimer on its website about the injunction. At the time, we wrote that the gag order seemed strange and likely a violation of First Amendment rights.
In a writ petition to the 9th Circuit, they suggest that the trial judge's suppression orders be vacated as unconstitutionally vague and coercive. They doubt that the pool of potential jurors in the San Diego area is truly being unduly influenced, and in any event, they argue the judge's gag order is tantamount to a prior restraint in contradiction of the right to free speech.
"Without more, the nearness of trial weighs at least as heavily against prior restraints as in favor, because that is 'the precise time when public interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at its height' and '[n]o suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech...bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression,'" states the petition. "To conclude otherwise — to allow the nearness of trial, of itself, to justify prior restraints — would be to countenance '[a]n endless series of moratoria on public discussion' about first one case and then another, as they work their way through the system and near trial, which 'could hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgment of freedom of expression.'”
In the petition, embedded below, the attorneys go on to point out that this kind of prior restraint on factual information about a case is without precedent. In addition, the requirement to put the disclaimer on their website is argued to put the SLCC in the position of either putting the disclaimer on the site and appearing to bow down before the court's infringement of its speech, or not putting the disclaimer up at all and therefore being unable to inform readers of the site of the infringement of its speech. Either way, through the prior restraint gag order issued by the court, the Salt Lake Comic Con is left unable to simply explain its side of the case.
Fortunately, it looks like the 9th Circuit is more than a bit interested in hashing this out.
A panel of judges say, in a short order issued Tuesday, the petition "raises issues that warrant an answer" and that San Diego Comic-Con has until noon Friday to file an answer. Additionally, in an extremely unusual move, the appellate court is also allowing Judge Battaglia an opportunity to address the petition.
I have to say, being able to hear Judge Battaglia explain his response to the petition will be quite interesting. I'm struggling to come up with what he might say beyond repeating the questionable concerns about jury tampering that might actually move the needle on the gag order being anything other than questionable at best.
So you may have noticed this already, but giant telecom conglomerates don't much like having to upgrade their networks, especially in lower ROI areas. And while that's understandable from a purely-financial perspective, this practice is creating some major, notable broadband deployment holes where poor people tend to live. With telcos specifically refusing to upgrade lagging DSL networks at any real scale, that's also creating an emboldened cable broadband monopoly in many areas. That by proxy keeps prices high, speeds low, and allows the introduction of things like bullshit usage caps and overage fees.
By and large, localized efforts to do something about this generally run face-first into brick walls, thanks in large part to the almost comical stranglehold most ISPs have over state legislatures and regional telecom regulators. In many instances this culminates in ISPs not only refusing to expand their networks into under-served areas, but quite literally writing protectionist state laws to make sure nobody else can, either. This cake and eat it too mentality persists in countless states that have prioritized campaign contributions from the likes of AT&T and Comcast over the general welfare of their public constituents.
Despite the broadband industry consistently whining about "burdensome regulation," the reality is there's little to nothing passing for real oversight in many of these areas, and the regulation that is written -- is often focused primarily on protecting these duopolies' uncompetitive geographical fiefdoms. In Vermont, the Vermont Public Utility Commission (VPUC) recently tried to buck this trend by including provisions in Comcast's 11 year permit (pdf) with the state requiring it to not only retain public access programming in the state, but expand "no less than" 550 miles of additional cable into under-served Vermont communities over 11 years.
The VPUC claimed that it could impose the blanket 550-mile line extension mandate on Comcast because it is the "largest" cable operator in Vermont and can afford it. These discriminatory conditions contravene federal and state law, amount to undue speaker-based burdens on Comcast's protected speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution... and deprive Comcast and its subscribers of the benefits of Vermont law enjoyed by other cable operators and their subscribers without a just and rational basis, in violation of the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.
ISPs love to trot out the First Amendment complaint wherever and whenever possible, similarly insisting that net neutrality protections somehow curtail their free speech rights (arguments that traditionally don't see much traction in the courts). But Comcast is also busy telling local Vermont news outlets that it's spending money on lawyers instead of more cable because it's just really worried about how much Vermont residents pay for broadband and TV service:
Comcast declined to talk about the case. But in a written statement company spokeswoman Kristen Roberts said the new state permit would, "cost millions of dollars, place discriminatory burdens on Comcast and its customers, and arbitrarily increase their costs for cable service.
While that's very sweet of Comcast, the fact is that Comcast enjoys an effective monopoly over broadband in countless areas; the closest it comes to competition in Vermont being a relatively pathetic telco by the name of Fairpoint Communications. Fairpoint acquired Verizon's unwanted DSL networks in the state several years back, bungled the acquisition, stumbled into bankruptcy, and struggles to offer 3 to 6 Mbps DSL across wide swaths of the state. This is, again, thanks to a generation of lawmakers and regulators that have effectively allowed giant duopolists to write state (and often federal) telecom law.
In a working, competitive market, Comcast wouldn't need to be prodded and cajoled by the state to actually upgrade and expand its network. But there's simply no organic market pressure forcing Comcast's hand because the U.S. telecom market is painfully, obviously broken. As a result, there has been a growing push to explore more creative public/private partnerships to help bring connectivity to long-neglected areas. But Comcast consistently supports laws hamstringing those efforts too, allowing Comcast to have its cake (not deploy broadband) and eat it too (erecting regulatory barriers preventing others from doing so either).
Because ageism is allegedly rampant in Hollywood, California legislators have decided to address the problem head on not at all. Instead of enforcing on-the-books laws against employment discrimination, the legislature -- backed by the Screen Actors Guild -- has decided some of the First Amendment has to go. It has crafted a new law to fight ageism in Hollywood studios… by targeting a popular movie database. In California, A + B = WTF.
The law -- currently blocked by an injunction -- forbids third-party sites with paid subscribers from publishing certain facts about actors and actresses. The only fact at issue is their age. And, despite lawmakers pretending the stupid, unconstitutional law targets a variety of websites, it's really only having an effect on one: IMDb.
This failure of a law stems from a failure of a lawsuit brought by actress Junie Hoang, who blamed her lack of starring roles on IMDb publishing her real age. She wanted $1 million in damages, apparently expecting IMDb to subsidize her next 500 years of denied acting opportunities. (Discovery during the suit revealed Hoang made less than $2000/year from acting.)
The Fail Train rolls on with the Screen Actors Guild offering its full-throated approval of First Amendment limitations, as Elizabeth Nolan Brown reports.
In its own motion, SAG-AFTRA complained that IMDB "contends it has an absolute First Amendment right to disseminate the ages of everyone in Hollywood, consequences be damned, and no matter how much or little value such expression has in the marketplace of ideas." But "so long as the communication of the age of persons in the entertainment industry writ large facilitates illegal age discrimination, such expression may be regulated consistent with the First Amendment even though specific communications might not be discriminatory."
Note that the Actors Guild doesn't claim that IMDb publishes age information that's false, nor that it publishes true information obtained in an illegal manner. Rather SAG-AFTRA asserts that IMDb somehow has a legal responsibility to help actors obtain work by concealing their ages; that the state has the ability to judge what kinds of content have "value" in the "marketplace of ideas"; and that information of "little value" can be banned.
The motion is filled with terrible arguments. But considering its conceit, where else could it go? When you start with the premise the best fix for ageism at movie studios is targeting a third-party website, there's really no room for logic or coherent arguments. Add to that the fact that actors are actively calling for free speech restrictions, and you've got an elliptical mess on your hands -- one that makes the argument the state can be trusted to determine what speech has "value."
SAG's opening salvo names and shames the real parties responsible for ageism…
Plaintiff's website publishes everyone's age regardless of whether it is relevant to any public issue at all, and does so without any comment or context. This is not an invitation to public debate. Rather, it is an open invitation for casting directors to engage in illegally discriminatory conduct…
...before moving on to spend the rest of the brief arguing that its IMDb's fault casting directors engage in illegal discriminatory conduct.
As set forth in the Declaration of Marilyn Szatmary filed concurrently herewith, there is massive age discrimination in the entertainment industry and IMDb.com facilitates that discrimination as the go-to website for casting decisions.
Publishing ages doesn't "facilitate discrimination." Nothing forces studios to participate in discriminatory hiring practices… at least nothing outside the studios themselves. Other sites without paid subscribers are still free to publish actors' ages. At least with IMDb, paid subscribers can ask to have this information removed. Other sites not targeted by this legislation (which, in reality, is every other site but IMDb) have no obligation to remove factual information from their sites.
The brief does nothing to convince anyone the law is Constitutional. All it does is make it clear SAG would rather bite the hand that feeds info to studios than the hand that feeds its members acting jobs. It's bad legislation lawmakers allowed themselves to be talked into and it should be struck down permanently by the time this is all said and done. SAG's support for the blocked bill is intellectually dishonest. The problem lies in the studios, not outside websites, no matter how much studios may rely on IMDb to do its hiring homework for them.
Utah and Idaho -- two states with more in common than a border -- have been enforcing First Amendment-trampling liquor laws preventing adults viewing certain films from enjoying adult beverages while doing so. I'm not talking about porn theaters, although the use of the word "adult" certainly leads the mind in that direction. No, I'm talking about regular, old-fashioned R-rated films no one really has much objection to adults viewing, even those who often object to adults viewing films rated X and up.
In a clear waste of public funds and law enforcement resources, officers are sneaking off to R-rated films at movie houses serving alcohol in hopes of catching them engaged in double-devilry. The movie houses have been fighting back, noting (in lawsuit form) the enforced laws are unconstitutional and inconsistently enforced. Theaters in Utah and Idaho could expect visits from undercover prudes for films like "50 Shades of Grey" and, apparently, "Deadpool."
Theaters in both states sued their respective state alcohol boards. Brewvies -- the theater suing the state of Utah -- has been handed a win. Elizabeth Nolan Brown reports on the federal court's decision in the delightfully-titled article "First Amendment Protects Cinema's Right to Show Unicorn Masturbation Scene While Serving Alcohol, Says Judge."
A Utah movie theater that dared to serve alcohol during a sexually explicit movie has won its legal battle against the state's Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC).
"The State has violated the First Amendment by bringing an administrative enforcement action against a mainstream motion picture theater showing an R-rated movie," U.S. District Judge David Nuffer wrote for the court Thursday.
The decision [PDF] details a lot of the backstory, which includes state officials singling out Brewvies to score cheap wins for the state alcohol board. It also shows the state, after harassing Brewvies multiple times, suggesting it could preview all movies before showing (the court calls this "untenable"), alter the movies it shows to edit out "obscene" content (forbidden by contracts with motion picture studios), or just stop serving alcohol (lose a great deal of its profits).
It also shows an attorney at the state's attorney's office was the source of the sole complaint against Brewvies' showing of Deadpool -- the end result of which was even more harassment of the theater and, consequently, this lawsuit.
Between February 12, 2016, and March 24, 2016, Brewvies showed the movie Deadpool on one of its screens. A friend of Sheila Page, the attorney at the Attorney General’s Office who represents the DABC in enforcement proceedings, mentioned to Ms. Page that Brewvies was showing Deadpool. Once Ms. Page received the information from her friend, she sent an email to Defendant Margaret Hardie, who has been the DABC Compliance Officer assigned to Brewvies since 2014. In her email to Ms. Hardie, dated February 22, 2016, Ms. Page wrote: “I hate to bring this up, but it is just too blatant to ignore. Brewvies is showing Deadpool. The reviews describe explicit sex scenes and male and female frontal nudity. I know some people who have seen it, and they confirm that it is very raunchy amid the bloody violence. Perhaps you should refer it to [the State Bureau of Investigation].” That email, which was the only complaint received by the DABC about Brewvies showing Deadpool, triggered a referral to the State Bureau of Investigation.
Undercover officers were sent to "investigate." It would have been cheaper to keep them home. All three had already seen the movie, one of them multiple times. But their attendance generated an inadvertently-hilarious report on all the naughtiness contained in Deadpool... and gave Brown's article its unforgettable title.
Officer Bullock’s report describes certain scenes of the movie in terms of the prohibitions of Subsection 7. For instance, he states that the male and female characters were “shown numerous times engaging in acts or simulated acts of sexual intercourse” and that the male character “is shown on his back under bed sheets briefly engaged in masturbation or simulated masturbation using a stuffed unicorn toy.” He also describes a scene where the woman was wearing a leather bikini, with an imagined strap-on penis “that isn’t shown,” and “has her groin area pressed against the man’s posterior,” and she tells him to relax as he is sweating and grimacing. She then bends down and says, “Happy Women’s Rights Day” during what Officer Bullock calls “the sodomy or simulated sodomy scene.”
Officer Bullock also says that during one sex scene, the male character fondled the woman’s bare breasts and, finally, during the credits, Officer Bullock describes “a drawing of the main character (male) . . . ‘as he rides on the back of a unicorn, he rubs its horn briefly until the horn shoots out rainbows (simulating orgasm).”
Officer Bullock (along with Officer Cannon -- Utah's pro prudes seem to have the porniest of surnames…) presented their "findings" and the state went to work getting itself sued. In the end, it's the state hearing a judge whisper "It's First Amendment Day every day!" in its ear as it drives its point home.
The State offered only one governmental interest in support of Section 7’s restrictions: avoiding potential negative secondary effects from combining sexually explicit images with alcohol. Though this may be a compelling governmental interest, Section 7 is not the least restrictive means for accomplishing it.
Section 7 is overinclusive. A statute is overinclusive, and thus facially invalid, if there is a showing that the “law punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” If the statute is found to be overinclusive it will “invalidate all enforcement of that law, until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.”
Section 7 is overinclusive because it captures mainstream content.
The court continues, pointing out how the state's alcohol regulations serve to unconstitutionally regulate speech, a definite forbidden (government) act.
Section 7 reaches “many films that are far removed from what is colloquially termed ‘hard core,’ or even ‘soft core,’ pornography.” The State admits this. It makes no contention that Deadpool is pornography. The State only argues that by analogy short portions of Deadpool are like the films typically found in an adult theater.
Unlike the statute in Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, no language limits Section 7’s application to those businesses that are characterized by regularly showing sexually explicit material, who make that their essential nature. The State has violated the First Amendment by bringing an administrative enforcement action against a mainstream motion picture theater showing an R-rated movie. That demonstrates the breadth of Section 7’s reach. Section 7’s restrictions impose unacceptable limitations on speech that the State admits should be accorded full First Amendment protection.
State booze regulators will have to go back to the drawing board. The statute needs to be severely narrowed before it can be considered constitutional. Undercover officers Bullock and Cannon will have to start watching R-rated movies on their own time, on their own dime, and presumably without a notebook in one hand and a hard on for free speech oppression in the other.
When faced with First Amendment activity they don't care for, some legislators attempt to gerrymander this right until it only contains the speech they like. This can take the form of cyberbullying bills, hate speech legislation, and, lately, anti-protesting laws.
The problem with these efforts is they routinely run afoul of the Constitution. Some do better than others trying to stay within the confines of what can actually be controlled by the government, but in most cases, the proposed laws are badly-written rush jobs attempting to paper over the current issue du jour.
Another anti-protesting law is in the works, prompted by oil pipeline demonstrations both in North Dakota and, closer to home, in the district of the state rep introducing the bill, Scott Martin of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.
Under the terms of the bill, “a person is responsible for public safety response costs incurred by a State agency or political subdivision as a result of the State agency’s or political subdivision’s response to a demonstration if, in connection with the demonstration, the person is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor offense.”
In other words, they could be on the hook for costs, such as police overtime, medical or emergency response, or other basic public services associated with protests. Whatever felony or misdemeanor offense the protester was convicted of would come with its own independent penalty.
Because the state's laws concerning damage to property and the usual assortment of rioting-related charges apparently isn't enough to deter people from complaining about stuff in Martin's district, a new law must be put in place to hold demonstrators responsible for the actions of others, as well as anything the state might want to add to the final post-protest invoice.
The bill cites -- in support of its First Amendment-chilling efforts -- the millions of dollars spent by government agencies in response to the Dakota Pipeline protests. It's a slick move, one that might convince more bottom-line-oriented legislators to hop aboard despite the obvious Constitutional implications.
In practice, this law could saddle someone picked up during a protest for blocking a sidewalk (a misdemeanor) with a sizable chunk of the costs incurred by the government during the protest. This will discourage most people from showing support for any controversial cause or, indeed, for any cause at all. Any protest of any size will result in additional expenditures by government agencies, all of which can now be passed on directly to the protest's participants.
And it won't be spread evenly among participants. The costs will be borne only by those arrested, which creates an incentive to arrest as many protesters as possible to offset projected expenses. This, in turn, will push prosecutors towards ensuring even the most bullshittiest of charges sticks, as they'll have to answer to lawmakers waving ledger books filled with red ink if they don't.
Sure, this bill won't survive a Constitutional challenge, but someone's going to have to spend their own money to correct the Pennsylvania government's error. Hopefully, the bill will get laughed out of the legislature immediately -- especially since Rep. Martin's intentions may be less than honorable.
DeSmog Blog notes that Martin has close ties to pipeline lobbyists. Prior to joining the Pennsylvania Senate, Martin worked for a firm called Community Networking Strategies. CNS is a subsidiary of the lobbying firm, McNees, Wallace & Nurick — which lobbies for Gulf Oil Ltd, Industrial Energy Consumers of Pennsylvania, and Sunoco Logistics.
If it does somehow become law, it will be a statewide embarrassment and a vehicle for government abuse. And it will give the state the ability to rob Peter twice to pay Officer Paul's protest-related overtime.
As you likely know, for most of the past nine months, we've been dealing with a defamation lawsuit from Shiva Ayyadurai, who claims to have invented email. This is a claim that we have disputed at great length and in great detail, showing how email existed long before Ayyadurai wrote his program. We pointed to the well documented public history of email, and how basically all of the components that Ayyadurai now claims credit for preceded his own work. We discussed how his arguments were, at best, misleading, such as arguing that the copyright on his program proved that he was the "inventor of email" -- since patents and copyrights are very different, and just because Microsoft has a copyright on "Windows" it does not mean it "invented" the concept of a windowed graphical user interface (because it did not). As I have said, a case like this is extremely draining -- especially on an emotional level -- and can create massive chilling effects on free speech.
A few hours ago, the judge ruled and we prevailed. The case has been dismissed and the judge rejected Ayyadurai's request to file an amended complaint. We are certainly pleased with the decision and his analysis, which notes over and over again that everything that we stated was clearly protected speech, and the defamation (and other claims) had no merit. This is, clearly, a big win for the First Amendment and free speech -- especially the right to call out and criticize a public figure such as Shiva Ayyadurai, who is now running for the US Senate in Massachusetts. We're further happy to see the judge affirm that CDA Section 230 protects us from being sued over comments made on the blog, which cannot be attributed to us under the law. We talk a lot about the importance of CDA 230, in part because it protects sites like our own from these kinds of lawsuits. This is just one more reason we're so concerned about the latest attempt in Congress to undermine CDA 230. While those supporting the bill may claim that it only targets sites like Backpage, such changes to CDA 230 could have a much bigger impact on smaller sites like our own.
We are disappointed, however, that the judge denied our separate motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP law. For years, we've discussed the importance of strong anti-SLAPP laws that protect individuals and sites from going through costly legal battles. Good anti-SLAPP laws do two things: they stop lawsuits early and they make those who bring SLAPP suits -- that is, lawsuits clearly designed to silence protected speech -- pay the legal fees. The question in this case was whether or not California's anti-SLAPP law should apply to a case brought in Massachusetts. While other courts have said that the state of the speaker should determine which anti-SLAPP laws are applied (even in other states' courts), it was an issue that had not yet been ruled upon in the First Circuit where this case was heard. While we're happy with the overall dismissal and the strong language used to support our free speech rights, we're nevertheless disappointed that the judge chose not to apply California's anti-SLAPP law here.
However, that just reinforces the argument we've been making for years: we need stronger anti-SLAPP laws in many states (including Massachusetts) and, even more importantly, we need a strong federal anti-SLAPP law to protect against frivolous lawsuits designed to silence protected speech. The results of this case have only strengthened our resolve to do everything possible to continue to fight hard for protecting freedom of expression and to push for stronger anti-SLAPP laws that make free speech possible, and not burdensome and expensive.
You have not heard the last from us on the issue of the First Amendment, free speech and anti-SLAPP laws -- or how some try to use the court system to silence and bully critics. Step one of this is our new Free Speech edition, which we announced just a few weeks ago, where we are focusing more of our reporting efforts on issues related to free speech and anti-SLAPP. We intend to do a lot more as well. For years, we've talked about these issues from the position of an observer, and now we can talk about them from the perspective of someone who has gone through this process as well.
Of course, if you have to face something like this, it helps to have great lawyers--and we're immensely grateful for the incredible hard-work of Rob Bertsche, Jeff Pyle and Thomas Sutcliffe along with the rest of the team at their firm, Prince Lobel Tye LLP.
Finally, I can't even begin to thank everyone who has supported us over the past nine months -- whether by kind words (you don't know how much that helped!) or through our survival fund at ISupportJournalism.com or by becoming a Techdirt Insider. We just passed Techdirt's 20th anniversary and while it's one thing to think that people like and support you, it's another thing altogether to see how people come out to support you when it matters most. And we were overwhelmed by the support we received over the past nine months, and the kind words and help that many, many people offered. It was beyond heartening, and, once again, it reinforces our resolve to continue to speak up for free speech and to do what we can to protect others' ability to speak out as well.
Members of a New York "Black Lives Matter" group are suing the town of Clarkstown and its police department over illegal surveillance. The plaintiffs allege they were placed under surveillance by the Clarkstown PD's Strategic Intelligence Unit (SIU) for a number of reasons, none of which were legal uses of the agency's spy wares.
It would seem the lawsuit [PDF] has a good chance of paying off. Allegations of racial profiling and illegally surveilling citizens for their First Amendment activities are backed by the results of investigations and one police official's own admissions.
A letter to the US Attorney's office in New York, attached as an exhibit, bolsters the claims made in the BLM lawsuit. In it, Clarkstown town Supervisor George Hoehman details a long list of surveillance violations and other police misconduct.
According to the letter [PDF], the SIU began surveillance of members of a play entitled "A Clean Shoot?" performed by a group called "We the People." The surveillance included constant monitoring of their social media profiles and the deployment of geofencing in hopes of capturing anyone else who might be involved with the group and/or the play.
The Clarkstown PD shared the information it gathered with the Haverstraw Police Department -- information that included the results of searches of criminal databases. Clarkstown's SIU "warned" Haverstraw the next production of the play would be in September, but noted that participants posed no threat of violence despite harboring "strong opinions."
When setting up the geofences, Clarkstown PD lumped BLM and We the People members in with gang members, terrorists, and other more legitimate targets of police surveillance. This continued even though they were told (repeatedly) by the local district attorney's office they should not have Black Lives Matter listed as a surveillance target.
In August 2016, the special prosecutor handling the investigation of this surveillance demanded Clarkstown PD hand over communications pertaining to its spying on the two groups. He never received anything. Instead, Police Chief Michael Sullivan deleted all of the data from his issued cellphone. He also allowed Sgt. Steven Cole-Hatcher (head of the SIU) to wipe his own cellphone and to delete possibly-incriminating files from his departmental computer. Sullivan was suspended for fifteen days. Cole-Hatcher was given the opportunity to retire. He's now suing to get his job back and it's his filings that have generated a lot of the evidence needed by BLM to successfully pursue this lawsuit.
The letter also alleges things unrelated to the BLM lawsuit, but equally disturbing. Local law enforcement officials have apparently engaged in election interference, surveillance of judges, and monitoring of the town supervisor's social media profiles with the department's surveillance software.
Much of what's in the most recent lawsuit retreads allegations made previously. Fortunately, some of those allegations have already been sustained. The lawsuit pleads violations of the First and Fourth Amendment and seeks damages and injunctions against future unlawful surveillance.
Chief Sullivan has (unhelpfully) explained BLM and We the People weren't singled out for unlawful surveillance. He stated "many other groups and individuals" were surveilled by the SIU -- a statement he made without clarifying whether these others instances were for legitimate reasons.
Adding the latest allegations to those already sustained suggests local law enforcement agencies have more in common with cancerous growths than the "protectors and servants" ideal.
On June 14th, the New York Times published an editorial concerning violent rhetoric being deployed during political races. In it, the author made an incredibly bad claim:
Was this attack [by Hodgkinson] evidence of how vicious American politics has become? Probably. In 2011, when Jared Lee Loughner opened fire in a supermarket parking lot, grievously wounding Representative Gabby Giffords and killing six people, including a 9-year-old girl, the link to political incitement was clear. Before the shooting, Sarah Palin's political action committee circulated a map of targeted electoral districts that put Ms. Giffords and 19 other Democrats under stylized cross hairs.
This just simply wasn't true. To begin with, Palin's map contained only political districts under stylized crosshairs, not faces of legislators. Not only that, but there's been no conclusive link between Palin's crosshair map and Loughner's shooting. This was noted in two corrections published by the New York Times the next day, which also excised the two false statements.
Sarah Palin sued the New York Times for defamation a few weeks later because it apparently just wasn't enough to catch a "fake news" purveyor making some truly laughable assertions in an op-ed. The defamation suit has died a quick death, although Palin's claims were investigated with a bit more thoroughness than usual once the parties had entered their motions.
An examination of the run-up to the publication of the erroneous op-ed showed there was no actual malice in the New York Times' assertions -- just some really bad op-edmanship. The statements were provably false, which is key to defamation claims, but there also has to actual malice. And while many people think they know what's meant by actual malice, it's probably not what you think. In the legal context, actual malice requires "knowledge" of falsity before publication or reckless disregard. It doesn't just mean that you were trying to be mean (indeed, you could argue that "actual malice" doesn't require any... um... actual... malice). In this case, the court just can't find any knowledge of falsity -- and thus, no actual malice. [PDF link]
[E]ven then, a defamation complaint by a public figure must allege sufficient particularized facts to support a claim of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, or the complaint must be dismissed.
Here, as already mentioned, the complaint fails on its face to adequately allege actual malice, because it fails to identify any individual who possessed the requisite knowledge and intent and, instead, attributes it to the Times in general. This will not suffice.
The court also points to the proactive measures taken by the Times to correct the misstatements after they were brought to its attention as evidence of a lack of actual malice. The corrections weren't prompted by a lawsuit or threats of a lawsuit, but rather by readers displeased the Times would make a connection between Palin and Loughner that had never been established.
Even if the Times hadn't made these immediate efforts, the court still would likely have cut the paper as much slack as it could, given the First Amendment implications of the lawsuit.
Nowhere is political journalism so free, so robust, or perhaps so rowdy as in the United States. In the exercise of that freedom, mistakes will be made, some of which will be hurtful to others. Responsible journals will promptly correct their errors; others will not. But if political journalism is to achieve its constitutionally endorsed role of challenging the powerful, legal redress by a public figure must be limited to those cases where the public figure has a plausible factual basis for complaining that the mistake was made maliciously, that is, with knowledge it was false or with reckless disregard of its falsity.
To entertain the theory the press can be held civilly responsible for swiftly-corrected errors would chill reporting on pretty much anything. To take the press to court is to take the First Amendment to court. A higher standard must be met by plaintiffs.
