Hillary Clinton Wants A 'Manhattan Project' For Encryption... But Not A Back Door. That Makes No Sense

from the politics-is-dumb dept

In the Democratic Presidential debate on Saturday night, Hillary Clinton followed up on her recent nonsensical arguments about why Silicon Valley has to "solve" the problem of encryption. As we've noted, it was pretty clear that she didn't fully understand the issue, and that was even more evident with her comments on Saturday night.

Here's what's clear: she's trying to do the old politician's trick of attempting to appease everyone with vague ideas that allow her to tap dance around the facts.

First, she proposed a "Manhattan-like project" to create more cooperation between tech companies and the government in fighting terrorism. The Manhattan Project was the project during World War II where a bunch of scientists were sent out to the desert to build an atomic bomb. But they had a specific goal of "build this." Here, the goal is much more vague and totally meaningless: have tech and government work together to stop bad people. How do you even do that? The only suggestion that has been made so far -- and the language around which Clinton has been echoing -- has been to undermine encryption with backdoors.

However, since that resulted in a (quite reasonable) backlash from basically anyone who knows anything about computer security, we get the second statement from Clinton that she doesn't want backdoors.

"Maybe the back door isn't the right door, and I understand what Apple and others are saying about that. I just think there's got to be a way, and I would hope that our tech companies would work with government to figure that out."

No, she clearly does not understand what Apple and others are saying about that. Just a week or so ago, she insisted that Apple's complaint about it was that it might lead to the government invading users' privacy, but that's only a part of the concern. The real concern is that backdooring encryption means that everyone is more exposed to everyone, including malicious hackers. You create a backdoor and you open up the ability for malicious hackers from everywhere else to get in.

So, she's trying to walk this ridiculously stupid line in trying to appease everyone. She wants the security/intelligence officials to hear "Oh, I'll get Silicon Valley to deal with the 'going dark' thing you're so scared of," and she wants the tech world to hear "Backdoors aren't the answer." But, that leaves a giant "HUH?!?" in the middle.

It seems to come down to this: None of the candidates for president appear to have the slightest clue how encryption or computer security work and that allows them to make statements like this that are totally nonsensical, while believing that they make sense.

The issue, again, is that what they're really asking for is "Can you make a technology where only 'good' people can use it safely, and everyone else cannot?" And the answer to that question is to point out how absolutely astoundingly stupid the question is. Because there's no way to objectively determine who is "good" and who is "bad," and thus the only possible response is to create code that really thinks everyone is "bad." And to do that, you have to completely undermine basic security practices..

So this whole idea of "if we just throw smart people in a room, they'll figure it out" is wrong. It's starting from the wrong premise that there's some sort of magic formula for "good people" and "bad people." And without understanding that basic fact, the policy proposals being tossed out are nothing short of ridiculous.

Filed Under: encryption, going dark, hillary clinton, manhattan project, silicon valley

No, Strong Crypto Is Not Making The World 'Go Dark' For Intelligence Agencies: Here's Why

from the don't-be-afraid-of-the-dark dept

Last year, Techdirt noted that there was something of a concerted campaign to paint strong encryption as a real threat to intelligence agencies. That's continuing, except that for a number of recent attacks "encryption" has become a generic excuse for intelligence failures. To the extent that there was any real logic behind the attacks on crypto, the main one was that it was making things "go dark" by preventing the authorities from accessing vital information that could have stopped the attack/saved lives/led to arrests etc. if only it had been available. You can see why this phrase is such a favorite: it cleverly reminds us that once things have gone dark, all kinds of scary stuff could start happening, just like in our childhood nightmares. The only problem with this metaphor is that it is exactly wrong, as Phillip Rogaway points out in a recent interview in The Atlantic:

law enforcement has an extraordinary set of tools available to them now. An unprecedented set of capabilities, both for law enforcement and intelligence services. These aren't somehow the dark times for either law enforcement or intelligence. These are the times of extraordinary information. Nowhere in history has it been so easy to learn so much about everybody.

Critics might counter that it's easy to say that, but how are the authorities supposed to gather vital information when strong encryption has been used? An excellent column in The Washington Post by Nicholas Weaver, a computer security researcher at the International Computer Science Institute, provides step-by-step instructions that the intelligence services can follow if they are afraid of the gathering dark:

Let's examine a hypothetical investigation into Johnny Badguy. To plan and execute his crimes, Johnny uses an iPhone with encrypted features -- such as disk encryption that prevents anyone without the pass code from accessing the data and iMessage which encrypts messages in transit -- that have drawn the ire of FBI Director James Comey.

As Weaver points out, the communications metadata is actually much more useful than any encrypted content that has "gone dark":

If the investigator knows everything Johnny does, everyone he talks to and everywhere he goes, how much does it matter that the investigator doesn't know what Johnny says?

And it's not just about metadata: unless switched off, Johnny's iCloud backup will include a copy of all undeleted messages, all his contacts, his email accounts and his photographs. Moreover, Weaver notes, Google provides even more useful info:

Every IP address used to log into the Google account can recreate Johnny's movements -- the same information used by the FBI to unmask former CIA head David Petraeus's affair. If Johnny stays logged into Google through his browser, investigators have access to Johnny's search history and, thanks to how the Google+ button operates, a large number of the pages Johnny has viewed.

On top of that, a warrant to the phone company will provide:

the movements of the phone itself, as every call, text or push notification records at least the cell tower and sector, which says Johnny was in a particular wedge-shaped location occupying a few square miles.

As Weaver concludes:

Taken together, and further combined with other sources (such as the near-ubiquitous license plate readers and toll-tags), investigators have a nearly complete picture of Johnny's behavior, movements and associates without having to ever worry about the effects of cryptography.

As well as confirming that metadata is in general far more revealing than content -- despite what the UK government likes to insist -- Weaver's tale of Johnny Badguy brings out something that is insufficiently appreciated: the fact that today's mobile devices provide an amazing treasure-trove of information about their owner that is without precedent historically. In fact, Weaver's helpful analysis shows that the real threat to the intelligence agencies is not that the bad people might start using strong encryption, but that they might stop using smartphones.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: detective work, encryption, going dark, information, investigations, law enforcement

FBI Director Says 'Smart People' At Office Supply Companies Can Help Limit Terrorists' Access To Pen And Paper

from the also-has-concerns-about-auto-manufacturers-offering-locking-trucks-by-default dept

Another terrorist attack (this one thwarted) has renewed calls for private companies to work more closely with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

The pair were arrested in counter-terror raids in Sydney’s west yesterday with police saying they and three other conspirators were involved in “formulating documents connected with preparations to facilitate, assist or engage a person to undertake a terrorist act”.

The group of alleged extremists used handwritten notes to plot a Sydney attack in a bit to circumvent police and ASIO surveillance, The Australian reports.

The scrawled messages circulating between the group allegedly detailed the an attack on a government building, believed to be the AFP’s Sydney headquarters.

FBI Director James Comey has spent the last several months expressing his concern that criminals and terrorists are eluding justice by using off-the-shelf products offered by manufacturers nationwide -- paper, pens, shredders, trash cans, etc.*

"We aren't seeking anything more than what we've always been able to obtain with court orders, subpoenas and warrants. But now, this information is unavailable to us, thanks to decisions being made by some very smart people who have, for whatever reason, decided to start supplying their customers with these items."

Comey acknowledged that a legislated ban on these items is highly unlikely, but pointed out that the lack of access to handwritten notes was on its way to becoming a day-to-day occurrence for law enforcement.

"The reality is that terrorist plots are going to be carried out, kids are going to be kidnapped and to-do lists are going be executed -- and law enforcement will be locked out. We go to Georgia-Pacific, Bic or Royal with a warrant and we still can't obtain the communications we're seeking because these companies have decided to allow their customers to use a destructible form of communication."

Addressing his critics, Comey coldly noted that approaching third parties for access to these communications has also been a dead end.

"We've sought the assistance of Staples, Office Depot and other office supply retailers, but have been stymied completely by the incredulous laughter of their legal representatives, along with their demands to know whether 'we're serious' and 'Where's the camera? Is this one of those punk'd shows?'"

Comey again expressed his belief that a solution is out there, but it takes law enforcement and nation's top office supply companies working together.

"There are some very smart people running these companies and I think if they were willing to apply themselves to the problem, they could come up with a solution."

The administration has less-than-firmly stated that it won't look into mandating the elimination of this communication method. Congress has similarly shown little support for Comey's quest to achieve the impossible.

But some long-time supporters of the NSA -- along with presidential candidates who believe everything the AP prints -- are calling for more extreme measures to be taken in response to recent terrorist attacks.

Sen. Tom Cotton, Marco Rubio and a handful of others are touting a plan for mandatory internet usage.

"Extremists and terrorists are hiding behind pen-and-paper while carrying out their violent plans. This is unacceptable. If the nation is going to be secure, citizens and non-citizens residing in the US should be required to use internet-based communication methods, preferably of the unencrypted variety."

Comey agreed that something must be done to prevent today's criminals from "going looseleaf." The key, he says, is no longer in the government's hands. It's in the hands of private companies, who he feels are more interested in their bottom line than a secure nation.

"It's not a security issue. It's a business model issue," Comey said, adding that customers should pressure companies into abandoning the production of these archaic items. "In a world where iPad-like devices are as prevalent as National Security Letters, it makes no sense for the Hammermills of the nation to continue to offer archaic communication methods."

*Just in case it wasn't obvious, nothing in the above post actually happened other than the thwarted terrorist attack in which the suspects used handwritten notes to avoid surveillance. They also used text messages, which was (part of) their downfall. But arguments against encryption because some bad people use it are no different than arguments against pen/paper, which also helps bad people avoid the scrutiny of law enforcement.

Filed Under: encryption, going dark, james comey, paper, pencil, terrorism

WaPo's Excellent Explainer On Encryption Debunks WaPo's Stupid Editorial In Favor Of Encryption Backdoors

from the hey,-you-guys-should-talk! dept

Washington Post reporter Andrea Peterson has put together a really excellent explainer piece on what you should know about encryption. Considering the source, it's a good "general knowledge" explainer piece for people who really aren't that aware of encryption or technically savvy. That's important and useful, given how important this debate is and how many participants in it don't seem to understand the first thing about encryption. But what struck me is this little tidbit:

Can the government stop terrorists from using encryption?

Well, no. The most the government can probably do is bar companies from offering the most secure forms of encryption to their users. But encryption isn't just one product. Just like the math it's based on, it's really more of a concept or an idea rather than a specific technical tool.

And it's pretty impossible to outlaw ideas.

It goes on, in some depth, to explain just what a stupid idea it would be to outlaw end-to-end encryption, noting that there are lots of non-US companies and plenty of open source offerings for encryption that would still be widely available and used.

Now, compare that to the ridiculous editorial that the Washington Post put out a year ago, advocating for just such a solution:

How to resolve this? A police “back door” for all smartphones is undesirable — a back door can and will be exploited by bad guys, too. However, with all their wizardry, perhaps Apple and Google could invent a kind of secure golden key they would retain and use only when a court has approved a search warrant. Ultimately, Congress could act and force the issue, but we’d rather see it resolved in law enforcement collaboration with the manufacturers and in a way that protects all three of the forces at work: technology, privacy and rule of law.

Hey, Washington Post editorial board, I hope you read your own newspaper.

Filed Under: andrea peterson, backdoors, encryption, going dark, golden key
Companies: washington post

James Comey, Dianne Feinstein Team Up To Mislead About Encryption; Promise Legislation To Undermine National Security

from the ugh dept

This is hardly a surprise, but after Congress had more or less realized that passing a law to undermine encryption wasn't a good idea, the clueless surveillance state hawks have used the Paris and San Bernardino attacks as a chance to go for it again. In a hearing this morning, FBI Director James Comey -- who has long been leading the charge -- explained that he thought tech companies ought to change their business model to drop end-to-end encryption. Ridiculously, he argued that there's no "technical issue" in undermining encryption, just a business decision:

Now, Comey said at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing Wednesday morning, extensive conversations with tech companies have persuaded him that “it’s not a technical issue.”

“It is a business model question,” he said. “The question we have to ask is: Should they change their business model?”

Comey is being misleading to disingenuous here. Yes, anyone can undermine encryption. And, yes, I guess you could argue that undermining encryption and weakening security for all your users is a "business model" issue in that they won't trust you any more and might look for alternative providers. But that's not the real issue. Comey's trying to shift the debate, because he knows that what he's really asked for is impossible. He's asked for backdoors that only law enforcement can use. And basically every computer security expert has explained that the only way to do that would be to expose everyone to more threats. And Comey seems to think that's okay.

Let me repeat that. The head of the FBI, who is supposed to be protecting American citizens, thinks it's okay to make everyone less safe, based on the unproven theory that it'll make his own job a little easier.

And, not surprisingly, Senator Dianne Feinstein, was right there ready to assist. She cited the Paris attacks as evidence for why "the world is really changing"

“I suspect what happened was in the aftermath of Snowden, particularly Europe got very conservative with respect to encryption. The companies back away. Now, that’s changing with Paris and God forbid what might happen in the future. So what I’m trying to say is, I think this world is really changing in terms of people wanting the protection and wanting law enforcement, if there is conspiracy going on over the Internet, that that encryption ought to be able to be pierced.”

Again, this is the same Senator who just a month ago was practically screaming about how important cybersecurity is, and now she says that the single biggest factor in protecting information online -- encryption -- should be done away with.

And, indeed, while others have held back, Feinstein has said she's working with Senator Burr on legislation to effectively break encryption:

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) told the Senate Judiciary Committee on Wednesday that she would seek a bill that would give police armed with a warrant based on probable cause the ability “to look into an encrypted Web."

"I have concern about a PlayStation that my grandchildren might use," she said, "and a predator getting on the other end, and talking to them, and it's all encrypted. I think there really is reason to have the ability, with a court order, to be able to get into that."

A spokesman for Feinstein's office told the Daily Dot in an email that the senator has been working with Judiciary Committee Chairman Richard Burr (R-N.C.) the issue of encryption and that Burr's office is taking the lead on potential legislation.

None of that makes any sense. First of all, the Playstation is not encrypted end-to-end, and if she's concerned about who her grandchildren are talking to on the Playstation maybe she should look into that, rather than having the government undermine the very foundations of basic computer security on the internet?

Hopefully cooler heads prevail in Congress, but we've seen Feinstein and Burr team up to do tremendous damage through fearmongering before, and apparently it's not going to stop any time soon.

Filed Under: backdoors, business mod, congress, dianne feinstein, encryption, going dark, james comey, legislation, richard burr

White House 'Responds' To Petition For Strong Encryption... By Asking For More Info From A Misspelled Ed Felten

from the say-what? dept

Earlier this year, the EFF's Rainey Reitman set up the SaveCrypto.org petition, which tied directly into the White House's We the People... petition site. The petition got the necessary 100,000 signatures to demand a response (though the White House isn't always good about doing that). And, now the White House has responded (sorta). The petition itself is pretty clear:

Reject any law, policy, or mandate that would undermine our security.

The government should not erode the security of our devices or applications, pressure companies to keep and allow government access to our data, mandate implementation of vulnerabilities or backdoors into products, or have disproportionate access to the keys to private data.

We demand privacy, security, and integrity for our communications and systems. As a public, we should be confident that the services we use haven’t been weakened or compromised by government mandate or pressure. No legislation, executive order, or private agreement with the government should undermine our rights.

Weakening encryption weakens the entire Internet. Please endorse strong encryption, and encourage other world leaders to do the same.

The response, on the other hand, is not clear at all. It just asks people to provide more info and says it's meeting with the people who put together the petition this week.

We want to hear from you on encryption:

Thank you for signing the petition on strong encryption and speaking out on this important national debate. As the President has said, "There's no scenario in which we don't want really strong encryption." It is critical that the government, the private sector, and other experts regularly engage to understand the impacts of encryption on national security, public health and safety, economic competitiveness, privacy, cybersecurity, and human rights around the world.

This conversation about encryption is also part of a broader conversation about what we, as a nation, can do to fight terrorism as it evolves online. That is why, in his address to the nation on Sunday, the President reiterated the Administration’s call for America’s technology community and law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials to work together to fight terrorism. American technologists have a unique perspective that makes them essential in finding new ways to combat it. They are the best and most creative in the world, and we need them to bring their expertise, innovation, and creativity to bear against the threat of terrorism.

This week, administration officials will sit down with the creators of this petition to hear directly from them about their priorities and concerns.

We also want to hear from you. Share your comments and questions here, and we'll report back after the meeting.

This is a critical conversation, and we want to hear from as many voices as we can.

Thanks again for your participation in We the People.

Now, there are all sorts of problems with this. First off, Reitman says that contrary to the claims made in the response, no one from the White House has contacted her or anyone else at EFF. So, that claim that the White House is sitting down with the creators of the petition is bogus.

Second, while you should all go to that website and tell the White House what you think about strong encryption, it's absolutely ridiculous that anyone actually thinks that's necessary. The petition itself told the White House what they thought about encryption and that's that it's important in protecting our privacy and security and undermining it is dangerous with almost no real benefit. And, indeed, almost every technology expert who has opined on this subject has said the same thing -- including Ed Felten, the White House's Deputy CTO who supposedly co-wrote this response.

Except he didn't. Because not only does it not sound like him, the letter was actually signed by "Ed Felton" not Ed Felten: Someone in the White House (Ed?) noticed this eventually and it's since been changed, but it certainly suggests Felten himself had little to nothing to do with this response. The other signature on the letter is from Michael Daniel, the President's cybersecurity czar, whose name you might recognize from that time he bragged about his lack of technology knowledge and skills, claiming it could "be a little bit of a distraction" and later argued that of course backdooring encryption was totally possible, though when asked to name a single technology expert who agreed with him, noted that "I don't have any off the top of my head." We're still waiting.

Of course, I think we know which one of those two names actually wrote this non-response. But if that's the way the government is going to play the game, we might as well make use of the tools they've provided and let them know (yet again) about the importance of strong encryption without backdoors.

Filed Under: ed felten, encryption, going dark, petition, rainey reitman, we the people, white house
Companies: eff

Rep. Michael McCaul Proposes 'Commission' To 'Force' Silicon Valley To Undermine Encryption

from the well,-here-we-go... dept

Rep. Michael McCaul, the head of the House Homeland Security Committee has now given a speech in which he announced plans to introduce legislation that will create a committee to undermine encryption in the tech industry:

The legislation "would bring together the technology sector, privacy and civil liberties groups, academics, and the law enforcement community to find common ground," Chairman Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) said in a Dec. 7 speech at National Defense University. "This will not be like other blue ribbon panels, established and forgotten."

He said the ability of terrorist groups to use encrypted applications while communicating is one of his biggest fears. "We cannot stop what we cannot see," he said in reference to recent attacks in San Bernardino, Calif., and Paris.

Yes, the idea that it will include technologists and privacy and civil liberties folks sounds good, but it still seems like the key focus is going to be around undermining encryption. You don't need a special commission to do the only thing you really need to do: which is to keep making ever more secure encryption. And, of course, McCaul has been among the leading voices in seeking to blame encryption for everything. A few weeks ago he insisted that the Paris attackers used encryption and in the Q&A portion after his speech yesterday he went even further directly claiming the Paris attackers used the Telegram app -- something that no one else has claimed to date. He first admits that a "backdoor" to encryption is a bad idea, but then basically says, "but there must be some technological solution" before claiming that the Paris attackers definitely used encryption.

It's a very complex issue. I think initially lawmakers thought there was an easy legislative fix where we just amend the CALEA statute, until we found out that providing a backdoor into everybody's iPhone was not going to be a very good strategy. Not only would it provide a backdoor for the government, but also for hackers. So you've noticed that the language of the FBI director and the language of the Secretary of Homeland Security has shifted to trying to find a technology solution to this problem.

This part is true, but that "shift" to finding a "technology solution" still involves creating backdoors to encryption -- and just not calling them backdoors. McCaul continues:

I will not tell you that it's an easy solution, but I've had very in-depth discussions that I do believe there are alternatives. There are some solutions to this problem. And I think the inherent problem, and the reason why I'm advocating the formation of this commission, is because of the reluctance of both parties to sit in the same room together. And so what this legislation provides -- in fact what it will mandate -- that all relevant parties sit in the same room together, and in a very short period of time, provide the Congress with solutions and recommendations for legislation to deal with what I consider to, as I said in my remarks, one of the most difficult challenges of this century, in dealing with counterterrorism and basically criminal behavior.

First of all this is hogwash. People from both sides are more than willing to sit together, if there was some possible productive outcome from it, and compelling them to sit in the same room doesn't change the facts that what they're asking for is impossible. I don't now how many times it needs to be said, but full encryption makes us all much safer, and you can't magically create a technology that "only the good people" can use. No one's demanding that law enforcement and gunmakers get together to create bullets that only hit bad people. And no one's demanding that automakers and law enforcement get together to design cars that only nice people can drive. Why do people magically think that Silicon Valley can determine who's good and who's bad and set up technology so that only nice people can have their privacy protected?

McCaul then continues, falsely claiming the Paris attackers used encryption:

If we don't do anything. Title III wiretaps and FISAs will become a thing of the past. When we saw the encrypted apps on the on the Paris attackers' iPhone - it was Telegram. When eight attackers and numerous co-conspirators, foreign fighters from Syria, can do something like that and it's completely under the radar screen. We know why it went undetected. It went undetected because they were communicating in the dark space. In a space where we can't shine a light on to see these communications even if we have a court order.

Of course, this is hogwash. No one else has claimed the Paris attackers used encryption. And in fact we now know that they communicated via unencrypted SMS and that they did a lot of their planning in plain sight, with the guy behind the plans bragging to an English-language ISIS publication about his plans, and the attackers booking hotels and guest houses in their own names.

Politico followed up with staffers on McCaul's committee to ask about this, and they admitted that McCaul was exaggerating -- saying he was talking "in general about terrorists' use of encryption" rather than specifically about the Paris attacks. Except, he said it pretty directly, which means he's either misinformed or lying. And, yet, now he's rushing to set up a special commission to help figure out a way to deal with this problem that he himself is exaggerating? That's not encouraging.

McCaul later went on to repeat the "this is a difficult problem" line which misses the point. It's not a difficult problem. It's not that smart people don't want to work on this, it's that law enforcement and McCaul are asking for the impossible: encryption that protects privacy, but only for good people. And, yet, he says he needs to "force people" to solve this problem (he literally uses the phrase "force them.")

While some have suggested that this commission could deal with many other issues unrelated to encryption (which could, potentially be a good thing), the timing of this, just as so many have been calling to undermine encryption by phrasing it as calling for "a conversation" between techies and law enforcement, combined with McCaul's incorrect statements on encryption is worrisome.

The only other "positive" in all of this is that he's pushing this commission as an alternative to legislation that would mandate encryption backdoors admitting (correctly) that "a legislative knee-jerk reaction could weaken Internet protections and privacy for everyday Americans...." That's absolutely true, but what, exactly, does he expect this new commission to do other than to undermine encryption and weaken those protections? And, as he made clear in his statements above, he's still expecting this commission to suggest a legislative solution in a fairly short time period. In other words, this may not be a "legislative knee-jerk" but it sure looks like a plan to lead to knee-jerk legislation, just one where McCaul can point to some committee's "recommendations" to cover up the fact that he's demanding the impossible.

Filed Under: conversation, encryption, going dark, homeland security, michael mccaul, paris attacks, silicon valley

Senator Mitch McConnell To Obama: Please, Just Tell Us What Law You Need To Ban Encryption And You'll Get It

from the begging-to-undermine-american-security dept

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has always been a friend of the intelligence community, but he's using the attack in San Bernadino to ramp up the anti-encryption insanity to new levels, practically begging President Obama to tell him what law he wants to ban encryption, and McConnell will help make sure Congress delivers. McConnell's statement was laying out what he thought President Obama should do in response to ISIS, and includes this ridiculous line:

He should tell us what legal authorities he needs to defeat encrypted online communications, and what is needed to reestablish our capture, interrogation, and surveillance capabilities.

"Defeat encrypted online communications"? Is he crazy? We need encrypted online communications to better protect us, and yet McConnell is trying to undermine those communications. He's actively proposing to make us all less safe. And, of course, talking about "reestablishing" our "surveillance capabilities" is about giving the NSA more surveillance powers. McConnell was, of course, the key person who tried to block any attempt at rolling back the NSA's unconstitutional phone records collection program.

Now, we know that President Obama didn't go quite as far as McConnell asked, but he did still push for a more "voluntary" solution -- which may morph into Congress doing something if people don't speak out loudly about what an incredibly dumb idea this is.

Filed Under: congress, encryption, going dark, mitch mcconnell, president obama

Hillary Clinton Doubles Down Her Attack On Silicon Valley: Wants A 'Solution' For Encryption & Clampdown On Free Speech

from the that-seems-pretty-dumb dept

A few weeks ago, we pointed out that Hillary Clinton had, unfortunately, joined in with other clueless politicians to call for "Silicon Valley" to "develop solutions" to the "concerns of law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals" on "encryption." Anyone who's followed the "debate" over encryption over the past year knows that asking Silicon Valley to "develop solutions" is James Comey's codewords for "create a backdoor for encryption" -- no matter how many times experts in encryption have explained to him that such a solution makes everyone less safe. After we and a few others wrote about Clinton's unfortunate and dangerous decision to throw her lot in with those who wish to backdoor encryption, one of her main tech advisers, Alec Ross, went a little ballistic, insisting she did not say what she clearly did say.

And, this weekend Clinton apparently decided to double down and then go even further -- even before President Obama suggested that he'd also support undermining encryption. First, on ABC's This Week, she repeated the argument that we just need "the best minds" to "come together" and "deal" with this issue.

STEPHANOPOULOS: How about Apple? No more encryption?

CLINTON: This is something I've said for a long time, George. I have to believe that the best minds in the private sector, in the public sector could come together to help us deal with this evolving threat. And you know, I know what the argument is from our friends in the industry. I respect that. Nobody wants to be feeling like their privacy is invaded.

But I also know what the argument is on the other side from law enforcement and security professionals. So, please, let's get together and try to figure out the best way forward.

But, again, that's like asking "the best minds" to come up with bullets that only kill bad people. Or books that only nice people are allowed to read. You're asking for an impossibility, and in doing so, you're making everyone less safe by undermining encryption -- which is the key to realistic computer security.

Even worse, when Clinton claims that she knows "what the argument is from our friends in the industry" she gets their argument wrong. It's not just about invading privacy. It's about the fact that she's asking for the impossible. It's not just about protecting the privacy of people from intruding government. It's about not weakening overall systems that will allow those with bad intent to do lots of damage. It's a ridiculous statement and Clinton appears to be getting just as bad technology advice as basically every other presidential candidate.

And, that wasn't her only ridiculous anti-tech statement on the weekend. She also said that Facebook, YouTube and Twitter should censor bad content online to somehow stop ISIS.

STEPHANOPOULOS: If you were in the Oval Office tonight, would you be announcing a new strategy?

CLINTON: Well, I think what -- that's what we'll hear from the president, an intensification of the existing strategy and I think there's some additional steps we have to take.

If you look at the story about this woman and maybe the man, too, who got radicalized, self-radicalized, we're going to need help from Facebook and from YouTube and from Twitter. They cannot permit the recruitment and the actual direction of attacks or the celebration of violence by this sophisticated Internet user.

They're going to have to help us take down these announcements and these appeals they get up.

I know that this view is one that many people agree with, but it's equally dangerous. First, it assumes that ISIS propaganda is apparently so powerful that no counter speech could possibly work against it, and thus it must be censored. But that's ridiculous on multiple levels. It overvalues the speech of ISIS and its supporters and the impact that it has (most studies have shown radicalization happens because of people individuals know in real life, not randos on the internet).

Really, though, exactly how are Facebook and Twitter and YouTube supposed to do this? How are they supposed to review every bit of content that everyone creates, and determine which bits are "good" and allowed and which are "bad" and not allowed? Clinton is asking for a fairy tale -- a world where (1) it's obvious what's good content and what's not and (2) one in which every bit of speech and communication is monitored and scored on such a non-existent scale. Both of these things are impossible. I don't know about you, but I prefer political candidates who focus on the possible, rather than fairy tales (I recognize this leaves me with basically almost no politicians to support, but occupational hazard, I guess...).

In a separate speech, given at the Brookings Institution, Clinton took this idea even further, calling on Silicon Valley to "disrupt ISIS," which is such a painful abuse of the term "disrupt" as to again raise questions about who is advising her on tech policy issues:

“We need to put the great disrupters at work at disrupting ISIS."

Disruption in the tech world is about making things cheaper and better, and reinventing markets. It's not about magically stopping bad people from using technology. This is still fairy tale thinking.

But, more importantly, it encourages (or potentially threatens to mandate) that these content and communications platforms have to start proactively monitoring all speech online, and determining, on the fly, what speech is "good" and which speech is "bad." That's dangerous and will undoubtedly lead to much greater censorship -- including content that actually is useful in highlighting atrocities and dangerous activities online. We've seen this before. After US politicians pressured YouTube into removing "terrorist" videos, it resulted in videos being deleted from a Syrian watchdog group that was documenting atrocities.

Besides, these two separate issues seem totally contradictory. On the one hand, Clinton and other anti-encryption folks whine about not being able to see what terrorists are saying "because encryption." But then, at the same time, they're saying that when those same people talk about things publicly online -- in a way that's trackable -- we should shut them down.

It's almost like they have no strategy at all... except to try to throw the blame on technology companies.

Filed Under: disruption, encryption, free speech, going dark, hillary clinton, isis, james comey
Companies: facebook, google, twitter, youtube