DOJ Back To Pushing For Legislation Targeting Encryption

from the CLIPPER-CHIP-2K18 dept

The New York Times is reporting that the War on Encryption continues, with a renewed push for legislation the Justice Department couldn't talk Obama into.

Federal law enforcement officials are renewing a push for a legal mandate that tech companies build tools into smartphones and other devices that would allow access to encrypted data in criminal investigations.

F.B.I. and Justice Department officials have been quietly meeting with security researchers who have been working on approaches to provide such “extraordinary access” to encrypted devices, according to people familiar with the talks.

[...]

Against that backdrop, law enforcement officials have revived talks inside the executive branch over whether to ask Congress to enact legislation mandating the access mechanisms.

FBI Director Chris Wray still has yet to hand over his list of agreeable security experts to Sen. Ron Wyden. Wray continues to assert there's a way to solve the "going dark" problem that won't involve make device encryption less secure, but every suggestion he offers involves making device encryption less secure. There are a few techies looking for solutions, and that small group may be who Wray believes can talk legislators into prepping a mandated access bill.

A National Academy of Sciences committee completed an 18-month study of the encryption debate, publishing a report last month. While it largely described challenges to solving the problem, one section cited presentations by several technologists who are developing potential approaches.

They included Ray Ozzie, a former chief software architect at Microsoft; Stefan Savage, a computer science professor at the University of California, San Diego; and Ernie Brickell, a former chief security officer at Intel.

The solutions presented by this group are more of the same: key escrow, weakened encryption, or technological assistance mandates. None of these work out particularly well for customers, as each options provides additional attack vectors for criminals, not just law enforcement. So, even if Wray hopes to rely on more sympathetic tech experts, he's still going to run into the same facts: you cannot provide access to law enforcement without increasing the chance of access by criminals and state-sponsored hackers.

It appears the DOJ isn't interested in letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. And why should it? It won't be affected by mandated access and/or weakened encryption. Those affected most will be members of the general public, and they simply don't matter when the FBI's agitating for destroying the encryption the public relies on to keep their devices and communications secure.

[O]ne Justice Department official familiar with the deliberations contended that it might not be necessary to come up with a foolproof system, arguing that a solution that would work for ordinary, less-savvy criminals was still worth pursuing.

Take a long look at that statement. This is the DOJ saying it's willing to sacrifice the security of millions of Americans to make sure it can round up the nation's least intelligent criminals. This isn't a balance anyone outside of the FBI's inner circle will be happy with. Wray and others routinely claim encryption is preventing them from solving serious crimes and hunting down dangerous criminals, but when all is said and done, it will apparently be satisfied locking up the most inept suspects.

Filed Under: backdoors, doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, legislation, responsible encryption

Russian Court Says Telegram Must Hand Over Encryption Keys To State Intelligence Service

from the maybe-don't-hold-onto-all-of-the-keys-in-the-first-place dept

Here's an idea for the FBI, gift-wrapped and signed "From Russia, With Love."

Telegram, the encrypted messaging app that’s prized by those seeking privacy, lost a bid before Russia’s Supreme Court to block security services from getting access to users’ data, giving President Vladimir Putin a victory in his effort to keep tabs on electronic communications.

Supreme Court Judge Alla Nazarova on Tuesday rejected Telegram’s appeal against the Federal Security Service, the successor to the KGB spy agency which last year asked the company to share its encryption keys. Telegram declined to comply and was hit with a fine of $14,000. Communications regulator Roskomnadzor said Telegram now has 15 days to provide the encryption keys.

Who needs backdoors when messaging services are willing to keep their customers' front doors keys on hand for you? Sure, Telegram doesn't want to turn these over to the FSB, but its decision to hold onto encryption keys means they're available to be had. Telegram is appealing this decision, so customers' keys are safe for now, but there's zero chance the FSB is going to back down.

The FSB has also provided a ridiculous argument for the FBI to use when demanding companies retain keys for easy law enforcement access. According to the FSB's interpretation of the Russian constitution, no privacy violations occur when the government obtains citizens' encryption keys.

The security agency, known as the FSB, argued in court that obtaining the encryption keys doesn’t violate users’ privacy because the keys by themselves aren’t considered information of restricted access.

Clever. The keys are not restricted info. Everything accessible with the keys is. This isn't completely unlike judicial assertions that passwords are not evidence, even if relinquishing them then gives the government access to plenty of evidence. In this case, the FSB is collecting the keys to everyone's houses and promising not to open them up and take a look around whenever it feels the urge. The best way to protect users' privacy is to not hold the keys. The second best way is to take your business elsewhere (but in reverse, I guess) when local governments claim the only way you can do business locally is by placing users' communications directly in the government's hands.

If Telegram is forced to hand the keys over, it will be the last communications company in Russia to do so. All others have "registered" with the state communications agency, putting their users' communications directly in the Russian government's hands. If Telegram decides to pull out of the market, it will leave behind nearly 10 million users. Many of those will probably end up utilizing services the FSB has already tapped. Others may go overseas for uncompromised messaging services. But in the end, the FSB will get what it wants.

As for Telegram, it's facing a tough choice. With an initial coin offering in the works, it may not be willing to shed 10 million users and risk lowering its value. On the other hand, it may find standing up for 10 million users isn't something that matters to investors. Unfortunately, pushing back against the FSB on behalf of its users still may result in the loss of several million users once the Russian high court reaches its expected decision several months down the road. It still has the option of moving its operations out of the reach of the Russian government while still offering its services to Russian citizens. This may be the choice it has to make if it wants its millions of Russian users to avoid being stuck with compromised accounts.

Filed Under: encryption, fsb, privacy, russia, surveillance
Companies: telegram

The Future The FBI Wants: Secure Phones For Criminals, Broken Encryption For Everyone Else

from the safety's-just-another-word-for-nothing-left-to-lose dept

The old truism is in play again with the FBI's renewed CryptoWar: if X is outlawed, only criminals will have X. In this case, it's secure encryption. The FBI may not be trying to get encryption banned, but it does want it weakened. No backdoors, claims FBI director Chris Wray, just holes for the government to use at its pleasure. So, if the FBI gets it way, the only truly secure encryption will be in the hands of criminals… exactly the sort of people the FBI claims it needs weakened encryption to catch.

For years, a slew of shadowy companies have sold so-called encrypted phones, custom BlackBerry or Android devices that sometimes have the camera and microphone removed and only send secure messages through private networks. Several of those firms allegedly cater primarily for criminal organizations.

Now, the FBI has arrested the owner of one of the most established companies, Phantom Secure, as part of a complex law enforcement operation, according to court records and sources familiar with the matter.

Phantom makes phones solely for criminals, unlike Apple or Android manufacturers, who only have a certain percentage of criminals in their userbases. All of these companies may provide the protection of encryption, but only one actively targets a criminal market. Encryption protects everyone, not just criminals, but that fact is usually paved over with subtle-as-10-tons-of-asphalt comments from the FBI director while portraying the FBI as the nation's white knight and cell phone manufacturers as profit-driven sociopaths.

These companies marketing directly to criminals do more to protect data and communications than vanilla smartphones. Remote wipe capability is built in. Often, cameras and microphones are removed, along with GPS software/hardware. It's more security than most people need, but then again, most people aren't cartel members.

The thing is, the FBI director doesn't care if you're law-abiding. He wants your encryption options limited and weakened so the contents can be accessed. This makes your smartphone more susceptible to being accessed by criminals, rather than just G-men. And these criminals accessing your phone will probably have phones the FBI can't even access, even with backdoors or key escrow or easily-cracked encryption. Chris Wray claims this is all about public safety, but he's willing to make the public less safe to gain the access he wants.

While I understand the concern of the inability to access evidence, the fact remains no solution involving compromised encryption will make the public safer. And while I understand the concern, the concern itself is overstated and accompanied by smoke-and-mirrors presentations. The FBI points to stacks of locked phones, but says nothing about the many tools at its disposal: phone-cracking companies, judges, contempt charges, good old fashioned consent requests, or whether all cases involving these phones remain at a standstill. The FBI does not argue in good faith, and the access it wants can only be had by sacrificing the security and safety of law-abiding citizens.

Filed Under: doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, security

FBI Director Says It's 'Not Impossible' To Create Compromised Encryption That's Still Secure

from the saying-the-same-thing-over-and-over-doesn't-make-it-true dept

FBI Director Chris Wray was back on the "going dark" stump this week. In a speech [PDF] at Boston College, Wray again stated, without evidence, that it wasn't impossible to create weakened encryption that isn't weakened. (via Cyrus Farivar at Ars Technica)

We have a whole bunch of folks at FBI Headquarters devoted to explaining this challenge and working with stakeholders to find a way forward. But we need and want the private sector’s help. We need them to respond to lawfully issued court orders, in a way that is consistent with both the rule of law and strong cybersecurity. We need to have both, and can have both. I recognize this entails varying degrees of innovation by the industry to ensure lawful access is available. But I just don’t buy the claim that it’s impossible.

It really doesn't matter whether or not Wray "buys" this claim. If you deliberately weaken encryption -- either through key escrow or by making it easier to bypass -- the encryption no longer offers the protection it did before it was compromised. That's the thing about facts. They're not like cult leaders. They don't need a bunch of true believers hanging around to retain their strength.

Yet Wray continues to believe this can be done. He has yet to provide Senator Ron Wyden with a list of tech experts who feel the same way. The "going dark" part of his remarks is filled with incongruity and non sequiturs. Like this, in which Wray says he doesn't want backdoors, but rather instant access to encrypted data and communications… almost like a backdoor of some sort.

We’re not looking for a “back door” – which I understand to mean some type of secret, insecure means of access. What we’re asking for is the ability to access the device once we’ve obtained a warrant from an independent judge, who has said we have probable cause.

If by "backdoor," he means insecure exploit, then he's technically correct. If by "not a backdoor," he means another door located on the front or side or connected to the basement or whatever, then what difference does the door's location really make? A door is door and it provides an opening where there wasn't one previously.

Solutions have been provided. There's no shortage of people suggesting workarounds. Metadata is valuable even if Wray continues to downplay it. It's a weird position for him to take considering the agency's long reliance on metadata swept up by the NSA. Devices can be hacked, but Wray continues to assert this isn't a solution either, even after Cellebrite made the stunning announcement it could crack any iPhone, including the latest models. There are a variety of third parties hosting communications in cloud services, all of which could be approached to gain access to at least some evidence. Even public enemy #1, Apple, stores encryption keys for its iCloud services, which would give law enforcement much of what can't be obtained from a locked device.

Wray doesn't want a solution that isn't forced subservience of tech companies. That's become plainly apparent as he continues his anti-encryption crusade. Tech experts are ignored. Hacking breakthroughs like Cellebrite's aren't even cited. Legislators, for the most part, have offered no support for anti-encryption legislation, and yet Wray continues to push for technical access he can't define and proclaim his rightness despite having no expertise in the subject matter.

He also mentioned the stack of cellphones the agency claims it can't access -- 7,800 devices or more than half of those the FBI tried to access last year. But the number is meaningless. Wray claims they're all tied to investigations in one way or another, but does not describe what efforts were made to access their contents. Were the phones owners approached and asked for passcodes? Were the phones owners presented with the option of unlocking the devices or facing contempt charges? Were phones sent to Cellebrite or its competitors? Or has the FBI simply shrugged its shoulders, thrown them in a big pile, and decided to let the problem go unaddressed until it has enough legislators on its side?

In this discussion of The 7,800 Phones That Couldn't Be Broken, Wray mentioned something that shows the FBI won't be happy until it has mandated access to all encrypted data -- not just data at rest on locked devices.

Being unable to access nearly 78-hundred devices is a major public safety issue. That’s more than half of all the devices we attempted to access in that timeframe. And that’s just at the FBI. That’s not even counting devices sought by other law enforcement agencies – our state, local, and foreign counterparts. It also doesn’t count important situations outside of accessing a specific device, like when terrorists, spies, and criminals use encrypted messaging apps to communicate, which is an increasingly widespread problem.

Wray ended his speech as he always does -- with emotional appeals meant to throw shade on the tech experts who've told him his safely-broken encryption dreams are impossible.

After all, America leads the world in innovation. We have the brightest minds doing and creating fantastic things. A responsible solution will incorporate the best of two great American traditions – the rule of law and innovation. But for this to work, the private sector needs to recognize that it’s part of the solution. Again, I’m open to all kinds of ideas. But I reject this notion that there could be such a place that no matter what kind of lawful authority you have, it’s utterly beyond reach to protect innocent citizens. I also can’t accept that anyone out there reasonably thinks the state of play as it exists now – much less the direction it’s going – is acceptable.

Broken down, his final thoughts on "going dark" run like this:

1. Smart people refuse to help us.

2. They are irresponsible.

3. They are part of the problem.

4. They are making America unsafe.

Christ, what an asshole. The private sector is doing far more to "protect innocent citizens" than the FBI is. Encryption makes communications and data transfer much, much safer. Wray wants this weakened for one reason: to give law enforcement immediate access. Will this make America safer? The answer is no. Default encryption has been available for years now and there's been no corresponding spike in criminal activity and no loud chorus of united law enforcement officials lamenting their inability to close cases or prosecute people. America's jails are as full as they've ever been and crime rates remain far lower than they were prior to the advent of smartphones and encryption-by-default. It's only a very small number of law enforcement officials that seem to have a problem with this, but they're by far the loudest and most visible.

Filed Under: backdoors, chris wray, encryption, fbi, going dark, responsible encryption

Mike Godwin's First Essay On Encryption And The Constitution

from the going-back dept

Mike Godwin (you know who he is) was recently going through some of his earlier writings, and came across an essay (really an outline) he had written to the Cypherpunks email list 25 years ago, in April of 1993 concerning the Clipper Chip and early battles on encryption and civil liberties. If you don't recall, the Clipper Chip was an early attempt by the Clinton administration to establish a form of backdoored encryption, using a key escrow system. What became quite clear in reading through this 25-year-old email is just how little has changed in the past 25 years. As we are in the midst of a new crypto war, Godwin has suggested republishing this essay from so long ago to take a look back at what was said back then and compare it to today.

From: Mike Godwin
Subject: Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution To: e*c Date: Mon, 26 Apr 93 11:15:17 EDT

Note: These notes were a response to a question during Saturday's Cypherpunks meeting about the possible implications of the Clipper Chip initiative on Fourth Amendment rights. Forward to anyone else who might think these interesting.

--Mike

Notes on Cryptography, Digital Telephony, and the Bill of Rights By Mike Godwin

I.Introduction

A. The recent announcement of the federal government's "Clipper Chip" has started me thinking again about what the principled "pure Constitutional" arguments a) opposed to Digital Telephony and b) in favor of the continuing legality of widespread powerful public-key encryption.

B. These notes do *not* include many of the complaints that have already been raised about the Clipper Chip initiative, such as:

(1) Failure of the Administration to conduct an inquiry before embracing a standard,
(2) Refusal to allow public scrutiny of the chosen encryption algorithm(s), which is the normal procedure for testing a cryptographic scheme, and
(3) Failure of the administration to address the policy questions raised by the Clipper Chip, such as whether the right balance between privacy and law-enforcement needs has been struck.

C. In other words, they do not address complaints about the federal government's *process* in embracing the Clipper Chip system. They do, however, attempt to address some of the substantive legal and Constitutional questions raised by the Clipper Chip and Digital Telephony initiatives.

II. Hard Questions from Law Enforcement

A. In trying to clarify my own thinking about the possible Constitutional issues raised by the government's efforts to guarantee access to public communications between individuals, I have spoken and argued with a number of individuals who are on the other side of the issues from me, including Dorothy Denning and various respresentatives of the FBI, including Alan McDonald.

B. McDonald, like Denning and other proponents both of Digital Telephony and of a standard key-escrow system for cryptography, is fond of asking hard questions: What if FBI had a wiretap authorization order and couldn't implement it, either because it was impossible to extract the right bits from a digital-telephony data stream, or because the communication was encrypted? Doesn't it make sense to have a law that requires the phone companies to be able to comply with a wiretap order?

C. Rather than respond to these questions, for now at least let's ask a different question. Suppose the FBI had an authorization order for a secret microphone at a public restaurant. Now suppose it planted the bug, but couldn't make out the conversation it was authorized to "seize" because of background noise at the restaurant. Wouldn't it make sense to have a law requiring everyone to speak more softly in restaurants and not to clatter the dishes so much?

D. This response is not entirely facetious. The Department of Justice and the FBI have consistently insisted that they are not seeking new authority under the federal wiretap statutes ("Title III"). The same statute that was drafted to outline the authority for law enforcement to tap telephonic conversations was also drafted to outline law enforcement's authority to capture normal spoken conversations with secret or remote microphones. (The statute was amended in the middle '80s by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to protect "electronic communications," which includes e-mail, and a new chapter protecting _stored_ electronic communications was also added.)

E. Should we understand the law the way Digital Telephony proponents insist we do--as a law designed to mandate that the FBI (for example) be guaranteed access to telephonic communications? Digital Telephony supporters insist that it merely "clarifies" phone company obligations and governmental rights under Title III. If they're right, then I think we have to understand the provisions regarding "oral communications" the same way. Which is to say, it would make perfect sense to have a law requiring that people speak quietly in public places, so as to guarantee that the government can bug an oral conversation if it needs to.

F. But of course I don't really take Digital Telephony as an initiative to "clarify" governmental prerogatives. It seems clear to me that Digital Telephony, together with the "Clipper" initiative, prefigure a government strategy to set up an information regime that precludes truly private communications between individuals who are speaking in any way other than face-to-face. This I think is an expansion of government authority by almost any analysis.

III. Digital Telephony, Cryptography, and the Fourth Amendment

A. In talking with law enforcement representatives such as Gail Thackeray, one occasionally encounters the view that the Fourth Amendment is actually a _grant_ of a Constitutional entitlement to searches and seizures. This interpretation is jolting to those who have studied the history of the Fourth Amendment and who recognize that it was drafted as a limitation on government power, not as a grant of government power. But even if one doesn't know the history of this amendment, one can look at its language and draw certain conclusions.

B. The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

C. Conspicuously missing from the language of this amendment is any guarantee that the government, with properly obtained warrant in hand, will be _successful_ in finding the right place to be searched or persons or things to be seized. What the Fourth Amendment is about is _obtaining warrants_--similarly, what the wiretap statutes are about is _obtaining authorization_ for wiretaps and other interceptions. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Title III nor the other protections of the ECPA constitute an law-enforcement _entitlement_ for law enforcement.

D. It follows, then, that if digital telephony or widespread encryption were to create new burdens for law enforcement, this would not, as some law-enforcement representatives have argued, constitute an "effective repeal" of Title III. What it would constitute is a change in the environment in which law enforcement, along with the rest of us, has to work. Technology often creates changes in our social environment--some, such as the original innovation of the wiretap, may aid law enforcement, while others, such as powerful public-key cryptography, pose the risk of inhibiting law enforcement. Historically, law enforcement has responded to technological change by adapting. (Indeed, the original wiretaps were an adaptation to the widespread use of the telephone.) Does it make sense for law enforcement suddenly to be able to require that the rest of society adapt to its perceived needs?

IV. Cryptography and the First Amendment

A. Increasingly, I have come to see two strong links between the use of cryptography and the First Amendment. The two links are freedom of expression and freedom of association.

B. By "freedom of expression" I mean the traditionally understood freedoms of speech and the press, as well as freedom of inquiry, which has also long been understood to be protected by the First Amendment. It is hard to see how saying or publishing something that happens to be encrypted could not be protected under the First Amendment. It would be a very poor freedom of speech indeed that dictated that we could *never* choose the form in which we speak. Even the traditional limitations on freedom of speech have never reached so far. My decision to encrypt a communication should be no more illegal than my decision to speak in code. To take one example, suppose my mother and I agree that the code "777", when sent to me through my pager, means "I want you to call me and tell me how my grandchild is doing." Does the FBI have a right to complain because they don't know what "777" means? Should the FBI require pager services never to allow such codes to be used? The First Amendment, it seems to me, requires that both questions be answered "No."

C. "Freedom of association" is a First Amendment right that was first clearly articulated in a Supreme Court case in 1958: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. In that case, the Court held that Alabama could not require the NAACP to disclose a list of its members residing in Alabama. The Court accepted the NAACP's argument that disclosure of its list would lead to reprisals on its members; it held such forced disclosures, by placing an undue burden on NAACP members' exercise of their freedoms of association and expression, effectively negate those freedoms. (It is also important to note here that the Supreme Court in effect recognized that anonymity might be closely associated with First Amendment rights.)

D. If a law guaranteeing disclosure of one's name is sufficiently "chilling" of First Amendment rights to be unconstitutional, surely a law requiring that the government be able to read any communications is also "chilling," not only of my right to speak, but also of my decisions on whom to speak to. Knowing that I cannot guarantee the privacy of my communications may mean that I don't conspire to arrange any drug deals or kidnapping-murders (or that I'll be detected if do), but it also may mean that I choose not to use this medium to speak to a loved one, or my lawyer, or to my psychiatrist, or to an outspoken political activist. Given that computer-based communications are likely to become the dominant communications medium in the next century, isn't this chilling effect an awfully high price to pay in order to keep law enforcement from having to devise new solutions to new problems?

V. Rereading the Clipper Chip announcements

A. It is important to recognize that the Clipper Chip represents, among other things, an effort by the government to pre-empt certain criticisms. The language of announcements makes clear that the government wants us to believe it has recognized all needs and come up with a credible solution to the dilemma many believe is posed by the ubiquity of powerful cryptography.

B. Because the government is attempting to appear to take a "moderate" or "balanced" position to the issue, its initiative will tend to pre-empt criticisms of the government's proposal on the grounds of *process* alone.

C. But there is more to complain about here than bad process. My rereading of the Clipper Chip announcements will reveal that the government hopes to develop a national policy that includes limitations on some kinds of cryptography. Take the following two statements, for example:

D. 'We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities.'

E. 'The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." '

F. It is clear that neither Digital Telephony nor the Clipper Chip make any sense without restrictions on other kinds of encryption. Widespread powerful public-key encryption, for example, would render useless any improved wiretappability in the communications infrastructure, and would render superfluous any key-escrow scheme.

G. It follows, then, that we should anticipate, consistent with these two initiatives, an eventual effort to prevent or inhibit the use of powerful private encryption schemes in private hands.

H. Together with the Digital Telephony and Clipper Chip initiatives, this effort would, in my opinion, constitute an attempt to shift the Constitutional balance of rights and responsibilities against private entities and individuals and in favor of law enforcement. They would, in effect, create _entitlements_ for law enforcement where none existed before.

I. As my notes here suggest, these initiatives may be, in their essence, inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of expression, association, and privacy.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, backdoors, clipper chip, crypto wars, encryption, free speech, law enforcement

Australian Government Continues To Push Encryption Backdoors It Refuses To Call Encryption Backdoors

from the 'we-like-to-call-them-little-miracles' dept

The Australian government has decided it can beat math at its own game. The laws of math will be defeated by the laws of Australia, the government declared last year. In an effort to tackle something this article calls "terror encryption," the Home Office says laws punching holes in encryption for government access are just around the corner.

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull may not understand the laws of mathematics or how signing a bunch of words into law doesn't actually suspend them, but he does know tech companies are going to figure it out for him. Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton agrees: the government just needs to mandate broken encryption and the tech companies will handle the rest. It's for the good of the country, if not the world.

Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton says ubiquitous encryption - a tool used for secure personal banking platforms and some messaging services - has become a major obstacle to terror investigations.

"We know that more than 90 per cent of counter-terrorism targets are using it for communications, including for attack planning here," Mr Dutton told the National Press Club in Canberra on Wednesday.

"More than 90 per cent." That's seems high! I'm sure it's based on rigorous examination of facts and probably includes terrorists visiting bank websites or anything else with an HTTPS URL. Dutton wants platform providers and device makers to make it as easy as dropping a wiretap on a phone line, so it's clear the government isn't just seeking access to data at rest.

Whatever it is that the Australian government wants, it seems unable to articulate in words. The analogies used (phone wiretaps) suggest the stuff Dutton says he doesn't want is exactly what he wants.

Mr Dutton said he didn't want a "backdoor key" to encrypted devices or a licence to hack into services.

But he argued law enforcement access to encrypted communications should be on the same basis as telephone and other intercepts, in response to warrants issued by the court.

If Dutton wants access to ongoing communications on platforms secured with end-to-end encryption, than a backdoor or a golden key is really what he wants, even if he's unwilling to say so in public. Dutton also suggests companies will be punished for "allowing" terrorists to communicate using their encrypted platforms.

"Companies ought to be concerned with the reputational harm that comes from terrorists and criminals using their encryption and social media platforms for illicit ends," he said.

"As a society we should hold these companies responsible when their service is used to plan or facilitate unlawful activity."

I'm sure Dutton has more in mind than officious bad-mouthing of uncooperative tech companies by government officials. If holes are mandated, companies will be facing more than "reputational damage." But tut-tutting about scofflaw tech companies isn't going to budge the public opinion needle. Many people trust their communication platforms far more than their governments. And they value personal security and privacy far more than they value government access to communications, no matter how often the word "terrorism" is deployed as a justification.

Filed Under: australia, backdoors, encryption, responsible encryption, surveillance

Israeli Tech Company Says It Can Crack Any Apple Smartphone

from the thus-endeth-the-going-dark-conversation dept

Could this be the answer to FBI Director Chris Wray's call for broken device encryption?

In what appears to be a major breakthrough for law enforcement, and a possible privacy problem for Apple customers, a major U.S. government contractor claims to have found a way to unlock pretty much every iPhone on the market.

Cellebrite, a Petah Tikva, Israel-based vendor that's become the U.S. government's company of choice when it comes to unlocking mobile devices, is this month telling customers its engineers currently have the ability to get around the security of devices running iOS 11. That includes the iPhone X, a model that Forbes has learned was successfully raided for data by the Department for Homeland Security back in November 2017, most likely with Cellebrite technology.

Big, if true, but not exactly the answer Wray, and others like him, are seeking. Cellebrite claims it can crack any Apple device, including Apple's latest iPhone. This is a boon for law enforcement, as long as they have the money to spend on it and the time to send the device to Cellebrite to crack it.

It won't scale because it can't. The FBI claims it has thousands of locked devices -- not all of them Apple products -- and no one from Cellebrite is promising fast turnaround times. Even if it was low-cost and relatively scalable, it's unlikely to keep Wray from pushing for a government mandate. Whatever flaw in the architecture is being exploited by Cellebrite is likely to be patched up by Apple as soon as it can figure out the company's attack vector. And, ultimately, the fact that it doesn't scale isn't something to worry about (though the FBI doubtless will). No one said investigating criminal activity was supposed to easy and, in fact, a handful of Constitutional amendments are in place to slow law enforcement's roll to prevent the steamrolling of US citizens.

Cellebrite's service apparently disables lockscreen protection, allowing the company to root around in the phone's innards to pull out whatever law enforcement is seeking. This also apparently works with Android devices, although that news is far less surprising than discovering Apple's security measures have been defeated. Default encryption isn't an option for all Android devices and that operating system is generally considered to be the a pile of vulnerabilities d/b/a consumer software.

While this won't end calls for weakened encryption, it does at least give law enforcement agencies another option to deploy against locked devices. But I don't expect it to change the rhetoric. Those calling for "responsible encryption" don't really want private sector solutions, no matter how much they claim to want to hold a "conversation" about lawful access. They want tech company subservience. They want the government -- via judicial, executive, or legislative branch -- to put companies in their place. In their opinion, tech companies have been getting uppity and forgetting the private sector exists to serve the government. It's not just a Chris Wray problem. Plenty of government officials feel the same way. But the complaints about "going dark" are going to ring that much hollower when solutions are being offered by private companies other than the ones the FBI is just dying to smack around.

Filed Under: cracking, encryption, going dark, iphone, privacy, responsible encryption
Companies: apple, cellebrite

Report On Device Encryption Suggests A Few Ways Forward For Law Enforcement

from the time-to-dial-back-the-apocalyptic-narrative dept

Another paper has been released, adding to the current encryption discussion. The FBI and DOJ want access to the contents of locked devices. They call encryption that can be bypassed by law enforcement "responsible encryption." It isn't. A recent paper by cryptograpghy expert Riana Pfefferkorn explained in detail how irresponsible these suggestions for broken or weakened encryption are.

This new paper [PDF] was put together by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine. (h/t Lawfare) It covers a lot of ground others have and rehashes the history of encryption, along with many of the pro/con arguments. That said, it's still worth reading. It raises some good questions and spends a great deal of time discussing the multitude of options law enforcement has available, but which are ignored by FBI officials when discussing the backdoors/key escrow/weakened encryption they'd rather have.

The paper points out law enforcement now has access to much more potential evidence than it's ever had. But that might not always be a good thing.

The widespread use of cloud storage means that law enforcement has another potential source of evidence to turn to when they do not have access to the data on devices, either because the device is unavailable or the data on the device is encrypted. Not all of this digital information will be useful, however. Because storage is cheap or even free, people keep all sorts of non-noteworthy electronic documents forever.

What's unsaid here is law enforcement should be careful what it wishes for. Encryption that allows government on-demand access may drown it in useless data and documents. If time is of the essence in cases where law enforcement is seeking to prevent further criminal activity, having a golden key may not move things along any faster. I'm sure the FBI and others would prefer access all the same, but this does point to a potential negative side effect of cheap storage and endless data generation.

And the more access law enforcement has, the more chances there are for something to go horribly wrong on the provider's end.

How frequently might vendors be asked to unlock phones? It is difficult to predict the volume of requests to vendors, but a figure in the tens of thousands per year seems reasonable, given the number of criminal wiretaps per year in the United States and the number of inaccessible devices reported by just the FBI and Manhattan District Attorney’s Office. As a result, each vendor, depending on its market share, needs to be able to handle thousands to tens of thousands of domestic requests per year.

Such a change in scale, as compared to the software update process, would necessitate a change in process and may require a larger number of people authorized to release an unlock code than are authorized to release a software update, which would increase the insider risk.

The paper also runs down stats provided by the FBI and the Manhattan DA's office. It notes the overall number of unlockable phones has continued to rise but points out these numbers aren't all that meaningful without context.

In November 11, 2016, testimony to this committee, then-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) General Counsel James Baker reported that for fiscal year 2016, the FBI had encountered passcodes on 2,095 of the 6,814 mobile devices examined by its forensic laboratories. They were able to break into 1,210 of the locked phones, leaving 885 that could not be accessed. The information Baker presented did not address the nature of the crimes involves nor whether the crimes were solved using other techniques.

[...]

Although existing data clearly show that encryption is being encountered with increasing frequency, the figures above do not give a clear picture of how frequently an inability to access information seriously hinders investigations and prosecutions.

It goes on to note that we may never see this contextual information. Any attempt to collect this data would be hindered by law enforcement's reluctance to provide it, and there are currently no visible efforts being made by agencies to determine just how often encryption stymies investigations. Whatever would actually be reported would be tainted by subjective assessments of encryption's role in the investigation. However, without more context, the endless parade of locked device figures is nothing more than showmanship in service to the greater goal of undermining encryption.

The paper helpfully lists several options law enforcement can pursue, including approaching cloud services for content stored outside of locked devices. It also points out the uncomfortable fact that law enforcement doesn't appear to be making use of tools it's always had available. One of these options is compelled production of passwords or biometric data to unlock phones. While the Fifth Amendment implications of compelled password production are still under debate, it's pretty clear fingerprints or retinas aren't going to receive as much Constitutional protection.

On top of that, there's the fact that a number of device owners have already voluntarily provided copies of encryption keys, and these can likely be accessed by law enforcement using a standard warrant or an All Writs Act order.

[M]any storage encryption products today offer key escrow-like features to avoid data loss or support business record management requirements. For example, Apple’s full disk encryption for the Mac gives the user the option to, in effect, escrow the encryption key. Microsoft Windows’ BitLocker feature escrows the key by default but allows users to request that the escrowed key be deleted. Some point to the existence of such products as evidence that key recovery for stored data can be implemented in a way that sensibly balances risks and benefits at least in certain contexts and against certain threats. In any case, data that is recoverable by a vendor without the user’s passcode can be recovered by the vendor for law enforcement as well. Key escrow-type systems are especially prevalent and useful where the user, or some other authorized person such as the employer, needs access to stored data.

The report also claims law enforcement "had not kept pace" with the increase of digital evidence. It posits the problem is a lack of funding and training. Training is almost certainly a problem, but very few law enforcement agencies -- especially those at the federal level -- suffer for funding or expertise. This might be due to bad assumptions, where officials believed they would always have full access to device contents (minus occasional end user initiative on encryption). When it became clear they wouldn't, they began to seek solutions to the problems. This put them a few steps behind. Then there are those, like Manhattan DA Cy Vance and FBI Director Chris Wray, who are putting law enforcement even further behind by pushing for legislation rather than focusing their efforts on keeping officers and agents well-supplied and well-trained.

While the report does suggest vendors and law enforcement work together to solve this access "problem," the suggestions place the burden on vendors. One suggested fix is one-way information sharing where vendors make law enforcement aware of unpatched exploits, allowing the government (and anyone else who discovers it) to use these vulnerabilities to gain access to communications and data. It's a horrible suggestion -- one that puts vendors in the liability line of fire and encourages continued weakening of device and software security.

The report also points out the calls for harder nerding have been at least partially answered. The proposed solutions aren't great. In fact, one of them (running lawful access keys and software update keys through the same pipeline) is terrible. But it's not as though no one on the tech side is trying to come up with a solution.

Several individuals with backgrounds in security and systems have begun to explore possible technical mechanisms to provide government exceptional access. Three individuals presented their ideas to the committee.

• Ernie Brickell, former chief security architect, Intel Corporation, described ways that protected partitions, a security feature provided by future microprocessor architectures, could be used to provide law enforcement access to devices in their physical possession, provide remote access by law enforcement, or provide key escrowed cryptography for use by applications and nonescrowed cryptography for a set of “allowed” applications.

• Ray Ozzie, former chief technical officer and former chief software architect, Microsoft Corporation, argued that if a user trusts a vendor to update software, the user should be able to trust the vendor to manage keys that can provide exceptional access. He proposed that this extension of the trust model used for software updates could be used to provide government exceptional access to unlock mobile devices. Ozzie also provided the committee with materials describing how this approach could be extended to real-time communications such as messaging.

• Stefan Savage, professor of computer science and engineering, University of California, San Diego, described how phone unlock keys could be stored in hardware and made available via an internal hardware interface together with a “proof-of-effort” lock that together would require physical possession and a time delay before law enforcement could unlock a device.

The report points out these are only suggestions and have yet to be rigorously examined by security professionals. But their existence belies the narrative pushed by the FBI in its search for a federal statutory mandate. There are experts trying to help. Unfortunately, every solution proposed is going to require a sacrifice in device security.

The problem is complex, if you choose to believe it's a problem. It may be troublesome that law enforcement can't have access to device contents as easily as they could five years ago, but it's not the threat to public safety anti-encryption enthusiasts like Chris Wray and Cy Vance make it out to be. Encryption use has gone up while crime rates have remained steady or decreased. The emphasis on cellphones as the ultimate investigative goldmine is misplaced. Plenty of options remain and law enforcement spent years solving crimes without having one-stop access to communications and personal documents. An ancient discovery known as "fire" has put evidence out of reach for hundreds of years, but no one's asking the smart guys at Big Match to come up with a solution. Things are harder but they're not impossible. What is impossible is what Wray and others are asking for: secure compromised encryption.

Filed Under: doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, responsible encryption

FBI Director Still Won't Say Which Encryption Experts Are Advising Him On His Bizarre Approach To Encryption

from the perhaps-there's-a-reason-he-won't-say... dept

For the past few months, we've talked about how FBI Director Chris Wray has more or less picked up where his predecessor, James Comey, left off when it came to the question of encryption and backdoors. Using a contextless, meaningless count of encrypted seized phones, Wray insists that not being able to get into any phone the FBI wants to get into is an "urgent public safety issue."

Of course, as basically every security expert has noted, the reverse is true. Weakening encryption in the manner that Wray is suggesting would create a much, much, much bigger safety issue in making us all less safe. Hell, even the FBI used to recommend strong encryption as a method to protect public safety.

Last month, we wrote about a letter sent by Senator Ron Wyden to Wray, simply asking him to list out the names of encryption experts that he had spoken to in coming to his conclusion that it was possible to create backdoors to encryption without putting everyone at risk.

I would like to learn more about how you arrived at and justify this ill-informed policy proposal. Please provide me with a list of the cryptographers with whom you've personally discussed this topic since our July 2017 meeting and specifically identify those experts who advised you that companies can feasibly design government access features into their products without weakening cybersecurity. Please provide this information by February 23, 2018.

Technically, Wray still has a week or so to answer, but earlier this week during an open Senate hearing involving the heads of various law enforcement and intelligence agencies, Wyden asked Wray when he might get that list and Wray sidestepped the question entirely, other than saying he'd discuss it later (in a closed session):

If you can't see that, here's my quick transcript (though I do recommend watching the video just to see the smartass smirk on Wray's face through much of it).

Wyden: On encryption. Director Wray, as you know, this isn't a surprise because I indicated, I would ask you about this. You have essentially indicated that companies should be making their products with backdoors in order to allow you all to do your job. And we all want you to protect Americans and at the same time, sometimes there are these policies that make us less safe and give up our liberties. And that's what I think we get with what you all are advocating which is weak encryption. Now this is a pretty technical area, as you and I have talked about it. And there's a field known as cryptography. I don't pretend to be an expert on it. But I think there is a clear consensus among experts in the field against your position to weaken strong encryption. So I have asked you for a list of the experts that you have consulted. I haven't been able to get it. Can you give me a date this afternoon when you will give me... this morning, a sense of when we will be told who are these people who are advising you to pursue this route. Because I don't know of anybody who is respected in this field who is advising that it is a good idea to adopt your position to weaken strong encryption. So can I get that list?

Wray: I would be happy to talk more about this topic this afternoon. My position is not that we should weaken encryption. My position is that we should be working together -- the government and the private sector -- to try to find a solution that balances both concerns.

Wyden: I'm on the program for working together. I just think we need to be driven by objective facts, and the position you all are taking is out of sync with what all the experts in the field are saying and I'd just like to know who you all have been consulting, and we'll talk more about it this afternoon.

So, a few points on this. First, Wray doesn't answer the actual question of when he'll be giving Wyden a list, but rather suggests he'll discuss this topic in the closed session. But the question of when he'll be delivering his list of experts he's consulted shouldn't be a classified piece of information. It's just a date. Second, Wray immediately misrepresents the issue, by saying he's not asking to weaken encryption. Because he has to realize by now that that's exactly what he's asking to do. If he doesn't recognize that then it's clear he doesn't understand the first thing about how encryption actually works. Third, he's incorrectly talking about "balancing both concerns." But there's no balancing question here. It is not a "balance" between "security" and "civil liberties" as some keep trying to make it out to be. This is a concern between good security and bad security that makes everyone less safe (oh, and also has the potential to violate civil liberties).

It does not inspire confidence to have Wray have trouble answering such a basic question and then totally misrepresent how this all works, even in his two sentence answer.

Filed Under: backdoors, chris wray, cryptographers, encryption, experts, fbi, ron wyden

White Paper Points Out Just How Irresponsible 'Responsible Encryption' Is

from the a-hole-for-one-is-a-hole-for-all dept

In recent months, both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and FBI Director Christopher Wray have been calling for holes in encryption law enforcement can drive a warrant through. Both have no idea how this can be accomplished, but both are reasonably sure tech companies can figure it out for them. And if some sort of key escrow makes encryption less secure than it is now, so be it. Whatever minimal gains in access law enforcement obtains will apparently offset the damage done by key leaks or criminal exploitation of a deliberately-weakened system.

Cryptography expert Riana Pfefferkorn has released a white paper [PDF] examining the feasibility of the vague requests made by Rosenstein and Wray. Their preferred term is "responsible encryption" -- a term that allows them to step around landmines like "encryption backdoors" or "we're making encryption worse for everyone!" Her paper shows "responsible encryption" is anything but. And, even if implemented, it will result in far less access (and far more nefarious exploitation) than Rosenstein and Wray think.

The first thing the paper does is try to pin down exactly what it is these two officials want -- easier said than done because neither official has the technical chops to concisely describe their preferred solutions. Nor do they have any technical experts on board to help guide them to their envisioned solution. (The latter is easily explained by the fact that no expert on cryptography has ever promoted the idea that encryption can remain secure after drilling holes in it at the request of law enforcement.)

If you're going to respond to a terrible idea like "responsible encryption," you have to start somewhere. Pfefferkorn starts with an attempt to wrangle vague law enforcement official statements into a usable framework for a reality-based argument.

Rosenstein’s remarks focused more on data at rest than data in transit. For devices, he has not said whether his preferred legislation would cover a range of devices (such as laptop and desktop computers or Internet of Things-enabled appliances), or only smartphones, as in some recent state-level bills. His speeches also leave open whether his preferred legislation would include an exceptional-access mandate for data in transit. As some commentators have pointed out, his proposal is most coherent if read to be limited in scope to mobile device encryption and to exclude data in transit. This paper therefore makes the same assumption.

Wray, meanwhile, discussed both encrypted messaging and encrypted devices in his January 2018 speech. He mentioned “design[ing] devices that both provide data security and permit lawful access” and asked for “the ability to access the device once we’ve obtained a warrant.” Like Rosenstein, he did not specify whether his “responsible solution” would go beyond mobile devices. As to data in transit, he used a financial-sector messaging platform as a real-world example of what a “responsible solution” might look like. Similarly, though, he did not specify whether his “solution” would be restricted to only certain categories of data—for example, communications exchanged through messaging apps (e.g., iMessage, Signal, WhatsApp) but not web traffic (i.e., HTTPS). This paper assumes that Wray’s “solution” would, like Rosenstein’s, encompass encryption of mobile devices, and that it would also cover messaging apps, but not other forms of data in transit.

Either way, there's no one-size-fits-all approach. This is somewhat ironic given these officials' resistance to using other methods, like cellphone-cracking tools or approaching third parties for data and communications. According to the FBI (in particular), these solutions "don't scale." Well, neither do either of the approaches suggested by the Rosenstein and Wray, although Rosenstein limiting his arguments to data at rest on devices does suggest a somewhat more scalable approach.

The only concrete example given of how key escrow might work to access end-to-end encrypted communications is noted above: a messaging platform used for bank communications. An agreement reached with the New York state government altered the operation of the banking industry's "Symphony" messaging platform. Banks now hold encrypted communications for seven years but generate duplicate decryption keys which were held by independent parties (neither the banks nor the government). But this analogy doesn't apply as well as FBI Director Christopher Wray thinks it does.

That agreement was with the banks about changing their use of the platform, not with the developer about changing its design of the platform, which makes it a somewhat inapt example for illustrating how developers should behave “responsibly” when it comes to encryption.

Applied directly, it would be akin to asking cellphone owners to store a copy of a decryption key with an independent party in case law enforcement needed access to the contents of their phone. If several communication platform providers are also involved, then it becomes the generation of several duplicates. What this analogy does not suggest is what Wray and Rosenstein suggest: the duplication or development of decryption keys by manufacturers solely for the purpose of government access.

These officials think this solution scales. And it does. But scaling increases the possibility of the keys falling into the wrong hands, not to mention the increased abuse of law enforcement request portals by criminals to gain access to locked devices and accounts. As Pfefferkorn notes, these are problems Wray and Rosenstein have never addressed. Worse, they've never even admitted these problems exist.

What a quasi-escrow system would do is exponentially increase attack vectors for criminals and state-sponsored hacking. Implementing Rosenstein's suggestion would provide ample opportunities for misuse.

Rosenstein suggests that manufacturers could manage the exceptional-access decryption key the same way they manage the key used to sign software updates. However, that analogy does not hold up. The software update key is used relatively infrequently, by a small number of trusted individuals. Law enforcement’s unlocking demands would be far more frequent. The FBI alone supposedly has been unable to unlock around 7,800 encrypted devices in the space of the last fiscal year. State and local law enforcement agencies, plus those in other countries, up the tally further. There are thousands of local police departments in the United States, the largest of which already amass hundreds of locked smartphones in a year.

Wray's suggestion isn't any better. In fact, it's worse. His proposal (what there is of it) suggests it won't just be phone manufacturers providing key escrow but also any developer offering end-to-end encrypted communications. This vastly increases the number of key sources. In both cases, developers and manufacturers would need to take on more staff to handle law enforcement requests. This increases the number of people with access to keys, increasing the chances they'll be leaked, misused, sold, or stolen.

The large number of law enforcement requests headed to key holders poses more problems. Bogus requests are going to start making their way into the request stream, potentially handing access to criminals or other bad actors. While this can be mitigated with hardware storage, the attack vectors remain open.

[A]n attacker could still subvert the controls around the key in order to submit encrypted data to the HSM [hardware security module] for decryption. This is tantamount to having possession of the key itself, without any need to attack the tamper-resistant HSM directly. One way for an attacker to get an HSM to apply the key to its encrypted data input is to make the attacker’s request appear legitimate by subverting the authentication process for exceptional-access demands.

These are just the problems a key escrow system would produce on the supply side. The demand for robust encryption won't go away. Criminals and non-criminals alike will seek out truly secure platforms and products, taking their business to vendors out of the US government's reach. At best, forced escrow will be a short-term solution with a whole bunch of collateral damage attached. Domestic businesses will lose sales and other businesses will be harmed as deliberately-introduced holes in encryption allow attackers to exfiltrate intellectual property, trade secrets, conduct industrial espionage, and engage in identity theft.

Wray and Rosenstein tout "responsible encryption." But their arguments are completely irresponsible. Neither has fully acknowledged how much collateral damage would result from their demands. They've both suggested the damage is acceptable even if there is only a minimal gain in law enforcement access. And they've both made it clear every negative consequence will be borne by device and service providers -- from the additional costs of compliance to the sales lost to competitors still offering uncompromised encryption. There's nothing "responsible" about their actions or their public statements, but they both believe they're 100% on the right side of the argument. They aren't and they've made it clear the wants and needs of US citizens will always be secondary to the wants and needs of law enforcement.

Filed Under: doj, encryption, going dark, responsible encryption, rod rosenstein