Miami Heat Owner Sues Blogger & Google Over 'Unflattering' Photo

from the this-isn't-going-to-end-well dept

What is it with super rich sports owners and SLAPP suits? Remember Redskins owner Dan Snyder? Well here's a situation that seems even more ridiculous. Ranaan Katz is a minority owner of the Miami Heat, who just won the NBA championship. You might think he'd be pretty happy right now. Instead, he's suing a blogger and Google, claiming a copyright violation over of an "unflattering photo." Seeing as the photo in question is now quite newsworthy, here it is (and we're happy to explain fair use theories to Katz's lawyers, if they'd like):
The full story is even more ridiculous as you dig into the details. It turns out this is the second time that Katz has gone after this blogger. The first time was for defamation. For what? For running a blog that talked about Katz and his company... and, from the sound of things, posted legal documents that apparently Katz didn't want posted.

Where it gets really bizarre is the massive overreach on the defamation side of things. Because the bar for defamation on a public figure it quite high, Katz's lawyers claim that he's not a public figure -- despite being an owner of the Miami Heat, despite being a well-known successful real estate developer, and despite the fact that there's a street named after him and an "official day" in his honor. Instead, his lawyers have argued that getting the press to report on Katz's legal overreach is an attempt "to make Katz a public figure" even though he clearly is one and has been one. Either way, the blogger, represented by Marc Randazza, responded strongly to the ridiculousness of Katz' original lawsuit. You can see that response below, calling out the fact that a demand for an injunction against any future publication on the blog (as Katz requests) is clear prior restraint and based on no accepted legal theory in a defamation case.

Separate from that lawsuit, it looks like Katz and his lawyers have now tried a second approach, which appears to be an attempt to use the DMCA to censor. He claimed that the "unflattering image" above violates his copyright. A DMCA takedown was apparently issued to Google, who refused to comply. So now both the blogger and Google have been sued. Of course, it's unclear to me how he even holds the copyright in the photo, since he didn't take it. Either way, given the previous actions in the case, it certainly feels like this is a SLAPP-style suit, filed just to be a nuisance to the blogger who didn't fold under the defamation claims (and yes, to Katz's lawyer, that's an opinion). Update: I've added the filing in the copyright lawsuit below, which adds one other detail: the photograph is not registered for copyright in the US. Katz's lawyers point out that since the photo was originally from Israel it doesn't need to be registered, which is true, but could limit the effectiveness of any lawsuit. Separately, according to Randazza, Katz claims to have had the copyright in the photo assigned to him from the original photographer. None of that changes any of the analysis here about the lawsuits in question.

Of course, all this has really done is activate the Streisand Effect, and get a lot more attention to Katz, to the lawsuits, to the blog and, of course, to the photo itself. You would think that someone with so much money and business success would have thick enough skin to know how to ignore such things. In the meantime, Randazza has pointed out how bizarre it is to go from suing an individual blogger to adding one of the largest companies in the world to the fight on the other side, for no good reason:

My guess is that their strategy is this: If you keep whiffing against a small time blogger, you might as well then just pick a fight with one of the biggest companies in the world. Sit back and get your popcorn and watch how this one works out. I want to thank Mr. Katz for bringing in an 800 lb gorilla to help me in his unsupportable SLAPP suit.

We have yet to speak to Google's lawyers about this case, but we expect that they will be receptive to standing up for the First Amendment along with us.

Sometimes I think there should be mandatory training on the Streisand Effect before one is allowed to become a lawyer.

Filed Under: defamation, first amendment, ranaan katz, slapp, streisand effect
Companies: google, miami heat, nba

Speech-Via-Algorithm Is Still Speech, And Censoring It Is Still Censorship

from the this-makes-no-sense dept

I have to admit that I'm really confused about law professor and FTC advisor Tim Wu's general position on a variety of topics lately. In the past, I've often found him to be thoughtful and (very) insightful on various topics concerning internet policy and regulations. But, at times, he seems to go off the deep end, such as with his recent claims that big automatically means a monopoly. But, his latest piece in the NYTimes goes way further than anything I've seen before: claiming that search results shouldn't get First Amendment protection because it's "computers" speaking, not humans.

Is there a compelling argument that computerized decisions should be considered speech? As a matter of legal logic, there is some similarity among Google, Ann Landers, Socrates and other providers of answers. But if you look more closely, the comparison falters. Socrates was a man who died for his views; computer programs are utilitarian instruments meant to serve us. Protecting a computer’s “speech” is only indirectly related to the purposes of the First Amendment, which is intended to protect actual humans against the evil of state censorship. The First Amendment has wandered far from its purposes when it is recruited to protect commercial automatons from regulatory scrutiny.

This is wrong. And dangerous.

Let's be clear here: what search engines do is present opinions. They are opinions based on data programmed by humans. There is nothing special in that it's a computer that cranks through the data to output the opinion. Taken to its logical conclusion, Wu's argument is that we should protect uninformed opinions not based on an algorithmic exploration of the data -- but the second you add in a computer to crunch the numbers, that opinion is no longer protected. Contrary to Wu's assertion that this "wanders" from the point of the First Amendment, I'd argue the exact opposite. The First Amendment should protect all kinds of speech, but we should be especially happy about that which is based on data.

Two responses to Wu's piece help highlight this point nicely. Julian Sanchez notes that Wu's argument seems to suggest that any computer generated content doesn't get First Amendment protections -- and that would include computer-generated video games and movies:

Consider an argument for denying First Amendment protection to movies and video games. Human beings, we all agree, have constitutional rights—but mere machines do not. When the computer in your game console or DVD player “decides” to display certain images on a screen, therefore, this is not protected speech, but merely the output of a mechanical process that legislatures may regulate without any special restrictions. All those court rulings that have found these media to be protected forms of expression, therefore, are confused efforts to imbue computers with constitutional rights—surely foreshadowing the ominous rise of Skynet.

Probably nobody finds this argument very convincing, and it hardly takes a legal scholar to see what’s wrong with it: Computers don’t really autonomously “decide” anything: They execute algorithms that embody decisions made by their human programmers.

Similarly, Paul Levy takes Wu to task by comparing his argument to things like university rankings:

As the alumnus of a college that proudly rejects the proposition that the quality of educational institutions can be “measured by a series of data points,” I will take any opportunity to denigrate the Useless News and World Distort rankings of colleges, law schools and institutions of higher education.  But it would never have occurred to me to offer a “speech by computer” theory as a basis for denying that the ranking is speech or that it is protected opinion.  Maybe a stupid opinion, but that is not a basis for shutting the raters down, or enjoining them to change their rating criteria.  Indeed, this theory seems to me absurd — it is not the computers that have free speech rights, any more than printing presses have free speech rights.  It is the media companies that own the printing presses that have free speech rights, and by the same token it is the people and companies who program the computers and publish the results of their calculations that enjoy protection under the First Amendment.

Pretending that Google is a computer that magically generates answers, absent humans regular and consistent input into its algorithm, is a strange position to take, and it really does suggest that we should only protect opinions that don't include a component that uses a computer to analyze the data. I can't see how that's smart policy or anything close to what was intended in the concept of free speech.

Filed Under: algorithms, first amendment, search engine, tim wu
Companies: google

Supreme Court Overrules Fine For Naked Butt On TV; Punts On 1st Amendment Question

from the indecently-speaking dept

We've been following a series of cases over the past few years concerning the FCC's attempt to fine TV stations for "indecency." These cases include "fleeting expletives" like Bono cursing during an awards show ("this is fucking brilliant") to fleeting nudity like the Janet Jackson wardrobe malfunction... and, the case that just got decided: NYPD Blue's episode where actress Charlotte Ross is shown getting ready for a shower, dropping her robe and having her bare buttocks on screen for approximately seven seconds. As we noted, when the FCC originally went after ABC for this footage, it helped drive millions of people to go seek out the footage online, getting her butt a lot more attention than if they'd just let it go. Either way the case has meandered through the courts, with an early decision saying the policy was a First Amendment problem and a later ruling striking down the fine.

Some of the cases involving both fleeting expletives and fleeting nudity got merged into one along the way. The Supreme Court actually already had this case a few years ago and rejected one of the lower court decisions that found the policy "arbitrary and capricious," but failed to rule on whether the fine was legal. The appeals court, on remand, still tossed out the ruling, now saying that if the policy wasn't arbitrary and capricious, it was too vague.

The Supreme Court has now agreed (pdf), and rejected the FCC's fine.

The Commission failed to give Fox or ABC fair notice prior to the broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be found actionably indecent. Therefore, the Commission’s standards as applied to these broadcasts were vague, and the Commission’s orders must be set aside.

That said, the Court (as it has been doing with annoying regularity these days) was very, very careful to try to make the scope of the ruling as narrow as possible. In this case, it specifically refused to rule on the First Amendment question of whether or not the FCC's indecency policy violated the First Amendment. That's too bad. Justice Ginsburg did issue a very, very brief concurrence, in which she suggested that the Court really ought to review its original ruling (FCC v. Pacifica) which established that the FCC could issue fines for indecency on TV. In other words, she seems to think that it's time to review the First Amendment question:

In my view, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), was wrong when it issued. Time, technological advances, and the Commission's untenable rulings in the cases now before the Court show why Pacifica bears reconsideration.

Furthermore, even in the majority opinion, there are hints of concern about the First Amendment issues raised here:

This would be true with respect to a regulatory change this abrupt onany subject, but it is surely the case when applied to theregulations in question, regulations that touch upon “sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 372 (1964); see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 870–871 (1997) (“The vagueness of [a content-based regulation of speech] raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect”).

Hopefully, this means that if the First Amendment question does finally come before the court, it's ready to overturn that earlier ruling. Of course, I'm still amazed at how this very same Supreme Court always seems to ignore the "obvious chilling effect" issue when it comes to cases involving copyright law... but that's another story for another post.

Filed Under: bono, charlotte ross, fcc, first amendment, indecency, janet jackson, scotus, wardrobe malfunction
Companies: abc

Chris Evans' Lawyer Threatens Forum; Apparently Unfamiliar With Free Speech, Safe Harbors & Streisand Effect

from the a-little-lesson dept

What is it with lawyers who default to being over-aggressive, without (apparently) stopping to think about how such aggression will almost certainly backfire? Today's such story focuses on one Neil Meyer, a prominent Beverly Hills lawyer, who represents the Hollywood actor Chris Evans. On June 12th, a blog called the "Celebrity Smack Blog" posted a story with the title "Exclusive! Chris Evans Might Have An STD", which has now been taken down, though Google still has a cache at the time of this writing. It's the sort of typical crap you'd expect from a site called "Celebrity Smack Blog" -- a totally unsourced rumor from an anonymous person (described as "one of my best sources in Los Angeles" which means absolutely nothing). Given that it's on a silly blog and not particularly believable, chances are this is the kind of story that would get a brief bit of buzz and then disappear. Indeed a few other celebrity gossip sites appear to have picked up on the story, but most people don't seem to care, and it certainly doesn't appear on any major site.

Either way, a user on the forum Lipstick Alley posted the story to that forum, with a link to the original, some quotes from the story and the comments, and a random picture of Evans. Meyer quickly sent a threat letter that really tries to include everything but the kitchen sink. It argues that even though Lipstick Alley is a forum, it is responsible for what its users post (which is clearly wrong under Section 230 of the CDA). It argues that the site "fraudulently" and "intentionally" published the post, again despite it being a forum where a user posted the information. Meyer also seems to claim that reporting on Evans -- regardless of whether or not the information is factual -- is a misuse of his publicity rights (which is clearly wrong under the First Amendment). He also claims that merely linking to content that may be defamatory is, itself, against the law. He demands that the site "permanently remove any mention of Mr. Evans" even beyond this particular story -- which, again, has no legal basis.

Oh, and lest we forget, he pretends that he can unilaterally declare that the letter itself is secret and that the site cannot even "report on its substance" let alone publish it:

This letter is confidential legal communication and you are specifically prohibited from publishing any portion of it or reporting publicly on its substance in any way.

Some of the sites (including the original) that had the story appear to have taken them down, suggesting that perhaps they received similar letters. However, the folks who run Lipstick Alley, thankfully, work with lawyer Paul Levy, and have an understanding of the basics of the law and their own liability. Levy has responded to the letter (embedded below) and posted Meyer's letter and his own response publicly. I highly recommend reading both letters. Levy calls Meyer's attention to the legal failings of his threat letter -- and suggests that Meyer's strategy is bound to backfire, due to the Streisand Effect:

Lipstick Alley is not gong to comply with any of your demands. And, indeed, I cannot think of a strategy better suited to drawing both yourself and Evans into disrepute than by sending a letter such as yours. Given that you are billed as an "entertainment lawyer," it is amazing that you may have never taken the "Streisand effect" into account in deciding whether to send your letter.

I actually think there are a few places where Levy even underplays the ridiculousness of the original letter. Beyond the fact it's a user forum, Meyer's arguments, taken to their logical conclusion, would mean that no site could report on or show an image of Chris Evans without his permission. That makes little sense and the First Amendment clearly makes a mockery of such a claim.

And we won't even bother to discuss the ridiculousness of telling Lipstick Alley that it can't even report on the substance of the letter, let alone its specific contents.

Of course, there are a few clues that perhaps the reason that Meyer is unfamiliar with things like the Streisand Effect has to do with the fact that he's not particularly tech savvy. The letter notes that it was "dictated" (old school!), for one thing. But, I also noticed that Meyer's law firm, Stone, Meyer, Genow, Smelkinson & Binder, LLP, doesn't even appear to have a website. The domain which is listed as a part of Meyer's email address in the letter... takes you to a GoDaddy holding page. Yes, GoDaddy.

Hint to Hollywood stars: if you're going to hire an entertainment lawyer to try (badly) to police rumors about you online with questionable legal threats, perhaps first check to see if they have a website themselves.

Filed Under: cda, chris evans, first amendment, hollywood, neil meyer, paul alan levy, safe harbors, streisand effect

Big Ruling Says Using Trademarks In Artistic Works Can Be Protected Under The First Amendment

from the speak-freely dept

For years, we've talked about just how preposterous it is that various brands claim filmmakers and other content creators can't show their logos without permission. There are even lawyers who specialize in watching movies to make sure no brands appear without a license. Seriously. And this trademark madness extends to other areas as well. A few years ago, we wrote about a crazy case, involving the University of Alabama suing an artist named Daniel Moore (a huge fan of the school's football team) who regularly did paintings of great moments in the football team's history. The case was slightly complicated by the fact that there had been a licensing relationship between the University and Moore at various times, but eventually that went away and the legal fight was over whether Moore could paint depictions of football games without permission. Among the arguments the University made was one that said the very uniforms the players wore were covered by trademark, and depicting them without a license (or, hell, without a registered trademark symbol) was not to be allowed. After many years of fighting through the courts, a district court in 2009 tried to split the baby by saying that Moore could create and sell paintings... but not merchandise (mugs, calendars, etc.) based on those paintings.

This week, the ruling in the appeal of that case, in the 11th Circuit, was finally handed down -- and it's a good one. The court seems to recognize the basic First Amendment issues at play and takes a pretty broad view of how the use of trademarks in artistic works should be perfectly legal. The court relies heavily on Rogers v. Grimaldi -- which is more focused on publicity rights, but has a Lanham Act component as well. In the end, this ruling basically says the First Amendment issue trumps all, and the "likelihood of confusion" here is minimal as well, but takes a back seat to the First Amendment concerns:

In this case, we readily conclude that Moore’s paintings, prints, and calendars are protected under the Rogers test. The depiction of the University’s uniforms in the content of these items is artistically relevant to the expressive underlying works because the uniforms’ colors and designs are needed for a realistic portrayal of famous scenes from Alabama football history. Also there is no evidence that Moore ever marketed an unlicensed item as “endorsed” or “sponsored” by the University, or otherwise explicitly stated that such items were affiliated with the University. Moore’s paintings, prints, and calendars very clearly are embodiments of artistic expression, and are entitled to full First Amendment protection. The extent of his use of the University’s trademarks is their mere inclusion (their necessary inclusion) in the body of the image which Moore creates to memorialize and enhance a particular play or event in the University’s football history. Even if “some members of the public would draw the incorrect inference that [the University] had some involvement with [Moore’s paintings, prints, and calendars,] . . . that risk of misunderstanding, not engendered by any overt [or in this case even implicit] claim . . . is so outweighed by the interest in artistic expression as to preclude” any violation of the Lanham Act. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001.

That part is focused on the paintings. Unfortunately, the ruling on the merchandise side is still a little complex. The court rejects the summary judgment in favor of the University, but basically says it's an issue that needs to go to trial, rather than be resolved by summary judgment. Even more unfortunately, the court notes that Moore has "waived" his First Amendment and fair use claims for this part of the dispute. That seems like a bad decision by Moore, but there appears to be little he can do about it at this point. Moore chose to focus on a different argument, suggesting that the fact that he holds the copyright in the paintings trumps the trademark issue -- an argument the court basically tosses aside. Instead, the remaining issue is if the University effectively gave tacit approval to Moore to sell those items under the theory of "acquiescence." That discussion has little to do with the bigger questions.

Overall, though, the first part of this ruling is quite useful in showing that the First Amendment trumps trademark in artistic works in many cases, and hopefully will be relied on widely to stop ridiculous assertions about things like trademarks showing up in movies and other artwork without getting permission.

Filed Under: daniel moore, fair use, first amendment, licensing, university of alabama

Megaupload Filings Show Massive Flaws In US Case, Ask Court To Dismiss

from the and-off-we-go dept

While we've been mostly focused on the New Zealand aspects of the Megaupload case, the company (and the individuals sued) have made two interesting filings with the district court in the US concerning the case. The first one (pdf) seeks a dismissal of the company from the case for an issue we discussed back in April: criminal law requires that the defendant be served, and you can't serve a foreign company. Thus, there is no legal way for Megaupload to be tried under criminal law:

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe specific requirements for serving a summons on a corporate defendant in a criminal case. These requirements are neither vague nor optional – they quite explicitly require both service upon an agent of the corporation and a mailing to the corporation’s last known address within the United States. The Federal Rules do not contemplate service of a criminal summons on a wholly foreign corporation without an agent or offices in the United States. Wholly foreign corporations, therefore, may not be prosecuted for alleged violations of federal criminal law unless they waive service. In short, a corporation such as Megaupload cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of this Court for criminal proceedings absent its consent.

That is, however, separate from the cases against the individuals involved in Megaupload. However, as Megaupload's lawyer is suggesting if the case is dropped against the corporate entity, it may require dismissing the orders freezing the firms' assets.

The second filing (pdf) doesn't get the same headlines, since it's not asking for complete dismissal, but in many ways it's the more interesting filing. That filing is an effort to get seized assets back in order to pay for their defense. But it also foreshadows the rather key issue in the case, which we've raised in the past about both this case and the Rojadirecta case: the US government is flat out making up a concept that inducement to infringe violates criminal copyright law.

To be clear, under the Grokster decision, the US Supreme Court made up a concept known as "inducement" as violating copyright law. Such "inducement" is not found anywhere in the copyright statute. To do so, the court relied on principles found in civil law, not criminal law. Criminal law -- for hopefully obvious reasons -- has very different standards, and "inducement" is certainly not possible under criminal copyright law as it's written today. There is, of course, the concept of "aiding and abetting" within criminal laws, but there are clear limits in which that can be used -- and the US government completely fails to show all the necessary elements for aiding and abetting (in part because it tries to mix and match the actions of Megaupload users with the defendants -- but you can't do that). That is, while users may have willfully infringed (one prong of criminal copyright infringement), the government needs to show that the defendants themselves were involved in direct willful infringement. Instead, the government assumes that if users were willful, but the defendants were not, it can simply use some sort of made up legal transitive property to pretend that they can hang the willful infringement on the defendants.

What's amazing is that all of these issues were clearly raised in the Rojadirecta case, but as has been clear from the filings in that case, the Department of Justice still doesn't understand how it's mixing and matching the law here... so it just went ahead and did the exact same thing in the Megaupload case. Perhaps it realizes that it's making up a legal concept and just hoping that judges accept such things (which judges aren't supposed to do in criminal cases, since such common law rulings by a judge can only apply to civil law), or perhaps the Justice Department attorneys really don't understand the law. It honestly feels like it may be the latter.

Federal crimes are delimited by statute. It is for Congress, not for the courts, to say (and to warn) what constitutes a crime. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 213-14 (quoting United States v. Wilberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820) (“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment”)). Courts interpreting penal statutes will exercise restraint and adopt a narrow statutory interpretation unless Congress has definitely indicated that it intended a harsher reading. Id. Because “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984), reh’g denied, 456 U.S. 1112 (1984), the Act cannot be read to make secondary infringement a crime.

The filing also highlights, repeatedly, that the indictment fails to actually establish the basic facts necessary to bring the charges that are being brought:

These omissions are not small, they are not subtle, they are not few, and they are not inconsequential. The Government has attempted to make out an all-encompassing case of an alleged criminal copyright conspiracy without bothering to allege concrete specifics of the actual infringement allegedly committed. It has attempted to build one of “the largest criminal copyright cases ever brought by the United States” out of conclusory ipse dixit, reciting statutory verbiage and nothing more. Certainly Counts Four through Eight do not reflect facts supplying requisite probable cause.

Separately, the filing points out that the government's claims presume that every dollar earned by Megaupload was earned because of criminal activity. That, of course, is ridiculous for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that we know that there were a significant number of legitimate users and uses of Megaupload. Furthermore, the filing correctly points out that you can only use US copyright law against infringing acts that occurred inside the US, and yet the government assumes that every act of infringement is subject to US copyright law -- which is simply false -- and has resulted in much more straightforward cases being dismissed.

The Government seeks forfeiture of all of Defendants’ revenue because it has assumed all of the revenue is tainted by crime. But there is no probable cause to support that assumption, which by no means follows from—and is, indeed, at odds with—acknowledged aspects of Megaupload’s business that stand well removed from the alleged infringement. To put matters in perspective, consider the maximum statutory fine that might be imposed upon Megaupload and the individual Defendants were they convicted on all five criminal counts, Counts Four through Eight, concerning the alleged copyright infringement: The maximum fine per count for a first offense of criminal copyright infringement under 21 U.S.C. § 506(a) would be $250,000 for the individual and $500,000 for the corporation, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319(b), 3571(b)(3), 3571(c)(3), such that imposing the fine upon these Defendants consecutively across all five counts would result in a combined fine of $7,500,000.00. Yet tens of millions of dollars, more than ten times the amount of that maximum fine, have been seized from these Defendants as derived from the business. The math does not compute.

The filing also points out that Megaupload has substantial non-infringing uses, effectively using the Betamax ruling as a defense. I'm not sure this actually applies in the criminal context, but does raise some reasonable questions about whether or not you could even make a legitimate civil case against Megaupload.

Finally, the filing notes the basic First Amendment questions raised by the seizure itself, citing the Fort Wayne Books case:

The Government’s shuttering of Megaupload, purely on its own ipse dixit, is a modernday throwback to the unconstitutional prior restraints on speech that are a notorious enemy of the First Amendment. In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989), for instance, the State of Indiana filed a civil action against several owners of adult bookstores alleging RICO violations and, based on an ex parte showing of probable cause, seized “the real estate, publications, and other personal property comprising each of the three bookstores operated by the corporate defendants.” Id. at 51. Even assuming that the seized materials were obscene, and thus unprotected, the Court held that “our cases firmly hold that mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circulation.” Id. at 66; see United States v. Jenkins, 974 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1992) (“It is, of course, well-settled that the government may not seize presumptively protected expressive materials without a prior judicial determination of obscenity”). The bottom line is that the Government cannot order seizure of “literally thousands of books and films [to be] carried away and taken out of circulation by [a] pretrial order” until “the claimed justification for seizing books or other publications is properly established in an adversary proceeding.” Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 67; see, e.g., Multi-Media Distributing Co., Inc. v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 606, 614 (N.D. Ind. 1993)...

Here, the Government has effectively accomplished what Fort Wayne Books foreclosed. It has shuttered Megaupload, and, with it, a treasure trove of books, films, videos, photos, digital expression of every stripe, without any adversarial proceeding at all. What is more, if the Government had its way, 1,100-servers worth of that collection would have been wiped, with members of the public (including rightful owners of that material) left the poorer for it. In this sense, what the Government has done in this case raises further alarms, for it has seized not only allegedly infringing copies, but effectively taken down everything that was on Megaupload.com, taking works out of circulation entirely. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492 (1973) (explaining that “a single copy of a book or film may be seized and retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause” but it is when a book or film is “taken out of circulation completely” that the seizure rises to the level of a prior restraint). The parallels between this case and cases in which prior restraints have been denounced as unconstitutional are unsettling and, if nothing else, warrant heightened judicial skepticism and scrutiny

I'm sure we'll see these arguments show up again in a motion to dismiss, but for now, they're just being raised in an effort to get access to some of the seized funds. Either way, the further this case moves forward, the worse it looks for the feds case, which increasingly looks insanely weak (and highlights just how ridiculously over-aggressive the US government has been in pursuing the case).

Filed Under: criminal procedure, doj, first amendment, forfeiture, seizure
Companies: megaupload

North Carolina Tells Blogger That Providing Dietary Advice Is Illegal, Blogger Tells NC To Read The 1st Amendment

from the lawsuit-on dept

A guy named Steve Cooksey developed Type II diabetes a few years back, and in response ended up embracing a paleolithic diet and exercise regime (something that's increasingly popular these days). It seemed to work quite well for him, and he ended up setting up a website called Diabetes-Warrior.net in which he wrote about that and related issues. As more people got interested in the site and what he was saying, he also started answering questions and providing advice on the site (a la Dear Abby) as well as setting up a (fee-based) "coaching" service to help those interested in a similar diet/exercise regime.

The State of North Carolina decided all of this was illegal. Apparently providing any advice to others about dieting, without a license, puts you in some hot water.

It turns out that, like nearly every other state, North Carolina has a law that regulates the practice of "dietics/nutrition." There are a set of rules, which require getting a license before you can provide any sort of dietary advice. Like many such operations it appears the regulatory regime here is much more about limiting the supply of professionals to keep pricing artificially high, rather than any real health or safety mission.

Now, it's good to stop people from outright lying about their credentials, and there may even be some gray areas where someone is actively implying professional expertise that they don't have. But can you actually ban amateurs from sharing their opinions on diets at all?

It appears that Cooksey, along with the Institute for Justice are about to test that question, filing a lawsuit claiming that the attempt to prevent him from providing advice was a violation of his First Amendment rights.

But the First Amendment does not allow the government to ban people from sharing ordinary advice about diet, or scrub the Internet—from blogs to Facebook to Twitter—of speech the government does not like. North Carolina can no more force Steve to become a licensed dietitian than it could require Dear Abby to become a licensed psychologist.

IJ also made a short animated video about the case:

This seems like an important question that could impact a number of different "regulated" industries as well. I recognize the idea that protecting the public from fraudulent or scammy advisers is what may appear to be a laudable goal, but it's wide open to abuse in which ideas that the government doesn't like are censored for not coming from a "licensed" practitioner.

Filed Under: dietics, first amendment, institute for justice, north carolina, steve cooksey

Who's The Coward? Thin-Skinned NY Politicians Try To Ban Anonymous Comments

from the wow dept

Last fall, we were absolutely amazed at a paper written by some NY state politicians arguing that we have too much free speech, and that we need a "more refined" interpretation of the First Amendment, that outlaws things like "leaving improper messages on online message boards." Well... as covered by Dave Kravets at Wired, some NY state politicians have introduced the same bill, in both houses of the legislature, that would outlaw anonymous speech online. The actual bill is not particularly subtle.

It lays out the purpose front and center:

AN ACT to amend the civil rights law, in relation to protecting a person's right to know who is behind an anonymous internet posting

Most of the "bill" is definitions, but the key part is as follows -- written in all caps like a true internet troll:

A WEB SITE ADMINISTRATOR UPON REQUEST SHALL REMOVE ANY COMMENTS POSTED ON HIS OR HER WEB SITE BY AN ANONYMOUS POSTER UNLESS SUCH ANONYMOUS POSTER AGREES TO ATTACH HIS OR HER NAME TO THE POST AND CONFIRMS THAT HIS OR HER IP ADDRESS, LEGAL NAME, AND HOME ADDRESS ARE ACCURATE. ALL WEB SITE ADMINISTRATORS SHALL HAVE A CONTACT NUMBER OR E-MAIL ADDRESS POSTED FOR SUCH REMOVAL REQUESTS, CLEARLY VISIBLE IN ANY SECTIONS WHERE COMMENTS ARE POSTED.

This will, of course, never become law (or if it does, would never survive a Constitutional First Amendment challenge). The Supreme Court has been pretty clear:

Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees them to express critical minority views . . . Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society.

You would think that lawmakers would know this, but apparently their fragile egos can't take people making fun of them online.

What's amazing is that the lawmakers behind this seem oblivious to the concerns about the bill, insisting that anonymous posting can only be used for negative reasons."

Too often, online bullies hide behind their anonymity as they inflict pain. My legislation turns the spotlight on cyber-bullies by forcing them to reveal their identity or have their post removed. Once a bully is identified, steps can be taken to end the harassment. Bullying is no laughing matter. The more we can do to combat this abuse, the better off we will all be as a society.

That's from Assemblyman Jim Conte, a sponsor of the bill, who should be forced to not only read the details of the McIntyre case, but also to produce a report about the importance of anonymous speech throughout US history, starting with the Federalist Papers and moving forward from there. It's scary that these people who govern us who don't seem to understand what they're talking about.

Oh, and separately, I kicked this post off by mentioning the paper from last year. It's worth noting that these bills are not actually being brought forth by the same politicians. We have a general policy here at Techdirt where we don't mention political parties unless the party itself is key to the story. When we wrote that original comment, someone in the comments accused us of "hiding" the fact that the paper was written by Democrats. As we noted, we would have written it exactly the same way if it were written by Republicans. So, I will point out that the politicians who introduced bill in both houses in NY are... Republicans this time, which I'm only bringing up because of the contrast from last time. This isn't about parties. It's about clueless politicians, and neither mainstream party has a monopoly on (or, even, a shortage of) them.

Filed Under: anonymous comments, first amendment, jim conte, new york

Judge In Grooveshark Lawsuit Orders Blog To 'Preserve' Logs That Had Already Been Deleted

from the dangerous-ruling dept

Earlier this month, we noted a problematic attempt by Grooveshark's parent company, Escape Media, to subpoena information on an anonymous commenter on the blog site Digital Music News. As we noted at the time, Universal Music had referenced that comment in its lawsuit against Grooveshark. It seemed bizarre to reference an anonymous comment, especially one that seemed like pure hearsay (it made claims about things Grooveshark employees had done). In the lawsuit between UMG and Grooveshark it seemed completely pointless (and, indeed, Grooveshark has been arguing as much in that particular lawsuit). Yet, at the same time, Grooveshark subpoenaed DMN in an attempt to find out who posted that comment. DMN resisted the subpoena, noting that it discards and overwrites its log files every few days anyway, and these files had been long gone already. It also pointed to California's shield law for journalists and the basic First Amendment protections for anonymous speech.

Unfortunately, the judge has ruled against Digital Music News, and ordered it to produce the information. The judge has indicated that he will not require this information during the appeal that DMN's lawyer indicated they would file... but did require "preservation" of the evidence during that time. Beyond the shield law and First Amendment issues raised here (we'll get to those), this raises a very, very troubling proposition for any website that regularly overwrites its log files. Escape Media had argued that even if DMN overwrote the log files, it should be required to hand over the information on the subpoena just in case the overwritten data was still available and could be recovered.

So, what do you do in this situation? Under the judge's order to "preserve" data that has already been deleted, what is a site to do? Do they have to immediately stop using their existing hardware and set up an entire clone -- hanging onto all of the original hardware for who knows how long, just in case a forensics expert can find a tiny piece of (useless for this case anyway) data that has been overwritten probably a hundred times already? That seems crazy. Paul Levy, from Public Citizen, who is representing DMN on this issue, highlighted many of the issues in his blog post about this:

The imposition of data preservation requirements on a journalist who is not a party to the litigation raises questions apart from the merits of the order. Journalists need to be able to discard data when they no longer have any of their own use for it.  Yes, “the public has a claim to every man’s evidence,” but don’t members of the public who are not involved in litigation have the right to discard information despite the fact that it might turn out to be useful evidence for somebody else’s case?  Does the public have a claim to heroic efforts on every man’s part?  Shouldn’t there be higher standards for subpoenas demanding intrusive searches for discarded data in the hands of third parties?

The problem is compounded when it is a journalist that has been subpoenaed.  To what extent does society have any entitlement to make journalists in particular take heroic measures, such as searching the nooks and crannies of their computer equipment for fragments of discarded data?  The judge was sensitive to the fact that our client here is a journalist, telling Escape Media that he was not prepared to allow it to make any general search of Digital Music News’ computers.  But an issue that we may have to pursue on appeal is whether a journalist should ever have to undertake such drastic preservation efforts in aid of a lawsuit in which he is not involved, particularly given the relative unlikelihood that fragments of identifying data remain on his computers somewhere.

Indeed, the problem is broader than just journalists.  Companies often keep log files with respect to server visits (and hosted comments), but there is little business justification for keeping those logs forever; so generally speaking they are discarded after a period of time (EFF's best practices recommendations are worth a look in this regard).  Does the mere act of discarding log files set a company up for the possibility of a demand for forensic examination of the underlying servers, in the hope that some fragment of the data might be recovered?  In this regard, the trial court's order has chilling implications for other California companies, even beyond the issue of journalists. 

Issues of how to preserve the data remain to be decided.  This is not like just leaving one of your file cabinets untouched for a period of time; it is not even as easy as making sure you don't delete any of your email.  Preserving the web site while creating a copy of the underlying servers is a complicated process, requiring the services of a forensic specialist, and the cost could be substantial.  The estimates that we have been given are well into the five figures; but even the cost of several thousand dollars would be an enormous imposition on this small company.

It really is quite a difficult issue, and if the ruling stands, could become a massive headache for any company in California.

Separately, we should not ignore the First Amendment and shield law issues. DMN is not a party in this case, and it's not even clear why this information is needed. Escape/Grooveshark can and should point out that the information contained in the comment is pure hearsay so it shouldn't have to deal with it in the original case. The company has not filed a defamation claim against the commenter and does not appear to have met the high bar required to unveil an anonymous commenter anyway. This is a pretty big concern for any journalist or blogger out there. Being dragged into a third party dispute because someone comments on your site can represent a pretty big problem for a lot of smaller sites.

While Grooveshark's legal fight against the major labels certainly raises some interesting copyright questions, it's disappointing to see them going down this path and potentially creating serious problems not just for Digital Music News, but tons of journalists and websites.

Filed Under: anonymous speech, evidence, first amendment, log files, subpoena
Companies: digital music news, grooveshark, universal music

US Gov't Thinks Censorship Is Bad, Unless It's Paid For

from the funny-how-that-works dept

Aaron DeOliveira sends over an amusing statement summarizing the US government's views towards "censorship" on various issues:

Person: Hey, there are child porn sites everywhere!

Government: We are working on it.

Person: Hey, there's these pro-anorexia sites telling young girls to starve themselves!

Government: W/e. (editor's note for the old people: this means "whatever")

Person: Hey, registered hate groups like the KKK have websites!

Government: Well we can't stop them.

Person: I downloaded a movie from ThePirateBay.

Government: PIRATED MOVIES HARMING NOBODY? Time to censor the Internet!

It may seem quite amazing that the government seems to have a massive blindspot to how copyright conflicts with the First Amendment, but one big difference (of course) is that it's only that last situation that has a group of legacy industry players with strong lobbyist ties to DC pushing for such censorship to protect their outdated business models. And, suddenly, the rest of the chat makes a lot more sense.

Filed Under: censorship, first amendment, the pirate bay