FBI Tracks Down Cop Car Firebomber Using Info The FBI Claims Is Way Less Useful Than An Encryption Backdoor

from the I-don't-want-to-tell-you-how-to-do-your-job-but dept

For all of the DOJ and FBI's protestations that Apple (and others) just aren't doing enough to help out the federal government, the company actually provides a lot of assistance. No, Apple won't break encryption or build backdoors, but we live in a golden age of surveillance -- one so golden it's putting the surveillers at risk.

Bill Barr has continually attacked Apple for refusing to cede to his anti-encryption demands. Barr and FBI Director Chris Wray also like to complain that the information Apple can give them -- the stuff that isn't encrypted -- is mostly useless.

It isn't. And they know this. But this false claim provides a lot more leverage than the truth does. There's a wealth of information available that's not secured by encryption. A recent case covered by Thomas Brewster for Forbes shows how much investigators can do with Apple's assistance.

In the Seattle case, the FBI had been tipped off about the identity of a protester police believed had set fire to at least two police patrol vehicles during a protest against police brutality on May 30 following the killing of George Floyd, according to a search warrant reviewed by Forbes. The FBI checked the tip against surveillance feeds, news broadcast footage and social media images, deciding that the lead was worth chasing down. They obtained Verizon records for the suspect, Kelly Jackson, that revealed his location during the protests, what calls he made and the fact that he was using an iPhone 7.

That’s when the FBI called on Apple, asking for the suspect’s iCloud information. A trove of potential evidence was returned by the Cupertino tech giant, including screenshots hosted in Jackson’s photo library, according to the search warrant.

The key element here was the suspect's iCloud account. Videos showing the man building his Molotov cocktails, as well as videos showing him throwing them at cop cars, were found there. An image taken later in the day showed the suspect with his mask removed, allowing investigators to identify him. The account also contained a screenshot of a website providing the list of things needed to concoct the Molotov cocktails.

But there's more in the complaint [PDF]. Investigators also used Facebook to tie the suspect to his employer and drivers license data to identify him. The suspect had had previous interactions with law enforcement, which gave them access to his phone number. Phone records put him near the scene of the firebombings, as did videos uploaded by other protesters.

Investigators may not be able to crack the phone (then again, maybe they can), but they can still obtain plenty of information from data backed up to the cloud. This is true with most mobile devices, even though Barr and Wray seem to have a particular dislike for Apple. Pretending this isn't the case is self-serving at best and thoroughly dishonest at worst.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, doj, encryption, fbi, privacy, surveillance
Companies: apple, facebook

FISA Court Decides FBI, NSA Surveillance Abuses Should Be Rewarded With Fewer Restrictions On Searching 702 Collections

from the hey-we've-got-terrorists-to-catch-and-whatnot dept

A heavily-redacted opinion has been released by the FISA Court. Even with the redactions, it's clear the NSA and FBI have continued to abuse their Section 702 privileges. But rather than reject the government's arguments or lay down more restrictions on the use of these collections, the court has decided to amend the rules to make some of these abuses no longer abuses, but rather the new normal. This means there are now fewer protections shielding Americans from being swept up by the NSA collections or targeted using this data by the FBI.

Elizabeth Goitein of the Brennan Center has a good rundown of the abuses and the court's response. She points out in her Twitter thread that some of this can be traced back to the reforms enacted by the USA Freedom Act, which codified some restrictions but didn't go far enough to prevent future abuses or mandate better reporting of rule breaking by these agencies.

The opinion [PDF] notes the NSA found it too difficult to comply with a Section 702 requirement that at least one end of targeted communications involve someone outside of the United States. When faced with following this requirement and possibly losing access to communications it wanted, it simply chose to ignore the requirement.

On some prior occasions when NSA had tasked apparently [redacted] it violated its current targeting procedures [redacted] apparently in order to avoid loss of foreign-intelligence information. See Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Regarding [redacted] Certain Upstream Acquisitions, Feb. 21, 2019. Of course, the proper course would have been to seek amendment of the procedures earlier, rather than unilaterally deciding to deviate from them. Indeed, the Court's October 3, 2019, Order required the government to provide additional information about the disposition of information that was improperly acquired as a result of that incident.  

That's the problems with the "upstream" collection. The "downstream" collection has similar problems.

The Notice filed on August 23, 2019, explains that [redacted] post-tasking checks for selectors for certain [redacted] would not result in useful information regarding the location of the targets who use those facilities. See August 23, 2019, Notice, at 2-3. In anticipation of tasking such facilities, the proposed NSA targeting procedures have been revised to require [redacted] post-tasking checks only "in those cases in which [NSA]is technically capable of' performing them.

The courts says all of this is fine. It doesn't want the NSA to lose access to foreign intelligence information by tossing out stuff it can't be sure originated outside of the United States. It also doesn't want the NSA to lose similar information on the downstream side by tossing out anything whose origin can't be determined. So the court says it's the thought that counts and allows the NSA to disregard these requirements whenever they pose problems to analysts.

The Court expects that [redacted] post-tasking checks will be employed whenever feasible. On that understanding, and in view of the increased frequency with which acquired communications will be reviewed for indications that a target is in the United States when the [redacted] checks are not feasible, this revision does not impede the Court's finding that the 2019 NSA Targeting Procedures are "reasonably designed to ... ensure" that acquisitions are "limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States."

The court also addresses the NSA's information sharing with the FBI. And it comes to the conclusion that in close cases, the FBI should just get the info and determine on its own whether it's been legally acquired.

Under these provisions, NSA has some discretion in determining what information is "reliable" or "useful," and therefore must be passed to the FBI. The Court expects NSA to make such determinations on an individualized, case-by-case basis, by assessing the totality of information available about a particular target or selector. In close cases, the Court expects NSA to err on the side of providing information to the FBI, rather than withholding it, so that the FBI is better able to make informed and accurate decisions under its targeting procedures.

The FISA court notes this could result in abuse by the FBI but says that risk is worth taking since it would result in more efficient surveillance efforts.

One can conceive of circumstances in which omitting an FBI [redacted] under this provision could result in erroneous approval [redacted]. On the other hand, it seems likely that, in the vast majority of the situations in which the provision would be relied upon, the FBI would simply be avoiding duplicative effort that would not yield relevant new information.

This permission slip by the FISA Court is being handed out despite the FBI reporting recent violations of its Section 702 privileges.

In July 2019, an oversight review of [redacted] discovered 87 queries of raw FISA-acquired information in [redacted] that were not reasonably likely to retrieve foreign-intelligence information or evidence of a crime, including:

- queries of college students participating in a "Collegiate Academy"; and

- queries of individuals who had visited the FBI office (e.g., for maintenance).

The court says the FBI also abused access to run searches on a person filing a complaint and to vet potential informants.

The FBI also reported searching unminimized Section 702 collections 16,000 times -- all supposedly considered likely to "return foreign-intelligence information or evidence of a crime." The court says the FBI can really only justify seven of the 16,000 searches.

There's even more violations listed in the order, but at the end of it, all Judge James Boasberg has to say is that everyone involved did a pretty good job and just needs to try a bit harder in the future. And since trying hard is hard, he's made things easier by loosening a few restrictions. This obviously won't stop the never ending run of surveillance abuses. But it will designate fewer of them as "abuses," so things will at least look like they're improving, even if nothing has really changed.

Filed Under: 702, fbi, fisa court, fisc, nsa, section 202

FBI Horrified To Discover Ring Doorbells Can Tip Off Citizens To The Presence Of Federal Officers At Their Door

from the those-bastards-and-their-surreptitious-cameras dept

Ring's camera/doorbells may as well be branded with local law enforcement agency logos. Since Amazon acquired the company, Ring has cornered the law enforcement-adjacent market for home security products, partnering with hundreds of agencies to get Ring's products into the hands of residents. A lot of this flows directly through police departments, which can get them almost for free as long as they push citizens towards using Ring's snitch app, Neighbors, and allow Ring to handle the PR work.

So, it's hilarious to find out the FBI is concerned about Ring cameras, considering the company's unabashed love for all things law enforcement. The Intercept -- diving back into the "Blue Leaks" stash of exfiltrated law enforcement documents -- has posted an FBI "Technical Analysis Bulletin" [PDF] warning cops about the threat Ring cameras pose to cops. After celebrating the golden age of surveillance the Internet of Things has ushered in, the FBI notes that doorbell cameras see everyone who comes to someone's door -- even if it's people who'd rather the absent resident remained unaware of.

The document describes a 2017 incident in which FBI agents approached a New Orleans home to serve a search warrant and were caught on video. “Through the Wi-Fi doorbell system, the subject of the warrant remotely viewed the activity at his residence from another location and contacted his neighbor and landlord regarding the FBI’s presence there,” it states.

Ratted out by home security tech -- the kind often pushed on residents by law enforcement officers hoping to expand their surveillance networks by deputizing doorbells. Ring's cameras aren't just mute witnesses. Owners receive notifications when someone comes to their door and, depending on model, are able to hold conversations with them using built-in mics and speakers.

This means the sneak-and-peek feds might have been overhead discussing their tactical plans or specifics about the investigation. Hilarious. And this is how another FBI document on the subject of doorbells puts it, turning a normal home security device into a devious tool to be wielded against law enforcement:

“[S]ubject was able to see and hear everything happening at his residence” and possibly “covertly monitor law enforcement activity while law enforcement was on the premises…"

Covert monitoring is the best monitoring, as these FBI agents are well-aware. Sucks when it's the alleged perps doing the covert monitoring, I guess. And it sucks when the FBI decides now is the time to be hot and bothered when security cameras have been catching cops visiting/raiding properties for years. Audio recording isn't some new technology either, so if cops haven't been clued into this possibility already, they have no one to blame but themselves.

The documents are fascinating, and not just because they appear to turn Ring into a co-conspirator in crimes after so many years of being besties with law enforcement. It also shows how much goes unnoticed by people who routinely cite their years of training and experience when applying for search warrants. This should have been obvious from day one.

Filed Under: doorbells, fbi, ring, surveillance, warrants
Companies: amazon, ring

FBI Lawyer Criminally Charged For Lying To The FISA Court

from the thousands-of-lies;-one-(1)-guilty-plea dept

Earlier this year, the DOJ Inspector General released a report that -- surprise, surprise -- showed the FBI abusing its FISA privileges. The FBI had placed former Trump campaign advisor Carter Page under surveillance, suspecting (but only momentarily) that he was acting as an agent of a foreign power. (Guess which one.)

The report said the first wiretap request might have been valid, but subsequent requests for extensions weren't. The Inspector General said the agency cherry-picked info to keep the wiretap alive, discarding any evidence it had come across that would have ended the surveillance.

Even more damning, it found that FBI lawyer Kevin Clinesmith altered an email from another federal agency to hide Carter Page's involvement with that agency from the FISA court. The FISA court demanded the DOJ hand over information on any other cases before it that Clinesmith might have had a hand in. But that wasn't the end of it. Clinesmith was also referred to the DOJ for criminal charges.

The criminal charge has arrived. The criminal complaint [PDF] was filed in the DC federal district court. It details the email Clinesmith altered and submitted with the Carter Page surveillance extension request to the FISA court in 2017.

The original email -- sent to Clinesmith by an unnamed government agency -- said that Page was an "operational source" for this agency. The "Other Government Agency" (OGA) stated this in the email to Clinesmith:

[M]y recollection is that [Individual #1] was or is… [digraph] (two-letter designation for operational contacts) but the [documents] will explain the details. If you need a formal definition for the FISA, please let me know…

Here's how the email was submitted by Clinesmith to the FISA court (alteration in bold):

My recollection is that [Individual #1] was or is [digraph] and not a "source" but the [documents] will explain the details.

Clinesmith made some other false statements about Page's source status to the Supervisory Special Agent in charge of the case as well, but those aren't criminal offenses… just regular ol' intradepartmental lying.

During a series of instant messages between the defendant and the SSA, the defendant indicated that Individual #1 was "subsource" and "was never a source." The defendant further stated "[the OGA] confirmed explicitly he was never a source." The SSA subsequently asked "Do we have that in writing?"

We do. Falsified writing, but writing nonetheless. See above.

So, what's up next for the FBI liar lawyer? Looks like a felony conviction:

The former FBI attorney, Kevin Clinesmith, will plead to a single felony count of making a false statement, though his lawyer said it was not his intent to mislead the court that approved the original warrant in 2016 and three renewals in 2017.

“Kevin deeply regrets having altered the email. It was never his intent to mislead the court or his colleagues as he believed the information he relayed was accurate,” Clinesmith’s lawyer Justin Shur said in a statement. “But Kevin understands what he did was wrong and accepts responsibility.”

I would hope Clinesmith understood what he did wrong while he was doing it -- not just after being hit with a criminal complaint.

Some will argue Clinesmith's lying was due to his hatred of Trump. After all, special counsel Robert Mueller booted him (along with agents Peter Strzok and Lisa Page) after uncovering anti-Trump text messages sent by the lawyer, including one calling Vice President Mike Pence "stupid" and referring to the current GOP as "tea party on steroids."

But to assume that is to forget the FBI's long history of surveillance/wiretap abuses, its habitual lying to courts, and a penchant for voyeurism that goes far beyond what's necessary to close an investigation. Deep state conspiracies may be fun to construct, but the reality is the FBI has far more power than it has ever been able to wield responsibly.

Filed Under: carter page, fbi, fisa, fisa court, fisc, kevin clinesmith, lies, surveillance

Bill Barr Applauds FOSTA Sponsor's Clone Of Senate's Encryption-Breaking 'Lawful Access' Bill

from the DO-NOT-CONGRATULATE dept

I guess those "rule of law" folks don't care if a law is any good or will do what it intends to do without causing significant collateral damage. All they care about is that it's a law and, as a law, everyone should just subject themselves to it with a minimum of complaining.

The Attorney General is one of those "rule of law" people. Sure, he works for an administration that doesn't seem to care much about laws, propriety, or basic competence, but he's the nation's top cop, so laws and rules it is.

Bill Barr wants holes in encryption. He wants them so badly he's making up new words. "Warrant-proof encryption" isn't any different than regular encryption. It only becomes "warrant-proof" when the DOJ and FBI are talking about it, as though it was some new algorithm that only scrambles communications and data when the presence of a warrant is detected.

Far too many people in Washington think encryption is only valuable to criminals. Bills are in the works to compel encryption-breaking/backdooring. Some even handcuff these demands to Section 230 immunity -- a 2-for-1 special on shoveled shit straight from the federal government to Americans' favorite platforms and services.

Given how much the AG loves broad, abusive laws, it's no surprise he's going on the record to congratulate the author of another terrible law on her newest terrible piece of legislation.

Today, Attorney General William P. Barr issued the following statement on the introduction of a bill in the U.S. House of Representatives that would give law enforcement access to encrypted data with court approval in order to protect user privacy. The legislation was introduced by Representative Ann Wagner.

“I applaud Representative Wagner for introducing this critical lawful access legislation. Although strong encryption is vital, we cannot allow the tech industry to use encryption that blinds law enforcement and prevents it from thwarting or investigating serious crimes and national security threats, including terrorist plots, cyberattacks, and sexual exploitation."

Yes, let's applaud Rep. Ann Wagner. (Let's not.) Wagner was the sponsor behind FOSTA, the anti-sex worker law (d/b/a anti-sex trafficking legislation) that has been instrumental in roughly zero prosecutions -- the same prosecutions bill sponsors like Wagner claimed would be impossible without this new law.

That wasn't Wagner's only bogus claim. She also claimed the passage of FOSTA resulted in the immediate disappearance of 90% of "sex trafficking ads." This claim was proven false by fact checkers. The vast majority of the ads that vanished did so when Backpage shut down its adult ads prior to FOSTA's passage and prior to the DOJ's prosecution of the site's owners.

So, when Barr applauds Wagner, he's applauding someone who'll say almost anything to justify harmful legislation. This is the kind of person Barr admires because Bill Barr does the same thing, even though he's not writing new bills personally.

Here's some more of the "anything" Barr will say to applaud bad bill-making. Wagner's new thing is a clone of the Senate's "Lawful Access to Encrypted Data" bill. As you can guess by reading the bill's clunky title, it's another attempt to sacrifice encryption on the altar of law enforcement convenience, ensuring cops don't have to work too hard to collect evidence.

As we all are painfully aware, law enforcement agencies -- despite being around for more than 150 years -- have yet to solve a single crime. So it's imperative we give them access to gigabytes of communications and data so they can finally get around to putting a few criminals behind bars. That being said, here's what's being said by Barr in support of this bill. I have no idea what most of this has to do with anything, but it's full of things that sound bad.

The danger is particularly great for children, especially during this time of coronavirus restrictions when children are spending more time online. Survivors of child sexual abuse and their families have pleaded with technology companies to do more to prevent predators from exploiting their platforms to harm children. Unfortunately, these companies have not done enough, which is why this legislation is needed.

Well then. And I thought this administration was going to save kids from child predators by sending them to COVID-infested schools ASAP. But somehow this is the tech companies' fault, since they offer security to all users, even though a small percentage of users engage in criminal acts.

Barr finishes up his applause for Wagner and her LAED knockoff with what can only be a deliberate misreading of the issues at stake.

Privacy and public safety are not mutually exclusive. I am confident that the tech industry can design strong encryption that allows for lawful access by law enforcement. Encryption should keep us safe, not provide a safe haven for predators and terrorists.

The issue isn't privacy. The Constitution may help ensure privacy by limiting the government's intrusion into our lives and homes, but what's really at stake here is security. And security -- of devices and files and communications -- is directly related to public safety. You can't claim to be a champion of public safety when you're willing to make it easier for malicious hackers to gain access to email accounts, personal messages, smartphones, hard drives, computers, social media accounts, and everything else encryption shields from outsiders.

An encryption hole handcrafted for cops is a hole anyone else can use once it's discovered. A backdoor built into hardware or software isn't only going to be exploited by law enforcement. If the assistance is compelled, companies won't be able to patch security issues -- not if the flaw exists to serve the government. Tech companies in Australia -- where compelled technical assistance is already law -- are seeing their customer bases shrink as people look for options that aren't deliberately broken. The same thing will happen here in the US if bills like this become law.

Bill Barr is willing to sacrifice your security. And he won't be giving you anything in return. We won't be safer. We'll be more vulnerable than we've ever been. And Rep. Wagner wants to help him screw you over, just like she did to countless Americans with FOSTA.

Filed Under: ann wagner, backdoors, doj, encryption, fbi, fosta, laed, section 230, william barr

FBI Used Information From An Online Forum Hacking To Track Down One Of The Hackers Behind The Massive Twitter Attack

from the not-even-a-third-party-record dept

As Mike reported last week, the DOJ rounded up three alleged participants in the massive Twitter hack that saw dozens of verified accounts start tweeting out promises to double the bitcoin holdings of anyone who sent bitcoin to a certain account.

Three people were arrested. The ringleader appears to be a 17-year-old Tampa, Florida resident. The other two suspects are a 22-year-old Florida man and a 19-year-old from the UK. The hack was achieved through social engineering, giving the suspects access to an internal dashboard used by Twitter employees. This gave them access to multiple accounts, as well as all any direct messages sent to and from those accounts. That it was all just a bitcoin scam is somewhat of a relief, although not so much for victims who were duped out of nearly $100,000 via 400 transactions.

A rather interesting aspect of the investigation was pointed out by CNET reporter Alfred Ng. There are plenty of places investigators can go to obtain evidence stored on websites. But they don't always need a subpoena or warrant. Sometimes the information is already out in the open, having been harvested by malicious hackers and shared online. No paperwork needed.

If you can't read/see the tweet, it says:

wow, the FBI used a stolen database of OGUsers from April to identify one of the people allegedly involved in the Twitter hack

The information is contained in the criminal complaint [PDF] against 19-year-old UK resident Mason John Sheppard, a.k.a. "Chaewon." Ironically, a forum used by social media account hackers was itself hacked, resulting in a stash of info investigators were able to access without having to approach the site directly. From the complaint:

On April 2, 2020, the administrator of the OGUsers forum publicly announced that OGUsers website was successfully hacked. Shortly after the announcement, a rival criminal hacking forum publicly released a link to download the OGUsers forum database, claiming it contained all of the forum’s user information. The publicly released database has been available on various websites since approximately April 2020. On or about April 9, 2020, the FBI obtained a copy of this database. The FBI found that the database included all public forum postings, private messages between users, IP addresses, email addresses, and additional user information. Also included for each user was a list of the IP addresses that user used to log into the service along with a corresponding date and timestamp.

I reviewed records and communications that are part of this publicly-released database. I also found that on February 4, 2020, Chaewon exchanged private messages on OGUsers with another user of the forum during which Chaewon made a purchase of a video game username and was instructed to send bitcoin to address 188ZsdVPv9Rkdiqn4V4V1w6FDQVk7pDf4 (hereinafter, “the Chaewon purchase address”).

From there, the FBI was able to track bitcoin transactions, locate Sheppard's email address, and use that additional information to obtain information from virtual currency exchanges, Binance and Coinbase. With all of this information, the FBI was able to connect "Chaewon" and other usernames to Mason Sheppard to locate him and charge him with assisting in the hacking and bitcoin scam.

No warrants were needed. The info from the forum hack was already in the public domain. Bitcoin transactions are considered financial records, standing outside of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Even if it would possibly be more prudent to directly approach websites with subpoenas or warrants to obtain records, it appears to be far easier to just access data obtained from malicious hacking. And there are companies out there compiling information from data breaches and malicious hackings and selling access to law enforcement agencies who feel judges and additional paperwork will just slow them down.

Filed Under: 3rd party doctrine, 3rd party information, fbi, hacking, mason sheppard, ogusers, twitter hack, warrant

DOJ And Florida Officials Announce Arrests Relating To Twitter Hack

from the that-didn't-take-long dept

This seemed fairly inevitable, after it became quite clear that the Twitter hack from a few weeks ago was done by teen hackers who didn't seem to do much to cover their tracks, but officials in Florida announced the arrest of a Florida teenager for participating in the hack, followed by the DOJ announcing two others as well -- a 19 year old in the UK and a 22 year old in Florida.

As for why the first announced was separate and done by Florida officials, it appears that it involved a 17-year-old, and apparently it was easier to charge him as an adult under state laws, rather than under federal law, as with the other two.

Hillsborough State Attorney Andrew Warren filed 30 felony charges against the teen this week for “scamming people across America” in connection with the Twitter hack that happened on July 15. The charges he’s facing include one count of organized fraud, 17 counts of communications fraud, one count of fraudulent use of personal information with over $100,000 or 30 or more victims, 10 counts of fraudulent use of personal information and one count of access to computer or electronic device without authority.

Hillsborough County Jail records show Clark was booked into jail shortly after 6:30 a.m. Friday.

Warren’s office says the scheme to defraud “stole the identities of prominent people” and “posted messages in their names directing victims to send Bitcoin” to accounts that were associated with the Tampa teen. According to the state attorney, the scheme reaped more than $100,000 in Bitcoin in just one day.

Once again, it's looking like we got incredibly lucky -- that it was just some young hackers mostly messing around, rather than anyone with serious ill-intent and the ability to plan something bigger. It now appears that Twitter's internal security controls were kind of a mess. Over 1,000 employees had access to the control panel that would allow people to make the changes that enabled the hack -- and even that some staffers and contractors somehow made it a game to abuse their powers to spy on users.

Once again, it seems that Twitter needs to fix up a lot of things on the security side, including figuring out how to do end-to-end encryption for direct messages.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, florida, hack, twitter hack

The FBI Issued Warning To Law Enforcement Agencies After Being Duped By A Satirical 'Paid Protester' Website

from the our-nation's-best-and-brightest-I-guess dept

The federal government's "Fusion Centers" -- overseen by the DHS -- continue to provide us with the least bang for our federal buck. DHS officials have told Congress that the real purpose of the centers -- supposedly designed to gather intelligence about threats to the country -- is to generate conversations about terrorism. And those conversations are meant to portray the DHS as useful and worthy of continued funding.

Officials behind the false claims told Senate investigators that such reports weren’t meant to be “finished intelligence” and that despite their report’s inaccuracies and sloppy wording they considered it to be a “success.”

“[It did] exactly what it’s supposed to do – generate interest,” DHS officials told Senate investigators.

That's really not something we need. The country has plenty of terrorism awareness already. It doesn't need to have its time and money wasted on half-baked reports written by apparently half-baked DHS officials. Nor does it need the combined forces of federal and local law enforcement generating "leads" from citizens who are more racist than terrified, and pretending these bigoted assertions are useful intelligence. From this so-called "intelligence," DHS components (along with their local partners) head out into the field to violate rights and privacy. All this does is generate antipathy and waste tax dollars.

Apparently, government agencies will believe almost anything anyone tells them. How that's going to fight a war on terror is anyone's guess. A long-dormant satirical site recently became the focus of Fusion Center intel gathering, most likely thanks (at least in part) to some helpful citizens whose heads the joke sailed over.

A satirical website offering “rioters” for $99 each — with a “Car/Dumpster fire upgrade option available” — was cited by the FBI as evidence that “violent agitators” were being paid to cause mayhem in the early days of the George Floyd protests. Anti-terrorism agencies known as Fusion Centers, including the one in Maine, spread the bogus warning to local police departments, likely contributing to increased tension and conflict between officers and demonstrators in the streets.

A Situational Information Report by the FBI’s San Antonio Division, dated June 3, states: “unidentified individuals discussed various websites for payment to agitate and commit violent acts.” Payments to “violent agitators” were made “anonymously via Bitcoin” and “were rumored to be managed by members of Antifa.” The report claims “targets and locations were also discussed on the websites.”

The website, Protestjobs.com, was created in 2017 in response to conspiracy theories about George Soros funded paid protesters disrupting Trump events. After some initial popularity, the site receded into the internet background. But its popularity surged again after the George Floyd protests began, as theorists once again sold themselves on the idea that widespread civil unrest was actually the result of paid protesting.

The site's recent popularity generated articles at BuzzFeed and Reuters, both of which pointed out the site was satirical. Its popularity among conspiracy theorists resulted in a Snopes post debunking the notion that the site was actually offering paid protesters to whoever wanted to buy them.

We would expect debunkings like this to fail to persuade conspiracy theorists. What we wouldn't expect is for the nation's top investigative agency to do zero due diligence before informing other government agencies about this supposedly dangerous site.

Yet that same day, June 3, the FBI office in Texas was taking Protest Jobs deadly serious. Its report states: “The company offers a variety of protest packages that include, but are not limited to, proving spray paint artists, broken storefront windows, and car and dumpster fire upgrade options.”

The official warning sent to local cops in early June by the Maine Information and Analysis Center (MIAC) and other Fusion Centers linked to that report and said it “discusses the use of various websites for payment to individuals who agitate and commit violent acts during protests.”

Look, we understand securing the nation is a round-the-clock job. And it's not an easy one. But when civil liberties and privacy are on the line -- as they always are when there's a Fusion Center in operation -- we would prefer to see our intelligence gathering public servants be a bit more intelligent. The FBI being duped by a clearly satirical website is a horrible look, especially as the agency continues to increase its involvement in the national security arena. Its history of rights violations is already lengthy and disturbing. But now it's operating in an area with less oversight, laxer rules, and more deference from courts. It's only a matter of time before terror warriors end up ruining someone's life because they didn't get the joke.

Filed Under: dhs, fake news, fbi, fusion centers, protesters, warnings

The FBI Is Abusing The All Writs Act To Gain Access To Millions Of Travel Records

from the not-how-the-Third-Party-Doctrine-works dept

When the Fourth Amendment limits your surveillance plans, just go private. That seems to be the standard operating procedure for law enforcement agencies.

When cops aren't willing to canvas neighborhoods to find crime suspects, they just head to Google and ask for info on everyone who happened to be in the area. When they want more data on suspects they're tracking, they don't run subpoenas by judges. They just tap into collections of data harvested from breaches and malicious hacking, all compiled and collated by private companies for easy searchability. And when the CBP decides its own ALPR database just doesn't have enough plate photos in it, it taps into Vigilant's stash of 9 billion plates even as it admits it may not have the legal authority to do so.

The FBI does the same thing. Thomas Brewster reports for Forbes that the FBI has taken an expansive view of the Third Party Doctrine to grab records from a private company that complies records related to several different businesses. The company is Sabre, a publicly-traded entity that compiles travel bookings. First formed in 1964, the company, which began as a division of American Airlines, now handles bookings for nearly every major airline, hoovering up data on a third of world's air travelers.

Sabre gained a lot of traction as an investigative tool following the 9/11 attacks in 2001. But it continues to be used as a convenient compilation of travel records, sparing the FBI (and others) from approaching several different companies with subpoenas.

Brewster has dug up some recent documents detailing Sabre's relationship with the FBI.

[A]s detailed in one international cybercrime investigation, Sabre can be compelled to proactively watch and report on a persons’ whereabouts as soon as they start travelling. In an order from December 2019, feds asked Sabre to provide the FBI with “real-time” updates on the travel activities of a hacking suspect, an Indian fugitive called Deepanshu Kher. Sabre was told to provide “complete and contemporaneous ‘real time’ account activity information of the traveler [Kher] on a weekly basis” for six months. Sabre would provide “any travel orders, transactions or reservations” for the suspect.

The order goes on to note law enforcement has already tapped Sabre's vast stores of travel data to assist in three other investigations dating back to 2016. This appears to be an abuse of a very old legal doctrine -- one that dates back much, much further than even the 2001 attacks. The All Writs Act (b. 1789) is in play here, and it appears to be allowing the FBI to skirt subpoena requirements to go to a compiler of third party records, rather than the original source of those records.

[Attorney Mark Zwillinger {who represented Apple in the San Bernardino case}] says that if it wants to leverage the All Writs Act, the government has to show a third party is necessary and close enough to the matter at hand. With Sabre, given there were other ways of getting the information on Kher’s travel, such as records of him entering the U.S. via Customs and Border Protection databases, that necessity was questionable.

There are also questions on the “reasonableness of the burden” on Sabre, another requirement for All Writs Act orders, he adds. “In one particular order, it might not be that burdensome, but once you start to get some volume here, then it really turns Sabre into a sort of … government agent every time they want to find a fugitive.”

This isn't how the Act is supposed to work. The FBI is aware of the limits of the Act and its duty to comply with Constitutional rights and applicable law. Unfortunately, the first check on abuses like this is the federal court system, and it appears to be fine with the FBI imposing a burden on a third party one step removed from the original travel records. The second check is the recipient of bogus orders like these. But Sabre doesn't appear to be willing to call the government on its bullshit, allowing the FBI to continue defining the "third party" part of Third Party Doctrine as being anyone holding records created by someone else.

Filed Under: 3rd party records, 4th amendment, all writs act, doj, fbi, privacy, travel records