Federal Judge Says Public Has Right To Know About FBI's Biometric Database, Awards $20,000 In Legal Fees To FOIA Requester

from the more-forced-transparency dept

Another win for the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the American public in general. A federal judge has ruled the public has the right to know certain details about the FBI's facial recognition database.

U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan said the bureau's Next Generation Identification program represents a "significant public interest" due to concerns regarding its potential impact on privacy rights and should be subject to rigorous transparency oversight.

"There can be little dispute that the general public has a genuine, tangible interest in a system designed to store and manipulate significant quantities of its own biometric data, particularly given the great numbers of people from whom such data will be gathered."

Not only did Chutkan compel the release of documents related to the FBI's Next Generation Identification (NGI) database, but she also awarded $20,000 in legal fees to EPIC. In the opinion [pdf link], she points out that -- despite its arguments to the contrary -- the FBI was anything but "responsive" to EPIC's FOIA request.

The FBI’s explanation for its delay in producing the requested documents is not unreasonable; the Court is well aware that compliance with FOIA requests can require significant agency time and resources. However, after EPIC narrowed the scope of its Second Request—at the behest of the FBI—the FBI had no further contact with EPIC for six months, until after EPIC filed this lawsuit. The FBI has not advanced any colorable legal reason why, after indicating that it possessed responsive documents and asking for a revised request, it simply ceased all communication with EPIC in October 2012, until EPIC sought recourse in this Court in April 2013.

Despite the FBI being more motivated by lawsuits than FOIA requests, Chutkan softens this blow by stating she saw "no evidence" that the agency behaved "recalcitrantly or obdurately." This is its standard m.o. of many government agencies, FBI included. If it wasn't, there wouldn't be nearly as many lawsuits.

The good news is that courts are recognizing (at least, now and then) that there's a very asymmetrical collection of information going on here. Agencies like the FBI gather up tons of data, much of it personally-identifiable, and then refuses to grant the public even the tiniest bit of access. When members of the public ask to see the data gathered on them (by requesting their own records), they're told that doing so would compromise law enforcement operations and methods.

The public does have a right to know what's being collected and distributed to law enforcement agencies around the nation. The public cannot simply rely on the (limited and often ineffective) oversight of its legislators. True accountability comes from outside the government, not from within it, and FOIA laws are supposed to facilitate that. A few more wins for the public will increase the effectiveness of the accountability tool, something that has been blunted tremendously by government agencies' willful opacity over the past several years.

Filed Under: biometric database, facial recognition, fbi, foia
Companies: epic

The FBI Is Offended That It Isn't Allowed To Control How The Press Portrays Its Deceptive Activities

from the poor-james-comey dept

The last few weeks have revealed a bunch of deceptive practices by law enforcement -- mainly the FBI. First, there was the revelation that the FBI had impersonated an online news story to install malware in trying to track a high school bomb threat. Then, there was a story from a couple of weeks ago about the FBI turning off internet access at some luxury villas in Las Vegas, and then acting as repair technicians to get inside and search the place (while filming everything). That was a story we had hoped to cover, but hadn't yet gotten to it. However, after the NY Times editorial board slammed that operation, FBI Director James Comey wrote a reply defending the FBI's "use of deception."

First, Comey defends the fake news story, noting that it was perfectly legal... under "Justice Department and FBI guidelines at the time." As Scott Greenfield notes, this is the "Nixon answer" to questions of illegality by the executive branch:

By Comey’s hand, he defines lawful as approved by the Department of Justice and FBI. To put this less tactfully, it’s lawful if he says it’s lawful. It’s the executive branch Nixon answer, that the president can commit no crime because he’s the president.

Comey also defends the practice because it worked, as if that's the justification needed:

In 2007, to solve a series of bomb threats and cyberattacks directed at a Seattle-area high school, an F.B.I. agent communicated online with the anonymous suspect. Relying on an agency behavioral assessment that the anonymous suspect was a narcissist, the online undercover officer portrayed himself as an employee of The Associated Press, and asked if the suspect would be willing to review a draft article about the threats and attacks, to be sure that the anonymous suspect was portrayed fairly.

The suspect agreed and clicked on a link relating to the draft “story,” which then deployed court-authorized tools to find him, and the case was solved. No actual story was published, and no one except the suspect interacted with the undercover “A.P.” employee or saw the fake draft story. Only the suspect was fooled, and it led to his arrest and the end of a frightening period for a high school.

Except, of course, all sorts of illegal and privacy-invasive investigative techniques may work to catch criminals, but we don't allow them, because of the impact on everyone else. That's what the whole 4th Amendment is about. And basic concepts like protecting privacy. Yes, we'd catch more criminals if the FBI had mandated microphones and cameras in everyone's house, but we don't allow that because it goes too far. The fact that "it works" makes no comment on whether or not it's appropriate or legal.

As for the Vegas sting using fake internet technicians, Comey's response there is even more pathetic, chiding the press for reporting on public filings in the court case before the Justice Department has responded:

The Las Vegas case is still in litigation, so there is little we can say, but it would have been better to wait for the government’s response and a court decision before concluding that the F.B.I. engaged in abusive conduct.

Marcy Wheeler has the best response to that, highlighting how the FBI, in this very same case (but it's also true in lots of high-profile FBI cases) put out press releases that only gave its side of the story, and claimed things as fact that were misleading and inaccurate -- but didn't seem to have any problem with the press taking its one side of the story without considering the response from the accused:

Jim Comey thinks the press shouldn’t report on this until after the government has had its shot at rebuttal? Does he feel the same about the army of FBI leakers who pre-empt defense cases all the time? Does Comey think it improper for his FBI to have released this press release, upon defendant Wei Seng Phua’s arrest, asserting that he is a member of organized crime as a fact and mentioning a prior arrest (not a conviction) that may or may not be deemed admissible to this case?

According to the criminal complaint, Wei Seng Phua, is known by law enforcement to be a high ranking member of the 14K Triad, an Asian organized crime group. On or about June 18, 2013, Phua was arrested in Macau, along with more than 20 other individuals, for operating an illegal sport book gambling business transacting illegal bets on the World Cup Soccer Tournament. Phua posted bail in Macau and was released. 

I didn’t see the FBI Director complaining about press stories, written in response to the press release, reported before the defense had been able to present their side.

And, so, apparently, not only does the FBI director think it's proper to use deceptive practices if "it works," he also thinks that the press should only report on the FBI's side of the story, furthering the deceptive practices with what's effectively propaganda. The use of deception by law enforcement is already questionable enough. Asking the press to be a willing participant in that deception is simply ridiculous.

Filed Under: deception, deceptive practices, doj, fbi, james comey, journalism, press coverage

Civil Liberties Groups Argue Against DOJ's Petition For Expansion Of Hacking Powers And Judicial Jurisdictions

from the please,-sirs,-may-we-have-a-whole-fuckload-more? dept

The DOJ wants the FBI to have the ability to run amok, hacking overseas computers and accessing electronics wherever and whenever, with a minimum of hassle. The DOJ's proposal, which was presented to a judicial advisory committee in September, asks for some major alterations to Rule 41.

As Mike explained back in September, what the DOJ is proposing is an expansion of power that takes the necessarily limited exceptions applied to terrorism investigations and applies them to everyday criminal investigations. Then it goes further, wiping out jurisdictional limitations.

The provision, known as Rule 41 of the federal rules of criminal procedure, typically allows judges to issue search warrants only within their judicial district. But the government has asked to alter this restriction to allow judges to approve electronic surveillance to find and search a computer's contents regardless of its physical location, even if the device is suspected of being abroad.

This expansion is supposedly justified by the technological arms race law enforcement agencies (like the DOJ and FBI) continuing to claim they're somehow losing, despite billions of tax dollars and years of perfecting their skills. Rather than work within the confines of the Fourth Amendment and other related considerations, the government is looking to create a broad and permanent downhill slope to ease its investigative burden.

The DOJ is seeking expanded powers for the FBI, including the permission to implant malware and infiltrate overseas networks, just like its big brother, the NSA. In addition to asking for the codification of Fourth Amendment violations, the DOJ is also asking for permission to place the US in a number of diplomatically tenuous situations with other countries as a result of its agents' actions.

Unsurprisingly, there's plenty of outside resistance to this proposed change.

Technology experts and civil-liberties groups strongly oppose the proposed rule change. On Wednesday, several of them testified before the rule-making committee urging a rejection of the Justice Department's proposal. The rule change, they argued, would be substantive and not merely procedural, making it beyond the intended scope of the advisory panel. They also warned that the expansion would threaten the Fourth Amendment's strict limitations on government search and seizures, and allow the FBI to violate the sovereignty of foreign countries.

The panel hearing the inquiry didn't seem very impressed with those taking the side of the American public.

The judicial panel on Wednesday did little to tip its hand on the issue, but it did aggressively question several witnesses as to what alternative they would prefer that allows federal investigators to keep up with and catch elusive cybercriminals.

This, too, is unsurprising. The courts have a long history of showing deference to law enforcement agencies, and the increasing use of terrorism as a rhetorical device has only made this tendency worse. While there has been some pushback in the wake of the Snowden leaks, by and large the judicial viewpoint is that fighting crime is a noble pursuit and those engaged in this battle should be given every tool needed to succeed, even if that means shaving a few inches off the top of Americans' civil liberties.

But those arguing against this proposed change made a very valid point during their time in front of the panel: if we have to look to legislators for relief, so should the DOJ.

"I empathize that it is very hard to get a legislative change," said Amie Stepanovich, senior policy counsel with Access, a digital-freedom group. "However, when you have us resorting to Congress to get increased privacy protections, we would also like to see the government turn to Congress to get increased surveillance authority."

James Comey, of course, will be continuing his attempt to do exactly that. His speaking appearances are still largely composed of encryption complaints, and when not publicly demanding that tech companies get in bed with the FBI, he's meeting secretly with legislators in hopes of bending the nation's laws to his will.

Oddly, the DOJ has previously claimed the FBI doesn't need warrants to hack foreign computers -- an argument it made during the evidentiary hearings in the Dread Pirate Roberts/Silkroad case. Now, it's petitioning to grant US judges the power to sign off on warrants that can be used anywhere -- even overseas. If the panel agrees to this alteration, it would actually limit the FBI's extraterritorial activities, at least as described in federal court.

What this proposal sounds like is an attempt to expand its domestic powers, with a small nod towards extraterritorial activities thrown in as an expendable demand -- something to be given up to keep the domestic power expansion it really wants. Rights of foreigners are similarly expendable and are only respected when diplomatically expedient. Here in the US, it's a bit trickier, and that's the part the FBI actually wants to "simplify."

Filed Under: doj, fbi, hacking, rule 41

Guy Accused Of Operating Silk Road 2.0 Arrested In SF... Just Like The Last One

from the yes,-the-FBI-can-track-you-down dept

This morning, the FBI excitedly announced that they had arrested Blake Benthall as the alleged operator of Silk Road 2.0, the replacement to the original Silk Road, which went down when the feds arrested Ross Ulbricht 13 months ago. As with Ulbricht, Benthall is a young tech-savvy guy living in San Francisco. Assuming he was actually running Silk Road 2.0, you'd think he'd have figured out that staying in the US while doing so is a serious occupational hazard. You can read the full complaint, but it again looks like (just like Ulbricht) he was somewhat sloppy in covering his own tracks. It didn't help that he apparently allowed an undercover FBI agent to become pretty high up as a "support" staffer, giving him access to insider forums.

The complaint (as with Ulbricht's) is an interesting read, though it will be interesting to see what other information comes out of the next few months. It's not clear how the FBI found the server (in a foreign country) and had it imaged. That raised some questions in Ulbricht's case, and will likely do the same here. Benthall bounced around a variety of jobs, including for RPX (a patent aggregator that has tried to position itself as the "not evil" version of Intellectual Ventures) and SpaceX. In fact, it appears that when Benthall took over Silk Road 2.0 from its original creator, he was employed by SpaceX at that time. The criminal complaint also notes that at some point he bought a Tesla with bitcoins, though he appears to have done so about a month after someone else made news for doing the same.

As for the actual charges, the specifics here matter. It still seems like a bit of a reach that merely running a marketplace online should make you liable for people doing illegal stuff in that marketplace, but things like Section 230 don't protect criminal activity. The complaint also has money laundering and CFAA hacking charges in there as well, though the details are still all a bit murky.

It appears that this takedown is part of a larger global effort to take down a bunch of "darknet" drug operators and websites, with Silk Road 2.0 just being the shiny one that many in the public had already heard about.

While it's reasonable to argue that this is criminal activity and should be taken down, others have suggested that by merely taking down online darkmarkets like Silk Road and Silk Road 2.0, the government is actually making the world more dangerous. Indeed, a study released a few months ago argued that Silk Road greatly reduced violence in the drug trade market. One could argue that keeping the drug market violent reduces incentives for people to get involved in it, but there is also the collateral damage that a violent drug market creates on third parties and innocent bystanders.

Either way, I doubt that this will stop Silk Road 3.0 (or something similar) from springing up before too long. And whether or not the FBI gets whoever runs that, this will be a continuous cat and mouse game, and I imagine that future darkmarkets will get more and more secure.

Filed Under: blake benthall, dark market, doj, fbi, ross ulbricht, silk road, silk road 2.0
Companies: rpx, silk road, silk road 2.0, spacex

James Comey Again Demands Tech Companies Do As He Says And Grant The FBI Complete Access To Whatever It Wants

from the please-please-please-let-me-get-what-I-want dept

FBI director James Comey -- (again) citing no legal authority or precedent -- is demanding Google and Apple hand over the keys to their default phone encryption.

The director of the FBI on Monday doubled down on demands that Silicon Valley giants cooperate in the course of criminal investigations, saying that tech companies such as Apple and Google have to unlock cellphones, if authorities request it.

And what has all this "demanding" and "doubling down" netted Comey? Nothing really. He still needs a compliant legislative body to oblige his fantasies of subservient tech companies opening wide for fat-fingered g-men.

Comey's latest attempt to sell the government's plan to exchange fear for all-access mobile phone passes came at a counterterrorism conference hosted by Fordham University. And, once again, Comey followed up his baseless demands with a whole lot of nothing.

Comey didn't specify what he wants Apple and Google to do but said that to find a solution requires an "honest debate."

"I don't want to tell people what to do," he said. "But I want to try to foster a national conversation about this."

"There has to be some solution that will allow us with lawful authority to be able to have the company unlock the device," he added.

There's nothing honest about Comey's approach and walking around claiming that phone encryption will lead to new highs in terrorist attacks and pedophilia is only part of the dishonesty. Comey claims he doesn't want to "tell people what to do," apparently completely unaware that throwing around the weight of his agency and position and demanding phone makers play by his rules is the very definition of "telling people what to do."

Unfortunately for Comey, throwing around this weight just isn't enough anymore. No one in the tech world is going to be cowed into obeisance. Not anymore. Now, everyone wants to stick it to The Man, even many of those that worked in close proximity with government agencies over the past several years. Why? Because the nation's intelligence and investigative agencies are always hungry. They always want more.

The "solution" Comey's looking for runs through Congress. Historically, legislators have almost always come down on the side of law enforcement. The twin specters of terrorism and child molestation have resulted in plenty of government expansion and law enforcement leeway over the years. But maybe even the legislators are beginning to realize that this is something that can never be satiated. You can give and give and give and the same people will return over and over again, asking for just a little more. The government is -- and has been for years -- a mixture of junkies and their enablers.

Maybe we're at the point that a certain number of enablers have become sick of the constant need. Maybe they'll cut Comey and his ilk off and put up with the keening, inarticulate sounds of their withdrawal. Or maybe they'll meet them out back and slip them a fix when they think no one's looking. As I've said before, the voices out front are claiming the FBI will find no assistance here. It's the large number of those who've offered no opinion we need to keep an eye on. Law enforcement's emotional blackmail has worked for years. It may have recently lost its edge, but it's still too powerful to count out completely.

"In one way or another, our entire lives — our social lives, our work lives — reside online and on these devices," Comey said. "And that's a great thing. But that's also where the bad guys are."

Yeah. As in "real life" itself. I guess we should expect him to ask for "golden key" access to every front door in America. As long as he's transparent about it, what's there to be concerned about? Comey just wants to keep America safe. Who are we to deny complete access to our "entire lives?"

Filed Under: back doors, encryption, fbi, front door, james comey, mobile encryption
Companies: apple, google

FBI Holds Secret Meeting To Scare Congress Into Backdooring Phone Encryption

from the just-in-time-for--halloween dept

In September, both Apple and Google announced plans to encrypt information on iOS and Android devices by default. Almost immediately, there was a collective freakout by law enforcement types. But, try as they might, these law enforcement folks couldn't paint any realistic scenario of where this would be a serious problem. Sure, they conjured up scenarios, but upon inspection they pretty much all fell apart. Instead, what was clear was that encryption could protect users from people copying information off of phones without permission, and, in fact, the FBI itself recommends you encrypt the data on your phone.

But it didn't stop FBI director James Comey from ignoring the advice of his own agency and pushing for a new law that would create back doors (he called them front doors, but when asked to explain the difference, he admitted that he wasn't "smart enough" to understand the distinction) in such encryption.

So, now, of course, the FBI/DOJ gets to go up to Congress and tell them scary stories about just how necessary breaking encryption would be. And it's being done in total secrecy, because if it was done in public, experts might debunk the claims, like they've done with basically all of the scenarios provided in public to date.

FBI and Justice Department officials met with House staffers this week for a classified briefing on how encryption is hurting police investigations, according to staffers familiar with the meeting. The briefing included Democratic and Republican aides for the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, the staffers said. The meeting was held in a classified room, and aides are forbidden from revealing what was discussed.

It's almost guaranteed that someone will introduce some legislation, written primarily by the FBI, pushing for this (such a bill is almost certainly already sitting in some DOJ bureaucrat's desk drawer, so they just need to dot some i's, cross some t's and come up with a silly acronym name for the bill). So far, many in Congress have been outspoken against such a law, but never underestimate the ability of the FBI to mislead Congress with some FUD, leading to all sorts of scare stories about how we need this or we're all going to die.

Filed Under: back doors, calea, congress, doj, fbi, front doors, james comey, mobile encryption

FBI's Use Of 'Sneak And Peek' Warrants Still Steadily Increasing, Still Has Nearly Nothing To Do With Fighting Terrorism

from the more-drug-warring dept

Another tool supposedly "crucial" to the War on Terror is just another lowly footsoldier in the War on Drugs. Some long-delayed reports on Section 213 "sneak and peek" warrants have finally been released by the US government, providing more detail on the constantly-expanding use of delayed-notification warrants by the FBI.

While Section 213 didn't originate with the regrettable PATRIOT Act, it did coattail ride the government-expanding legislation into legitimacy. Robert Mueller, director of the FBI at the time, made this statement in 2005 defending the ongoing use of these warrants.

While not scheduled to sunset, the USA Patriot Act's delayed notice provision, Section 213, has been the subject of criticism and various legislative proposals. The FBI believes that Section 213 is an invaluable tool in the war on terror and our efforts to combat serious criminal conduct. It is important to note that delayed notice warrants were not created by the USA Patriot Act. Rather, the Act simply codified a common law practice recognized by courts across the country and created a uniform nationwide standard for the issuance of those warrants…

Delayed notice search warrants provide a crucial option to law enforcement and can only be issued if a federal judge finds that one of five tailored circumstances exists. The FBI has requested this authority in several cases. In most instances, the FBI seeks delayed notice when contemporaneous notice would reasonably be expected to cause serious jeopardy to an ongoing investigation.

Legislators expressed concern about these warrants during a 2005 Senate hearing, pointing out the significant increase in the number issued.

Apparently, the department sought and received the authority to delay notice 108 times between April 2003 and January 2005, a period of approximately 22 months. By contrast, it sought and received this authority 47 times between November 2001, when the PATRIOT Act was enacted, and April 2003, a period of about 17 months. The 5-month difference in timeframe aside, these numbers clearly reveal a substantial increase in use.

If they could have peered a little further into the future, they probably wouldn't have bothered noting this slight increase. 2010's report noted nearly 4,000 requests for delayed notification. A year later, the number had lept to 6,775. Two years later and the number has nearly doubled -- 11,129.

From 47 times in 17 months to over 30 times a day over the last ten years. This is another limited-use, for-emergency-use-only tool that has been converted into a workhouse by law enforcement. To keep it from being killed off, FBI Director Robert Mueller cited terrorism and investigations being placed in "serious jeopardy," but in reality, it's still all about drugs, drugs and more drugs.

This was the ratio in 2010.


It hasn't gotten any better.

Out of the 3,970 total requests from October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010, 3,034 were for narcotics cases and only 37 for terrorism cases (about .9%). Since then, the numbers get worse. The 2011 report reveals a total of 6,775 requests. 5,093 were used for drugs, while only 31 (or .5%) were used for terrorism cases. The 2012 report follows a similar pattern: Only .6%, or 58 requests, dealt with terrorism cases. The 2013 report confirms the incredibly low numbers. Out of 11,129 reports only 51, or .5%, of requests were used for terrorism.

Additionally, only 11 requests were rejected and the average delay was over 60 days. The longest recorded in 2013 was well over a year -- 546 days.

This was supposed to be an option of last resort -- something deployed when it was too dangerous to do otherwise. But it never was anything more than a way to skirt the Fourth Amendment for maximum FBI efficiency. Even in its early days -- not far removed from the horror of the 9/11 attacks -- the FBI was using delayed notice warrants to conduct routine investigations.

It would astound most Americans that government agents could enter their homes while they are asleep or their places of business while they are away and carry out a secret search or seizure and not tell them until weeks or months later. It would especially astound them that this authority is available for all Federal offenses, ranging from weapons of mass destruction investigations to student loan cases. That is what Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act authorizes. Indeed, the Justice Department has admitted that it has used Section 213 sneak and peek authority in nonviolent cases having nothing to do with terrorism. These include, according to the Justice Department's October 24, 2003 letter to Senator Stevens, an investigation of judicial corruption, where agents carried out a sneak and peek search of a judge's chambers, a fraudulent checks case, and a health care fraud investigation, which involved a sneak and peek of a home nursing care business.

So, the DOJ requests an inch, takes several miles, and searches citizens' homes and places of business several thousand times a year -- all without feeling compelled to inform its targets. The justifications the FBI offers (and has offered for years) are false. Are we actually supposed to believe the danger posed to investigating officers has increased at the same rate as the deployment of "sneak and peek" warrants? The defenders of this program can't expect anyone to believe anything that ridiculous. And yet, it continues -- not just unabated, but with steady increases.

Section 213 is just another way for the DOJ to keep the pesky public from impeding its forward progress. Anything hinting of rights or civil liberties is generally viewed as a loophole for criminals to exploit. This is more of the same. It's easier to execute search warrants when you don't have to bother serving them first.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, crime, drugs, fbi, privacy, sneak and peek, terrorism, warrants

Documents Show FBI Impersonated Newspaper's Website To Deliver Spyware To Suspect's Computer

from the a-free-(and-exploitable)-press dept

Spend enough time staring at redacted documents liberated from secretive government agencies and you're bound to miss a thing or two on the first pass. Chris Soghoian, technologist for the ACLU was browsing through some FBI documents [pdf link] obtained by the EFF and came across this:

In 2007, FBI sent malware via a link intended to look like a Seattle Times/AP story. https://t.co/Se9f0NXGd1 at pages 61-62. — Christopher Soghoian (@csoghoian) October 27, 2014

In 2007, FBI sent malware via a link intended to look like a Seattle Times/AP story. https://www.eff.org/document/fbicipav-08pdf … at pages 61-62.

The documents date back to 2008 and were obtained by the EFF in 2011. What Soghoian caught fills in the blanks in this story from 2007.

FBI agents trying to track the source of e-mailed bomb threats against a Washington high school last month sent the suspect a secret surveillance program designed to surreptitiously monitor him and report back to a government server, according to an FBI affidavit obtained by Wired News...

The software was sent to the owner of an anonymous MySpace profile linked to bomb threats against Timberline High School near Seattle. The code led the FBI to 15-year-old Josh Glazebrook, a student at the school, who on Monday pleaded guilty to making bomb threats, identity theft and felony harassment.

The court documents didn't detail how the FBI managed to install the weaponized payload on Glazebook's computer. The emails obtained by the EFF, however, expose the electronic paper trail.

The CIPAV (Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier) made its way to Glazebrook's system via a Myspace message sent by the FBI… which was impersonating the Seattle Times.



Is this really what we want our investigative agencies to be doing in the name of public safety? Soghoian says no.

"The ends don't justify the means. I'm not saying that the FBI shouldn't be investigating people who threaten to bomb schools. But impersonating the media is a really dangerous line to cross."

The Seattle Times isn't too happy, either. Editor Kathy Best says the paper is now "seeking answers" from the FBI. Best's full statement on behalf of the Times is short, but deeply critical of the agency's actions.

We, like you, just learned of this and are seeking answers ourselves from the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s office.

But we are outraged that the FBI misappropriated the name of The Seattle Times to secretly install spyware on the computer of a crime suspect. Not only does that cross the line, it erases it.

Our reputation—and our ability to do our job as a government watchdog—is based on trust. And nothing is more fundamental to that trust than our independence from law enforcement, from government, from corporations and from all other special interests. The FBI’s actions, taken without our knowledge, traded on our reputation and put it at peril.

The FBI has already responded (somewhat) to Best's statement, deploying the usual deferrals to public safety and agency investigatory procedures.

“Every effort we made in this investigation had the goal of preventing a tragic event like what happened at Marysville and Seattle Pacific University. We identified a specific subject of an investigation and used a technique that we deemed would be effective in preventing a possible act of violence in a school setting. Use of that type of technique happens in very rare circumstances and only when there is sufficient reason to believe it could be successful in resolving a threat. We were fortunate that information provided by the public gave us the opportunity to step in to a potentially dangerous situation before it was too late.”

TL; DR: The public should be counting its blessings rather than examining our questionable methods.

Taken at face value, Special Agent Frank Montoya Jr. is basically saying that the FBI will abuse its power (and the reputations of others) whenever it determines such methods to be necessary to achieve its goals. Not really a comforting idea at all, and one that basically confirms Soghoian's suspicions: the ends will be used to justify the means, no matter how potentially damaging the means are.

Filed Under: bomb threat, fbi, impersonation, investigations, journmalism, malware

During Cold War, CIA And FBI Hired Over 1,000 Nazis As Spies, Limited Investigations Of Those Nazis

from the minor-war-crimes dept

A new book by Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler's Men, apparently details how the FBI and CIA hired over 1,000 Nazis during the height of the cold war, forgiving them their past sins, so long as they might help spy on the Soviet Union.

At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, law enforcement and intelligence leaders like J. Edgar Hoover at the F.B.I. and Allen Dulles at the C.I.A. aggressively recruited onetime Nazis of all ranks as secret, anti-Soviet “assets,” declassified records show. They believed the ex-Nazis’ intelligence value against the Russians outweighed what one official called “moral lapses” in their service to the Third Reich.

The agency hired one former SS officer as a spy in the 1950s, for instance, even after concluding he was probably guilty of “minor war crimes.”

You can argue whether or not this moral cost-benefit analysis was reasonable, but it appears that the CIA further sought to block investigations into those Nazis for some of their war crimes -- which seems to tilt the balance pretty strongly in favor of immoral.

And in 1994, a lawyer with the C.I.A. pressured prosecutors to drop an investigation into an ex-spy outside Boston implicated in the Nazis’ massacre of tens of thousands of Jews in Lithuania, according to a government official.

Meanwhile, the FBI was carefully hiding those Nazis from the Justice Department (which the FBI is a part of), even though the DOJ had a department trying to find them:

In 1980, F.B.I. officials refused to tell even the Justice Department’s own Nazi hunters what they knew about 16 suspected Nazis living in the United States.

The bureau balked at a request from prosecutors for internal records on the Nazi suspects, memos show, because the 16 men had all worked as F.B.I. informants, providing leads on Communist “sympathizers.” Five of the men were still active informants.

Oh, and then there's the fact that Hoover not only protected the Nazis, but he went after journalists who were investigating the US's hiding of those Nazis:

In 1968, Mr. Hoover authorized the F.B.I. to wiretap a left-wing journalist who wrote critical stories about Nazis in America, internal records show. Mr. Hoover declared the journalist, Charles Allen, a potential threat to national security.

John Fox, the bureau’s chief historian, said: “In hindsight, it is clear that Hoover, and by extension the F.B.I., was shortsighted in dismissing evidence of ties between recent German and East European immigrants and Nazi war crimes. It should be remembered, though, that this was at the peak of Cold War tensions.”

Kinda thinking that we shouldn't even bother with comments on this article, because the CIA and FBI have already hit Godwin's Law.

Filed Under: allen dulles, cia, fbi, j. edgar hoover, nazis

FBI Raids House Of 'Second Leaker' Who Provided Terrorist Watchlist Documents To The Intercept

from the FBI's-'Leak-Repair-Kit'-swings-into-action dept

The government appears to have located the "second leaker." Snowden obviously still remains out of reach in Russia, but the other leaker -- one hinted at over the past few months and confirmed in Laura Poitras' Snowden documentary "Citizenfour" -- seems to have been identified by the FBI. Michael Isikoff at Yahoo News breaks the news.

The FBI has identified an employee of a federal contracting firm suspected of being the so-called "second leaker" who turned over sensitive documents about the U.S. government's terrorist watch list to a journalist closely associated with ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden, according to law enforcement and intelligence sources who have been briefed on the case.

The FBI recently executed a search of the suspect's home, and federal prosecutors in Northern Virginia have opened up a criminal investigation into the matter, the sources said.

Once again, we're limited to anonymous "sources" and other unconfirmable information, but it seems the target of the raid was behind the leak of documents related to the federal government's terrorist watchlist program, published by The Intercept on August 5th. This was the same story the government attempted to defuse by leaking an official version to the Associate Press shortly before the Intercept's article went live.

Shortly after publication, government officials began to openly speculate about the existence of a second leaker, something others had been hinting at for weeks after a run of leaked documents at German news site Der Spiegel, none of which were attributed to Ed Snowden.

If the feds have their man, we'll get to see whether this administration will continue its record-setting pace for prosecuting whistleblowers. A hint dropped by one unnamed official suggests the DOJ may not be quite as enthusiastic about leaks punishment as it once was.

One source, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter, said there was concern "there is no longer an appetite at Justice for these cases."

Maybe not, but it's highly unlikely this case will slide if the leaker is caught. First off, there have been no statements from anyone with the requisite amount of power that the US government has softened its stance on Snowden's leaks. As far as they're concerned, he's still a criminal. The documents leaked by the second leaker may not have been as sensitive as those leaked by Snowden, but they still contain information the government wished to withhold. Add to that the ongoing prosecution of journalist James Risen and the recent sentencing of Chelsea Manning, and you still have an environment highly hostile to leaky government employees.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, feds, leaker, second leaker, terrorist guidelines, terrorist watchlist, the intercept, tsa, whistleblower