USTR's Anti-Transparency Rules For TAFTA/TTIP Documents Published

from the now-let's-have-the-others-anyway dept

Alongside the corporate sovereignty provisions, perhaps the most controversial aspect of the TAFTA/TTIP negotiations is the deep secrecy that surrounds them. This is largely unbroken on the US side, aside from a few token meetings with the public in which questions are deflected with content-free or generic replies. The EU has at least released a few documents outlining its general negotiating positions, although this week we learned that British MPs aren't allowed to see details of the mandate that was given to the EU's negotiators, so the openness is still minimal. Now, in a rather ironic development, through a Freedom Of Information Act request Knowledge Ecology International has managed to obtain a letter sent in July 2013 to the European Commission outlining the measures the USTR will be taking to keep the talks as un-transparent as possible:

As we prepare for the initiation of negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement, I would like to thank you for your letter of July 5, 2013, describing the arrangements that the European Union (EU) has in place for the protections of negotiating documents, given the sensitive nature of their content and that apply in the context of negotiations for a TTIP Agreement. I take this opportunity to inform you of the arrangements that the United States will apply for the protection of TTIP negotiating documents, given the sensitive nature of their content.

There is the obligatory nod to openness:

Transparency is an important principle for the Obama Administration, just as it is for the EU.

Which is swiftly negated by the following:

However, the United States also shares the EU's view that a certain level of special care in handling these documents is necessary to enable mutual trust between negotiators and for each side to preserve positions taken for tactical reasons with regard to third countries with which we are or could be negotiating in the future.

Those are pretty feeble excuses. It's imposing secrecy that makes trust necessary: if everything in the negotiations were out in the open, as is the case for WIPO meetings, trust wouldn't be required. And as for "preserving positions", their final form will be evident for all to see in the agreement, assuming it is concluded, and how those final positions were achieved tactically is largely a product of the particular negotiating dynamics between the US and EU, and hardly relevant to any other talks which might happen. As the letter explains, basically everything is to be kept secret, except for two groups of people:

For the US side, this means that documents containing such information may be provided only to (1) US government officials, and (2) persons outside the US government who participate in its internal consultation process and who have a need to review or be advised of the information in these documents. Anyone provided access to the documents will be informed that they are not permitted to share the documents with persons who are not authorized to see them.

That is, lobbyists can still be provided with access, since it is obviously vital that they "review" whether the terms are acceptable to their industries, but there's nothing for the general public. No surprise there, but the following is news:

The United States will hold the TTIP documents in confidence for five years after entry into force of the TTIP Agreement, or if no agreement enters into force, for five years after the last round of negotiations.

That's even worse than for TPP, where the participants have agreed to keep all the negotiating documents secret for four years after ratification. That's an indication that the USTR is not content with keeping details of the negotiations away from the prying eyes of the public as they happen, but aims to lock them down for even longer than with TPP. You really have to wonder what the US has to hide there.

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Filed Under: eu, secrecy, tafta, transparency, ttip, ustr

USTR's Special 301 List Of 'Naughty' Countries Without Strong Enough Patent And Copyright Laws Is A Complete Joke

from the as-if-we-didn't-know-that dept

We've talked plenty of times about what a complete joke the USTR's Special 301 report is. It's supposedly a "listing" of "naughty" countries who don't protect intellectual property enough for the US's tastes. However, as we've noted, there is no methodology behind it: a bunch of industry lobbyists submit lists of what countries they don't like to the USTR, the USTR talks to various diplomats, basically rewrites the list to "shame" certain countries, and releases the list. Canada, which has been put on the list for years despite having stricter copyright laws than the US, has officially stated that it simply does not accept the Special 301 findings as legitimate. Chile did the same thing a year ago. As I've mentioned before, at a conference a few years ago, I even saw the then head of the US Copyright Office mock the Special 301 report as a widely recognized joke.

Unfortunately, however, for countries who are heavily reliant on good relations with the United States, being on "the naughty" list is often an effective way to force them to jump through hoops to make Big Pharma or Hollywood happy. As we've discussed, Spain has been pressured into changing its copyright laws via the 301 list multiple times.

George Washington PhD student Gabriel Michael has decided to dig deep into the Special 301 Report and its history to determine if there's any point to it at all, and his initial results suggest that the process is even more of a joke than initially suspected. He notes that there's no real "enforcement" mechanism (at least not one that the US seems willing to use). He also notes that the US is incredibly hypocritical about it. While the Special 301 report mostly complains that other countries don't have enough intellectual property protection, at other times it goes the other way, like when it's the kind of IP that the US government doesn't like (geographical indicators or GI).

...by any reasonably objective standard, the European Union offers very high levels of IP protection. Yet as recently as 2006, Special 301 listed the European Union on its watch list, citing “concerns” about the EU’s geographical indication (GI) regime. Given that GIs are a form of intellectual property, USTR essentially placed the EU on its watch list for offering too much IP—or, if you prefer, the wrong kind of IP. Interestingly, this is a tacit admission by the U.S. that at least some kinds of IP can act as trade barriers.

In researching the effectiveness of the Special 301, Michael notes that supporters of the effort point to a study done in the International Trade Journal called "Special 301 and Royalty Receipts from U.S. Trade Partners" by David Riker, which argued that the Special 301 is effective, because there's a pretty big increase ($5.4 billion annually) in US royalty receipts from countries after being placed on the list. Michael sets out to replicate Riker's results and discovers very, very different results, in part because Riker made some notable errors (claiming Hong Kong was on the priority list, when it wasn't). Riker also only looked at some of the countries in the Special 301 Report. Michael looked at what happened when you viewed all of them, and he also had two more years of data to research. In the end, Michael finds that Riker's conclusions are simply not supported by the data.

To summarize, while I was able to replicate Riker’s results, simply including additional years of data causes his findings of significance to disappear. Likewise, even in his original dataset and models, if Watch List designations are included, the findings of significance disappear.

Ultimately, these results lead me to conclude that Riker’s 2012 article is both theoretically and empirically flawed. It cannot support the conclusion that Special 301 designations are correlated with increased IP royalties from designated countries in subsequent years.

In another post, Michael points out the obvious: the Special 301 list is never actually about intellectual property protections, but about political considerations. He notes that countries that are considered to have stronger IP protection (using the Park-Ginarte Index) are often listed on the Special 301 Report, while others with less protection are not. He even looks at the average of countries on the list and off, and finds that those on the list have higher protection than those off the list: Given that, Michael looked at the leaked Wikileaks State Department cables, where there are a bunch discussing the Special 301, and quickly notes that it's pretty clear that political considerations were much more important than actual concerns about intellectual property conditions. In short, the Special 301 is just a way to diplomatically slap a country with whom we're having other political issues, in order to give the US leverage on some political point. He quotes State Department cables concerning Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Bolivia and Norway showing how it's much more about politics.

At some point, it needs to be asked why we have the Special 301 setup at all. It seems designed mainly to piss off other countries, while making Hollywood and Big Pharma feel good. It doesn't seem to do anything beneficial at all.

Filed Under: copyright, diplomacy, evidence, impact, intellectual property, patents, politics, special 301, ustr

This Week In Techdirt History

from the hindsight-is-20-20 dept

Let's embark on another look back through Techdirt's history:

Five Years Ago

This week in 2009, there was a lot of wrangling over royalties and rates. YouTube convinced PRS in the UK to slash its streaming royalties by reminding them just how much they rely on YouTube for an audience. Meanwhile, ASCAP was pushing for videogame sellers to pay performance rights to songwriters. A Swedish indie label operator asked whether $1 per song still make sense in the age of iPods, and a Canadian lawyer was demonstrating the absurdity of Canada's copyright levy system. eMusic had just raised prices after signing Sony to its service — a terrible PR move that the company appeared to be trying to sweep under the rug. In the background of all this was a discussion about the rise and future of internet radio, now a massive royalty battleground all its own.

Five years ago, the RIAA was six months into pushing an earlier version of its voluntary "strikes" plan for ISPs, but none had signed on. Meanwhile, the British government was rejecting the whole notion of "three strikes". On the ISP side, Verizon wasn't counting strikes but it was pitching a screwball argument that US broadband is really competitive.

The USTR had just launched a new website with promises of transparency, and we all know how that went. Also, the Supreme Court had just announced that it would hear the Bilski case, giving it a chance to rule firmly on the question of software and business model patents — which it decided not to do, offering an extremely narrow ruling instead.

Ten Years Ago

In 2004, the CAN-SPAM act was still reasonably young, and we were grappling with its impact. We noted that, as predicted, it increased the amount of spam. It created a whole new service industry for spam detectives, and some major issues like nefarious use of the required 'unsubscribe' button. And of course, companies were rushing to patent anti-spam technology.

Several new tech trends were emerging or taking shape this week in 2004. The public was growing increasingly comfortable with online news, while experts were discussing the future of security and the need to adopt two-factor authentication. The online storage revolution sparked by Gmail was picking up steam with 1gb storage offerings transforming from "news" to "the norm". There was a lot of buzz (and a lot of questions) about the move to 64-bit systems. And we took a look at the youth of the digital age's very own musical art form: circuit bending.

Fifteen Years Ago

It was a quiet week (remember those?) in 1999. We were surprised and a bit dismayed by the sales of Sony's silly $2000 robot dog, excited about the possibility of fiber to the house (before Google would have been anywhere on anyone's list of companies that might offer such a thing), and curious but unsure about the idea of sending exobits per second of data through power lines.

Some traditional companies and retailers were going web-only, and one particularly weird company was offering to write complaint letters for you, for a fee.

519 Years Ago

Over half a millennium ago, in a wonderful and timeless act of innovation, a friar distilled the first-ever batch of Scotch whisky at the Lindores Abbey in Scotland. The order came down this week, on June 1st 1495, from the Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, along with the necessary supplies: "To Friar John Cor, by order of the King, to make aqua vitae, VIII bolls of malt."

Filed Under: history, look back, royalties, spam, ustr
Companies: ascap, riaa, verizon

US Government Praises Italy For Implementing SOPA Features The US Public Vehemently Rejected

from the questions-to-ask dept

It's no secret that the USTR has been pushing for copyright maximalist policies over the past few years (mostly done by a guy who recently went through the revolving door to become an MPAA lobbyist). However, one thing they keep claiming is that they're only looking to get other countries to match existing US laws, rather than expand them. That's clearly untrue if you look through the actual language being negotiated (only available via leaks). But, even so, it's pretty clear that the USTR is pushing an extreme maximalist approach. Last week, it released its latest Special 301 report, in which it names which countries are "naughty" about intellectual property. "Naughty" is not defined by any objective standard. Rather, the USTR asks various industry lobbyists to tell them which countries they dislike the most, and the USTR rewrites it into the list. The Special 301 process has long been a complete joke that even many maximalists recognize as silly (we heard the former head of the US Copyright Office once mock it).

The latest version of the report is more of what we've come to expect in previous reports. China has been naughty. India and Spain have been called out of class for a special extra review. Blah blah blah. But, it also notes that both Italy and the Philippines were removed from the Watch List "in recognition of their intellectual property rights accomplishments." Both countries have certainly become much more aggressive on copyrights recently -- and they've done so by being a lot more aggressive than the US. In fact, as we've been reporting, Italy made a dangerous move to allow an administrative agency to issue censorship bans on websites without any judicial process. And, in fact, it's already begun issuing questionable death sentences on sites, forcing ISPs to block access.

If this sounds like the approach originally considered in SOPA (actually, it's going even further than that), that was then massively rejected by the public, you'd be exactly right. So you would think that the USTR would, perhaps, chastise Italy for such an abuse of intellectual property for censorship in a manner that the American public (who the USTR is supposed to represent) have rejected. But, nope. The USTR praises this very approach:

Italy is removed from the Watch List in the 2014 Special 301 Report in recognition of the Italian Communications Regulatory Authority’s (AGCOM) adoption, on December 12, 2013, of long-awaited regulations to combat copyright piracy over the Internet.

In other words, here you have the USTR basically admitting that it approves of countries moving to an approach even more extreme than SOPA. Of course, the reality here is pretty transparent. If Italy and others implement SOPA, down the road, it can be negotiated into various international agreements, so that the US will claim that it has to implement SOPA to "comply with our international obligations." It's been done before. That's exactly how we got the DMCA. Congress initially rejected it, and so Bruce Lehman specifically went to WIPO to get the DMCA put into the 1996 Copyright Treaty... and, voila, two years later Congress said it had to pass the DMCA to comply with that treaty.

The USTR has long been a supporter of maximalist policies. Praising Italy for implementing an even more extreme version of SOPA just highlights how little concern the USTR has for the interests of the American public. Instead, it appears almost entirely focused on the interests of the most powerful lobbyists (who, not surprisingly, are also the USTR employees' likely future employers).

Filed Under: agcom, censorship, copyright, injunctions, italy, sopa, ustr

Obama Complains That TPP Critics Are 'Conspiracy Theorists' Who 'Lack Knowledge' About Negotiations

from the well,-that-would-appear-to-be-your-own-fault dept

It's become fairly clear that the TPP agreement is in trouble these days (for a variety of reasons). And it appears that President Obama is losing his cool concerning the agreement and its critics. In a press conference with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, President Obama lashed out at TPP critics, calling them "conspiracy theorists" whose criticism "reflects lack of knowledge of what is going on in the negotiations." Oh really?

If you take an issue like drugs, for example, the United States does extraordinary work in research and development, and providing medical breakthroughs that save a lot of lives around the world. Those companies that make those investments in that research oftentimes want a return, and so there are all kinds of issues around intellectual property and patents, and so forth.

At the same time, I think we would all agree that if there’s a medicine that can save a lot of lives, then we’ve got to find a way to make sure that it’s available to folks who simply can’t afford it as part of our common humanity. And both those values are reflected in the conversations and negotiations that are taking place around TPP. So the assumption somehow that right off the bat that’s not something we’re paying attention to, that reflects lack of knowledge of what is going on in the negotiations.

But my point is you shouldn’t be surprised if there are going to be objections, protests, rumors, conspiracy theories, political aggravation around a trade deal. You’ve been around long enough, Chuck — that’s true in Malaysia; it’s true in Tokyo; it’s true in Seoul; it’s true in the United States of America — and it’s true in the Democratic Party.

Um. You know why those complaining may "lack knowledge of what is going on in the negotiations"? Perhaps it's because the USTR -- a part of the Obama White House -- has insisted that the entire negotiations take place in complete secrecy with no transparency at all. If President Obama doesn't want conspiracy theories about the agreement, and wishes that its critics were more informed about the negotiations, he can change that today by instructing the USTR to release its negotiating positions and promise to make all future negotiating positions public.

But he won't do that. Why? Because the USTR has admitted that if the public knew what was going on with the TPP, it wouldn't support the agreement. And so the negotiations continue in secret. And the President Obama gets frustrated about a lack of knowledge and conspiracy theories? Really?

Filed Under: barack obama, conspiracy, criticism, secrecy, tpp, transparency, ustr

Meet TISA: Another Major Treaty Negotiated In Secret Alongside TPP And TTIP

from the really-good-friends dept

This Wednesday evening there is to be a "Public Information Session and Discussion" (pdf) about TISA: the Trade in Services Agreement. If, like me, you've never heard of this, you might think it's a new initiative. But it turns out that it's been under way for more than a year: the previous USTR, Ron Kirk, informed Congress about it back in January 2013 (pdf). Aside from the occasional laconic press release from the USTR, a page put together by the Australian government, and a rather poorly-publicized consultation by the European Commission last year, there has been almost no public information about this agreement. A cynic might even think they were trying to keep it quiet.

Perhaps the best introduction to TISA comes from the Public Services International (PSI) organization, a global trade union federation representing 20 million people working in public services in 150 countries. Last year, it released a naturally skeptical brief on the proposed agreement (pdf):

At the beginning of 2012, about 20 WTO members (the EU counted as one) calling themselves "The Really Good Friends of Services" (RGF) launched secret unofficial talks towards drafting a treaty that would further liberalize trade and investment in services, and expand "regulatory disciplines" on all services sectors, including many public services. The "disciplines," or treaty rules, would provide all foreign providers access to domestic markets at "no less favorable" conditions as domestic suppliers and would restrict governments' ability to regulate, purchase and provide services. This would essentially change the regulation of many public and privatized or commercial services from serving the public interest to serving the profit interests of private, foreign corporations.

The Australian government's TISA page fills in some details:

The TiSA negotiations will cover all services sectors. In addition to improved market access commitments, the negotiations also provide an opportunity to develop new disciplines (or trade rules) in areas where there has been significant developments since the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations. There negotiations will cover financial services; ICT services (including telecommunications and e-commerce); professional services; maritime transport services; air transport services, competitive delivery services; energy services; temporary entry of business persons; government procurement; and new rules on domestic regulation to ensure regulatory settings do not operate as a barrier to trade in services.

If that sounds familiar, it's because very similar language is used to describe TAFTA/TTIP, which aims to liberalize trade and investment, to provide foreign investors with access to domestic markets on the same terms as local suppliers, to limit a government's ability to regulate there by removing "non-tariff barriers" -- described above as "regulatory settings" -- and to use corporate sovereignty provisions to enforce investors' rights.

Those similarities suggest TISA is part of a larger plan that includes not just TAFTA/TTIP, but TPP too, and which aims to cement the dominance of the US and EU in world trade against a background of Asia's growing power. Indeed, it's striking how membership of TISA coincides almost exactly with that of TTIP added to TPP:

The 23 TiSA parties currently comprise: Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, European Union (representing its 28 Member States), Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Korea, Switzerland,, Turkey and the United States.

Once more, the rising economies of the BRICS nations -- Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa -- are all absent, and the clear intent, as with TTIP and TPP, is to impose the West's terms on them. That's explicitly recognized by one of the chief proponents of TISA, the European Services Forum:

the possible future agreement would for the time being fall short of the participation of some of the leading emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India and the ASEAN countries. It is not desirable that all those countries would reap the benefits of the possible future agreement without in turn having to contribute to it and to be bound by its rules.

The Australian government's page reveals that there have already been five rounds of negotiations -- all held behind closed doors, of course, just as with TTIP and TPP. The Public Information Session taking place in Geneva this week seems to mark the start of a new phase in those negotiations, at least allowing some token transparency. Perhaps this has been provoked by the growing public anger over the secrecy surrounding TPP and TAFTA/TTIP, and fears that the longer TISA was kept out of the limelight, the worse the reaction would be when people found out about it.

It seems appropriate, then, that the unexpected unveiling of this new global agreement should be greeted not only by an updated and more in-depth critique from the PSI -- "TISA versus Public Services" -- but also the first anti-TISA day of protest. Somehow, I don't think it will be the last.

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Filed Under: corporate sovereignty, isds, secrecy, tafta, tisa, tpp, trade agreement, trade in services agreement, transparency, ttip, ustr

Sending A Message: It's Time To Stop Secret Trade Agreements That Undermine Democracy

from the speak-up dept

A bunch of organizations and companies have teamed up to demand that President Obama Stop the Secrecy around the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. With over 2.8 million signatures already, the groups behind this project are projecting a "stop the secrecy" light on buildings around Washington DC to draw attention to the shady, underhanded nature of the way that these trade agreements are negotiated. The campaign kicked off by shining the message on the Canadian embassy: The organizers note that as the campaign goes on and more people sign, they'll be shining the message bigger and brighter -- and on bigger targets.

While this may be a bit gimmicky, the message here is a serious one. It makes absolutely no sense at all that negotiations like the TPP are done in secret. All of the excuses the USTR gives about this wither under scrutiny. Plenty of other international agreements are negotiated with public texts being shared. The USTR could easily do the same if it chose to. The very fact that former USTR Ron Kirk admitted that they won't reveal the details of these agreements because the public might not like them explains exactly why this kind of secrecy is undemocratic.

Filed Under: secrecy, stop the secrecy, tpp, ustr

Revolving Door: MPAA Hires Chief USTR Negotiator Behind ACTA And TPP's IP Chapter

from the a-big-pat-on-the-back dept

For the past five years or so, the USTR's chief intellectual property negotiator has been Stan McCoy. McCoy has long positioned himself as an intellectual property maximalist, repeating talking points from lobbyists regularly, while condescending to anyone who questions the legitimacy of those claims. McCoy famously was the chief negotiator behind the US's disastrous (and mostly failed) attempt to push ACTA through, as well as the lead on the TPP's intellectual property chapter -- a chapter so bad it may help sink the TPP agreement. In fact, previous reports have noted that McCoy's bullying and aggression in trying to push through the TPP were angering others in the negotiations. McCoy also has a long history of mocking public interest advocates, while praising maximalists for similar tactics. From a report a few years ago concerning a hearing that McCoy chaired:

The burden of proof was very obviously on the public interest, civil society groups. Stan McCoy of the USTR, who was presiding over the hearing, joked about the two-phonebook-sized submission by the International Intellectual Property Alliance. (Lol?) Sadly, there is no independent verification of these industry reports and there were no tough questions for industry regarding their testimony. Several times, McCoy interrupted civil society groups’ testimony to chide them on speaking too generally about IP policy, but refrained when industry witnesses did the same.

Given all that, it should be no surprise at all that McCoy, the failed strategist behind ACTA and the TPP's IP provisions... has received his reward and pat on the back from the industry: a shiny new job at the MPAA. As Tim Lee notes in that link, this is just the latest in the never-ending revolving door between maximalist lobbying groups and the USTR:

Last year I wrote that at least a dozen former senior USTR officials have moved to industry groups that favor stronger protections. McCoy's hire makes it a baker's dozen. Previous hires include including Greg Frazier, who (according to his LinkedIn page) spent 8 years as the executive vice president of the Motion Picture Association of America after a stint at USTR. Other former USTR officials took jobs at drug and medical device companies.

McCoy's old job, assistant USTR for intellectual property and innovation, made him the Obama administration's highest-ranking trade negotiator on patent and copyright issues. Jamie Love, director of the public interest organization Knowledge Ecology International, notes that this isn't the first time USTR's top intellectual property official has gone on to take a lobbying job. McCoy's predecessor, Victoria Espinel, is now the head of the software industry group BSA.

Espinel's predecessor at BSA was Robert Holleyman, the man Obama just nominated to a senior post at USTR. While at BSA, Holleyman supported the controversial Stop Online Piracy Act, which would have created an official internet blacklist to aid in anti-piracy efforts. (He backtracked a few weeks later after an uproar in the technology community.

Another of McCoy's predecessors as USTR's top IP official is Joe Papovich, who later spent seven years as a lobbyist for the recording industry.

As Lee notes, the revolving door between maximalist lobbying organizations and the USTR goes round and round, with USTR officials joining the lobbyist organizations and then going back to the USTR. It's a clear case of regulatory capture by the industry. None of those folks go on to public interest or civil society groups, nor does the USTR ever seem interested in hiring those people. It's entirely a one-sided effort to help out the biggest lobbying interests. Work for a few years pushing through policies that favor those companies, and then get "rewarded" with a nice, high-paying job for those very same lobbyists, and no one ever seems to point out the obvious corruption in the entire process.

As Lee notes, as easy as it is to ascribe comic-book levels of ill-intent here, that's unlikely. McCoy and others genuinely believe what they're doing is the right thing. But the end results are clear:

I doubt public servants like McCoy consciously pursue dubious policies in an effort to curry favor with future employers. McCoy's press representative hasn't responded to my interview request, but I assume McCoy sincerely believes the Hollywood-friendly policies he advocated at USTR were in the interests of the nation.

But the revolving door between USTR and industry groups creates a strong but subtle pressure on USTR's culture. Like many government agencies, USTR regularly turns to outside experts to help it sort through complex trade issues. Naturally, they turn to people they trust: their former colleagues — or even former bosses — who now work at trade organizations with plenty of resources to devote to understanding the minutia of trade policy.

And it's even worse than that, frankly. Because, when you combine that revolving door, with the proposals seen in ACTA, TPP and elsewhere, it undermines the public trust in all of this. People see it and naturally assume corruption, even if the intent is pure. In other words, even if we give McCoy and others the benefit of the doubt, the very fact that he spent 5 years pushing entirely for the MPAA's policies, while brushing off any and all claims from the MPAA's critics, and then took a job at the MPAA, confirms in the minds of many people that the USTR has no interest in representing the public good. And that perception (regardless if the underlying intent is real or not) corrodes public trust in the federal government, and the USTR in particular.

Filed Under: acta, copyright, maximalists, patents, revolving door, stan mccoy, tpp, ustr
Companies: mpaa

NY Times Changes Its Tune On TPP; Highlights Cronyism, Lack Of Transparency As Problems

from the getting-it-right-second-time-around dept

Last fall, many folks who follow these issues were somewhat dismayed by a weird NY Times editorial that appeared to endorse the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, while basically ignoring the many complaints about it. It wasn't exactly a ringing endorsement, but it did clearly support the agreement, concluding with:

A good agreement would lower duties and trade barriers on most products and services, strengthen labor and environmental protections, limit the ability of governments to tilt the playing field in favor of state-owned firms and balance the interests of consumers and creators of intellectual property. Such a deal will not only help individual countries but set an example for global trade talks.

The endorsement resulted in the Times being rightly mocked for endorsing a secretive agreement that the NY Times editorial writers had not seen (indeed, could not see). Apparently, some folks on the editorial staff took at least some of this criticism to heart, and have now released a new editorial that is much more critical of the TPP -- in particular, the process around it.

That is, while the editorial still (rightly, in our opinion) supports the idea of lowering key trade barriers, it finally acknowledges that a lot of what the TPP is doing has little to do with removing trade barriers, and plenty to do with helping corporations push through global regulations that it could not get adopted domestically. Furthermore, it directly takes on the fact that the USTR is ridiculously secretive on the negotiation with everyone except big businesses that have direct access:

The Obama administration has revealed so few details about the negotiations, even to members of Congress and their staffs, that it is impossible to fully analyze the Pacific partnership. Negotiators have argued that it’s impossible to conduct trade talks in public because opponents to the deal would try to derail them.

But the administration’s rationale for secrecy seems to apply only to the public. Big corporations are playing an active role in shaping the American position because they are on industry advisory committees to the United States trade representative, Michael Froman. By contrast, public interest groups have seats on only a handful of committees that negotiators do not consult closely.

That lopsided influence is dangerous, because companies are using trade agreements to get special benefits that they would find much more difficult to get through the standard legislative process. For example, draft chapters from the Pacific agreement that have been leaked in recent months reveal that most countries involved in the talks, except the United States, do not want the agreement to include enforceable environmental standards. Business interests in the United States, which would benefit from weaker rules by placing their operations in countries with lower protections, have aligned themselves with the position of foreign governments. Another chapter, on intellectual property, is said to contain language favorable to the pharmaceutical industry that could make it harder for poor people in countries like Peru to get generic medicines.

The editorial further notes the problematic "corporate sovereignty" provisions that allow companies the ability to sue countries for regulations they dislike, noting how it could be abused by banks to block financial regulations (as an example). It further questions some of the predictions of economic benefits from these agreements.

Towards the end, it notes (as many of us have been pointing out for years) that the Obama administration, and the USTR in particular, only have themselves to blame for this mess:

To a large extent, the administration has only itself to blame. By keeping secret so much information about trade negotiations, which have ceased to be purely about trade matters like tariffs and quotas, the government has made itself a target for criticism. Mr. Obama and Mr. Froman argue that their critics have misunderstood or misrepresented their intentions. But that is precisely why the president should provide answers to the questions people have raised about these agreements. It is time for him to make a strong case for why these new agreements will be good for the American economy and workers.

Of course, considering how many times this has been pointed out, and the USTR's only response is to push out blatant misrepresentations of the truth, it seems unlikely that anything is going to change any time soon.

Filed Under: cronyism, michael froman, ny times, tpp, transparency, ustr

German Politicians Hit Back At USTR Criticisms Of European Cloud Idea

from the well,-what-did-they-expect? dept

Last week we wrote about the USTR suggesting that any attempt by the European Union to create its own local cloud in order to minimize surveillance by the NSA would violate trade agreements. This has not gone down well with European politicians, particularly in Germany, whose Deutsche Telekom was singled out for criticism. Here's what Bavaria's Minister for Europe, Beate Merk, said while visiting the US, as reported by Die Welt (original in German):

"In my talks with the USTR, I've made it clear that our discussions of a "Schengen cloud" [that is, EU-only] has no protectionist background, but is born out of need as a consequence of the lost confidence arising from the NSA business," Merk said to Die Welt.

"We have a duty to ensure that the data of people in the EU is safe from unrestrained access by third parties", Merk added. If there is no offer from the US side for more data protection and data security, one is obliged "to propose one's own ideas on this score," underlined Merk.

She also pointed out that the EU cloud proposals were being made by commercial providers, not put in place through legislation, which means that the accusation of "protectionism" was simply incorrect. A German member of the European Parliament was even more forthright:

"The criticism of the US Trade Representative is bizarre! It seems they've noticed that people have finally had enough and that spying on data will no longer be tolerated."

As Die Welt notes, thanks to the USTR's ill-judged comments on this issue:

The "Schengen cloud" has become a stumbling block for the planned [TAFTA/TTIP] free trade agreement.

Maybe not a very serious stumbling block, but combined with differences over GMOs, hormone beef and cheese names, it's enough to make achieving an "ambitious" agreement, along with its claimed benefits, just that bit more difficult.

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Filed Under: eu commission, eu only cloud, local cloud, surveillance, trade agreements, ustr