TSA 'Security Fee' Expected To Double Next Year, Current Level Of Ineptness To Remain Unchanged

from the rights-to-be-violated-twice-as-effectively-in-fiscal-2014 dept

The TSA, having earned every bit of its ~$8 billion/year, is now looking for just a little bit more. As Kevin Underhill at the ultra-enjoyable Lowering the Bar blog notes, the "security fee" that's been tacked onto tickets is about to increase -- more than doubling in most cases.

[T]he AP says that Congress is currently debating whether to double the TSA fee that is currently $5 per ticket. (It's actually $2.50 per "enplanement," but close enough.) Passengers pay that, not the airlines. The TSA collects about $1.8 billion from us every year just through this fee, and in return, provides virtually nothing in addition to what's already provided by (1) alert passengers and (2) reinforced cockpit doors.

And it will definitely be passengers paying the fee. The CEO of Delta Airlines has already gone on the record to inform the public that this increase will be all theirs.

"Airfares are going up for consumers. So that tax increase will not be absorbed by Delta," Richard Anderson said at a Delta Air Lines Inc. presentation for investors in New York on Wednesday.

As if there was ever any doubt. Any new fee levied by the government, whether to cable companies, wireless providers or airlines, is immediately dumped into the laps (or rather, extracted from the pockets) of Joe Public.

The AP story offers a slightly deeper explanation of the fee that doesn't do much to justify the increase.

The fee is meant to offset some of the cost of the Transportation Security Administration. A report last year by the Government Accountability Office found that the fees currently cover about 29 percent of the cost of airline security. The higher fee is meant to get travelers to pay for more of those costs, although some of the new money is slated to be spent on non-security items.

Hmm. As far as I know, every government program is already paid for by travelers, including our extra-useless Theatrum Satis Absurdum. The only way to get travelers to pay more of the cost is to double-dip, first through income taxes and second, through this ridiculous "security fee."

Not that this fee increase will result in better or more efficient "security." Travelers will just pay more and see nothing in return. The $5 fee will increase to roughly $11.20 per round trip ticket, with some of the funds earmarked for "covering" security costs, and the rest vanishing into the "non-security" ether.

In exchange, travelers will continue to be saved from toy guns carried by toy monkeys, small children with rare medical conditions, breast cancer survivors and dozens of "suspicious people" given "ocular patdowns" by Behavioral Detection Officers employing the best in modern junk science.

Filed Under: security fee, tsa

TSA Agent: Give Me That Toy Monkey Gun Or I'm Calling The Real Cops

from the monkey-see-monkey-do dept

I have something of a conflicting relationship with the Transportation Security Administration. On one side, I absolutely hate the idea of giving up freedom and pride for the sake of one of the most futile attempts at security theater known to man. On the other hand, it's quite useful to have such an amazing example at which to point when I get into a conversation with someone about how stupid my government can be. Then again, it's hard to justify that use when so many of my countrymen are subjected to poking and prodding by agents of the people that elect them. On the other hand, I mean, if I'm ever lonely on a cold, wintery night, the airport ain't that far away, know what I mean?

But, in an apparent effort to make my mind up for me, the TSA has recently decided to prove to the world that they've lost their collective minds. The latest example of this is when the TSA in St. Louis took possession of a gun a woman had in her bag. Which would be fine, except that the gun was 2 inches long and was owned by the sock-puppet the woman had crafted as part of her business.

The TSA agent searched the bag and found the 2-inch-long toy pistol, which gave her pause.

"She said, 'This is a gun,'" May said. "I said, 'No, it's not a gun it's a prop for my monkey.'"

But the agent remained concerned.

"She said 'If I held it up to your neck, you wouldn't know if it was real or not,' and I said 'really?'" May said.

Again, kudos to this TSA agent for making certain everyone around her knew she wasn't competent enough to be able to tell a real gun from a 2 inch toy because, hey, that's going to be useful information come performance review time. And sure, there might be some TSA rule somewhere that specifically says that nothing even resembling a firearm can be taken onto a plane in this way, but that doesn't make the passenger stupid, it makes the rule stupid. Put it this way: we now live in a country where you can't take a sock-puppet's toy gun on a plane. Congratulations everyone.

Fortunately for everyone on the flight, safety is the TSA's primary concern.

The agent confiscated the monkey doll's toy weapon and said she was required to call police.

"Rooster Monkburn has been disarmed, so I'm sure everyone on the plane was safe," May said. "I understand she was doing her job but at some point doesn't common sense prevail?"

Of course not, citizen. There's nothing in the TSA employee handbook about common sense. It's all genital-brushing and nudie-scanning, all the time. Even the TSA said so when they were asked to comment:

The TSA told NBC News in a statement: "TSA officers are dedicated to keeping the nation's transportation security systems safe and secure for the traveling public. Under longstanding aircraft security policy, and out of an abundance of caution, realistic replicas of firearms are prohibited in carry-on bags."

There's a joke here about something being two inches long still being the realistic version of an object typically several times larger, but I'm not going to make it (pssst! I'm talking about penises again!). Instead, let's just say that the TSA's dedication to not using any semblance of common sense is a wonderful prime reason for their dismantling.

Filed Under: guns, monkeys, sockpuppet, toys, tsa

TSA Collects Nearly $500,000 In Abandoned Change Per Year And Has No Idea What To Do With It

from the the-unofficial-National-Tip-Jar dept

The TSA undoubtedly has several problems, chief among them being charged with providing an expensive, interactive theater program aimed at putting travelers' minds at ease while simultaneously putting their nether regions through a rigorous groping regimen. The exposure of documents stating its all-important job isn't actually that important certainly doesn't help. As it stands now, the TSA is just another government institution, destined to be funded in perpetuity, even as its relevance continues to erode.

One problem it shouldn't have but does is how to deal with a vast accumulation of pocket change left behind by the nation's travelers.

Last year, the Transportation Security Administration collected $531,395.22 in change left behind at checkpoints.

Federal law requires the TSA to report the amount of unclaimed money they keep every year to Congress. The fiscal 2012 report, obtained by The Washington Post, shows the agency collected about $499,000 in U.S. currency, and another $32,000 in foreign currency, at their checkpoints.

While this amount is literally small change compared to the agency's ~$8 billion annual budget, it's still too significant an amount to ignore. This unclaimed change is earmarked for "civil aviation security" -- you know, the main thing that the TSA does. The agency is supposed to put the money back into the company, so to speak. But, if the following figure is accurate, it would appear the agency is operating at peak (in)efficiency.

[T]he TSA has only spent about $6,500 of the money it collected last year.

Well, if the agency can't use it, maybe it could pass it on to those who could.

On Tuesday, the House passed H.R. 1095, sponsored by Rep. Jeff Miller (R-Fla.), which would require the TSA to fork that cash over to nonprofit organizations that provide travel-related assistance to military personnel or their families.

Good idea, one would think. But that would be before hearing how expensive giving money away can be when the TSA handles the job.

The Congressional Budget Office estimated [pdf] that collecting, accounting for and transferring the money to the USO would cost $1.2 million — $700,000 more than the actual amount collected.

The CBO's two-page estimate is woefully light on details on how it arrived at its $1.2 million figure. It just sort of claims the costs will exceed $1 million, extrapolates this income/expenditure over a decade and states the whole thing will be a wash, even if the TSA's spending steadily declines. To sum up: nothing ventured, nothing lost.

It seems there would be a very inexpensive way to route this money to charity. First off, each airport's security team could designate a charity to route the funds to. Then… nothing. The TSA simply collects the change as usual and dumps it into the proper receptacle. The designated charity could pick this up quarterly (unintentional pun), count it themselves and turn over a receipt for record keeping to the TSA -- all on their own dime (slightly less unintentional pun). Total cost to the TSA: nothing more than the hourly wage it already pays to have someone scoop up and store abandoned change.

End result? PR wins all around (especially if local charities are used) and the agency won't be spending money to reroute money. In fact, donation boxes for the selected charity could be set up right past the scanners, allowing people to toss the change in themselves and restore a little faith in humanity after a trip through the TSA's dehumanizing theatrical production.

Filed Under: charity, loose change, money, tsa

Guy Builds Ten Weapons With Products Purchased After Getting Through Airport Security

from the security-theater dept

If past history is any indication, it seems likely that the little convenience shop on the "air side" of most airports is soon going to be told to stop selling certain items. Last week a few sites, including Boing Boing, Gizmodo and Business Insider, all had stories on a guy who showed how to build a small bomb in less than ten minutes with items that could all be purchased after already passing through TSA security in an airport. The bomb may not be that big, but you could see how it could do at least some damage (and, given the situation, it's not that difficult to imagine ways to make changes to it that would be more damaging). But, here's the thing. That video isn't the only weapon shown. The YouTube account Terminal Cornucopia actually put up ten videos of weapons that can be built on the air side of airport security, including a crossbow, a remote detonator, a slingbow, a "remotely triggered incendiary suitcase," a shotgun, a spiked club, a pewter slug and a blowgun. Frankly, the exploding suitcase and possibly the shotgun strike me as even more impressive than the initial small bomb.

So, who's behind this? Apparently, it's a security researcher named Evan Booth who explains that he sent all of these examples to the TSA. He also explains his response to the obvious question: "but what if the terrorists see these videos?"

That’s a great question. An even better question is: What if they already know all this? All of these findings have been reported to the Department of Homeland Security (TSA) to help them better detect these types of threats. Furthermore, the next time you fly, you’ll be flying as a more informed consumer (and taxpayer, possibly) — one who is more equipped to demand better, more appropriate airport security.

Which, of course, is really the point. Pretending that keeping this info secret makes people safer means believing that if you don't know about a security hole it goes away.

Filed Under: airport, evan booth, security, tsa, weapons

TSA's $1 Billion 'Behavioral Detection' Program Only Slightly More Accurate Than A Coin Flip

from the treading-very-expensive-water dept

I have yet to see a Government Accountability Office report that can't be described as "highly negative" -- at minimum. Most tend to fall somewhere between "brutal" and "scathing." This is a good thing, although I imagine any agency that is the subject of these reports strongly feels otherwise.

Unfortunately, I'm also inclined to believe that I'll go to my grave before I see a GAO report giving its subject a thumbs up or a 3-out-of-5 star rating. This is a bad thing, because it suggests many of these agencies coast from scathing review to scathing review with minimal interest in improving things.

The GAO's report on the TSA's Behavioral Detection program, SPOT (Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques), is out and it's every bit as bad as the laborious lead-in above would have you believe. First off, any program that immediately conjures up this scene from It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia is a program that has some serious problems.

[relevant dialog here for those unwilling/unable to view video]

Frank: Yeah, he probably just carved up his mother and father and he’s runnin’ away on the road.
Dennis: That’s right.
Mac: Could be, Frank. All I’m saying is that I’m ready for any situation. And that’s why you’re all safe as long as I’m around.
Dennis: …Uh-huh.
Mac: Yeah, I did an ocular pat-down and I cleared him.
Frank: Say what?
Dee: I’m sorry?
Mac: I’m saying that I did an ocular assessment of the situation, garnered that he was not a security risk and I cleared him for passage.
Dennis: What in the hell are you talking about?
Mac: I’m talking about breaking down the security situation, clearing an individual and making it safe for passage.

The TSA has been attempting for years to up its security game. Rather than roll back questionable barn-door-closing policies, it has instead opted to increase the number of highly trained BDOs (Behavioral Detection Officers) deployed in our nation's airports. This has been slowly developing since 2007 and hasn't improved over the last half-decade. All told, nearly a billion dollars have been sunk into the program, with the end result being a scattershot system that the GAO says detects potential threats with an accuracy that is "the same or slightly better than chance."

There are 99 pages full of investigative info and proposed remedies in the report, but most of what's wrong with the program is handled up front.

Four years after the rollout, a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) was assembled to test the program's accuracy by comparing SPOT's hit rate with randomly selected passengers. But any hopes of this test providing an accurate reflection of the program's efficacy was completely undermined by the TSA's refusal to share any pertinent data with the TAC.

According to the TAC report, TAC members received briefings from the contractor that described the study plans and results, but because of TSA’s security concerns, TAC members did not receive detailed information about the contents of the SPOT referral report, the individual indicators used in the SPOT program, the validation study data, or the final report containing complete details of the SPOT validation study results. The TAC report noted that several TAC members felt that these restrictions hampered their ability to perform their assigned tasks.

In other words, the TSA was so "concerned" about security that it prevented a committee tasked with evaluating its security program from performing its duties. And, obviously, the overriding concern was for the TSA's security, not the passengers' security. The stymied TAC still produced a report, but considering the number of limitations it was subjected to, its findings were relatively meaningless.

The Behavioral Detection program was supposed to be the cutting edge of airport security, turning the agency into a smarter, more responsive security force. But instead of applying any sort of scientifically proven methods, the agency leaned heavily on BDO hunches. (This has been observed in other DHS agencies as well. The DHS notably stated in its Civil Liberties Assessment that CBP agent hunches should supersede any civil liberties concerns when it comes to searching electronics at the borders.)

The GAO has the following to say about the "science" behind the SPOT program.

Peer-reviewed, published research does not support whether the use of nonverbal behavioral indicators by human observers can accurately identify deception. Our review of meta-analyses and other studies related to detecting deception conducted over the past 60 years, and interviews with experts in the field, question the use of behavior observation techniques, that is, human observation unaided by technology, as a means for reliably detecting deception. The meta-analyses, or reviews that synthesize the findings of other studies, we reviewed collectively included research from more than 400 separate studies on detecting deception, and found that the ability of human observers to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral cues or indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance (54 percent).

There's more:

Moreover, a 2008 study performed for the Department of Defense by the JASON Program Office reviewed behavior detection programs, including the methods used by the SPOT program, and found that no compelling evidence exists to support remote observation of physiological signals that may indicate fear or nervousness in an operational scenario by human observers, and no scientific evidence exists to support the use of these signals in detecting or inferring future behavior or intent…

Fear or nervousness is a common reaction in people with "nothing to hide" when trapped in a conversation with a TSA agent who has the power to do anything from preventing them from making their flight to holding them indefinitely and/or turning them over to law enforcement simply because they don't like an answer or the manner in which the answer was delivered.

And it goes far beyond simply sniffing around aimlessly for "suspicious behavior."

In particular, the report stated that success in identifying deception and intent in other studies is post hoc and such studies incorrectly equate success in identifying terrorists with the identification of drug smugglers, warrant violators, or others. For example, when describing the techniques used by BDOs in the SPOT program, the report concluded that even if a correlation were found between abnormal behaviors and guilt as a result of some transgression, there is no clear indication that the guilt caused the abnormal behavior. The report also noted that the determination that the abnormal behavior was caused by guilt was made after the fact, rather than being based on established criteria beforehand.

So, we have hunches and post facto attributions masquerading as a behavioral detection program. A billion dollars have been sunk into a program that has no scientific basis and that has never been conclusively proven to provide better threat detection than a BDO could achieve by flipping a coin.

This is what's supposedly keeping us safe from airborne acts of terrorism. Despite the lack of results, the TSA as recently as 2011 declared it was looking to expand this program. Sure, claiming to be following the "Israeli model" may make the agency look smarter, but in practice, there's very little indication this program has done anything to make BDOs better… or us safer.

Filed Under: behavioral detection, terrorists, tsa

TSA Security Theater Makes Unwilling Co-Star Out Of 3-Year-Old With Rare Medical Condition

from the learning-from-your-mistakes-not-permitted-by-governing-TSA-bylaws dept

It seems the TSA is unable to learn from its mistakes. When your entire operation is continually scrutinized and criticized by the public and policy makers, you'd think there would be a concerted effort to minimize these sorts of embarrassing incidents.

The TSA hasn't met a medical condition it can't treat as threat. Anything physically unusual is subjected to additional patdowns, harassment and detainment. Err on the side of caution, I suppose, but it's doing itself no favors by refusing to up its level of understanding past "aggressively mystified."

A disabled child was harassed by government agents and his family was caused to miss their flight, all because inept security screeners thought that his medical equipment may have been a bomb. Even children with debilitating medical conditions set off paranoiac ideations and inhumane treatment from the Transportation Security Administration.

3-year-old Apollo, who was born with a cardiovascular abnormality that affects his ability to eat, was suspected of harboring an explosive device after TSA employees believed they had detected residue on the medical supplies that help keep him alive.

Yes, Apollo's condition is unusual and yes, for whatever reason, his very essential formula set off the explosive residue testing equipment, but the entire system leading up to this point is incredibly fallible. The TSA's boilerplate response ignores a great many facts in its hurry to offload the blame on Apollo's parents.

The TSA looked into Bergeron’s complaint for Yahoo Shine on Friday before issuing the following statement: “We regret that the family did not have a positive screening experience. We strongly encourage passengers with medical conditions to arrive at the checkpoint with ample time for screening. We are committed to maintaining the security of the traveling public and strive to treat all passengers with dignity and respect.”

Thanks for the "arrive early" tip, but Apollo's mother (Renee Bergeron) did everything she could do to expedite this process and it still went wrong.

“I walked right up to the first agent and told her, ‘My son is tube-fed and this cooler has formula and medical supplies in it,’” Bergeron said, explaining that she had hoped that being direct would be a helpful approach and that it would have prompted a TSA agent to do a thorough search and swab of the items before sending them through to their gate.

No such luck. The responding (ha!) TSA agent told her to put it on the belt with the rest of luggage and made no attempt to inform the screeners up ahead that something unusual might be on the way. The formula cooler triggered the "bomb residue" alarm and Bergeron's (and Apollo's) day went from merely difficult to something much worse.

They were escorted to a restroom then, as Apollo had to go, but Bergeron was not allowed to take him alone. Then the two were ushered to a private room where agents gave Bergeron a thorough pat-down and where a nervous Apollo began to cry and beg his mom to hold him. Bergeron was told she couldn’t touch her son because she could “contaminate” him. “It was horribly traumatic for him,” she said.

“To make a long story short, the flight left without us,” she wrote in her blog. “As it turns out, they don’t hold flights for people suspected of carrying explosives onto the plane.”

Somewhat ironically, Bergeron and her son were on their way to an "Everybody Plays" event, which celebrates and encourages active lives for children with different health issues and disabilities. To be subjected to additional hassle and attention because of his condition isn't going to help Apollo learn to live a fuller life.

Now, it may seem a bit churlish to criticize the agency for following its own policies regarding explosive residue, but it's not as if Bergeron didn't try to let agents know something unusual was headed their way, in terms of both luggage and human beings. But this was ignored and the usual panic ensued when the machine decided the formula was actually explosives. And it's not as if the agency doesn't have any previous experience with this exact flier.

Bergeron said she is considering filing a complaint with the TSA. It’s not the first time they have experienced harassment at the hands of the agency.

Last year they were mistreated on their way to Texas for Apollo’s medical treatment. In that instance, a TSA employee attempted to pour out all four of Apollo’s bottles of formula before he found it in himself to spare all but one. “It was so blown out of proportion and ridiculous” Bergeron said.

The policies constantly override any innate logic TSA agents might possess and continue unimpeded even when the agency itself admits it doesn't think airplanes are terrorist targets. The underlying problem with these policies and the security theater they anchor is that they're unable to be overridden by agents' intuition or better judgement. Because of this, no one learns anything from these experiences. The TSA just copy-pastes another boilerplate "just policy" non-apology and moves on to the next debacle.

Even worse, the TSA itself provides absolutely no assistance for travelers in terms of prepping for unusual situations, other than tell them to "arrive early." Arriving early is completely useless when agents are free to detain fliers for nearly any reason and for indefinite periods of time. A spokesperson spoke to Yahoo and pointed to this post on the TSA's blog as "answering" questions about how bomb residue tests work. But what's contained in that post doesn't address Bergeron's situation at all. Furthermore, it doesn't really explain the system. It spends most of the post telling people TSA agents will be using swabs to detect bomb residue. No information is given as to what common (or uncommon) items/chemicals/household products might cause a false positive. There's no info on failure rates or anything detailing the technology involved. It's just "we'll be using these so don't be worried." In terms of dealing with Bergeron's multiple experiences with the TSA, it's about as useless as a 404 page.

I understand that too much information might give someone an idea of how to bypass these tests, but when you're dealing with the possibility of throwing out the only food a child with a rare medical condition can eat simply because of policies and faulty machinery, you need to be willing to disseminate more info than a canned response and a worthless "we're the good guys" blog post.

Filed Under: children, medical conditions, search, tsa

TSA Security Checks Begin Long Before Travelers Arrive At The Airport

from the more-data-stockpiling-and-careless-dissemination dept

The TSA may not be privately concerned about the average flier's desire to hijack the flight he or she is boarding, but that hasn't dissuaded it from continually ratcheting up the invasiveness of its pre-boarding procedures. Between the spilling of breast milk/baby formula and the casual groping of toddlers, attractive women and anyone with a visible medical condition, the TSA has "brusquely and barely competently invasive" nailed down.

But that's just what's going on between the airport exit and your departing flight. The New York Times reports that there's an entire level of pre-boarding screening going on well before you hit the airport.

The Transportation Security Administration is expanding its screening of passengers before they arrive at the airport by searching a wide array of government and private databases that can include records like car registrations and employment information.

While the agency says that the goal is to streamline the security procedures for millions of passengers who pose no risk, the new measures give the government greater authority to use travelers' data for domestic airport screenings. Previously that level of scrutiny applied only to individuals entering the United States…

It is unclear precisely what information the agency is relying upon to make these risk assessments, given the extensive range of records it can access, including tax identification number, past travel itineraries, property records, physical characteristics, and law enforcement or intelligence information.

At what point does someone "who poses no risk" start feeling offended the TSA is doing deep read on his or her financial and employment background? The TSA already has the PreCheck program, which allows fliers to pay money to reclaim civil liberties removed by the agency's security theater.

Those who haven't joined this select group are still receiving very thorough vetting (even when flying domestically) but without gaining any of the benefits the one benefit of extensive pre-screening: speedier passage through security. The TSA says these background checks "streamline" the process, but if so, the results are nearly imperceptible to travelers. Of course, this lack of noticeable change may be due to the TSA's bold plan to speed up things slightly sometime before 2015.

The T.S.A. has emphasized its goal of giving 25 percent of all passengers lighter screening by the end of next year, meaning they can keep their shoes and jackets on, wait in separate lines and leave laptop computers in their bags.

While we're all waiting for a one-quarter of travelers to start breezing through security, the extensive background checks will continue on all fliers, with the collected data being shared indiscriminately with other government agencies and private businesses.

Much of this personal data is widely shared within the Department of Homeland Security and with other government agencies. Privacy notices for these databases note that the information may be shared with federal, state and local authorities; foreign governments; law enforcement and intelligence agencies — and in some cases, private companies for purposes unrelated to security or travel.

For instance, an update about the T.S.A.'s Transportation Security Enforcement Record System, which contains information about travelers accused of "violations or potential violations" of security regulations, warns that the records may be shared with "a debt collection agency for the purpose of debt collection."

If you're one of those unlucky travelers who receive the algorithmically-generated "please extensively search this flier" designation (or return home from a trip to find your voicemail full of calls from collections agencies), there's not much you can do about it. There's an official "Traveler Redress Inquiry Program," but as we've noted before, it's low on functionality and long on officious uselessness.The TRIP provides minimal details in response to inquiries, if it can be bothered to respond at all. Those on no-fly lists (or those that suspect they might be) receive letters that refuse to "confirm nor deny" the inquirer's inclusion on this super-secret list.

Add the TSA to the long list of agencies gathering tons of data on Americans simply because they have the technology and the opportunity. Supposedly this invasion of privacy will pay off in an incremental speed improvement at airport security checkpoints sometime in the next year or two. The resulting payoff in increased security will continue to hover right around nil for the foreseeable future.

Filed Under: background checks, civil liberties, privacy, tsa

Accidentally Revealed Document Shows TSA Doesn't Think Terrorists Are Plotting To Attack Airplanes

from the but-the-body-scans-continue dept

Jonathan Corbett, a long-time vocal critic of TSA body scanners, has been engaged in a lawsuit against the government concerning the constitutionality of those scanners. In the course of the case, the TSA gave him classified documents, which he was ordered not to reveal. In using some of that information to make his case, he needed to file two copies of his brief: a public one with classified stuff redacted, and the full brief under seal, for the government and the courts to look at. Just one problem: someone over at Infowars noticed that apparently a clerk at the 11th Circuit appeals court forgot to file the document under seal, allowing them to find out what was under the redactions... Included in there is the following, apparently quoted from the TSA's own statements:

“As of mid-2011, terrorist threat groups present in the Homeland are not known to be actively plotting against civil aviation targets or airports; instead, their focus is on fundraising, recruiting, and propagandizing.”

Elsewhere, the TSA appears to admit that "due to hardened cockpit doors and the willingness of passengers to challenge hijackers," it's unlikely that there's much value in terrorists trying to hijack a plane these days (amusingly, that statement is a clear echo of Bruce Schneier's statement criticizing the TSA's security theater -- suggesting that the TSA flat out knows that airport security is nothing more than such theatrics).

Elsewhere, in the redacted portions, the TSA is quoted as admitting that "there have been no attempted domestic hijackings of any kind in the 12 years since 9/11."

As Corbett notes in his filing, the entire basis for the nude scanners is that they were somehow necessary to stop terrorists with explosives from getting on planes. Yet, as he makes clear, the TSA knows that there's been little threat of any such attack for quite some time. He also details how the machines are not very good at tracking down explosives, and pretty much everything that has been caught with these machines (such as guns) could be easily found via traditional metal detectors. Further, as noted above, other protections that have nothing to do with the nude scanners are the main reason (which the TSA admits) that terrorists have moved on from targeting airplanes.

Amazingly, it appears that the government forced Corbett to redact the revelation that the TSA's own threat assessments have shown "literally zero evidence that anyone is plotting to blow up an airline leaving from a domestic airport." Corbett argues that this shows why the searches are not reasonable under the 4th Amendment. Corbett also points out that about the only thing the machines seem useful at catching are illegal drugs -- but, as he notes, that's "irrelevant to aviation security." Sure, the government may like the fact that it catches illegal drugs with these machines, but the TSA can't argue it needs the machines for "terrorism" when it knows that's not true, and then tries to keep them just because it finds some narcotics...

While it still seems unlikely that Corbett's lawsuit will actually succeed, he's right that these revelations mean that, at the very least, Congress should be investigating why the TSA insisted that it needed these machines to find terrorists that it now admits aren't actually plotting to attack airplanes.

Filed Under: body scanners, jonathan corbett, naked scanners, terrorism, tsa

9-Year-Old Sneaks Onto Flight; TSA Blames The Government Shutdown, Then Says It Did Its Job Just Fine

from the because-you-gotta-blame-someone dept

You may have seen this story making the rounds about a 9-year-old boy somehow getting through multiple layers of security at an airport in Minnesota to get aboard a flight to Las Vegas. It appears that there were multiple lapses here. The kid got through the TSA security checkpoint without a ticket. He got onto the plane without a ticket. The plane then took off without anyone noticing that (1) the plane had too many passengers and (2) he wasn't on their list of unaccompanied minors (something they noticed mid-flight). The TSA's response was initially to blame the the government shutdown:

WCCO contacted the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) Sunday morning, during which a spokesperson said staffing is currently low due to the number of employees furloughed in the wake of the federal government shutdown.

A few hours later, the TSA responded again, trying a different strategy. Apparently someone realized that nearly all TSA agents at security checks are still on the job, even if their pay is deferred. So, with a second shot at this, rather than blame the government shutdown, the TSA's strategy is to claim it did everything it was supposed to:

“The child was screened along with all other passengers to ensure that he was not a threat to the aircraft,” said the TSA spokesperson.

Someone else in the article also notes that the TSA's job is to make sure that the people passing through security are "not a threat," and not whether or not they're supposed to board the plane. That's an interesting argument, but doesn't make much sense. I fly fairly frequently, and these days every single time I fly there are two TSA agents who review the boarding pass before you make it through security (one as you enter security who mainly makes sure you have a boarding pass for a flight through that security checkpoint, and the second who checks your IDs and is supposed to verify that the boarding pass is legit).

Of course, these kinds of lapses aren't unheard of. In the past it used to be much easier. Comedian/actor Molly Shannon has told her story a few times about how when she was a little girl she was able to sneak onto a plane to NY (after her father suggested she try it). But that was back when airport/airline security was a lot lower. Either way, it's pretty ridiculous for the TSA to blame the government shutdown for such a lapse. People have long argued that the TSA is more "security theater" than anything else -- giving you the appearance of security, rather than any actual protections -- and this seems to support that theory.

Filed Under: flights, government shutdown, kids, security theater, stowaways, tsa

Former DHS/NSA Official Says You Should Blame Privacy Advocates For The TSA Groping You

from the wait,what? dept

Remember Stewart Baker? He's the former Homeland Security and NSA officials who recently argued that civil liberties activists were to blame for 9/11. Apparently, that sort of thinking (blame the activists for what it leads the government to do) worked so well the last time, he's back for more. According to him, all the bullshit you've had to go through with the TSA at our airports is because of those darn meddling privacy advocates. Yes, we've now learned that the reason a TSA measured the weight of my little friend and his bag of tricks is because privacy advocates just wouldn't let the TSA do invasive background checks on all of us. The privacy advocating jerks.

TSA ended up taking more time to inspect everyone, treating all travelers as potential terrorists, and subjecting many to whole-body imaging and enhanced pat-downs. We can't blame TSA for this wrong turn, though. Privacy lobbies persuaded Congress that TSA couldn't be trusted with data about the travelers it was screening. With no information about travelers, TSA had no choice but to treat them all alike, sending us down a long blind alley that has inconvenienced billions.

Of course! It isn't the TSA's fault the TSA debased me. It's because privacy advocates (also me) didn't want the TSA to debase me by massively invading my privacy. It makes perfect sense! Never mind that this is all a theater show ostensibly designed to up the suicide count of Americans worldwide, because they sure aren't catching anyone important. It's the privacy people who are to blame. Also, all those women who are sexually assaulted? Pshh, they were dressed to provocatively. Blame the short-skirt makers or whoever.

Then, because apparently Stewart Baker hasn't been reading the news lately, he testified that instead the government just needs more data on all of us, while driving home the point that the current security screenings are stupid.

No one wants to be against privacy, but we've tried the privacy campaigners' preferred solution, denying even the smallest scrap of data to the government, and they saddled us with ten years of stupid screening at our airports, where a lack of data forced TSA to treat everyone like a suspected terrorist. No one liked that solution, with good reason. It's time to recognize that failure and encourage experiments in smarter, faster, more informed screening based on data-sharing.

Okay, no. The TSA has not tried the privacy campaigner's preferred solution, because I've yet to hear a privacy campaigner stamp her feet over the fact that her nipples haven't been tweaked lately. And, while everyone would like better and safer solutions for traveling, making the "our government just doesn't have enough data on us" argument at this point in time might be the most tone-deaf thing since Bob Dylan. The TSA is full of misconduct, the government is collecting too much data on us and is overloaded with it, all while even the TSA's advocates are calling their current screening processes "stupid."

Drop the curtain on this theater, because the show has been going on too long and it sucks anyway.

Filed Under: blame, civil liberties, privacy, privacy advocates, stewart baker, tsa