Supreme Court Now Says That The Trademark Office Can't Reject 'Immoral Or Scandalous' Trademarks

from the well-fuck-yeah(tm) dept

This should have been pretty much a foregone conclusion after the Supreme Court's ruling two years ago in Simon Tam's case about The Slants trademark. In that case, the Supreme court ruled that part of the Lanham Act that said the government could deny trademarks on "disparaging" marks was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. However, that ruling was a bit messy. The court agreed that the law was unconstitutional under the 1st Amendment, but had two different theories as to why, neither of which got a majority. So the specific law that said the PTO could reject "disparaging" marks was tossed, but technically other content-based restrictions, such as those for "immoral and scandalous" remarks remained on the books. So, pretty quickly that got challenged as well, and now the Supreme Court instead has said that's unconstitutional too.

The basic reasoning should be obvious: under the First Amendment, the government cannot be in the business of judging the appropriateness of content (for what it's worth, this is also why Senator Josh Hawley's silly bill is unconstitutional). Here, the majority decision, written by Justice Kagan, made pretty quick work of the ruling, basically just saying that the same thing that they said in the Tam case applies here as well.

If the “immoral or scandalous” bar similarly discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, it must also collide with our First Amendment doctrine. The Government does not argue otherwise. In briefs and oral argument, the Government offers a theory for upholding the bar if it is viewpoint-neutral (essentially, that the bar would then be a reasonable condition on a government benefit). See Brief for Petitioner 14–26. But the Government agrees that under Tam it may not “deny registration based on the views expressed” by a mark. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. “As the Court’s Tam decision establishes,” the Government says,“the criteria for federal trademark registration” must be “viewpoint-neutral to survive Free Speech Clause review.” Pet. for Cert. 19. So the key question becomes: Is the “immoral or scandalous” criterion in the Lanham Act viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based?

It is viewpoint-based. The meanings of “immoral” and“scandalous” are not mysterious, but resort to some dictionaries still helps to lay bare the problem. When is expressive material “immoral”? According to a standard definition, when it is “inconsistent with rectitude, purity,or good morals”; “wicked”; or “vicious.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1246 (2d ed. 1949). Or again, when it is “opposed to or violating morality”; or “morally evil.” Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 961 (3d ed. 1947). So the Lanham Act permits registration of marks that champion society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate those concepts. And when is such material “scandalous”? Says a typical definition, when it “giv[es] offense to the conscience or moral feelings”; “excite[s] reprobation”; or “call[s] out condemnation.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, at 2229. Or again, when it is “shocking to the sense of truth, decency,or propriety”; “disgraceful”; “offensive”; or “disreputable.” Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 2186 (1944). So the Lanham Act allows registration of marks when their messages accord with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of decency or propriety. Put the pair of overlapping terms together and the statute, on its face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and those provoking offense and condemnation. The statute favors the former, and disfavors the latter. “Love rules”? “Always be good”? Registration follows. “Hate rules”? “Always be cruel”? Not according to the Lanham Act’s “immoral or scandalous” bar.

The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint-discriminatory application.

The ruling mocks the Government's position that some of the examples shown of the PTO rejecting marks were "mistakes," as well as the request to basically read the law entirely differently than it's written.

How, then, can the Government claim that the “immoral or scandalous” bar is viewpoint-neutral? The Government basically asks us to treat decisions like those described above as PTO examiners’ mistakes. See Brief for Petitioner 46. Still more, the Government tells us to ignore how the Lanham Act’s language, on its face, disfavors some ideas. In urging that course, the Government does not dispute that the statutory language—and words used to define it—have just that effect. At oral argument, the Government conceded: “[I]f you just looked at the words like ‘shocking’ and ‘offensive’ on their face and gave them their ordinary meanings[,] they could easily encompass material that was shocking [or offensive] because it expressed an outrageous point of view or a point of view that most members” of society reject. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. But no matter, says the Government, because the statute is “susceptible of” a limiting construction that would remove this viewpoint bias. Id., at 7 (arguing that the Court should “attempt to construe [the] statute in a way that would render it constitutional”). The Government’s idea, abstractly phrased, is to narrow the statutory bar to “marks that are offensive [or] shocking to a substantial segment of the public because of their mode of expression, independent of any views that they may express.” Id., at 11 (emphasis added); see Brief for Petitioner 27–28. More concretely, the Government explains that this reinterpretation would mostly restrict the PTO to refusing marks that are “vulgar”—meaning “lewd,” “sexually explicit or profane.” Id., at 27, 30. Such a reconfigured bar, the Government says, would not turn on viewpoint, and so we could uphold it.

But we cannot accept the Government’s proposal, because the statute says something markedly different. This Court, of course, may interpret “ambiguous statutory language” to “avoid serious constitutional doubts.”

Easy.

Except, of course, with this court, very little is easy. There are a bunch of concurring opinions, with some dissenting in part. Justice Alito kicks it off with a short concurring opinion bravely talking up the principles of free speech, before then insisting that Congress could still write a law to block "FUCT" because he, personally seems to feel such a word is too vulgar for society or something. It's... bizarre.

For the reasons explained in the opinion of the Court, the provision of the Lanham Act at issue in this case violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint and cannot be fixed without rewriting the statute. Viewpoint discrimination is poison to a free society. But in many countries with constitutions or legal traditions that claim to protect freedom of speech, serious viewpoint discrimination is now tolerated, and such discrimination has become increasingly prevalent in this country. At a time when free speech is under attack, it is especially important for this Court to remain firm on the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination. We reaffirm that principle today.

Our decision is not based on moral relativism but on the recognition that a law banning speech deemed by government officials to be “immoral” or “scandalous” can easily be exploited for illegitimate ends. Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas. The particular mark in question in this case could be denied registration under such a statute. The term suggested by that mark is not needed to express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today, generally signifies nothing except emotion and a severely limited vocabulary.The registration of such marks serves only to further coarsen our popular culture. But we are not legislators and cannot substitute a new statute for the one now in force.

I have a fair bit of difficulty figuring out how Alito's argument in that latter paragraph could possibly be consistent with the 1st Amendment, but, hey, he's the Supreme Court Justice, and I'm not. Justice Roberts takes a slightly similar position, saying that it's fine to say the ban on "immoral" marks is unconstitutional, but surely "scandalous" is viewpoint neutral, because vulgarity. This, again, seems like a bizarre attempt at line drawing. Justice Breyer complains about the standard used in the majority ruling, calling it too rigid, and wants more of a balancing test (which, if I remember correctly, has mostly been rejected by the Court in 1st Amendment cases). Sotomayor, like Alito, worries that this will lead to a rush of vulgar and obscene trademarks:

The coming rush to register such trademarks—and the Government’s immediate powerlessness to say no—is eminently avoidable. Rather than read the relevant text as the majority does, it is equally possible to read that provision’s bar on the registration of “scandalous” marks to address only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity. Such a narrowing construction would save that duly enacted legislative text by rendering it a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech that is permissible in the context of a beneficial governmental initiative like the trademark-registration system. I would apply that narrowing construction to the term “scandalous” and accordingly reject petitioner Erik Brunetti’s facial challenge

Again, I have trouble seeing how this makes any sense. And, frankly, if there is a mad dash to register vulgar trademarks, well, that only matters if those marks are valued in commerce. If people want to buy vulgar t-shirts or whatnot, that's kind of on them. It's not Congress' job to stop vulgar t-shirts, which should be fairly obvious from the 1st Amendment. At least the majority got it right.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, erik brunetti, fuct, immoral, lanham act, scandalous, supreme court, trademarks

Senator Hawley Proposes Law To Force Internet Companies To Beg The FTC For Permission To Host Content

from the say-what-now? dept

Senate newbie Josh Hawley has made it clear that he's no fan of big internet companies and has joined with others in suggesting that Section 230 is somehow to blame for whatever it is he dislikes (it mainly seems to be he thinks the public likes them too much). So now he's proposed a massively stupid and clearly unconstitutional bill, called the "Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act," to wipe out CDA 230 protections for large internet platforms. The proposal is shockingly dumb and so obviously unconstitutional it boggles the mind that Hawley is actually a constitutional lawyer.

The bill is pretty straightforward, both in how it operates, and in how misguided it is. If you're a "big" internet platform -- defined as having more than 30 million "active monthly users" in the US or more than 300 million such users globally (or having over $500 million in revenue) -- then you automatically lose the protections of CDA 230. You can regain them by making a request to the FTC. In order to get them, you have to pay for an "audit" of your content moderation practices, and pro-actively "prove" via "clear and convincing evidence" that the practices are "politically neutral." Once the you do that, the FTC would "vote" on whether or not you could get CDA 230 protections, and they would only be granted with a "supermajority vote," which would mean at least four out of the five commissioners would have to vote for it. Since FTC Commissioners are always 3 to 2 in favor of the political party in the White House, that means any internet company that wants to get approval would need to get at least one commissioner of the non-Presidential party to vote for the immunity as well.

There's no way this survives constitutional scrutiny (if it actually becomes law, which seems unlikely). The First Amendment pretty clearly says that Congress can't create a law that (1) forces a company to get approval for its moderation practices and (2) judges content on whether or not it's deemed "politically neutral." Also, what the hell does "politically neutral" even mean? It doesn't mean anything. And, as for "clear and convincing evidence," tons of people have pointed to clear and convincing evidence that these platforms don't moderate based on political viewpoints, and yet we still have tons of people insisting they do. Nothing is going to convince some people that the platforms are actively targeting conservatives, no matter how many times evidence to the contrary is presented. Hawley has set up a purposefully impossible standard. As we've pointed out, many people still insist that Twitter deciding to kick off literal Nazis is "evidence" of anti-conservative bias. As NetChoice points out, Hawley's bill would require sites to host KKK propaganda just in order to obtain basic liability protections.

Is Josh Hawley truly arguing that any large website must cater to Nazis if it wants to allow public conversation? Because, damn, dude, that's a bold call.

This is from the guy who claims to be a "Constitutional Conservative"? Really? His current bio hypes up that he's a "leading constitutional lawyer" and talks about how he was one of the lead attorneys in the Hobby Lobby case, which was (in part) defending a company's right to use the First Amendment to refuse to obey certain laws that violated the religious beliefs of their owners. So, apparently, in that case, it's bad for the government to enforce rules for private businesses -- but for other kinds of companies, the government should force them to moderate content in a particular way? I mean, is Hobby Lobby forced to be "politically neutral" in the products it sells in its shops? You'd expect Hawley to be at the front of the line screaming about how awful that would be. Can you imagine the stink that Hawley himself would put up if Congress attempted to force Hobby Lobby to be "politically neutral" in its own actions?

Either way, this law is a non-starter, and once again shows that Hawley isn't legislating from any position of principle, but is grandstanding clearly unconstitutional ideas in the belief that self-identified "conservatives" hate the big internet companies these days, so any attack on them, no matter how dumb and unconstitutional, must be fine. As TechFreedom points out, this is little more than a fairness doctrine for the internet -- something conservatives have been against for decades. Incredibly, for all of the misguided and misleading complaints about how "net neutrality" was the "government takeover of the internet," Hawley's bill actually does a bunch of the things that opponents to net neutrality pretended net neutrality would do -- and yet, because it's politically expedient, you can likely bet that many of those who were against net neutrality will now support Hawley's ridiculous bill.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, cda 230, content moderation, ftc, josh hawley, politically neutral, section 230
Companies: facebook, google, twitter, youtube

New Zealand Man Gets 21 Months In Prison For Sharing Footage Of The Christchurch Shooting

from the criminalizing-being-a-jerk dept

Shortly after the Christchurch mosque shooting, the New Zealand government's censorship board decided to categorize almost everything related to the shooting (the shooter's manifesto, his livestream of the shooting, his social media posts) as "objectionable." This wasn't a case of reaching an obvious conclusion. Officially terming it "objectionable" made it a criminal act to distribute any of this content via social media or other services.

Having done that, the government wasted no time bringing criminal charges against violators. The first arrest happened only two days after the shooting, netting the government an 18-year-old defendant. The more interesting arrest was the second one, which landed Phillip Arps, a local businessman with some not-so-latent white nationalist leanings.

Arps spent the hours after the shooting refusing to condemn the violent act and -- the event triggering the criminal charges -- passing around footage of the shooting. Not all that surprising for a man whose company is named after a German prison camp and who charges $14.88 a foot for insulation installation.

Since each count against Arps could have netted him a max 14 years in prison, the final sentence seems comparatively light.

A businessman in New Zealand has been sentenced to nearly two years in prison for sharing footage of the Christchurch mosque attacks, which saw a lone gunman livestream the massacre of 51 Muslims during Friday prayers on March 15.

Philip Arps, 44, was sentenced during a court hearing in Christchurch on Tuesday after having earlier pleaded guilty to two charges of distributing objectionable material.

Arps will spend 21 months in prison for sharing footage of the shooting with 30 people. This sentence only seems reasonable in comparison to the 28 years he could have been hit with. What's not reasonable is putting someone in prison for sharing footage of a crime committed by someone else, no matter how objectionable their personal beliefs are.

The government's immediate reaction to this tragedy has been emotionally-charged. This may make for speedy legislating, but first reactions are rarely the most thoughtful reactions. The government has criminalized the sharing of content the general public is going to naturally find interesting. They will seek it out and share it -- some out of curiosity and some to continue spreading their hate as thinly as possible.

This behavior shouldn't be encouraged but it also shouldn't be criminalized. But legislators and the state censorship board saw an opportunity to make a statement -- one that came with prison sentences attached -- few in the nation would openly object to. This opportunism is going to result in some sketchy prosecutions in the future -- one far less clear-cut than the punishment of a New Zealand citizen for being an asshole.

Filed Under: christchurch shooting, free speech, new zealand, objectionable material, philip arps, sharing, video

Supreme Court Signals Loud And Clear That Social Media Sites Are Not Public Forums That Have To Allow All Speech

from the well-that's-a-nice-surprise dept

Last fall I wrote about the Supreme Court agreeing to hear a case that some argued would allow the Supreme Court to declare that social media sites were public forums thereby limiting their ability to block or ban certain users. A key argument brought forth by many who have been kicked off of various social media platforms is that under a strained reading of both the Pruneyard case (a very narrowly ruled case, establishing malls as public forums) and the Packingham case (which said states cannot create laws that ban people from the internet), is that social media platforms like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter are some sort of quasi-public forums, and therefore the 1st Amendment applies to them as state actors... and therefore they can't ban anyone or block content. This has never made much sense, and required a pretty twisted reading of those other cases -- but there was some thought that this new case might allow the Supreme Court to weigh in on the subject.

The details of the case are a bit involved -- and you can read the original post for more details -- but the short version is that two producers were fired from a public access channel, Manhattan Neighborhood Network, for criticizing MNN. The two fired producers, DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Melendez, argued that this violated the 1st Amendment, because MNN was set up by New York City's government, as required by New York State. Thus, there was a strong argument that MNN was a public forum, given the state's role in creating it. The 2nd Circuit agreed that it was a public forum and MNN appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the specter that if the ruling were allowed to stand, it could end up being applied to the various social media platforms as well, creating quite a mess.

As I wrote in my post about it, this seemed like a stretch as well, since the state's role in creating MNN was a key factor here, and that was not at all true with social media platforms. I also thought that the Supreme Court would likely rule narrowly and avoid the issue of social media platforms altogether -- though, given the political climate, I feared that the Supreme Court would say something stupid on this and create a new mess. Instead, the ruling, which came out earlier this week, went in the opposite direction. While the ruling itself doesn't directly apply to social media, the Supreme Court actually reversed the 2nd Circuit ruling that declared MNN a public forum, and very strongly hinted that it's ridiculous to think social media platforms could be considered public forums. And, for all the so-called "conservatives" who have been the most vocal in promoting the theory that social media sites are public fora governed by the 1st Amendment, it might surprise them to find that it was the so-called "conservative Justices" who decided this one, with Kavanaugh writing the opinion, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch -- and Sotomayor writing the dissent, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan.

Indeed, hysterically, it appears that a key argument made by the majority to argue against a finding of a public forum is one from one of the "conservatives" currently suing a platform. Stay tuned for that tidbit. But first, the decision itself. I was wrong in expecting the court to uphold the 2nd Circuit's ruling (and my fear was that they would apply it in a way that was too broad). But Kavanaugh and the majority make it clear that they see public forum doctrine to be very, very, very limited. And it doesn't apply to a public access TV network, even one created by the state.

Under the state-action doctrine as it has been articulated and applied by our precedents, we conclude that operation of public access channels on a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive public function. Moreover, a private entity such as MNN who opens its property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor. In operating the public access channels, MNN is a private actor, not a state actor, and MNN therefore is not subject to First Amendment constraints on its editorial discretion.

The key to Kavanaugh's ruling is that to make a private entity a public forum, it needs to take over "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." The "exclusively" part is what the majority focuses on.

It is not enough that the federal, state, or local government exercised the function in the past, or still does. And it is not enough that the function serves the public good or the public interest in some way. Rather, to qualify as a traditional, exclusive public function within the meaning of our state-action precedents, the government must have traditionally and exclusively performed the function.

The Court has stressed that “very few” functions fall into that category.... Under the Court’s cases, those functions include, for example, running elections and operating a company town.... The Court has ruled that a variety of functions do not fall into that category, including, for example: running sports associations and leagues, administering insurance payments, operating nursing homes, providing special education, representing indigent criminal defendants, resolving private disputes, and supplying electricity.

And, the majority says, running a TV station also does not qualify.

The relevant function in this case is operation of public access channels on a cable system. That function has not traditionally and exclusively been performed by government.

And that's pretty much the ballgame for those arguing for a public forum designation even for this public access channel created by the state. However, Kavanaugh does go further in highlighting why it would be ludicrous to argue that social media sites, for example, would qualify and be subject to the 1st Amendment. As the opinion notes, just hosting a forum for speech does not magically turn you into a government actor hosting a "public forum." And then Kavanaugh goes even further, directly saying that a private entity can moderate all they'd like:

By contrast, when a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily constrained by the First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor. The private entity may thus exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum. This Court so ruled in its 1976 decision in Hudgens v. NLRB. There, the Court held that a shopping center owner is not a state actor subject to First Amendment requirements such as the public forum doctrine....

The Hudgens decision reflects a commonsense principle: Providing some kind of forum for speech is not an activity that only governmental entities have traditionally performed. Therefore, a private entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor. After all, private property owners and private lessees often open their property for speech. Grocery stores put up community bulletin boards. Comedy clubs host open mic nights. As Judge Jacobs persuasively explained, it “is not at all a near-exclusive function of the state to provide the forums for public expression, politics, information, or entertainment.”

And just to drive the point home:

In short, merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to First Amendment constraints.

If the rule were otherwise, all private property owners and private lessees who open their property for speech would be subject to First Amendment constraints and would lose the ability to exercise what they deem to be appropriate editorial discretion within that open forum. Private property owners and private lessees would face the unappetizing choice of allowing all comers or closing the platform altogether. “The Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private property to public use.” ... Benjamin Franklin did not have to operate his newspaper as “a stagecoach, with seats for everyone.” ... That principle still holds true. As the Court said in Hudgens, to hold that private property owners providing a forum for speech are constrained by the First Amendment would be “to create a court-made law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private ownership of property rests in this country.” ... The Constitution does not disable private property owners and private lessees from exercising editorial discretion over speech and speakers on their property

This is less important to the point we're discussing here, but if you're wondering why the majority said that even when the state creates the public access channel by law, it does not become a public forum, Kavanaugh explains that this would open up way too many charges of other private entities that require government licensing being charged as a public forum:

Numerous private entities in America obtain government licenses, government contracts, or governmentgranted monopolies. If those facts sufficed to transform a private entity into a state actor, a large swath of private entities in America would suddenly be turned into state actors and be subject to a variety of constitutional constraints on their activities. As this Court’s many stateaction cases amply demonstrate, that is not the law.

And it is noteworthy that the majority opinion makes it clear that some public access channels, if actually operated by the government, could count as a public forum, subject to the 1st Amendment. It just doesn't think MNN meets that criteria.

Now, here's the ironic bit. Kavanaugh concludes the opinion with the following:

It is sometimes said that the bigger the government, the smaller the individual. Consistent with the text of the Constitution, the state-action doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the individual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty. Expanding the state-action doctrine beyond its traditional boundaries would expand governmental control while restricting individual liberty and private enterprise. We decline to do so in this case.

MNN is a private entity that operates public access channels on a cable system. Operating public access channels on a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive public function. A private entity such as MNN who opens its property for speech by others is not transformed by that fact alone into a state actor. Under the text of the Constitution and our precedents, MNN is not a state actor subject to the First Amendment.

Cornell Law professor Michael Dorf found that first sentence that I bolded above a bit odd, as Kavanaugh doesn't quote that line, but just says "it is sometimes said." So he went hunting for where that quote originated, and it turns out that it originated with Dennis Prager.

Remember Dennis Prager? He was actually one of the first to file a lawsuit making the ridiculous claim that YouTube is a public forum, subject to the First Amendment (after YouTube put just a small percentage of his videos into "restricted mode" and Prager freaked out, claiming "anti-conservative bias" despite the fact that YouTube put a far higher percentage of videos on what most people would consider to be more "liberal" channels into the very same restricted mode). Prager's lawsuit was laughed out of court, but it is still cited all the time by people who claim (1) anti-conservative bias by the platforms, and (2) that platforms are a public forum, and therefore subject to the First Amendment. Indeed, this is from Prager's original complaint:

Despite their control and regulation of one of the largest forums for public speech and expression in California, the United States, and the world, Google/YouTube regulate and censor speech as if the laws governing free speech and commerce do not apply to it. In so doing, Defendants believe that they have unfettered, unbridled, and unrestricted power to censor speech or discriminate against public speakers at their whim for any reason, including their animus toward and political viewpoints of their public users and providers of video content, because Defendants are for profit organizations rather than governmental entities.

Google/YouTube are wrong. As the California Supreme Court has stated: “[t]he idea that private property can constitute a public forum for free speech if it is open to the public in a manner similar to that of public streets and sidewalks” has long been the law in California. Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. N.L.R.B. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 858. The United States Supreme Court also recognized more than a half-century ago that the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution can apply even on privately owned property. One of the most important places to exchange and express views is cyberspace, particularly social media, where users engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on any number of diverse topics. And because the “[i]nternet’s forces and directions are so new, so protean, and so far reaching,” however, the U.S. Supreme Court warned that the law must be conscious that what it says today about the characteristics of a forum or free speech medium may be obsolete tomorrow. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1735-38 (2017).

So, boy, is it ever ironic that in a Supreme Court ruling that completely and utterly debunks Prager's own legal theory, the "conservative" wing of the Supreme Court quotes (without citation) a line from Prager to defend why Prager is laughably wrong. That's delicious.

Oh, and just in case the folks arguing that social media is a public forum think the dissenting "liberal" judges might save them here, that's not going to fly either. From Sotomayor's dissent:

In addition, there are purely private spaces, where the First Amendment is (as relevant here) inapplicable. The First Amendment leaves a private store owner (or homeowner), for example, free to remove a customer (or dinner guest) for expressing unwanted views.... In these settings, there is no First Amendment right against viewpoint discrimination.

So, uh, yeah. If you're arguing that private platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter are magically "public fora" even as the Supreme Court is rejecting that designation for a public access channel that was literally created by the state, suffice it to say that you're argument is not going to go very far.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, free speech, public forum, scotus, supreme court

Turkish Gov't: Erdogan's Bodyguards Needed To Attack DC Protesters Because They Were Too Close When They Said Mean Things

from the welcome-to-the-insult-free-zone dept

A few years back, thin-skinned thug/President of Turkey Recep Erdogan paid the US a visit. He brought his security detail with him, which isn't unusual. World leaders always travel with security. What was more surprising were the actions of his security team. When faced with protesters hurling dangerous words in the direction of Erdogan, his security personnel decided "when in Rome" wasn't applicable. Acting as though they were on their home turf, Erdogan's bodyguards began physically assaulting protesters and journalists covering the protests.

This put Washington DC police in the awkward and novel position of protecting protesters and journalists from beatings. It also put Erdogan and his security officers under the heading of "Defendants" in a federal lawsuit. Erdogan's off-the-cuff defense of his bodyguards' actions -- that they were right to retaliate against insults targeting the president -- appears to be the defense the Republic of Turkey is using in its attempt to get this lawsuit dismissed. (h/t Adam Steinbaugh)

The motion to dismiss [PDF] alleges a lot of things. It claims protesters were dangerous. It claims the DC Metro Police did not keep protesters as far away from Erdogan as Erdogan felt they should be. It claims anti-Turkey protesters injured pro-Turkey supporters. But mostly it claims the use of force was justified.

Local law enforcement did nothing to enforce U.S. federal law making it a crime for two or more persons to harass or attempt to harass a foreign dignitary within 100 feet. See 18 U.S.C. § 112. MPD either ignored or was unaware that under U.S. law, and international treaty obligations, dignitaries are different, and that the United States promises a higher level of security to “internationally protected persons” than ordinary persons, as part of the fabric of diplomacy and international comity.

What kind of "harassment?" Well, it looks like people were saying mean things about Erdogan within hearing distance.

When President Erdogan arrived at the Residence, the angry Anti-Turkey Group, of which several members had already acted violently, continued to tout symbols of PKK/YPG support while yelling aspersions about President Erdogan within an unsafe distance of the Turkish president and the Residence he was attempting to enter.

After some barely-related narrative about how tough and dangerous it is to be the Turkish president in the age of ISIS, the motion continues with its claims of harmful free speech.

Section 112(a) broadly prohibits assaults against foreign officials, official guests, and IPPs, and attacks upon the official premises, private accommodations, and means of transport of such persons. 18 U.S.C. § 112(a). The provision also criminalizes attempts to commit such offenses. Id. Notably, neither intent to injure an IPP nor proof of injury is required to be found guilty of a crime under Section 112(a). See United States v. Gan, 636 F.2d 28, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1020 (1981).

Which includes "harassment," a term the Turkish government's motion decides to define with an outdated version of the law it's citing:

Section 112(b) prohibits, among other things, (1) harassment or (2) attempts to harass a foreign official and (3) the congregation of two or more persons within 100 feet of a foreign official with the intent to harass. 18 U.S.C. § 112(b).28 The term “harass” has been interpreted to apply to “such activities as may seriously alarm or persecute foreign officials.” CISPES (Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador) v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1985). The legislative history of the statute (in its pre-amended form) includes the following example of individual misconduct criminalized by Section 112(b)(1) and (2):

Engaging in a course of conduct, including the use of abusive language, or repeatedly committing acts which alarm, intimidate or persecute him which serve no legitimate purpose

The law no longer references the "use of abusive language."

There's a lot to the motion, but the crux of it is that Erdogan's security team was justified in using physical force on protesters, most of whom were using nothing more than words. The Republic of Turkey will very likely escape being held liable for the actions of Erdogan's security team, but their actions at least gave more of the world a glimpse at what the country's favorite response to critical speech is: vindictive violence.

Filed Under: assault, attacks, bodyguards, free speech, protests, recep tayyip erdogan, turkey

Court: Arresting A Driver For Shouting 'Fuck You' Out The Window At A Nearby State Trooper Is Unconstitutional

from the because-duh dept

Slowly but surely, law enforcement officers are being made to understand that speech they don't like isn't illegal speech. I mean, several of them likely already know this but they're willing to roll the dice on a lawsuit rather than endure a minimal hit to their self-image.

This isn't to say it's a good idea to give cops the finger or tell them to go fuck themselves. This is just to say that doing these things isn't a crime. It's protected speech. Cops aren't obliged to serve and protect citizens. That's just a cool slogan to paint on the side of cruisers. But they are obligated to uphold Constitutional rights, which is something they seem to have a hard time doing.

Courts have reminded cops that flipping the bird isn't an arrestable offense. It's protected speech. They've also reminded cops that this is a form of protected criticism, as crude as it is. The very heart of First Amendment protections is the right of citizens to criticize their government. Sometimes criticism takes the form of a fleeting f-bomb from a passing vehicle.

Here's how this latest reminder starts, courtesy of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals [PDF]:

In 2015, Trooper Cross was performing a routine traffic stop on a van pulled to the shoulder of a busy five-lane highway in Fort Smith, Arkansas. From 50 feet away, Trooper Cross heard Thurairajah, who was driving by, yell “f**k you!” out of his car window. The van’s occupants were a mother and her two young children. Thurairajah was driving at about 35 miles-per-hour on the far lane of the road moving in the opposite direction. Trooper Cross observed the two children in the van react to the yell.

Trooper Lagarian Cross should have let the story end there. At best, the story could have made it way back to the station with some embellishment and resentful commentary about ungrateful citizens and their big mouths. Instead, Trooper Cross did this:

Trooper Cross ended the traffic stop of the van and pursued Thurairajah, stopped him, and arrested him, citing Arkansas’s disorderly conduct law. Trooper Cross believed the shout constituted “unreasonable or excessive noise” under the law.

A stupid response to a stupid move. The arrestee spent several hours in jail before all charges were dropped. Thurairajah sued Trooper Cross and prevailed in the lower court. The trooper appealed. The Appeals Court doesn't have any good news for him.

Cross argued he was entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably believed Thurairajah's "fuck you!" violated the law. The Appeals Court takes a not-so-subtle dig at the trooper's rationale when discussing his arguments.

In other words, Trooper Cross is protected by qualified immunity if a reasonable officer in his shoes would have reasonably believed, even if mistaken, based on objective facts, that Thurairajah was violating the disorderly conduct statute’s excessive noise prohibition by shouting the two-word insult from a moving vehicle with an unamplified human voice.

The hinting at the ridiculousness of the trooper's argument is followed by some case law, which shows there's nothing on the books backing the trooper's "reasonable officer" assertions.

Under the statute, the verbal content of Thurairajah’s yell is irrelevant. The statute does not penalize offensive speech, only unreasonable or excessive noise. Arkansas courts have not previously concluded that a two-word yell could violate the disorderly conduct statute’s unreasonable or excessive noise provision. To be sure shouting can form the basis of disorderly conduct. Those cases where shouting was part of a scenario that resulted in a finding of disorderly conduct, however, involved extended loud shouting and disruptive behavior or amplified sound. As the district court noted, context matters in analyzing the facts. In no case, has a two-word unamplified outburst constituted disorderly conduct.

It's not even close.

Thurairajah’s shout was unamplified and fleeting, no crowd gathered because of it, city traffic was not affected, no complaints were lodged by anyone in the community, business was not interrupted, nor were an officer’s orders disobeyed. Thurairajah’s conduct may have been offensive, but it was not an unreasonable or excessive noise.

That's the Fourth Amendment violation -- depriving the passing driver of his freedom with a completely bogus arrest. Then there's the First Amendment violation. Thurairajah claimed the arrest was a retaliatory response to his protected, two-word criticism of Trooper Cross. The court agrees.

First, Thurairajah’s profane shout was protected activity. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (holding where defendant walked through courthouse corridor wearing jacket bearing the words “F**k the Draft” in place where women and children were present and no showed no intent to incite disobedience to or disrupt the draft, state lacked power to punish defendant for underlying content of message the inscription conveyed). Second, Trooper Cross’s arrest was an action that would chill continued activity by a person of ordinary firmness. As we recognized in Hoyland, “there can be little doubt that being arrested for exercising the right to free speech would chill a person of ordinary firmness from exercising that right in the future.” And, according to a fair reading of Trooper Cross’s affidavit, the arrest was motivated, at least in part, by the content of the shout. Finally, as discussed above, Cross had neither probable cause nor arguable probable cause to arrest Thurairajah.

That's all four prongs of the free speech retaliation test. And there's no squeaking out of this, thanks to limited case law. Both rights were clearly established at the point Trooper Cross decided to terminate a traffic stop and arrest a passing driver for his drive-by f-bomb. Cross is headed back to the lower court to face the consequences of his stupid, retaliatory actions.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 8th circuit, eric thurairajah, free speech, lagarian cross, police, retaliatory arrest

Republicans Blame CDA 230 For Letting Platforms Censor Too Much; Democrats Blame CDA 230 For Platforms Not Censoring Enough

from the which-is-it? dept

It certainly appears that politicians on both sides of the political aisle have decided that if they can agree on one thing, it's that social media companies are bad, and that they're bad because of Section 230, and that needs to change. The problem, of course, is that beyond that point of agreement, they actually disagree entirely on the reasons why. On the Republican side, you have people like Rep. Louis Gohmert and Senator Ted Cruz who are upset about platforms using Section 230's protections to allow them to moderate content that those platforms find objectionable. Cruz and Gohmert want to amend CDA 230 to say that's not allowed.

Meanwhile, on the Democratic side, we've seen Nancy Pelosi attack CDA 230, incorrectly saying that it's somehow a "gift" to the tech industry because it allows them not to moderate content. Pelosi's big complaint is that the platforms aren't censoring enough, and she blames 230 for that, while the Republicans are saying the platforms are censoring too much -- and incredibly, both are saying this is the fault of CDA 230.

Now another powerful Democrat, Rep. Frank Pallone, the chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee (which has some level of "oversight" over the internet) has sided with Pelosi in attacking CDA 230 and arguing that companies are using it "as a shield" to not remove things like the doctored video of Pelosi:

But, of course, the contrasting (and contradictory) positions of these grandstanding politicians on both sides of the aisle should -- by itself -- demonstrate why mucking with Section 230 is so dangerous. The whole point and value of Section 230 was in how it crafted the incentive structure. Again, it's important to read both parts of part (c) of Section 230, because the two elements work together to deal with both of the issues described above.

(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

(2) Civil liability No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).

It's these two elements together that make Section 230 so powerful. The first says that we don't blame the platform for any of the actions/content posted by users. This should be fairly straightforward. It's about the proper application of liability to the party who actually violated the law, and not the tools and services they used to violate the law. Some people want to change this, but much of that push is coming from lawyers who just want the bigger pockets to sue. It involves, what I've referred to as "Steve Dallas lawsuits" after the character in the classic comic strip Bloom County, who explains why you should always focused on suing those with the deepest pockets, no matter how tangentially they are to the law violating.

But, part (2) of the law is also important. It's the part that actually allows platforms the ability to moderate. Section 230 was an explicit response to the ruling in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, in which a NY state judge ruled that because Prodigy wanted to provide a "family friendly" service, and therefore moderated out content it found objectionable (in order to support that "family friendly" goal), it therefore became automatically liable for any of the content that was left up. But, of course, that's crazy. The end result of such a rule would be either that platforms wouldn't do anything to moderate content, which would mean everything would be a total free for all -- and you couldn't have a "family friendly" forum at all, and everything would quickly fill up with spam/porn/harassment/abuse/etc -- or platforms would basically restrict almost everything to create a totally anodyne and boring existence.

The genius of Section 230 is that it enabled a balance that allowed for experimentation and this includes the ability to experiment with different forms of moderation. Everyone focuses on Facebook, YouTube and Twitter -- which all take moderately different approaches -- but having a Section 230 is also what allowed for the radically different approaches taken by other sites: like Wikipedia and Reddit (and even us at Techdirt). These use very different approaches, some of which work better than others, but much of which is community-dependent. It's that experimentation that is good.

But the very fact that both sides of the political aisle seem to be attacking CDA 230 but for completely opposite reasons really should highlight why messing with CDA 230 would be such a disaster. If Congress moves the law in the direction that Gohmert/Cruz want, then you'd likely get many fewer platforms, and some would just be overrun by messes, while others would be locked down and barely usable. If Congress moves the law in the direction that Pelosi/Pallone seem to want, then you would end up with effectively the same result: much greater censorship as companies try to avoid liability.

Neither solution is a good one, and neither would truly satisfy the critics in the first place. That's part of the reason why this debate is so silly. Everyone's mad at these platforms for how they moderate, but what they're really mad at is humanity. Sometimes people say mean and awful things. Or they spread disinformation. Or defamation. And those are real concerns. But there need to be better ways of dealing with it than Congress stepping in (against the restriction put on it by the 1st Amendment), and saying that the internet platforms themselves either must police humanity... or need to stop policing humanity altogether. Neither is a solution to the problems of humanity.

Filed Under: cda 230, censorship, content moderation, frank pallone, louis gohmert, nancy pelosi, section 230, ted cruz

Australian Federal Police Raid Even More Journalists Over Leaked Documents

from the setting-fire-to-freedom dept

Australia got scary in a hurry.

One day after raiding the home of News Corp Australia journalist Annika Smethurst over the publication of leaked documents detailing the government's domestic surveillance plans, the Australian Federal Police raided ABC News Australia over leaked documents detailing the killing of unarmed civilians by Australian special forces in Afghanistan.

Somewhat surprisingly, the AFP did not prevent John Lyons, the executive editor of ABC News, from live-tweeting the entire raid. This resulted in an astounding stream of tweets (with photos!) showing the AFP was seeking a wealth of information from ABC offices, including notes, correspondence, reports, briefing documents, photographs, and anything else it could use to (presumably) find the source of the leaks.

The AFP claims the raid of the ABC offices has nothing to do with its raid of a journalist's home the previous day. This is only true in the sense that two different sets of leaks were targeted. In the greater scheme of things, they are very definitely related, as is the investigation currently being pursued by the Department of Home Affairs targeting yet another journalist over a story about asylum seekers seeking to enter Australia by boat.

Journalists all over the world are shocked by the Australian government's actions, which directly threaten press freedom in that country. The continuing expansion of its national security powers have reduced the rights of the country's citizens. These powers are on full public display, being utilized in an incredibly damaging way.

The head of the Home Affairs office seems less than concerned about the destruction of rights and freedoms happening in the country he's supposed to be protecting.

A later statement from the AFP said Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton was "not notified prior to the execution of the warrants".

"The AFP's actions have been independent and impartial at all times," it said.

"When the AFP receives referrals it assesses them for criminality and does not make value judgements on the issue instead identifying whether there has been any contraventions of Commonwealth Law, and when [sic] evidence as to whether the offence has been committed or otherwise."

This bit of bureaucracy speech isn't nearly as alarming as the statement from Prime Minister Scott Morrison, who characterized the no-longer-theoretical threat to journalism as solid policework.

Asked if the news troubled him, he said: “It never troubles me that our laws are being upheld.”

That's how those up top feel about running leak investigations through the offices and houses of Australian journalists. There's apparently nothing wrong with destroying a private sector instrument of government accountability in the name of national security.

Filed Under: australia, chilling effects, free speech, journalists, raids

Released Warrant Shows SFPD Started Monitoring Journalist's Phone Weeks Before Officers Raided His Home

from the internal-investigations-weird-rn dept

More details have surfaced about the San Francisco Police Department's search of journalist Bryan Carmody's residence. The affidavits for the search of his house remain under seal, but the SFPD's police chief has already admitted these "lacked clarity." This strongly suggests the affidavits didn't mention Carmody's profession to avoid having them rejected for violating California's journalist shield law.

Some of this civil liberties-punching paperwork has been released. And it shows the SFPD spent several weeks monitoring Carmody's communications before deciding to bring the rights violations to his doorstep.

San Francisco police obtained a warrant to search a freelance journalist’s phone records and were authorized to “conduct remote monitoring” on the phone more than two months before a controversial raid on his home and office, according to documents released Friday.

Officers executed the warrant on Bryan Carmody’s phone records on March 1 — the first of seven search warrants obtained in the investigation into who leaked him a report on the Feb. 22 death of Public Defender Jeff Adachi.

There's no extended affidavit attached to the warrant [PDF], but the short description of the investigation makes no mention of Bryan Carmody's line of work. All it does is claim Carmody is suspected to be involved in the theft of the leaked police report detailing public defender Jeff Adachi's death.

Nature of investigation: Mr. Carmody is being investigated as a co-conspirator in the theft of the San Francisco Police report, involving the death investigation of Jeff Adachi. The criminal investigation focuses on the conspiracy to commit a crime, the theft of a police report, and the willful obstruction of justice.

This part of the warrant says the SFPD is only seeking phone records spanning two days in February. But on the next page, the court authorizes ongoing "remote monitoring" of Carmody's phone "until the conclusion of the investigation." This includes signals produced in "locations not open to the public or visual surveillance."

This warrant wasn't handed to the SF Chronicle by the court or the SFPD, but rather by Bryan Carmody, who was finally notified of this particular search three months after it happened.

The warrant also shows the SFPD had Carmody in its sights long before most of the public was aware he was the source of the leaked death report obtained by other reporters. As the Chronicle's article points out, the first public statement on Carmody's involvement came during a Board of Supervisors meeting in April in which the city's public defender's office revealed this information. The phone monitoring warrant was granted on March 1st, only days after news stations published the leaked document.

Every new development makes the SFPD look worse. The department may not be making the hole any deeper at this point, but its prior groundwork has proven to have created a far deeper hole than early estimates indicated.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, bryan carmody, free speech, raids, sfpd, warrant

European Court Of Justice Suggests Maybe The Entire Internet Should Be Censored And Filtered

from the oh-come-on dept

The idea of an open "global" internet keeps taking a beating -- and the worst offender is not, say, China or Russia, but rather the EU. We've already discussed things like the EU Copyright Directive and the Terrorist Content Regulation, but it seems like every day there's something new and more ridiculous -- and the latest may be coming from the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), which frequently is a bulwark against overreaching laws regarding the internet, but sometimes (too frequently, unfortunately) gets things really, really wrong (saying the "Right to be Forgotten" applied to search engines was one terrible example).

And now, the CJEU's Advocate General has issued a recommendation in a new case that would be hugely problematic for the idea of a global open internet that isn't weighted down with censorship filters. The Advocate General's recommendations are just that: recommendations for the CJEU to consider before making a final ruling. However, as we've noted in the past, the CJEU frequently accepts the AG's recommendations. Not always. But frequently.

The case here involves a an attempt to get Facebook to delete critical information of a politician in Austria under Austrian law. In the US, of course, social media companies are not required to delete such information. The content itself is usually protected by the 1st Amendment, and the platforms are then protected by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that prevents them from being liable, even if the content in question does violate the law (though, importantly, most platforms will still remove such content if it's been determined by a court to violate the law).

In the EU, the intermediary liability scheme is significantly weaker. Under the E-Commerce Directive's rules, there is an exemption of liability, but it's much more similar to the DMCA's safe harbors for copyright-infringing material in the US. That is, the liability exemptions only occur if the platform doesn't have knowledge of the "illegal activity" and if they do get such knowledge, they need to remove the content. There is also a prohibition on a "general monitoring" requirement (i.e., filters).

The case at hand involved someone on Facebook posting a link to an article about an Austrian politician, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek, and added some comments along with the link. Specifically:

That user also published, in connection with that article, an accompanying disparaging comment about the applicant accusing her of being a ‘lousy traitor of the people’, a ‘corrupt oaf’ and a member of a ‘fascist party’.

In the US -- some silly lawsuits notwithstanding -- such statements would be clearly protected by the 1st Amendment. Apparently not so much in Austria. But then there's the question of Facebook's responsibility.

An Austrian court ordered Facebook to remove the content, which it complied with by removing access to anyone in Austria. The original demand was also that Facebook be required to prevent "equivalent content" from appearing as well. On appeal, a court denied Facebook's request that it only had to comply in Austria, and also said that such "equivalent content" could only be limited to cases where someone then alerted Facebook to the "equivalent content" being posted (and, thus, not a general monitoring requirement).

From there, the case went to the CJEU, who was asked to determine if such blocking needs to be global and how should the "equivalent content" question be handled.

And, then, basically everything goes off the rails. First up, the Advocate General, seems to think that -- like many misguided folks concerning CDA 230 -- there's some sort of "neutrality" requirement for internet platforms, and that doing any sort of monitoring might lose their safe harbors for no longer being neutral. This is mind-blowingly stupid.

It should be observed that Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 prohibits Member States from imposing a general obligation on, among others, providers of services whose activity consists in storing information to monitor the information which they store or a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. Furthermore, it is apparent from the case-law that that provision precludes, in particular, a host provider whose conduct is limited to that of an intermediary service provider from being ordered to monitor all (9) or virtually all (10) of the data of all users of its service in order to prevent any future infringement.

If, contrary to that provision, a Member State were able, in the context of an injunction, to impose a general monitoring obligation on a host provider, it cannot be precluded that the latter might well lose the status of intermediary service provider and the immunity that goes with it. In fact, the role of a host provider carrying out general monitoring would no longer be neutral. The activity of that host provider would not retain its technical, automatic and passive nature, which would imply that that host provider would be aware of the information stored and would monitor it.

Say what now? It's right that general monitoring is not required (and explicitly rejected) in the law, but the corollary that deciding to do general monitoring wipes out your safe harbors is... crazy. Here, the AG is basically saying we can't have a general monitoring obligation (good) because that would overturn the requirement of platforms to be neutral (crazy):

Admittedly, Article 14(1)(a) of Directive 2000/31 makes the liability of an intermediary service provider subject to actual knowledge of the illegal activity or information. However, having regard to a general monitoring obligation, the illegal nature of any activity or information might be considered to be automatically brought to the knowledge of that intermediary service provider and the latter would have to remove the information or disable access to it without having been aware of its illegal content. (11) Consequently, the logic or relative immunity from liability for the information stored by an intermediary service provider would be systematically overturned, which would undermine the practical effect of Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31.

In short, the role of a host provider carrying out such general monitoring would no longer be neutral, since the activity of that host provider would no longer retain its technical, automatic and passive nature, which would imply that the host provider would be aware of the information stored and would monitor that information. Consequently, the implementation of a general monitoring obligation, imposed on a host provider in the context of an injunction authorised, prima facie, under Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/31, could render Article 14 of that directive inapplicable to that host provider.

I thus infer from a reading of Article 14(3) in conjunction with Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 that an obligation imposed on an intermediary service provider in the context of an injunction cannot have the consequence that, by reference to all or virtually all of the information stored, the role of that intermediary service provider is no longer neutral in the sense described in the preceding point.

So the AG comes to a good result through horrifically bad reasoning.

However, while rejecting general monitoring, the AG then goes on to talk about why more specific monitoring and censorship is probably just fine and dandy, with a somewhat odd aside about how the "duration" of the monitoring can make it okay. However, the key point is that the AG has no problem with saying, once something is deemed "infringing," that it can be a requirement on the internet platform to have to remove new instances of the same content:

In fact, as is clear from my analysis, a host provider may be ordered to prevent any further infringement of the same type and by the same recipient of an information society service. (24) Such a situation does indeed represent a specific case of an infringement that has actually been identified, so that the obligation to identify, among the information originating from a single user, the information identical to that characterised as illegal does not constitute a general monitoring obligation.

To my mind, the same applies with regard to information identical to the information characterised as illegal which is disseminated by other users. I am aware of the fact that this reasoning has the effect that the personal scope of a monitoring obligation encompasses every user and, accordingly, all the information disseminated via a platform.

Nonetheless, an obligation to seek and identify information identical to the information that has been characterised as illegal by the court seised is always targeted at the specific case of an infringement. In addition, the present case relates to an obligation imposed in the context of an interlocutory order, which is effective until the proceedings are definitively closed. Thus, such an obligation imposed on a host provider is, by the nature of things, limited in time.

And then, based on nothing at all, the AG pulls out the "magic software will make this work" reasoning, insisting that software tools will make sure that the right content is properly censored:

Furthermore, the reproduction of the same content by any user of a social network platform seems to me, as a general rule, to be capable of being detected with the help of software tools, without the host provider being obliged to employ active non-automatic filtering of all the information disseminated via its platform.

This statement... is just wrong? First off, it acts as if using software to scan for the same content is somehow not a filter. But it is. And then it shows a real misunderstanding about the effectiveness of filters (and the ability of some to trick filters). And there's no mention of false positives. I mean, in this case here, a politician was called a corrupt oaf. How should Facebook be forced to block that. Is any use of the phrase "corrupt oaf" now blocked? Perhaps it would have to be "corrupt oaf" and the politician, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek, that need to be together to be blocked. But, in that case, does it mean that this article itself cannot be posted on Facebook? So many questions...

The AG then insists that somehow this isn't too burdensome (based on what, exactly?) and seems to make the mistake of many non-technical people, who think that filters are (a) much better than they are, and (b) not dealing with significant gray areas all the time.

First of all, seeking and identifying information identical to that which has been characterised as illegal by a court seised does not require sophisticated techniques that might represent an extraordinary burden.

And, I mean, perhaps that's true for Facebook -- but it certainly could represent a much bigger burden for lots of other, smaller providers. Like, us, for example.

Hilariously, as soon as the AG is done saying the filtering is easy, the recommendation notes that (oh right!) context may be important:

Last, such an obligation respects internet users’ fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, in so far as the protection of that freedom need not necessarily be ensured absolutely, but must be weighed against the protection of other fundamental rights. As regards the information identical to the information that was characterised as illegal, it consists, prima facie and as a general rule, in repetitions of an infringement actually characterised as illegal. Those repetitions should be characterised in the same way, although such characterisation may be nuanced by reference, in particular, to the context of what is alleged to be an illegal statement.

Next up is the question of blocking "equivalent content." The AG, properly notes that determining what is, and what is not, "equivalent" represents quite a challenge -- and at least seeks to limit what may be ordered to be blocked, saying that it should only apply to content from the same user, and that any injunction be quite specific in what needs to be blocked:

I propose that the answer to the first and second questions, in so far as they relate to the personal scope and the material scope of a monitoring obligation, should be that Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a host provider operating a social network platform from being ordered, in the context of an injunction, to seek and identify, among all the information disseminated by users of that platform, the information identical to the information that was characterised as illegal by a court that has issued that injunction. In the context of such an injunction, a host provider may be ordered to seek and identify the information equivalent to that characterised as illegal only among the information disseminated by the user who disseminated that illegal information. A court adjudicating on the removal of such equivalent information must ensure that the effects of its injunction are clear, precise and foreseeable. In doing so, it must weigh up the fundamental rights involved and take account of the principle of proportionality.

Then, finally, it gets to the question of global blocking -- and basically says that nothing in EU law prevents a member state, such as Austria, from ordering global blocking, and therefore, that it can do so -- but that local state courts should consider the consequences of ordering such global takedowns.

... as regards the territorial scope of a removal obligation imposed on a host provider in the context of an injunction, it should be considered that that obligation is not regulated either by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 or by any other provision of that directive and that that provision therefore does not preclude that host provider from being ordered to remove worldwide information disseminated via a social network platform. Nor is that territorial scope regulated by EU law, since in the present case the applicant’s action is not based on EU law.

Regarding the consequences:

To conclude, it follows from the foregoing considerations that the court of a Member State may, in theory, adjudicate on the removal worldwide of information disseminated via the internet. However, owing to the differences between, on the one hand, national laws and, on the other, the protection of the private life and personality rights provided for in those laws, and in order to respect the widely recognised fundamental rights, such a court must, rather, adopt an approach of self-limitation. Therefore, in the interest of international comity, (51) to which the Portuguese Government refers, that court should, as far as possible, limit the extraterritorial effects of its junctions concerning harm to private life and personality rights. (52) The implementation of a removal obligation should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the protection of the injured person. Thus, instead of removing the content, that court might, in an appropriate case, order that access to that information be disabled with the help of geo-blocking.

That is a wholly unsatisfying answer, given that we all know how little many governments think about "self-limitation" when it comes to censoring critics globally.

And now we have to wait to see what the court says. Hopefully it does not follow these recommendations. As intermediary liability expert Daphne Keller from Stanford notes, there are some serious procedural problems with how all of this shakes out. In particular, because of the nature of the CJEU, they will only hear from some of the parties whose rights are at stake (a lightly edited quote of her tweetstorm):

The process problems are: (1) National courts don’t have to develop a strong factual record before referring the case to the CJEU, and (2) Once cases get to the CJEU, experts and public interest advocates can’t intervene to explain the missing info. That’s doubly problematic when – as in every intermediary liability case – the court hears only from (1) the person harmed by online expression and (2) the platform but NOT (3) the users whose rights to seek and impart information are at stake. That's an imbalanced set of inputs. On the massively important question of how filters work, the AG is left to triangulate between what plaintiff says, what Facebook says, and what some government briefs say. He uses those sources to make assumptions about everything from technical feasibility to costs.

And, in this case in particular, that leads to some bizarre results -- including quoting a fictional movie as evidence.

In the absence of other factual sources, he also just gives up and quotes from a fictional movie – The Social Network -- about the permanence of online info.

That, in particular, is most problematic here. It is literally the first line of the AG's opinion:

The internet’s not written in pencil, it’s written in ink, says a character in an American film released in 2010. I am referring here, and it is no coincidence, to the film The Social Network.

But a quote in a film that is arguably not even true, seems like an incredibly weak basis for a law that fundamentally could lead to massive global censorship filters across the internet. Again, one hopes that the CJEU goes in a different direction, but I wouldn't hold my breath.

Filed Under: advocate general, cjeu, corrupt oaf, defamation, e-commerce directive, eu, eva glawischnig-piesczek, filters, global censorship, intermediary liability, jrusidiction, monitoring
Companies: facebook