Grammatically, the only thing I can make sense of it is that it is a method by which, within a chart of the signal strength of multiple cell phones in a communication network, to provide cell phones.
(Quite what bearing such signal strength would have on what methods would be effective for providing cell phones is not clear to me.)
In order for it to mean anything other than that, I think there'd have to be another word somewhere, if not an entire additional clause.
I'd vote this Funny, except that the meter is broken; the fourth line has nine syllables, due to the fact that each letter of "BnB" is pronounced separately, where the original only had six.
You could fudge it with seven syllables, or (with the right syllables) maybe even eight, but nine just can't be done smoothly here.
But, to be fair, not all data gathering is surveillance. Which may have been (part of the point underlying) what she was trying to say, though if so she's been going about it badly.
As I said, in that case, what you're trusting and what you're verifying are different things. If you trust them to not make any errors, you don't feel the need to verify that they haven't made any.
I would argue that capital punishment is appropriate in exactly three scenarios:
* When the nature of the crime is such that the possibility of a repeat performance cannot be countenanced, and when no other means of preventing that person from continuing to commit such crimes is expected to be effective. (E.g. a psychopathic killer who has demonstrated the ability to escape from any confinement. Think supervillains if necessary.)
* When it is less cruel than all other available options. (Life in some prisons might be considered worse than a quick death. The prospective executee might need to agree about this, in any given case, for it to qualify.)
* When A: the nature of the crime is such that the possibility of a repeat performance cannot be countenanced, B: execution is more cost-effective in terms of available resources than any other option that is likely to be effective, and C: the necessary resources for any other option - including delay, in hopes of gaining access to either more resources or better options - cannot be spared. (I don't have a handy example for this one, but the example situations I envision involve wartime or post-apocalyptic scenarios.)
None of these scenarios are likely to occur often, if at all, in the real world - particularly not in a relatively wealthy, and presumably relatively civilized, society such as that of the USA (or any other "First World" nation).
IMO, the most powerful aspect of this language, however, is the ability to add, and use, any such basic consonants (concepts) as a suffix to any individual word
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: No, this is NOT Levison's fault
Would it have helped you to read it as "blame for the outcome", as distinct from "blame for what happened"?
Because I think that (or something similar to it) is what I did, and I didn't have the immediate objection to it that many respondents here seem to have had.
So they're redefining "trust" from its commonly understood meaning, along with (and quite possibly predating) the other redefinitions we've seen, and who knows what others?
It may make sense in-industry and as jargon, but it's not going to be understood that way by people not familiar with the industry enough to know the jargon, and I do find it rather questionable whether Reagan would have been using the term in that sense to betin with.
(I do acknowledge that there can be valid use for "trust the person you're talking to, but verify that that person is the person you think you're talking to", and the like, but in that case what you're trusting and what you're verifying are different things.)
Except, of course, that "trust but verify" is an oxymoron. If you trust, you don't need to verify; if you feel the need to verify, that demonstrates that you don't trust.
To be fair, I think you're misreading the pronoun antecedents; I think the "their" in the part you highlighted is referring to "the people as a whole", not to the "small minority".
I think the idea is "because we can't inspect the traffic to determine which HTTPS requests are for content we object to, as we could with HTTP, we would have no choice but to block the entire site in order to make sure no one accesses the objectionable content".
Still bad, but not the same thing as "it's bad because it's encrypted", even though it would potentially produce the same result.
While $12 million isn't a huge amount in these contexts, no, A: the figures for a Presidential race are much higher than those for most individual Congressional races, so there's much more of a chance for the smaller amount to make a relatively large difference, and B: as the article notes, even the $12 million is only a "first, see if we can do it" precursor to a much larger attempt in 2015.
There's discussion going on on the mozilla-governance mailing list (also accessible as the mozilla.governance newsgroup, on news.mozilla.org) about this, including participation by Mozillians, both ones involved in this decision and ones who were not. There have been some interesting points brought up there so far, and I think it may be worth following.
I had the same thought, and it should be entirely possible to recompile the "sandbox" wrapper (which is apparently going to be a separate component, not part of Firefox directly although it may be shipped with it) to just provide the same ID in all cases, or do other things as you see fit.
However, from what's said in the second of the two linked Mozilla blog posts, there appear to be claims that the black-box "Content Decryption Module" will in some way take steps to verify the "sandbox"; if it doesn't match what the CDM expects, the CDM will refuse to decrypt the stream.
It's not clear how the CDM will go about doing that, since allegedly the only information the CDM will have access to is what the "sandbox" provides it via the EME API, but I imagine the people behind the system would already have thought of that; if they're still confident that they can do it, they're probably right.
Even if that verification is as simple as a basic hash, it would be prohibitively difficult to modify the "sandbox" in a way that would do what we'd want but would still validate the same way as the unmodified one.
Do you really believe Mozilla has that much leverage?
You're right about the justification for this, though you've spun it backwards, but I think they're probably right in their reasoning: if everyone else supports this and Firefox doesn't, then the vast majority of people who encounter a video they can't play in Firefox and can play in something else will just use something else, and Firefox gets weaker (giving it even less leverage for next time).
There are counterarguments to that; I saw one person already specifically state that the only reason he's stayed with Firefox over Chrome is Firefox's respect for his rights and his privacy, and that now with that dropped he will have no reason not to switch. It's very likely, however, that such people are by far in the minority.
I do think Mozilla is trapped between a rock and a hard place here. The decision to incorporate EME support at all is a bad one, yes, but it may very well be the least of the available evils - and given that they implement it, they seem to be taking most reasonable measures to limit or otherwise minimize its negative impact.
All that gets you is (a somewhat modified version of) the ESR release line of Firefox. With the release of Firefox 31, there will be a new ESR release line, including everything that's in Firefox 31; no more than a couple of months after that, Iceweasel will be on 31 as well, with all of those changes.
How, exactly, would the general public stand up to this?
There are three main ways to do something like that, usually: do without the product or service, switch to getting it from a competitor, or get the government to intervene.
Doing without is not a viable option in the case of Internet access (that being precisely the main argument for "common carrier" classification as I understand it).
In the vast majority of cases, there are no viable competitors to get Internet service from (that being the actual root cause of the problem, as this site has pointed out a number of times).
If the FCC does not intervene, then the only fallback would be to get the legislature(s) to do so - and the legislators are, by and large, considerably more beholden to monied interests such as the incumbent ISPs than to the public they are supposed to represent. (Possibly inevitably so, due to the structure of our electoral systems and the rules which currently govern them.)
Short of the extreme of violent overthrow, what avenue does that leave for the public to stand up to this?
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Re: Re: Triangulation
(Quite what bearing such signal strength would have on what methods would be effective for providing cell phones is not clear to me.)
In order for it to mean anything other than that, I think there'd have to be another word somewhere, if not an entire additional clause.
On the post: Airbnb Under Pressure, Agrees To Hand Over Data To NY's Attorney General
Re:
You could fudge it with seven syllables, or (with the right syllables) maybe even eight, but nine just can't be done smoothly here.
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Re: In defense of pirates
On the post: Feinstein (Again) Says Metadata Program 'Is Not Surveillance'
Re: What is surveillance?
On the post: Cisco Goes Straight To The President To Complain About The NSA Intercepting Its Hardware
Re: Re: Re: Re: Perfect for KoolAid
On the post: Georgia To Protect Execution Pharmacists From Transparency So They Can Execute Disabled Man
Re: Re:
I would argue that capital punishment is appropriate in exactly three scenarios:
* When the nature of the crime is such that the possibility of a repeat performance cannot be countenanced, and when no other means of preventing that person from continuing to commit such crimes is expected to be effective. (E.g. a psychopathic killer who has demonstrated the ability to escape from any confinement. Think supervillains if necessary.)
* When it is less cruel than all other available options. (Life in some prisons might be considered worse than a quick death. The prospective executee might need to agree about this, in any given case, for it to qualify.)
* When A: the nature of the crime is such that the possibility of a repeat performance cannot be countenanced, B: execution is more cost-effective in terms of available resources than any other option that is likely to be effective, and C: the necessary resources for any other option - including delay, in hopes of gaining access to either more resources or better options - cannot be spared. (I don't have a handy example for this one, but the example situations I envision involve wartime or post-apocalyptic scenarios.)
None of these scenarios are likely to occur often, if at all, in the real world - particularly not in a relatively wealthy, and presumably relatively civilized, society such as that of the USA (or any other "First World" nation).
On the post: DailyDirt: Speaking The Language
Re: Re: Re: Re:
On the post: Ladar Levison Explains How The US Legal System Was Stacked Against Lavabit
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: No, this is NOT Levison's fault
Because I think that (or something similar to it) is what I did, and I didn't have the immediate objection to it that many respondents here seem to have had.
On the post: Cisco Goes Straight To The President To Complain About The NSA Intercepting Its Hardware
Re: Re: Re: Re: Perfect for KoolAid
It may make sense in-industry and as jargon, but it's not going to be understood that way by people not familiar with the industry enough to know the jargon, and I do find it rather questionable whether Reagan would have been using the term in that sense to betin with.
(I do acknowledge that there can be valid use for "trust the person you're talking to, but verify that that person is the person you think you're talking to", and the like, but in that case what you're trusting and what you're verifying are different things.)
On the post: Cisco Goes Straight To The President To Complain About The NSA Intercepting Its Hardware
Re: Re: Perfect for KoolAid
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Re: Re: Re: Re:
On the post: Russian Official Threatens To Block Twitter And Facebook In Russia
Re:
Still bad, but not the same thing as "it's bad because it's encrypted", even though it would potentially produce the same result.
On the post: Lessig's Anti-SuperPAC SuperPAC Raises First $1 Million In Just 12 Days
Re: Re: Re: $12 million isn't that much money
On the post: Lessig's Anti-SuperPAC SuperPAC Raises First $1 Million In Just 12 Days
Re: $12 million isn't that much money
On the post: And Here We Go: Mozilla Felt Pressured Into Adopting DRM In HTML5
On the post: And Here We Go: Mozilla Felt Pressured Into Adopting DRM In HTML5
Re:
However, from what's said in the second of the two linked Mozilla blog posts, there appear to be claims that the black-box "Content Decryption Module" will in some way take steps to verify the "sandbox"; if it doesn't match what the CDM expects, the CDM will refuse to decrypt the stream.
It's not clear how the CDM will go about doing that, since allegedly the only information the CDM will have access to is what the "sandbox" provides it via the EME API, but I imagine the people behind the system would already have thought of that; if they're still confident that they can do it, they're probably right.
Even if that verification is as simple as a basic hash, it would be prohibitively difficult to modify the "sandbox" in a way that would do what we'd want but would still validate the same way as the unmodified one.
On the post: And Here We Go: Mozilla Felt Pressured Into Adopting DRM In HTML5
Re:
Since the content industry are the ones who control whether and in what form to release the content, they get the veto.
On the post: And Here We Go: Mozilla Felt Pressured Into Adopting DRM In HTML5
Re:
You're right about the justification for this, though you've spun it backwards, but I think they're probably right in their reasoning: if everyone else supports this and Firefox doesn't, then the vast majority of people who encounter a video they can't play in Firefox and can play in something else will just use something else, and Firefox gets weaker (giving it even less leverage for next time).
There are counterarguments to that; I saw one person already specifically state that the only reason he's stayed with Firefox over Chrome is Firefox's respect for his rights and his privacy, and that now with that dropped he will have no reason not to switch. It's very likely, however, that such people are by far in the minority.
I do think Mozilla is trapped between a rock and a hard place here. The decision to incorporate EME support at all is a bad one, yes, but it may very well be the least of the available evils - and given that they implement it, they seem to be taking most reasonable measures to limit or otherwise minimize its negative impact.
On the post: And Here We Go: Mozilla Felt Pressured Into Adopting DRM In HTML5
Re: ditch them
On the post: Contrary To What Big Broadband Players Will Say, The FCC Has Acted Many Times To Protect Net Neutrality
Re: Re: Re: Re:
There are three main ways to do something like that, usually: do without the product or service, switch to getting it from a competitor, or get the government to intervene.
Doing without is not a viable option in the case of Internet access (that being precisely the main argument for "common carrier" classification as I understand it).
In the vast majority of cases, there are no viable competitors to get Internet service from (that being the actual root cause of the problem, as this site has pointed out a number of times).
If the FCC does not intervene, then the only fallback would be to get the legislature(s) to do so - and the legislators are, by and large, considerably more beholden to monied interests such as the incumbent ISPs than to the public they are supposed to represent. (Possibly inevitably so, due to the structure of our electoral systems and the rules which currently govern them.)
Short of the extreme of violent overthrow, what avenue does that leave for the public to stand up to this?
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