"Convince them you're a business" consists of "I'd like business-class Internet." That's it. You don't have to give tax ID numbers, business license, or any name other than your own. I speak as a Comcast business-class Internet customer, with the service in my home.
If AB is really concerned about this, they should go after Warsteiner, whose slogan "eine Koenigin under den Bieren" translates to "a queen among beers". Of course, Warsteiner has been around since 1753 (a relative newbie for Germany), so AB would have trouble showing the first use...
Re: Re: Seems rock-solid current law to me. Why does it distress you?
"Courts are going by common law on copyright" is not at all the same as "courts are applying common-law copyright", and neither has anything to do with your last paragraph.
"Common law" is a concept that applies in the English and American legal systems, and refers to the body of case law (either in general, or on a particular subject). It is generally subordinate to statutory law (i.e., law passed by the legislature), but may (at least in the US) supersede the statute if a constitutional question is involved.
In the US, there is a copyright statute (the federal Copyright Act), and there is also a large body of case law applying and interpreting that statute. That body of case law is accurately described as "the common law on copyright," and is important when the statute is unclear, incomplete, and/or contradictory. It's particularly important when fair use is an issue for two reasons: (1) section 107 gives almost no detail about the factors or how they are to be weighed, and (2) there's a constitutional aspect to fair use that can even overrule the statute.
Your last paragraph is nonsense. Copyright can indeed be a common-law right, and in fact was a common-law right (as the wikipedia link you provided notes), notwithstanding its apparent conflict with "traditional common law property rights" (which is less of a conflict than an evolution). The reason that common-law copyright law isn't followed in the United States is that it's been replaced by statutory copyright law, not because "it goes against the grain" of anything.
One good thing about this complaint is that it's based almost entirely on judicially-determined facts from other cases. Since Steele has previously been informed of all these allegations, and had the opportunity to fight them (though he usually didn't exercise it), he's going to be precluded from re-arguing the facts at the disciplinary hearing, He's instead going to be limited to arguing whether these facts constitute "bringing a proceeding without a basis in law", "knowingly disobeying an obligation", etc. Good luck on that one.
The only real argument, I think, will be what level of discipline is appropriate. It's not easy, as an attorney, to get disbarred. Stealing from your clients is a good way to do it, and so is refusing to abide by previous discipline (e.g., your license is suspended, you're ordered to notify your clients and show the panel/court that you've done so, and you fail to do so). The pattern of fraud and abuse shown here, though, might well do it.
And what will happen to all that illgotten gains that he got from Prenda? Would any of it have to be paid back or given to pay for any sanctions that are still outstanding if any in his name that hasn't been paid?
Whatever remained outstanding of what Duffy owed remains a claim against his estate. Who knows if it's solvent, but it's definitely something that counsel should pursue.
Yes, it is. That fact may provide for civil, or even criminal, penalties against the folks who did the recording, and would most likely prevent the recording from being used as evidence for most purposes, but it doesn't mean that prior restraint of the recording is constitutional. Ken's initial post at Popehat explains why.
I've never heard "making out" equated with "having sex"--though the one can obviously lead to the other, I've never heard, or read of, their being used interchangeably. But really, it doesn't matter.
Whether "making out" means kissing/fondling/groping, or whether it means having sex, it's highly inappropriate (and in many cases, illegal) for a teacher to be doing it with a student. The teacher in question could, if she chose, sue for libel. It wouldn't be a slam dunk case, but neither would it be a completely stupid case. It wouldn't be a completely stupid case because the statement, on its face, was obviously defamatory. It wouldn't be a slam dunk because the context in which the comment was made makes it pretty unlikely that the student was making a serious claim of truth, that readers would interpret his post as being true, or that they'd be reasonable in doing so.
But contrary to your postings, libel is not a crime in the United States. And contrary to your apparent belief, schools do not have plenary authority over anything a student does. The school (and district) simply lacked any authority over the student's remarks, so their attempt to impose discipline over them was their first major error. Their second major error was in making a mockery of due process by threatening to make things worse if the student tried to appeal. Their third major error was involving law enforcement, when there was no conceivable way, under any possible interpretation of any relevant statute, that the kid's actions constituted any sort of crime.
The most favorable possible interpretation of the student's post was that it was a tasteless joke. There's a reasonable argument that it was defamatory. If the teacher in question believes so, she can sue for that (I don't think she'll win, but she at least has a reasonable argument). But it did not violate any laws, nor did it violate any (constitutional) school or district policies.
Re: Re: If you need to /force/ people to help you, that should tell you something
He wants a citizen to assault another citizen without the first having done any harm to the latter, which is most definitely illegal.
There are lots of problems with this proposal, but this isn't really one of them. You have the right to use force (including deadly force, if warranted) in defense, not only of yourself, but also of third parties (including third parties you don't even know). The rules surrounding this are murky and vary from state to state, and you can open yourself up to significant liability if you don't know them well. Thus, most self-defense instructors would advise against doing so--but it can be legal.
Slander, or even libel (which this would actually be if false and defamatory, since it was communicated in print) is very rarely (~=never) a crime in the United States. There are some criminal libel statutes on the books, but they're highly questionable, constitutionally speaking, and perhaps as a consequence, they're not used much, if at all.
Laws of other jurisdictions may vary, of course, but they wouldn't be relevant to this discussion.
It's been changing in recent years, but it's still pretty common for courts to only publish opinions that have some actual legal analysis. A four-sentence smackdown, satisfying as it is, doesn't have any real precedential value.
Assuming the court has jurisdiction over the parties (which it probably does; the meeting took place in LA, which means that representatives of both parties were present in LA, and the case is arising specifically out of that meeting), the court's jurisdiction covers the acts of those parties wherever they may be done. If CMP were to release the video (after this order was entered) from a server based in SeaLand, they'd still be violating the court's order and subject to sanctions for contempt or otherwise.
However, if CMP had already given a copy of the video to someone else before the court had made its order, that other party isn't bound by the order.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: What do the words really mean?
Well, no, she doesn't. She didn't write the order (which is very common), though she did apparently read it carefully and made significant changes. She could have written an order herself, or she could have decided that she didn't need to present the analysis in the order, even though she did it (whether in her mind, or in discussion with counsel at the hearing).
I agree with Ken that this TRO is at least questionable, but there are a couple of points to keep in mind:
* It's a temporary order--it only lasts for about three weeks, until they can have actual briefing and arguments with both parties represented. If the plaintiff has presented a colorable argument, it's not unusual to enter a TRO to preserve the status quo while the case can be more fully developed.
* It's very limited in scope--it covers only material relating to one specific meeting.
I also would have liked to see the judge explain, on the record, how she felt that this order met First Amendment muster--and she may have done that at the hearing for all we know. But I also don't think it's shown that she didn't apply that presumption, based only on what's made public.
I appreciate the significant correction to the previous article, and hope the EFF picks up on it (and unlike you, they don't have any excuse for the misleading headline). I'd still disagree with this part:
First, there's some dispute over whether or not those same rules apply to state governments as well -- with many arguing that without it being explicit, states can copyright their own creative works.
There is, in fact, no legitimate dispute on this point. As far as federal copyright law is concerned, there is no question that states can copyright their own creative works. An individual state may restrict its own ability to do so, or the ability of its counties/cities/etc. to do so (which is one of the issues in the City of Inglewood case you wrote about a few weeks ago), but there is no question as a matter of federal law.
But with respect to the annotations, the situation is unusual. In most states, the state prepares and prints the code. It will contain the full text of the statutes, and may have history (i.e., the dates and act numbers of the original law and any amendments that affected each code section), but won't have case notes or other research aids. This compilation is the law, and is consequently not copyrightable. Then, private publishers (Lexis and/or West, typically) prepare annotated versions of the code. The text of the code will be identical to the "official" version, but their editors will have prepared annotations for each code section, explaining how courts and other authorities (administrative agencies, and sometimes secondary materials like law reviews) have interpreted and/or applied the code section. Those annotations are original, if brief, works of authorship, and are unquestionably protected by copyright. There's no serious question, for example, that West's California Codes, Annotated, are copyrightable material.
So, in most states, you have the "official", un-annotated code, which is the law and only the law, and is consequently not protected by copyright; and you also have one or more "unofficial" annotated codes, which contain significant original material from private sources, and are copyrighted.
Georgia is unique in having contracted with a publisher to prepare an "official" annotated code. So far as I know, no other state has done this. That still doesn't make the annotations the law (otherwise you'd be giving private editors, potentially without any oversight whatsoever, the ability to make the law), and the annotations aren't really citable in any way, so their status as "official" is pretty illusory. I'm sure it gives some marketing clout to this version over West's, but beyond that I don't know that it has any effect.
One result of that fact, though, is that the OCGA is the "official" source of the code, and that's what you cite when you're citing the code. You'll note, though, that what's being cited is always the statutory part--that is, the text of the law itself, which is in the public domain (and which the state makes available for free at the LexisNexis link you gave in the previous post). The code itself even makes this clear, in section 1-1-1:
The statutory portion of the codification of Georgia laws prepared by the Georgia Code Revision Commission and the Michie Company pursuant to a contract entered into on June 19, 1978, is enacted and shall have the effect of statutes enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia.
(emphasis added)
The code is clear that only the statutory portion of that publication is the law. The remainder is useful, relevant information, but it is not the law.
I disagree with your analysis on fair use--I'd say only one of the four factors, at most, is in Malamud's favor. The factors:
1. Purpose and character of use. Though I'll readily grant that Malamud is using, or intending to use, the copyrighted material in the public interest, the question here is whether any transformation has taken place, or whether you've simply copied the work wholesale. Malamud is doing the latter.
2. Nature of the work. The annotations are generally factual (i.e., they're summaries of how a court decision has interpreted or applied a code section), and they are published, which is in Malamud's favor. They're not simple recitations of facts, though, as something like a phone book would be. I think this one balances in his favor, but not particularly strongly.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the portion taken. Malamud's taking and reprinting the entirety of an 48-volume hardbound set of books. Of course, part of that material is in the public domain. In my experience, annotations typically exceed the statutes themselves in length by at least 2:1, but I'll be generous and assume that they're about equal in length. That means he's reprinting 24 volumes' worth of copyrighted material without permission. I don't think I need to elaborate further on why this factor favors the state.
4. Effect on the potential market. The OCGA, in print, is really a bargain at $378 if I'm reading that page correctly (Under $400 for a 48-volume set of law books is dirt cheap--which is why I question whether I'm reading the page correctly). West's annotated GA code is 80 volumes and $1753. But even so, who will buy it if they can get it online for free? Some will, no doubt, but it's hard to deny that Malamud's publication will have a significant effect on the market (particularly if he keeps it up to date).
So no, I don't think fair use will win the day. The argument that the state's decision to incorporate all this material into the "official" code renders it non-copyrightable is an interesting one, and it may be a bit stronger.
The annotations are not, as some seem to think, explanations of the law in lay terminology. They are "legalese", just as much as the statutes themselves, and have nothing to do with the ability of "normal people without law degrees" to understand the law.
The United States follows the English common law tradition. Under this system, court decisions have precedential effect and are a kind of law (known, simply enough, as "case law"). Case law, in theory, is subordinate to statutory law, in that it interprets or applies statutory law, but can only overturn a statute if the court finds that the statute violates the constitution (recent cases where the Supreme Court has completely ignored the text of a statute in favor of what they thought the outcome should be, notwithstanding). In such a system, it is important to know how courts have interpreted and applied the statutes. That's why publishers pay editors to read through court decisions, identify their application to different statutes, and prepare notes for the relevant statutes. Those are the annotations.
The alternative would be a civil law system a la France and Spain, and those countries who follow that model. In such a system, only the statutes have binding effect; court decisions apply only to the parties in their particular case. In a civil law system, there is no need for annotations, since court opinions aren't authority. The codes themselves, however, are no more comprehensible to the layman than they are in a common-law system.
Obscenity has a specific and narrow, albeit not very clear, legal definition--see some discussion at Wikipedia. It's long been settled law that obscenity is one of the categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment (another is solicitation for a crime, such as for prostitution). Thus, whatever obscene speech may be on backpage.com is not protected by the First Amendment.
If everything on backpage.com were obscene, and the evidence in the record at the time of this hearing were enough to establish that, then Sheriff Dart would have no Constitutional problem in doing everything he could to shut it down. However, that isn't the case. At least some of the content on backpage.com (almost all of it, most likely) is not obscene, and even if that were not the case, there's no way that the judge could find, on the record at a TRO hearing, that it's all obscene. So, in summary:
* Obscene speech is specifically and narrowly defined by law * Obscene speech, as so defined, is not protected by the First Amendment * Whatever obscene speech is on backpage.com is not protected by the First Amendment * Whatever speech on backpage.com is NOT obscene (or a true threat, or a solicitation, or one of the other established First Amendment exceptions) IS protected by the First Amendment--and this category is not empty. * Since at least some of the speech on backpage.com is protected by the First Amendment, Sheriff Dart's actions are presumptively an unconstitutional prior restraint.
On the post: Comcast Users Now Need To Pay A $30 Premium If They Want To Avoid Usage Caps
Re: Re: Business account?
On the post: Drunken Monarchy Fight: King Of Beers V. Queen Of Beers In Trademark Tussle
A little late...
On the post: Latest TVEyes Ruling A Mixed Bag: Archiving & Sharing Privately Is Fair Use; Downloading & Sharing Publicly Is Not
Re: Re: Seems rock-solid current law to me. Why does it distress you?
"Common law" is a concept that applies in the English and American legal systems, and refers to the body of case law (either in general, or on a particular subject). It is generally subordinate to statutory law (i.e., law passed by the legislature), but may (at least in the US) supersede the statute if a constitutional question is involved.
In the US, there is a copyright statute (the federal Copyright Act), and there is also a large body of case law applying and interpreting that statute. That body of case law is accurately described as "the common law on copyright," and is important when the statute is unclear, incomplete, and/or contradictory. It's particularly important when fair use is an issue for two reasons: (1) section 107 gives almost no detail about the factors or how they are to be weighed, and (2) there's a constitutional aspect to fair use that can even overrule the statute.
Your last paragraph is nonsense. Copyright can indeed be a common-law right, and in fact was a common-law right (as the wikipedia link you provided notes), notwithstanding its apparent conflict with "traditional common law property rights" (which is less of a conflict than an evolution). The reason that common-law copyright law isn't followed in the United States is that it's been replaced by statutory copyright law, not because "it goes against the grain" of anything.
On the post: Ashley Madison Continues To Use Dubious Legal Takedown Threats To Try To Disappear The Data It Failed To Protect
Re: Re: Do no harm.
On the post: Illinois Attorney Discipline Board Finally Moves Against Prenda Mastermind John Steele
Re: Frivolous lawsuit (this included)
On the post: Illinois Attorney Discipline Board Finally Moves Against Prenda Mastermind John Steele
The only real argument, I think, will be what level of discipline is appropriate. It's not easy, as an attorney, to get disbarred. Stealing from your clients is a good way to do it, and so is refusing to abide by previous discipline (e.g., your license is suspended, you're ordered to notify your clients and show the panel/court that you've done so, and you fail to do so). The pattern of fraud and abuse shown here, though, might well do it.
On the post: Illinois Attorney Discipline Board Finally Moves Against Prenda Mastermind John Steele
Re:
Whatever remained outstanding of what Duffy owed remains a claim against his estate. Who knows if it's solvent, but it's definitely something that counsel should pursue.
On the post: Judge Realizing He Probably Can't Block Release Of Surreptitiously Recorded Video
Re:
On the post: School, Police Chief Must Face Lawsuit Brought By Student Suspended For 10 Days For Tweeting 'Actually, Yes'
Re:
Whether "making out" means kissing/fondling/groping, or whether it means having sex, it's highly inappropriate (and in many cases, illegal) for a teacher to be doing it with a student. The teacher in question could, if she chose, sue for libel. It wouldn't be a slam dunk case, but neither would it be a completely stupid case. It wouldn't be a completely stupid case because the statement, on its face, was obviously defamatory. It wouldn't be a slam dunk because the context in which the comment was made makes it pretty unlikely that the student was making a serious claim of truth, that readers would interpret his post as being true, or that they'd be reasonable in doing so.
But contrary to your postings, libel is not a crime in the United States. And contrary to your apparent belief, schools do not have plenary authority over anything a student does. The school (and district) simply lacked any authority over the student's remarks, so their attempt to impose discipline over them was their first major error. Their second major error was in making a mockery of due process by threatening to make things worse if the student tried to appeal. Their third major error was involving law enforcement, when there was no conceivable way, under any possible interpretation of any relevant statute, that the kid's actions constituted any sort of crime.
The most favorable possible interpretation of the student's post was that it was a tasteless joke. There's a reasonable argument that it was defamatory. If the teacher in question believes so, she can sue for that (I don't think she'll win, but she at least has a reasonable argument). But it did not violate any laws, nor did it violate any (constitutional) school or district policies.
On the post: Boston Police Commissioner Wants Cameras Further Away From Cops, Criminal Charges For Not Assisting Officers
Re: Re: If you need to /force/ people to help you, that should tell you something
There are lots of problems with this proposal, but this isn't really one of them. You have the right to use force (including deadly force, if warranted) in defense, not only of yourself, but also of third parties (including third parties you don't even know). The rules surrounding this are murky and vary from state to state, and you can open yourself up to significant liability if you don't know them well. Thus, most self-defense instructors would advise against doing so--but it can be legal.
On the post: New Hampshire Law Banning Ballot Selfies Struck Down As Unconstitutional
Re:
On the post: HP Asks For Heavily-Redacted Documents To Be Sealed; Judge Responds With Heavily-Redacted Refusal
Re:
On the post: Massachusetts Supreme Court Strikes Down Unconstitutional Law Restricting Political Speech
Re: Is this case about Slander?
Laws of other jurisdictions may vary, of course, but they wouldn't be relevant to this discussion.
On the post: Deputy Wants Immunity After Breaking Bones, Tearing Ligaments Of Suspect During Arrest; Appeals Court Quickly Shuts Him Down
Re: appeal : [DO NOT PUBLISH]
On the post: Judge Bars Anti-Abortion Group From Releasing Video... Raising Serious First Amendment Questions
Re: So?
However, if CMP had already given a copy of the video to someone else before the court had made its order, that other party isn't bound by the order.
On the post: Judge Bars Anti-Abortion Group From Releasing Video... Raising Serious First Amendment Questions
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: What do the words really mean?
On the post: Judge Bars Anti-Abortion Group From Releasing Video... Raising Serious First Amendment Questions
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: What do the words really mean?
I agree with Ken that this TRO is at least questionable, but there are a couple of points to keep in mind:
* It's a temporary order--it only lasts for about three weeks, until they can have actual briefing and arguments with both parties represented. If the plaintiff has presented a colorable argument, it's not unusual to enter a TRO to preserve the status quo while the case can be more fully developed.
* It's very limited in scope--it covers only material relating to one specific meeting.
I also would have liked to see the judge explain, on the record, how she felt that this order met First Amendment muster--and she may have done that at the hearing for all we know. But I also don't think it's shown that she didn't apply that presumption, based only on what's made public.
On the post: Even If The State Of Georgia Can Copyright Legal Annotations, Should It?
Correction
First, there's some dispute over whether or not those same rules apply to state governments as well -- with many arguing that without it being explicit, states can copyright their own creative works.
There is, in fact, no legitimate dispute on this point. As far as federal copyright law is concerned, there is no question that states can copyright their own creative works. An individual state may restrict its own ability to do so, or the ability of its counties/cities/etc. to do so (which is one of the issues in the City of Inglewood case you wrote about a few weeks ago), but there is no question as a matter of federal law.
But with respect to the annotations, the situation is unusual. In most states, the state prepares and prints the code. It will contain the full text of the statutes, and may have history (i.e., the dates and act numbers of the original law and any amendments that affected each code section), but won't have case notes or other research aids. This compilation is the law, and is consequently not copyrightable. Then, private publishers (Lexis and/or West, typically) prepare annotated versions of the code. The text of the code will be identical to the "official" version, but their editors will have prepared annotations for each code section, explaining how courts and other authorities (administrative agencies, and sometimes secondary materials like law reviews) have interpreted and/or applied the code section. Those annotations are original, if brief, works of authorship, and are unquestionably protected by copyright. There's no serious question, for example, that West's California Codes, Annotated, are copyrightable material.
So, in most states, you have the "official", un-annotated code, which is the law and only the law, and is consequently not protected by copyright; and you also have one or more "unofficial" annotated codes, which contain significant original material from private sources, and are copyrighted.
Georgia is unique in having contracted with a publisher to prepare an "official" annotated code. So far as I know, no other state has done this. That still doesn't make the annotations the law (otherwise you'd be giving private editors, potentially without any oversight whatsoever, the ability to make the law), and the annotations aren't really citable in any way, so their status as "official" is pretty illusory. I'm sure it gives some marketing clout to this version over West's, but beyond that I don't know that it has any effect.
One result of that fact, though, is that the OCGA is the "official" source of the code, and that's what you cite when you're citing the code. You'll note, though, that what's being cited is always the statutory part--that is, the text of the law itself, which is in the public domain (and which the state makes available for free at the LexisNexis link you gave in the previous post). The code itself even makes this clear, in section 1-1-1:
(emphasis added)
The code is clear that only the statutory portion of that publication is the law. The remainder is useful, relevant information, but it is not the law.
I disagree with your analysis on fair use--I'd say only one of the four factors, at most, is in Malamud's favor. The factors:
1. Purpose and character of use. Though I'll readily grant that Malamud is using, or intending to use, the copyrighted material in the public interest, the question here is whether any transformation has taken place, or whether you've simply copied the work wholesale. Malamud is doing the latter.
2. Nature of the work. The annotations are generally factual (i.e., they're summaries of how a court decision has interpreted or applied a code section), and they are published, which is in Malamud's favor. They're not simple recitations of facts, though, as something like a phone book would be. I think this one balances in his favor, but not particularly strongly.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the portion taken. Malamud's taking and reprinting the entirety of an 48-volume hardbound set of books. Of course, part of that material is in the public domain. In my experience, annotations typically exceed the statutes themselves in length by at least 2:1, but I'll be generous and assume that they're about equal in length. That means he's reprinting 24 volumes' worth of copyrighted material without permission. I don't think I need to elaborate further on why this factor favors the state.
4. Effect on the potential market. The OCGA, in print, is really a bargain at $378 if I'm reading that page correctly (Under $400 for a 48-volume set of law books is dirt cheap--which is why I question whether I'm reading the page correctly). West's annotated GA code is 80 volumes and $1753. But even so, who will buy it if they can get it online for free? Some will, no doubt, but it's hard to deny that Malamud's publication will have a significant effect on the market (particularly if he keeps it up to date).
So no, I don't think fair use will win the day. The argument that the state's decision to incorporate all this material into the "official" code renders it non-copyrightable is an interesting one, and it may be a bit stronger.
On the post: Even If The State Of Georgia Can Copyright Legal Annotations, Should It?
Re: Re:
The United States follows the English common law tradition. Under this system, court decisions have precedential effect and are a kind of law (known, simply enough, as "case law"). Case law, in theory, is subordinate to statutory law, in that it interprets or applies statutory law, but can only overturn a statute if the court finds that the statute violates the constitution (recent cases where the Supreme Court has completely ignored the text of a statute in favor of what they thought the outcome should be, notwithstanding). In such a system, it is important to know how courts have interpreted and applied the statutes. That's why publishers pay editors to read through court decisions, identify their application to different statutes, and prepare notes for the relevant statutes. Those are the annotations.
The alternative would be a civil law system a la France and Spain, and those countries who follow that model. In such a system, only the statutes have binding effect; court decisions apply only to the parties in their particular case. In a civil law system, there is no need for annotations, since court opinions aren't authority. The codes themselves, however, are no more comprehensible to the layman than they are in a common-law system.
On the post: Judge Slams Meddling Sheriff Thomas Dart For Likely First Amendment Attack On Backpage
Re:
If everything on backpage.com were obscene, and the evidence in the record at the time of this hearing were enough to establish that, then Sheriff Dart would have no Constitutional problem in doing everything he could to shut it down. However, that isn't the case. At least some of the content on backpage.com (almost all of it, most likely) is not obscene, and even if that were not the case, there's no way that the judge could find, on the record at a TRO hearing, that it's all obscene. So, in summary:
* Obscene speech is specifically and narrowly defined by law
* Obscene speech, as so defined, is not protected by the First Amendment
* Whatever obscene speech is on backpage.com is not protected by the First Amendment
* Whatever speech on backpage.com is NOT obscene (or a true threat, or a solicitation, or one of the other established First Amendment exceptions) IS protected by the First Amendment--and this category is not empty.
* Since at least some of the speech on backpage.com is protected by the First Amendment, Sheriff Dart's actions are presumptively an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Next >>