Yes, in error. Give the determination an Dowling, they have two choices. 1. Reword it or 2. Leave it alone until a case comes along that challenges it and it gets struck down by a Federal court.
The statute predates Dowling. Regardless, the issue isn't Dowling. It's preemption. The court would find it preempted, not forbidden by Dowling. Dowling interpreted the federal NSPA. It did not hold that states could not enact laws protecting federally-unprotected works under their theft statutes.
Sure. Infringement is not theft. Since you do not believe this makes sense, please cite relevant law which establishes that infringing on an IP right is theft. Please remember I debunked the PA law you cited last time (it was written to cover a situation where copyright did not yet apply).
Can you link to the comment? I didn't read them all, and I don't recall this one you're referring to. Regardless, you are correct that the statute was passed before the Copyright Act of 1976. That's why it applied to unpublished works. How does that refute the fact that Pennsylvania defined (and still defines) something that is otherwise infringement to be "theft"? The fact that it is now preempted is irrelevant. It explicitly defines an act of infringement as "theft."
Wait, you're inviting other people to choose which point you're going pretend to tear down? Has trolling on the internet become interactive? Choose-your-own-troll-adventure sounds like an interesting new way to waste time on the internet. I guess you can consider yourself part of the "creative" community now.
I thought we were all creators! Seriously, though, it's a stream-of-consciousness anti-IP rant. I don't even know where to begin.
The Pennsylvania law is written in error and needs to be reworded. This likely intentional and due the lobbying efforts of the content industry who have been trying to conflate these two acts for decades.
"Written in error"? What evidence of that do you have? None, I assume. As far as your conspiracy theory about content industry lobbying, that's more faith-based FUD. And it doesn't explain why there's been a gradual change to recognize intangibles as property that started well before the content industry started lobbying. You seem unable to accept the obvious: Intangibles have been considered "property" for a long time.
I'm curious too: Have you ever actually read any state theft statutes? I have. Some allow "theft" of intangibles, and some do not. This is all undeniable fact. The reality is that there's more than one definition of what constitutes "theft." I don't deny that some states don't permit "theft" of intangibles. Why do you deny that some state do?
No. Infringement is infringement. Theft is theft. They are not the same thing. At all.
True or false: Pennsylvania defined something we both agree to be infringement as "theft."
Here's the text again: "A person is guilty of theft if he publicly presents for profit, without the consent of the author thereof, any unpublished dramatic play or musical composition."
So your argument is, despite the undeniable fact that Pennsylvania defines that infringement to be "theft," infringement can never be theft? Is that right?
My suggestion: Your definition of "theft" is narrower than Pennsylvania's. Can you at least admit that?
Close. It would be preempted by Section 301 of the Copyright Act. What Pennsylvania calls "theft," the Copyright Act calls "infringement." And that's my point: Infringement is theft. It's preempted because it's the same thing.
No, I do not. I want you to give me some examples of property which is both intangible and non-rivalrous. In fact, tangible, non-rivalrous property would be a start.
Let's take a step back before we go any further down this tangent. Mike had said that "intellectual property" is not a good term because it implies something that is not there, namely, rivalrousness. In his narrow view, the only resources that qualify as "property" are those that are rivalrous. I disagreed, pointing out that IP is P because rivalrousness is not the test. I defined "property" as the rights a person has in a given thing, that is, proprietary rights in rem. In support, I quoted the very first definition of "property" in Black's Law Dictionary: "property (14c) 1. Collectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible." Mike's definition of "property" is narrower than the dictionary's definition, as Mike's definition does not allow any intangibles to be labeled "property." My argument is that this is wrong. Do you agree with me or Mike? I'm getting confused since we've shifted to other issues like whether debts are rivalrous.
No, the underlying work is an intangible, is non rivalrous, and exists so long as one physical copy exists. Otherwise you're just treating memories as if they were physical copies; once they're lost too, so is the work.
From where are you getting that notion? Section 102 provides: "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . ." There is nothing that says once that original, tangible medium is destroyed, the underlying work and/or copyright are destroyed too.
That is certainly the best argument you can make for the term 'intellectual property' having any kind of meaning. That is also exactly what Mike said, by the way: So it's high time to call this out and make the clear distinction. If people are going to go on using the term "intellectual property" -- and they will -- then at least point out that the content or the invention or the logo or whatever are not the "property". The property is the artificial monopoly itself, granted by the government, in the form of the copyright, the patent or the trademark.
My critique was that he did not further distinguish between the underlying work, which is intangible, and the copies, which are not. He was using "underlying content" to refer to physical copies. That's confusing, and wrong. "IP" can refer to the intangible rights in the underlying work or to the intangible underlying work itself. Mike conflated the distinction between the underlying work and copies, and he incorrectly concluded that IP cannot refer to the underlying work. He is correct that IP does not refer to the copies, but he was incorrect to conclude the copies = underlying work.
Super. So does this mean that if the federal government attempts to engage in prior restraint against me, I can claim that they've stolen my right of free speech, that this is theft, an essential element of which is taking, and thus they owe me money under the 5th Amendment's eminent domain clause, which prohibits takings without compensation?
No, because the First Amendment does not create proprietary rights in rem.
The better terminology remains 'infringement.'
'Theft' is a bullshit word, meant to evoke inapplicable concepts related to tangible, rivalrous, personal property.
You are conflating "theft" and "larceny." Theft is a more recent term, and it is in fact applied to intangibles. Larceny was confined to tangibles; theft is not. Nothing bullshit about it. It's descriptive fact.
Okay, could you please provide several examples of intangible, non-rivalrous things in which there are property rights? Since we're presently debating whether or not things like creative works would qualify, don't cite them as examples.
You want me to give you a list of intangible property? You're clearly a lawyer, so I'm surprised you'd ask this. Identities, trade secrets, promissory notes, choses in action, debts, and goodwill. That's just off the top of my head. I disagree that a debt is intangible, yet rivalrous. I think the distinction you're referring to is one of excludability, not rivalrousness. There's nothing rivalrous about an intangible debt. It, just like a copyright, is nonrivalrous.
So you're agreeing with Mike that the intellectual property is the copyright, not the work to which the copyright pertains?
No, I'm distinguishing between the copyright, the copy, and the underlying work.
Copyright = bundle of intangible rights in underlying work.
Copy = physical embodiment of underlying work.
Underlying work = intangible work created when first fixed in tangible medium.
Mike is referring to the "underlying content" as the copy. But this is confusing, and it's not how the terms are used. The underlying work is an intangible, and it exists even if all physical copies are destroyed. The underlying work cannot be physically destroyed because it is intangible. IP refers to the bundle of intangible rights in the underlying work. A copy is not IP. Some refer to the underlying work as IP, but I think this is just shorthand for the rights in the thing.
Then they're very poorly chosen words. Or more likely very careful chosen but dishonest words. For the intellectual property to be stolen, and for 'stolen' to have any meaning, the rightful holder would have had to suffer their deprivation. But he doesn't. He still has the rights, and in fact will use them against the pirate in that scenario. The pirate meanwhile hasn't got the rights, since he lacks the ability to enforce them against anyone else.
If a copyright were attached to an instrument like a bearer bond, and the instrument were stolen, your argument would make sense. But that never happens, so you've only wound up sounding like an idiot.
Nothing dishonest about it. I'm not talking about stealing ownership of the copyright. That can be theft. I'm talking about violating the rights of the copyright owner. That can also be theft.
For example, Pennsylvania has this statute:
§ 3931. Theft of unpublished dramas and musical compositions.
A person is guilty of theft if he publicly presents for profit, without the consent of the author thereof, any unpublished dramatic play or musical composition.
The reason is simple: The rights to an intangible can be the subject of theft whenever someone does something inconsistent with those rights, i.e., violates those rights. Not every state defines this to be theft, but many do. The federal government does as well.
"Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case that discussed whether copies of copyrighted works could be regarded as stolen property for the purposes of a law which criminalized the interstate transportation of property that had been "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" and holding that they could not be so regarded under that law.[1]" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dowling_v._United_States
I'm familiar with the opinion. The copies themselves were not stolen property, so the defendant wasn't transporting stolen property. But that's a different issue than whether copyright infringement is theft. I'm talking about theft of intangibles. That opinion is about theft of tangibles.
You assert this. Can you provide any example of non-rivalrous property ?
How about the first definition in Black's Law Dictionary:
property (14c) 1. Collectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible. • It is common to describe property as a “bundle of rights.” These rights include the right to possess and use, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer. — Also termed bundle of rights.
PROPERTY, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
This stuff is really basic, and it's been settled for a long time. TD is apparently unfamiliar, but that doesn't make it not so.
Sorry, still not theft. He hasn't stolen anything. If for the sake of argument I concede that the copyright itself were property owned by the holder, that hasn't been stolen either as the holder still has it. An infringement on that copyright is all that has occured. That is it. Infringement is not, never was, and never will be theft no matter how badly you wish to conflate the two.
I'm not confusing anything. The notion of theft of intangibles is well-entrenched in the law. I'm not talking about stealing ownership of the copyright itself. The copyright owner's title is not affected. Deny it all you want, but I can dig up tons of statutes and case law discussing theft of all sorts of intangibles. This has been around for a long time.
Also, I don't think AJ's (antidirt) original comment deserves to be hidden. Although the comment is worded a bit snarky-ish, it is true that AJ pointed this out on the original article and that he was right.
Yes, it was snarky. Seriously, though, I think it's important to note how sloppy Mike is with this stuff. In this post, he's now claiming it's unconstitutional. I doubt very much he's done any homework on this claim either.
We admit that "intellectual property" is not a great term -- in large part because it implies something that just isn't there: mainly, economic concepts that apply to rivalrous goods but simply don't apply to non-rivalrous ones.
It only implies something is not there if you begin with the definition that "property" refers only to tangible, rivalrous things. That's a narrow definition of "property," and it completely ignores the fact that the word has come to meaning something broader over the last few centuries. "Property," in the broader sense--the sense that those who consider IP to be P use it--simply refers to the bundle of intangible rights one has in a given thing. It doesn't matter if that thing is tangible, like a car, or intangible, like a copyrighted work. "Property" refers to the rights in the thing, not the thing itself.
I've been thinking about this a lot lately, and I think the real issue is that there are two different ways to use the term, and only one is really valid. "Intellectual property" is a useful term, but only when it refers to the copyright, patent or trademark itself and not the underlying content,
The underlying work is intangible, as is the copyright. For example, if I write a poem on a piece of paper, I have the physical embodiment of the work on the paper. That copy is not the underlying work, though. If I burn the paper, the copy disappears but the underlying work does not. The copyright is merely the intangible rights the copyright holder has in the intangible underlying work. IP only refers to these intangible things. Physical copies are not IP.
Describing a company that owns a variety of copyrights, patents and trademarks as having "a portfolio full of intellectual property" makes sense; saying a music pirate has "a hard drive full of stolen intellectual property" does not.
The company owns the IP. It has intangible rights in the underlying intangible things. The music pirate violates these rights when he makes copies. He has not stolen the physical copies, which are not IP, but he has stolen the IP. Theft of IP simply means doing something inconsistent with the IP holder's rights. The IP is stolen when the pirate violates the rights that make up the IP.
Unfortunately, many intellectual property system supporters and maximalists frequently confuse the two, and interchangeably switch around the underlying content/invention for the copyright/patent.
as some helpfully noted, US copyright law includes a weird provision, 17 USC 411(c)
I'm glad you finally looked at Section 411(c). You claimed in your earlier post: "You can't sue over theoretical infringement. You have to show actual infringement." That was totally wrong. Funny, and wrong. It's funny because you embedded the complaint in the post, and Section 411(c) was cited multiple times therein. It was mentioned three times on the very first page. It's hilarious that you definitively claimed that such suits are impossible, when it's obvious that you had no idea what you were talking about.
Good grief. I stated an opinion politely. I backed it up with statutory text, legislative history, and case law. I see that you and several others have abused the "report" button and hidden it. We couldn't dare have people disagreeing and explaining why, right? Ugh.
The irony is that Techdirt freaks out about abuse all the time, yet it tolerates its own system to be abused. It's strange how TD is so concerned about an abusive DMCA notice, but it says nothing as its own system is abused by those who openly brag about doing it.
Are opposing points of view really so scary that you can't even bear to look at them? Apparently so. How incredibly sad. Of course, Mike will never say anything. I guess he likes abuse when it suits him.
Was there music and did you report them to your masters?
I don't think there was, but I have sung "Happy Birthday" in public before. Don't tell my masters!
Gosh, even if someone just had a book and let others see the cover seems to be an infringement.
Try Section 109(c): "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (5), the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located."
Unless everybody starts bringing in their whole Facebook friends and friends of friends to the pool this point doesn't apply. Even if the pool serves 500 people from the same gated community (there are such places here that house 128 thousand people though the one I visit that has that absurd number inside the gated area has about 6 communal pools). What's substantial here?
I think you need to distinguish between private, public, and semi-public places. One of Congress's intentions in adding the public place clause was to make clear that semi-public places are "public":
Under clause (1) of the definition of ‘publicly‘ in section 101, a performance or display is ‘public‘ if it takes place ‘at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.‘ One of the principal purposes of the definition was to make clear that, contrary to the decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Wyatt, 21 C.O.Bull. 203 (D. Md. 1932), performances in **5678 ‘semipublic‘ places such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and schools are ‘public performances‘ subject to copyright control.
Under this broader understanding of "public," courts have considered private clubs to be engaging in public performances:
It is clear to the court that the performance of copyrighted musical works at the defendant's establishment, Muff's, falls within the definition of public performance *656 found in 17 U.S.C. § 101. Although the establishment is classified as a private club under the laws of the state of Kansas, it is a “place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances” may gather. Regardless of the status of the establishment under local law, congressional intent controls the application of the substantive provisions of the Copyright Act. Lerner v. Schectman, 228 F.Supp. 354, 357 (D.Minn.1964). Therefore, the court finds that the performance of copyrighted songs in a Kansas private club is a public performance as defined by federal copyright laws.
Ackee Music, Inc. v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 653, 655-56 (D. Kan. 1986).
There's many more examples in the case law. There can certainly be close cases, but I don't see how the HOA party is one of them.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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The statute predates Dowling. Regardless, the issue isn't Dowling. It's preemption. The court would find it preempted, not forbidden by Dowling. Dowling interpreted the federal NSPA. It did not hold that states could not enact laws protecting federally-unprotected works under their theft statutes.
On the post: Our New IP Czar Gives His First Speech... And It Is Not Encouraging At All
Re: Re: Re: Ouch.
Can you link to the comment? I didn't read them all, and I don't recall this one you're referring to. Regardless, you are correct that the statute was passed before the Copyright Act of 1976. That's why it applied to unpublished works. How does that refute the fact that Pennsylvania defined (and still defines) something that is otherwise infringement to be "theft"? The fact that it is now preempted is irrelevant. It explicitly defines an act of infringement as "theft."
On the post: Our New IP Czar Gives His First Speech... And It Is Not Encouraging At All
Re: Re: Re: Ouch.
I thought we were all creators! Seriously, though, it's a stream-of-consciousness anti-IP rant. I don't even know where to begin.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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"Written in error"? What evidence of that do you have? None, I assume. As far as your conspiracy theory about content industry lobbying, that's more faith-based FUD. And it doesn't explain why there's been a gradual change to recognize intangibles as property that started well before the content industry started lobbying. You seem unable to accept the obvious: Intangibles have been considered "property" for a long time.
On the post: Our New IP Czar Gives His First Speech... And It Is Not Encouraging At All
Re: Ouch.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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True or false: Pennsylvania defined something we both agree to be infringement as "theft."
Here's the text again: "A person is guilty of theft if he publicly presents for profit, without the consent of the author thereof, any unpublished dramatic play or musical composition."
So your argument is, despite the undeniable fact that Pennsylvania defines that infringement to be "theft," infringement can never be theft? Is that right?
My suggestion: Your definition of "theft" is narrower than Pennsylvania's. Can you at least admit that?
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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Let's take a step back before we go any further down this tangent. Mike had said that "intellectual property" is not a good term because it implies something that is not there, namely, rivalrousness. In his narrow view, the only resources that qualify as "property" are those that are rivalrous. I disagreed, pointing out that IP is P because rivalrousness is not the test. I defined "property" as the rights a person has in a given thing, that is, proprietary rights in rem. In support, I quoted the very first definition of "property" in Black's Law Dictionary: "property (14c) 1. Collectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible." Mike's definition of "property" is narrower than the dictionary's definition, as Mike's definition does not allow any intangibles to be labeled "property." My argument is that this is wrong. Do you agree with me or Mike? I'm getting confused since we've shifted to other issues like whether debts are rivalrous.
No, the underlying work is an intangible, is non rivalrous, and exists so long as one physical copy exists. Otherwise you're just treating memories as if they were physical copies; once they're lost too, so is the work.
From where are you getting that notion? Section 102 provides: "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . ." There is nothing that says once that original, tangible medium is destroyed, the underlying work and/or copyright are destroyed too.
That is certainly the best argument you can make for the term 'intellectual property' having any kind of meaning. That is also exactly what Mike said, by the way:
So it's high time to call this out and make the clear distinction. If people are going to go on using the term "intellectual property" -- and they will -- then at least point out that the content or the invention or the logo or whatever are not the "property". The property is the artificial monopoly itself, granted by the government, in the form of the copyright, the patent or the trademark.
My critique was that he did not further distinguish between the underlying work, which is intangible, and the copies, which are not. He was using "underlying content" to refer to physical copies. That's confusing, and wrong. "IP" can refer to the intangible rights in the underlying work or to the intangible underlying work itself. Mike conflated the distinction between the underlying work and copies, and he incorrectly concluded that IP cannot refer to the underlying work. He is correct that IP does not refer to the copies, but he was incorrect to conclude the copies = underlying work.
Super. So does this mean that if the federal government attempts to engage in prior restraint against me, I can claim that they've stolen my right of free speech, that this is theft, an essential element of which is taking, and thus they owe me money under the 5th Amendment's eminent domain clause, which prohibits takings without compensation?
No, because the First Amendment does not create proprietary rights in rem.
The better terminology remains 'infringement.'
'Theft' is a bullshit word, meant to evoke inapplicable concepts related to tangible, rivalrous, personal property.
You are conflating "theft" and "larceny." Theft is a more recent term, and it is in fact applied to intangibles. Larceny was confined to tangibles; theft is not. Nothing bullshit about it. It's descriptive fact.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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You want me to give you a list of intangible property? You're clearly a lawyer, so I'm surprised you'd ask this. Identities, trade secrets, promissory notes, choses in action, debts, and goodwill. That's just off the top of my head. I disagree that a debt is intangible, yet rivalrous. I think the distinction you're referring to is one of excludability, not rivalrousness. There's nothing rivalrous about an intangible debt. It, just like a copyright, is nonrivalrous.
So you're agreeing with Mike that the intellectual property is the copyright, not the work to which the copyright pertains?
No, I'm distinguishing between the copyright, the copy, and the underlying work.
Copyright = bundle of intangible rights in underlying work.
Copy = physical embodiment of underlying work.
Underlying work = intangible work created when first fixed in tangible medium.
Mike is referring to the "underlying content" as the copy. But this is confusing, and it's not how the terms are used. The underlying work is an intangible, and it exists even if all physical copies are destroyed. The underlying work cannot be physically destroyed because it is intangible. IP refers to the bundle of intangible rights in the underlying work. A copy is not IP. Some refer to the underlying work as IP, but I think this is just shorthand for the rights in the thing.
Then they're very poorly chosen words. Or more likely very careful chosen but dishonest words. For the intellectual property to be stolen, and for 'stolen' to have any meaning, the rightful holder would have had to suffer their deprivation. But he doesn't. He still has the rights, and in fact will use them against the pirate in that scenario. The pirate meanwhile hasn't got the rights, since he lacks the ability to enforce them against anyone else.
If a copyright were attached to an instrument like a bearer bond, and the instrument were stolen, your argument would make sense. But that never happens, so you've only wound up sounding like an idiot.
Nothing dishonest about it. I'm not talking about stealing ownership of the copyright. That can be theft. I'm talking about violating the rights of the copyright owner. That can also be theft.
For example, Pennsylvania has this statute:Source: http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/18/00.039.031.000..HTM
The State of Pennsylvania considers such infringement to be "theft," despite the fact that the thief has not taken ownership of the rights.
Theft of intangibles works this way generally. For example, aggravated identity theft: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1028A and theft of trade secrets: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1832 . Those are defined to be "theft," even though the right holder has not lost ownership of the rights.
The reason is simple: The rights to an intangible can be the subject of theft whenever someone does something inconsistent with those rights, i.e., violates those rights. Not every state defines this to be theft, but many do. The federal government does as well.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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I'm familiar with the opinion. The copies themselves were not stolen property, so the defendant wasn't transporting stolen property. But that's a different issue than whether copyright infringement is theft. I'm talking about theft of intangibles. That opinion is about theft of tangibles.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
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How about the first definition in Black's Law Dictionary:PROPERTY, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
This stuff is really basic, and it's been settled for a long time. TD is apparently unfamiliar, but that doesn't make it not so.
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I'm not confusing anything. The notion of theft of intangibles is well-entrenched in the law. I'm not talking about stealing ownership of the copyright itself. The copyright owner's title is not affected. Deny it all you want, but I can dig up tons of statutes and case law discussing theft of all sorts of intangibles. This has been around for a long time.
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Can't tell if serious. If so, please elaborate!
On the post: Court Issues Highly Questionable Restraining Order Over Anyone Even Remotely Related To Streaming Mayweather/Pacquiao Fight
Re: Re: Re: Re: Funny, and wrong.
Yes, it was snarky. Seriously, though, I think it's important to note how sloppy Mike is with this stuff. In this post, he's now claiming it's unconstitutional. I doubt very much he's done any homework on this claim either.
On the post: How To Use 'Intellectual Property' Properly
It only implies something is not there if you begin with the definition that "property" refers only to tangible, rivalrous things. That's a narrow definition of "property," and it completely ignores the fact that the word has come to meaning something broader over the last few centuries. "Property," in the broader sense--the sense that those who consider IP to be P use it--simply refers to the bundle of intangible rights one has in a given thing. It doesn't matter if that thing is tangible, like a car, or intangible, like a copyrighted work. "Property" refers to the rights in the thing, not the thing itself.
I've been thinking about this a lot lately, and I think the real issue is that there are two different ways to use the term, and only one is really valid. "Intellectual property" is a useful term, but only when it refers to the copyright, patent or trademark itself and not the underlying content,
The underlying work is intangible, as is the copyright. For example, if I write a poem on a piece of paper, I have the physical embodiment of the work on the paper. That copy is not the underlying work, though. If I burn the paper, the copy disappears but the underlying work does not. The copyright is merely the intangible rights the copyright holder has in the intangible underlying work. IP only refers to these intangible things. Physical copies are not IP.
Describing a company that owns a variety of copyrights, patents and trademarks as having "a portfolio full of intellectual property" makes sense; saying a music pirate has "a hard drive full of stolen intellectual property" does not.
The company owns the IP. It has intangible rights in the underlying intangible things. The music pirate violates these rights when he makes copies. He has not stolen the physical copies, which are not IP, but he has stolen the IP. Theft of IP simply means doing something inconsistent with the IP holder's rights. The IP is stolen when the pirate violates the rights that make up the IP.
Unfortunately, many intellectual property system supporters and maximalists frequently confuse the two, and interchangeably switch around the underlying content/invention for the copyright/patent.
You appear to be confused yourself.
On the post: Court Issues Highly Questionable Restraining Order Over Anyone Even Remotely Related To Streaming Mayweather/Pacquiao Fight
I'm glad you finally looked at Section 411(c). You claimed in your earlier post: "You can't sue over theoretical infringement. You have to show actual infringement." That was totally wrong. Funny, and wrong. It's funny because you embedded the complaint in the post, and Section 411(c) was cited multiple times therein. It was mentioned three times on the very first page. It's hilarious that you definitively claimed that such suits are impossible, when it's obvious that you had no idea what you were talking about.
On the post: Music Licensing Groups Argue That A Homeowners Association Playing Music At The Pool Is A Public Performance
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*clicks report*
Good grief. I stated an opinion politely. I backed it up with statutory text, legislative history, and case law. I see that you and several others have abused the "report" button and hidden it. We couldn't dare have people disagreeing and explaining why, right? Ugh.
The irony is that Techdirt freaks out about abuse all the time, yet it tolerates its own system to be abused. It's strange how TD is so concerned about an abusive DMCA notice, but it says nothing as its own system is abused by those who openly brag about doing it.
Are opposing points of view really so scary that you can't even bear to look at them? Apparently so. How incredibly sad. Of course, Mike will never say anything. I guess he likes abuse when it suits him.
On the post: Music Licensing Groups Argue That A Homeowners Association Playing Music At The Pool Is A Public Performance
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I don't think there was, but I have sung "Happy Birthday" in public before. Don't tell my masters!
Gosh, even if someone just had a book and let others see the cover seems to be an infringement.
Try Section 109(c): "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (5), the owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located."
On the post: Music Licensing Groups Argue That A Homeowners Association Playing Music At The Pool Is A Public Performance
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I think you need to distinguish between private, public, and semi-public places. One of Congress's intentions in adding the public place clause was to make clear that semi-public places are "public":H.R. REP. 94-1476, 64, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5677-78.
Under this broader understanding of "public," courts have considered private clubs to be engaging in public performances:Ackee Music, Inc. v. Williams, 650 F. Supp. 653, 655-56 (D. Kan. 1986).
There's many more examples in the case law. There can certainly be close cases, but I don't see how the HOA party is one of them.
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