The answer to this may be simple--we have not seen the complaint. They may not have brought a cause of action to enforce the illegal agreement. It could just be a straightforward defamation action, or other allegations outside of that contract.
Glad to hear it. Used to work with Tom; he's a good guy. If you're ever in St. Louis on January 25, Robert Burns' birthday, go to the Schlafly Tap Room.
I mean, go any time, but particularly at that time.
I don't agree with the "inarguable" likelihood of confusion comments. The TTAB noted that licensed products including the 12th Man mark include a wide variety of offerings, such a coffee, signs, stoneware, phone cases, earrings, tattoo sheets, food trays, towels (which the TTAB finds particularly important) and so on. Given that list of licensed products, it isn't unreasonable for the TTAB to find that people would likely think the soap is also licensed--one of many licensed products.
Which isn't to say there is necessarily going to be such confusion. Only that that TTAB decision isn't as unreasonable as made out in the article.
Had they not found a likelihood of confusion, it would have been interesting to see what they found on the dilution claim.
A “font” is the software that tells the computer how to produce the letters. Thus, it can be protected by copyright (though whether it should be is another issue). The letters themselves are a typeface and not protectable.
A font can be protected by copyright; a typeface cannot. However, you can agree to restrictive provisions in a license agreement, and that's how they can try to enforce this prohibition against using the typeface in a trademark.
How long a word has been around isn't really relevant. The word "apple" has been around for a long time, and of course it's a famous trademark as well. What matters is whether "cocky" was properly registered with respect to the specific goods and services identified in the application, and whether the applicant was entitled to the rights.
What's the basis for the claim that they don't have secondary meaning. It's true, they may not have secondary meaning, but in the article it's just kind of thrown out there without any reasoning.
In any event, I'm not sure it matters too much. You look at descriptiveness in the context of the good/services provided, and the registration they're arguing over is a registration of SQUARE DONUTS for "cafe services." That's not descriptive. It also shouldn't be broad enough to stop someone else calling their actual donuts square donuts.
This language in the opinion leads me to believe we haven't seen the last of Constitutional challenges to IPRs"
"Moreover, we address only the
precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised
here. Oil States does not challenge the retroactive application
of inter partes review, even though that procedure
was not in place when its patent issued. Nor has Oil
States raised a due process challenge. Finally, our decision
should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents
are not property for purposes of the Due Process
Clause or the Takings Clause."
Typically, judges lean toward a specific outcome based on their jurisprudence. They way they see the relevant legal issues leads them to want the case to come out one way or another. That's supposed to give way to precedent, factual findings by the jury, proper legal reasoning in a specific case, and so on, but sometimes the judge's own views on the legal issues push them beyond those things to get the result they want.
I once heard a 9th Circuit Justice state that he knows how he wants a case to come out, and his clerks are basically supposed to figure out the legal rationale to make it happen. That wasn't the first time I'd heard that from a judge, sometimes due to issues of legal philosophy, sometimes due to less high-brow considerations (like a case where the appeals court judge simply personally disliked the trial court judge).
I can't say that's what happened in this particular case, but the general mindset on the Federal Circuit tends to ebb and flow in certain directions, and I think the momentum of whatever the prevailing judicial philosophy is on the court can certainly impact rulings, leading to decisions that seem a bit of a stretch (as here, where even if one disagrees with the jury decision, I think it's a real stretch to conclude no reasonable jury could have come out as they did).
This isn't true. The part about upending the system, I mean. Courts have always had the power to overturn jury verdicts in civil cases, and it has always been used (though they're supposed to be reserved in doing so). Even the trial court judge can overturn the jury's verdict after they come back, though that doesn't happen often.
Even in a criminal case, an appeals court can (and courts do) overturn guilty verdicts. What they can't do is overturn a jury verdict of not-guilty. That's the context in which you generally talk about jury-nullification, because in that case--a not-guilty verdict in a criminal trial--the government is extremely limited in what it can do to overturn the jury, if it can do anything at all.
You're way behind the times. After the initial settlement, they went to court again after Apple's music business started to ramp up. Apple Inc. (the computer company) ended up buying all of the trademarks as part of the settlement, and they've licensed them back to Apple Corps (the Beatles).
Apple Inc. is not in violation of any agreement or settlement with the Beatles over their use of marks on music or music-related devices.
Likelihood of confusion seems really low here. On the other hand, the blurring claim looks a lot more viable. I don't think that will be so easily disposed of, since it doesn't require use on similar goods or services.
Moderation often involved 'censorship.' But it isn't illegal censorship, unless done by the government. That is taking a broad view of the term 'censorship.' I think that's in line with the ACLU statement on the term.
Also, the EFF and one of their partners has a report on 'censorship' in social media, which basically deals with content moderation on social media platforms.
So, though it may seem a minor point, I don't think it is correct to say this isn't censorship, but it is correct to say it isn't illegal censorship, and to point out that not all censorship is inherently bad.
No, this is just bad examination, most likely. Patent examiners generally treat a smartphone as a general purpose computer, and then evaluate patentability from there.
The file history is necessary to see what the patentee might have given up through patent prosecution by way of argument and amendment, but the broad claim here is so broad that I suspect there is plenty of invalidating art the examiner just never considered.
It doesn't. And without looking at the file history we can't tell if the patent applicant even argued that, but I suspect they did. I think the examination for this patent application was very poor.
It is defined, at least partially, within the patent application. If the definition of "mobile" were at issue, a court would likely look to the specification of the patent itself to determine the boundaries of that word.
Re: Why is there no penalty for the lawyers drafting these? Disb
The answer to this may be simple--we have not seen the complaint. They may not have brought a cause of action to enforce the illegal agreement. It could just be a straightforward defamation action, or other allegations outside of that contract.
(untitled comment)
I mean, go any time, but particularly at that time.
(untitled comment)
Which isn't to say there is necessarily going to be such confusion. Only that that TTAB decision isn't as unreasonable as made out in the article.
Had they not found a likelihood of confusion, it would have been interesting to see what they found on the dilution claim.
(untitled comment)
https://hothardware.com/news/grayshift-beats-usb-restricted-mode
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Font trademarks
Re: Re: Re: Re: Font trademarks
Re: Fire the USPTO who approved
(untitled comment)
In any event, I'm not sure it matters too much. You look at descriptiveness in the context of the good/services provided, and the registration they're arguing over is a registration of SQUARE DONUTS for "cafe services." That's not descriptive. It also shouldn't be broad enough to stop someone else calling their actual donuts square donuts.
(untitled comment)
This language in the opinion leads me to believe we haven't seen the last of Constitutional challenges to IPRs"
"Moreover, we address only the precise constitutional challenges that Oil States raised here. Oil States does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when its patent issued. Nor has Oil States raised a due process challenge. Finally, our decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause."
Re:
Re: Re: Supreme Court?
Re:
I once heard a 9th Circuit Justice state that he knows how he wants a case to come out, and his clerks are basically supposed to figure out the legal rationale to make it happen. That wasn't the first time I'd heard that from a judge, sometimes due to issues of legal philosophy, sometimes due to less high-brow considerations (like a case where the appeals court judge simply personally disliked the trial court judge).
I can't say that's what happened in this particular case, but the general mindset on the Federal Circuit tends to ebb and flow in certain directions, and I think the momentum of whatever the prevailing judicial philosophy is on the court can certainly impact rulings, leading to decisions that seem a bit of a stretch (as here, where even if one disagrees with the jury decision, I think it's a real stretch to conclude no reasonable jury could have come out as they did).
Re:
Even in a criminal case, an appeals court can (and courts do) overturn guilty verdicts. What they can't do is overturn a jury verdict of not-guilty. That's the context in which you generally talk about jury-nullification, because in that case--a not-guilty verdict in a criminal trial--the government is extremely limited in what it can do to overturn the jury, if it can do anything at all.
Re:
Apple Inc. is not in violation of any agreement or settlement with the Beatles over their use of marks on music or music-related devices.
(untitled comment)
(untitled comment)
Also, the EFF and one of their partners has a report on 'censorship' in social media, which basically deals with content moderation on social media platforms.
So, though it may seem a minor point, I don't think it is correct to say this isn't censorship, but it is correct to say it isn't illegal censorship, and to point out that not all censorship is inherently bad.
Re: here we go again
Re: Re: Re: Re:
Re:
Re:
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