The NSA's 702 Shutdown Is Good News, But There Are A Whole Lot Of Caveats
from the ALL-THE-ASTERISKS dept
The surprising shutdown of the NSA's email harvesting program -- one that operated "upstream" and grabbed not just communications to and from surveillance targets, but also those "about" surveillance targets -- is good news. Considering the NSA had done nothing but abuse this specific privilege, the shutdown is a welcome surprise. But it's not great news, for a variety of reasons.
First, the shutdown arrives on the heels of a yearlong denial of surveillance requests by the FISA court. This indicates the NSA was either still abusing its collection or the court no longer felt the program was constitutional, at least not the way the NSA was running it. The shutdown seems to reflect the NSA's inability or unwillingness to shift towards more targeted surveillance methods -- ones that won't sweep up lots of US persons' communications inadvertently.
It also suggests the program -- at least the upstream part of it -- is no longer as useful as it used to be. The rise in default encryption by email providers may be preventing the NSA from gathering as much info as it used to, as Julian Sanchez explains at Just Security.
[I]t is entirely possible that the change is driven in significant part by the broader post-Snowden adoption of STARTTLS encryption of communications between e-mail servers. That is, it is quite plausible that a large and growing percentage of transiting e-mail traffic is simply no longer visible to NSA, and must be accessed “downstream” at the e-mail server itself, rendering this form of collection less worth picking fights with the FISC over.
The NSA's statements about the shutdown mention that it will still be performing upstream collections but removing the "about" search variable. The agency notes this will decrease the amount of captured communications. But it's quite possible it was seeing fewer and fewer communications before it made this decision. The NSA shouldn't be too concerned about this loss (and it likely isn't), considering it has other options it can use to capture the communications it says it won't be capturing anymore.
[T]o the extent the traffic remains visible to NSA, they may simply have decided that it is easier to do the same “about” scans outside the borders of the United States, beyond the purview of either FISA or the FISC.
This is an option the NSA has deployed before. In 2011, the NSA killed off its bulk domestic collection of US persons' email metadata. Or so it said. In reality, it simply stopped gathering this data from domestic providers.
The [Inspector General's] report explained that there were two other legal ways to get such data. One was the collection of bulk data that had been gathered in other countries, where the N.S.A.’s activities are largely not subject to regulation by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and oversight by the intelligence court. Because of the way the Internet operates, domestic data is often found on fiber optic cables abroad.
This option is still viable and possibly of much more use to the NSA. If so, the NSA may be giving up part of its upstream collection in hopes of preventing its offshore and downstream collections from being scrutinized as thoroughly in the runup to the renewal of the FISA Amendments Act.
This is just what isn't being done upstream or under Section 702. The NSA still can gather plenty of US persons' communications -- incidentally or not -- under Executive Order 12333.
[T]he NSA’s authorities under executive order 12333 are vast, undisclosed and unconstrained by any need to explain its collections to the Fisa court. A former state department official who has warned Congress about 12333, John Napier Tye, has alleged that the NSA uses 12333 as a backup plan to route around legal restrictions on US surveillance.
“To the extent US person information is either stored outside the United States, routed outside the United States, in transit outside the United States, it’s possible for it to be incidentally collected under 12333,” Tye told the Guardian in 2014.
Whatever the NSA might be losing, it can only be a small percentage of its total take. It also has the option of asking friendly foreign intelligence agencies to perform these searches for it -- again without having to notify the FISA court.
The final problem with the NSA's announcement is it's unmoored from legislation. Unlike the drastic modification of the Section 215 metadata program -- which was tied to statutory requirements laid down by the USA Freedom Act -- the voluntary shutdown of the "about" collection doesn't contain anything legally-binding. As the ACLU points out, without codification the NSA could start its collection up again without notice, provided it has found a way to comply with the FISA court's demands… or found a better way to look like it's in compliance.
Thank you for reading this Techdirt post. With so many things competing for everyone’s attention these days, we really appreciate you giving us your time. We work hard every day to put quality content out there for our community.
Techdirt is one of the few remaining truly independent media outlets. We do not have a giant corporation behind us, and we rely heavily on our community to support us, in an age when advertisers are increasingly uninterested in sponsoring small, independent sites — especially a site like ours that is unwilling to pull punches in its reporting and analysis.
While other websites have resorted to paywalls, registration requirements, and increasingly annoying/intrusive advertising, we have always kept Techdirt open and available to anyone. But in order to continue doing so, we need your support. We offer a variety of ways for our readers to support us, from direct donations to special subscriptions and cool merchandise — and every little bit helps. Thank you.
–The Techdirt Team
Filed Under: 702, about collections, mass surveillance, nsa, surveillance
Reader Comments
Subscribe: RSS
View by: Time | Thread
can someone answer me this?
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: answer me this?
But that 'should' not matter with the NSA. NSA personnel nominally work directly for the U.S. President and indirectly for Congress-- President/Congress could impose whatever administrative work rules/restrictions they desire upon NSA personnel, as a condition of employment.
However, in practice, the NSA is so secretive, isolated and powerful -- that the President, his staff, and Congress (and FISA Court) have no real management knowledge or control of what NSA is actually doing day to day.
The NSA is essentially an independent, extra-governmental entity operating worldwide.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Re: answer me this?
You failed to understand the question.
#1. A nation CAN physically AND legally AND ethically impose its laws upon areas or persons outside its sovereign geographical territory. Yes ALL government do this and yes they ALL do it illegally, physically, and unethically as well. But each are separate issues and have no bearing upon each other.
#2. The answer to AC question should have been. All Americans technically and legally, as per the U.S. Constitution, "should" enjoy the exact same rights and privileges when dealing with the American government regardless of geographical locality. The rights of American citizens when dealing with their government never ends. But hey, its not like the American Government does not wipe its ass with the Constitution, and its not like most American Citizens are not worthless fucks without a clue. So naturally the Government is going to tell you right to your face that they respect the constitution as they clearly and visibly step on it as they walk to and from their podiums.
You are largely correct about the rest of the stuff and the NSA being extra governmental.
A lot of people don't know it, but that creates a huge problem where a shadow coup is possible within the U.S.A. Power players are ALWAYS looking to stay in the shadows because that is the most powerful position to be in. Have you ever wondered why the rhetoric of most parties seem wildly different but the results tend to be largely the same?
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: can someone answer me this?
Correct me if I'm wrong, but don't U.S. laws apply to U.S. citizens whether they're in the U.S. or not? If so, why does the NSA think that U.S. laws only apply to its operations in the U.S.?
The key term here is "US Persons" which the NSA considers to be anyone on US soil or a US citizen overseas. So, you're correct. But the way they handle it (they claim) is through minimization. They can suck up tons of stuff overseas, but they claim that if they become aware of US persons' communications (including US persons overseas), they will "minimize" the identifying info. How effective that is... well, that's open to interpretation.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Today the stream of information is one grey mass on the internet, something the historical distinction cannot deal with. Thus NSA is a kind of limitless collection that sieves the information and puts it into boxes with different legal standards.
In reality the question of how NSA should act is largely ungoverned since it is a split responsibility. The presidents side is too easily slanted towards propagandizing for the apparatus in NSA (It is responsible for how the main part of NSA acts. Saying NSA does something illegal and/or has too wide responsibilities is pointing fingers at yourself!).
The corner the congress has access to review is mostly collateral and since congress don't want to admit to problems on a historically bipartisan issue with no possibility for open public debate (no gain in smearing both parties!), the issue is very much in a political deadlock as to responsibility since nobody has anything to gain by playing up the issue and canaries are very easy to shut down on account of confidentiality.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Sasquatch... Loch Ness Monster...
...of the people, by the people, for the people...
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
I get it's what we got and we're starved for *anything* of substance with regards to NSA reforms, but bereft of robust judicial or legislative changes, I won't hold my breath.
The inner cynic in me assumes this
1) Is being done to discourage Congress from implementing meaningful legal reforms under the guise of "the problem program has been shut down! We're all good now. Nothing to see here!"
2) Is temporary and will be started back up later on without public notice.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
There is no way to spy on the world and not include domestic comms. It's impossible.
Universal human rights only works if they are universal.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Do we get a refund now?
Sauce: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utah_Data_Center
Just seems like a LOT of money for a government project that was only really used for 2 years. I mean, it's practically brand new! Can't the government sell it to Google or something and at least get us SOME of our (wasted) money back?!
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: Do we get a refund now?
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
STARTTLS is perhaps why they don't need 702
And if you don't think a large percentage of "encrypted" communications are insecure to a well funded adversary (e.g. logjam, or protocol downgrade w/an active MITM), I have a bridge to sell you.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Strategic Communications and Charades
The NSA's 702 Shutdown Is Good News, But There Are A Whole Lot Of Caveats
Do not be fooled. This is simply a public-relations ploy on part of NSA (US government).
Unless congress reauthorizes the FISA Amendments Act by 31Dec2017 the Act will expire and what better way to foster goodwill than to appear to be making concessions to the law (Constitution).
Highlighted text below was excerpted from the website dni.gov a report titled The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A
It will sunset on December 31, 2017 unless Congress passes legislation to remove or extend the sunset provision. Title VII includes not only Section 702, which concerns targeting non-United States (U.S.) persons 1 abroad for surveillance, but also Sections 703, 704 and 705, which concern and provide statutory procedures and protections for surveillance of U.S. persons abroad.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Absolutely good news
[ link to this | view in chronology ]