ACLU Obtains Documents Showing Amazon Is Handing Out Cheap Facial Recognition Tech To Law Enforcement

from the Prime-membership-not-required dept

More bad news on the privacy front, thanks to one of America's largest corporations. Documents obtained by the ACLU show Amazon is arming law enforcement agencies with cheap facial recognition tech, allowing them to compare any footage obtained from a variety of sources to uploaded mugshot databases.

The company has developed a powerful and dangerous new facial recognition system and is actively helping governments deploy it. Amazon calls the service “Rekognition.”

Marketing materials and documents obtained by ACLU affiliates in three states reveal a product that can be readily used to violate civil liberties and civil rights. Powered by artificial intelligence, Rekognition can identify, track, and analyze people in real time and recognize up to 100 people in a single image. It can quickly scan information it collects against databases featuring tens of millions of faces, according to Amazon.

It's already been deployed to several areas around the country, with Amazon acting as the government's best friend a la AT&T historic proactive cooperation with NSA surveillance efforts. The documents [PDF] obtained by the ACLU show Amazon has been congratulated by local law enforcement officials for a "first-of-its-kind public-private partnership," thanks to its deployment efforts. On top of providing deployment assistance, Amazon also offers troubleshooting and "best practices" for officers using the tech. It has even offered free consulting to agencies expressing an interest in Rekognition.

These efforts aren't surprising in and of themselves, although Amazon's complicity in erecting a law enforcement surveillance structure certainly is. Amazon is looking to capture an underserved market, and the more proactive it is, the more market it will secure before competitors arrive. To further cement its position in the marketplace, Amazon is limiting what law enforcement agencies can say about these public-private partnerships.

In the records, Amazon also solicits feedback and ideas for “potential enhancements” to Rekognition’s capabilities for governments. Washington County even signed a non-disclosure agreement created by Amazon to get “insight into the Rekognition roadmap” and provide additional feedback about the product. The county later cited this NDA to justify withholding documents in response to the ACLU’s public records request.

Documents also suggest Amazon is looking to partner with body camera manufacturers to add its facial recognition tech. This is something body camera manufacturers are already considering, and licensing an established product is far easier than building one from the ground up.

The system is powerful and can apparently pull faces from real-time footage to compare to databases. It also allows agencies to track individuals. It puts passive cameras on surveillance steroids, giving any person who strolls past a government camera a chance to be mistaken for a wanted suspect. To date, facial recognition software has managed to generate high numbers of false positives, while only producing a handful of valid arrests.

These efforts have been deployed with zero input from the largest stakeholder in any government operation: the general public.

Because of Rekognition’s capacity for abuse, we asked Washington County and Orlando for any records showing that their communities had been provided an opportunity to discuss the service before its acquisition. We also asked them about rules governing how the powerful surveillance system could be used and ensuring rights would be protected. Neither locality identified such records.

It may be the NDAs discourage public discussion, but more likely the agencies acquiring the tech knew the public wouldn't be pleased with having their faces photographed, tracked, stored indefinitely, and compared to pictures stored in law enforcement databases. And if public agencies are unwilling to discuss these programs with the public, they're far less likely to create internal policies governing use of the tech. Amazon's push to secure a sizable portion of this market is only making things worse, and its use of NDAs is going to further distance these public agencies from being accountable to the people they serve.

Filed Under: face recognition, law enforcement, police, privacy, rekognition, surveillance
Companies: aclu, amazon

Judge Allows Fourth Amendment Challenge Of Warrantless Device Searches At The Border To Continue

from the uphill-battling dept

A federal judge has allowed the ACLU, EFF, and the several plaintiffs they represent to continue their Fourth Amendment lawsuit against DHS, ICE, and CBP. The plaintiffs are challenging the Constitutionality of border device searches -- something that has skyrocketed in recent years. As it stands now, these agencies believe nothing stronger than reasonable suspicion is needed to perform highly-intrusive searches. In many cases, not even suspicion is needed, thanks to the "border search" exception to the Fourth Amendment courts have carved out for the government.

Policies for agencies performing border device searches are pretty much identical. All allow searches and seizures of devices without individualized suspicion. This warrantless, suspicionless search may also result in the device being confiscated for weeks or months while a forensic search is undertaken -- again, supposedly without violating travelers' rights. CBP's policy was altered this year, requiring forensic searches and the mirroring of devices to at least reach the level of reasonable suspicion. Better than ICE's policy, but still nothing approaching a warrant.

The government sought to have the lawsuit dismissed, claiming the plaintiffs had no standing to assert violations, much less seek injunctive relief on the theory they would likely be subjected to intrusive device searches the next time they traveled.

The court disagrees with all the government's arguments. The government claimed the number of device searches -- although steadily increasing -- is still a small percentage of the overall whole. The court points out it doesn't really matter what the percentage is. It's whether or not CBP and ICE perform these searches routinely. From the decision [PDF]:

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy the “substantial risk” inquiry. Plaintiffs allege that CBP data demonstrates that it is on track to conduct approximately 30,000 searches this fiscal year. Defendants point out, however, that those searches only amounted to 0.008% of the approximately 189.6 million travelers who arrived at U.S. borders during this period. Defendants argue that this future search probability—which they characterize as a “slight chance” of search—is not sufficient to establish standing here.

There is no numerical threshold, however, at which likelihood of harm becomes a “substantial risk” of harm. See Kerin v. Titeflex Corp., 770 F.3d 978, 983 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that “a small probability of a great harm may be sufficient”). Although 0.008% may be a small percentage of total travelers, the searches still occur at an average of approximately 2500 searches per month. In SBA List, the Supreme Court supported its conclusion that there was a substantial likelihood of future harm with the explanation that proceedings enforcing the statute in question were “not a rare occurrence,” with twenty to eighty such cases occurring per year. Against this backdrop, 30,000 searches per year is not a “rare occurrence,” even if it makes up a small percentage of total travelers.

The government also argued allegations of future harm were too vague to support a lawsuit. The court finds this argument unbelievable, given the history of the plaintiffs' interactions with border agents and the agencies' border search practices.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations of future harm are impermissibly “vague” and speculative. They point to Reddy for the proposition that in the First Circuit, “‘[s]peculation’ that a government actor ‘might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to’ Plaintiffs, is ‘not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.’” In Reddy, however, the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ assertions of standing were speculative as to a New Hampshire buffer zone statute, emphasizing that the statute had not yet been enforced. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs challenge policies that are in place and are being actively enforced.

[...]

Plaintiffs’ alleged future injury does not depend upon defendants’ future illegal conduct untethered to a pattern of past practice, cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (concluding that plaintiff subject to illegal arrest procedure made no showing that he was likely to be arrested and subjected to illegal procedure again), but rather upon recurring conduct authorized by official policies. That is, Plaintiffs’ subjection to prior searches further bolsters their allegations of likely future searches.

The heart of the matter is the border search exception. It's what allows CBP and ICE to bypass the Supreme Court's Riley decision and its institution of a warrant requirement for device searches. The government seizes a single phrase from the Supreme Court ruling: "search incident to arrest." Its argument attempts to divorce border device searches from the Supreme Court's finding that searching cellphones was more analogous to searching houses than searching pants pockets or suitcases. The court doesn't agree with the government's distinction.

As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that Riley’s reasoning is irrelevant here simply because Riley’s holding was limited to the search incident to arrest exception, see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. Judicially recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement do not exist in isolation; rather, they are all part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, justified because, ordinarily, the circumstances surrounding the search and the nature of the search have been deemed “reasonable.”

[...]

Here, the First Circuit has not yet spoken on what level of suspicion is required to justify a cell phone or other electronic device search at the border. The First Circuit has, however, acknowledged the significant privacy interests implicated in a cell phone search, explaining that the information on these devices is “the kind of information one would previously have stored in one’s home and that would have been off-limits to officers performing a search incident to arrest.”

The court then goes on to say that merely raising the standard for invasive device searches to "reasonable suspicion" may not be enough.

[T]he Supreme Court rejected the reasonable suspicion standard when it came to cell phones because it “would prove no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches.” Digital device searches at the border, perhaps even when supported by reasonable suspicion, raise the same concerns.

This is encouraging, even if all that's happened at this point is the case surviving the government's motion to dismiss. It provides plenty of insight into the court's thinking, and shows how much of it is at odds with the government's assertions. This has the potential to restore some Fourth Amendment protections at our nation's borders for the first time in years.

Filed Under: 1st circuit, 4th amendment, border searches, cbp, dhs, ice, warrants
Companies: aclu, eff

County Attorney Formally Asks ACLU To Stop Saying Factual Things About Pending Drug Legislation

from the please-stop-undermining-my-spin dept

A state prosecutor who claims to be supportive of lowering drug possession incarceration rates is mad at the ACLU for pointing out the legislation she's backing doesn't support this position at all. The ACLU's activism has led to the county attorney's unfortunate decision to send a formal letter to the group kindly asking it to knock it off. (via the ACLU's Will Gaona)

In response to an online campaign, Pima County Attorney Barbara LaWall sent a letter to the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona asking that it “cease and desist from disseminating a misleading solicitation.”

The ACLU was “dumbfounded” by the letter, which it found to be without “legal merit,” a spokesman told the Star.

Earlier this month, the civil-rights group urged people to contact LaWall and ask her to withdraw her support for House Bill 2241, which would increase penalties for people convicted of several crimes involving certain opiates, including heroin and fentanyl.

“This is a dangerous bill that will force Arizonans suffering from drug addiction into prisons for years without treatment,” a March 19 ACLU of Arizona Facebook post reads. “Take action now and tell Barbara LaWall to publicly withdraw her support for HB 2241!”

As cease-and-desists go, LaWall's is pretty low-key. The letter [PDF] notes LaWall is not complaining about the people who've contacted her office as a result of the ACLU's post. She's also not requesting the ACLU say nothing more about the issue. Instead, she's asking the ACLU to correct its "misinformation."

Contrary to the statement disseminated in the ACLUs solicitation, HB 2241 does NOT punish individual drug users who possess or use these drugs to feed their addictions, and it is highly misleading to suggest that HB 2241 would punish drug users by sending them to prison. This Bill increases the sentence for convicted drug traffickers and drug dealers who flood our community with the deadly poisons of fentanyl, carfentanyl, and heroin. It docs NOT punish those who are arrested for simple drug possession.

This is not even technically true. Under LaWall's guidance, the county has already incarcerated people for possessing as little as one-tenth gram of heroin. Statewide, more than 20% of drug felony cases involve less than one gram. The ACLU's opposition to the bill stems from the lack of language separating those who sell small amounts to fund their own habits from those actually "flooding" communities with large quantities of opioids. Even drugs traded for anything of value -- no matter what quantity -- would trigger mandatory minimum five-year sentences for those convicted.

LaWall's letter has prompted an angry response from the ACLU, which believes the letter was sent to intimidate it into silence. All the ACLU has done is point out the flaws with the bill and that it runs contrary to LaWall's publicly-stated support for reducing drug-related incarcerations. LaWall's response to the ACLU's criticism -- no matter how mildly stated -- is still a demand the ACLU stop making factual statements about the bill she supports.

It's not that LaWall is unaware of these criticisms. Earlier debate on the bill produced the same criticism the ACLU is now being asked to stop: that the bill would result in more incarceration and less diversion of addicts to resource that may allow them to kick the habit and return successfully to society.

But anything drug-related -- especially bills attempting to address drug overdoses -- is going to be propelled more by emotion than logic, as is evidenced by this statement from a supportive state legislator.

Explaining his vote in support of the bill, state Rep. Mark Finchem, R-Oro Valley, said: “I don’t care how much one person hands off to another. If somebody is selling dope to my kid, I want them in prison.”

Well, let's hope your kid doesn't get caught with any purchased drugs, Mr. Finchem. If they do, the new law does them no favors. Considering prosecutors are viewing amounts less than a gram as felonious -- with the possibility of tacking on distribution charges if Finchem's child has shared or sold any to others -- his offspring could be facing five years minimum just for purchasing enough drugs to feed their own habit. The bill doesn't absolve purchasers, nor make it any easier for them to end up in a diversion program, rather than in jail.

The ACLU's criticisms are valid. The county attorney's request the ACLU stop portraying the legislation as opposed to LaWall's stated beliefs is not. Fortunately, neither the bill nor LaWall's demands are moving forward at this point. It's always a bad look when public servants start telling members of the public to exercise their First Amendment rights less. But it's even worse when this attempt starts with the public servant calling facts "misinformation."

Filed Under: arizona, barbara lawall, cease and desist, criminal justice, free speech
Companies: aclu

Iowa Town Threatens Critical Resident With A Lawsuit, Gets Sued By The ACLU Instead

from the First-Amendment-For-(Government)-Dummies dept

A small town in Iowa has decided one of its residents has too much First Amendment. Boldly marching forward in the face of mild criticism, Sibley's government had its lawyer threaten a local man with a lawsuit if he didn't take down or alter his website that criticized the town government for its repeated failure to address a serious problem in the town.

Sibley has less than 3,000 residents but it is the home to a large animal byproduct processing plant. Iowa Drying and Processing went into operation five years ago. Unaffectionately nicknamed the "Blood Plant," IDP's operations were the subject of complaints due to the pervasive foul odor emanating from it.

Local programmer Jeremy Harms set up a website advising people to stay away from Sibley after repeated calls for action were met with a lot of doing nothing by city politicians. His website previously answered the question about relocating to Sibley with "No." Thanks to the city's legal threats, the answer has been upgraded to "Maybe." In addition to pulling his hard "no," Sibley also amended his original post to reflect the few positives the town has.

After his website went locally viral (2,000 hits from a town with less than 3,000 residents), the government decided to act. It didn't approach the Blood Plant about taming the fumes. Instead, it sent a letter to Harms threatening him with a lawsuit if he didn't stop criticizing the town and its government. On top of that, the city's attorney (Daniel Dekoter) ordered Harms to stop talking to the press. These dubious demands were backed by a dubious interpretation of state law.

The Jan. 18 letter stated the original content of shouldyoumovetosibleyia.com was disparaging property in Sibley, which led to a reduction in taxable value of the property. It also stated Iowa recognizes a type of lawsuit called “slander of title,” which involves the disparagement of real estate. The letter stated Harms displayed malice by the fact that he renewed the domain name registration of his website, despite progress being made with the smells, that he chose a website name that would target people interested in moving to Sibley and that he claimed the information was current when it was false.

“In short, that line of reasoning was the legal and factual basis for the threat of litigation,” DeKoter wrote. “I am writing on my own time to explain this, since you or the lawyer you consulted apparently did not view the legal issues from the same perspective that I did.

[...]

The letter continued that Harms was within his legal rights to publish the website in its current, altered form, but the opinion of DeKoter is that Harms would do better spending time doing something more helpful to the community of Sibley.

It's a hell of law to cite when engaging in censorship and prior restraint. Good luck getting that one to hold up in court. The law requires false statements and malice, and nothing Harms published even comes close to that. Considering there's press coverage confirming several residents' complaints about the odor of the plant, the basis for the statements made on Harms' website seem very truthful and not published with a reckless disregard for the truth. It takes more than the potential to drive away residents to make this allegation stick, no matter what spin the town's lawyer applied in his follow-up threat to Harms.

Dekoter might feel he can browbeat a town resident with a bunch of legal mumbo jumbo about "slander of title," but he'll have to do better than that answering the ACLU's complaint [PDF], filed on behalf of Mr. Harms. This followed a letter sent in December, in which the city's attorney instructed Harms to either take down the site or start filling it with positive comments about Sibley.

The ACLU's complaint recounts previous news coverage of the Blood Plant's effect on Sibley residents. It also notes that coverage of the issue has now become completely one-sided thanks to the town muscling Harms out of the conversation. As a result of the legal threat, Harms cancelled an interview with local journalists. The resulting article only ran the city's side of the story with no rebuttal from the target of its ire.

This prior restraint allowed city leaders to do what they wanted when speaking to the press, including denying threatening letters were sent. If Harms couldn't speak to journalists, he certainly wouldn't be handing over copies of the two letters he had already received.

The ACLU seeks a permanent injunction against everything the town has threatened, as well as a judgment affirming Harms' right to criticize the government. This should be a quick win for Harms as there's little the First Amendment protects more than criticism of those in power. It is at the heart of this right and anything a government tries to do to shut down criticism will run an unfriendly judicial gauntlet. All that's really unsettled at this point is how much it's going to cost Sibley residents, who not only have to put up with fumes town leaders didn't want to address, but will soon be asked to cover the costs of the town's boneheaded First Amendment violations.

Filed Under: daniel dekoter, first amendment, free speech, iowa, jeremy harms, sibley
Companies: aclu

Government Says FISA Court Should Stop Wasting Time Considering The ACLU's Request For Greater Transparency

from the and-take-your-worthless-Constitution-with-you! dept

Late last year, the FISA Court did something it had never done before. It performed an en banc review of an earlier decision to determine whether or not the ACLU had standing to petition the court to release decisions pertaining to ongoing surveillance programs. The judges found the ACLU could continue its legal battle -- one it has waged on and off for more than a decade. It pointed out the ACLU had raised enough of a First Amendment allegation to be heard, although it wasn't particularly optimistic about its ability to overturn decades of FISA court secrecy.

The FISA court has posted the opening briefs from both parties. The government's brief [PDF] basically argues that the court has worked in near-total darkness for years and it should go on doing so for years to come. The phrase "national security" is used frequently. It points to two earlier petitions by the ACLU -- filed with different FISA judges -- as having set up a dilemma the government shouldn't even need to address. Judge Saylor's opinion in 2013 opened the door for the ACLU's standing, finding the ACLU was entitled to access at least one opinion dealing with bulk collection authority.

Judge Collyer's decision, released only months later, made no such finding. Instead, Collyer noted the court's secrecy was essential to the nature of the surveillance it approved and the ACLU had no standing to allege a violation of a First Amendment right to access FISA court documents. The government argues Collyer's decision was correct, not the one recently reached by the full panel of FISA judges.

There is similarly no substantial argument that it is logical to open up the FISC's proceedings to public view. The FISC's "entire docket relates to the collection of foreign intelligence by the federal government." In re Motion for Release, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 487. Its operations are governed "by FISA, by Court rule, and by statutorily mandated security procedures issued by the Chief Justice of the United States," which together "represent a comprehensive scheme for the safeguarding and handling of FISC proceedings and records." Id. at 488. The FISC has thus correctly found that ''the detrimental consequences of broad public access to FISC proceedings or records would greatly outweigh any" benefits, and . . that these harms "are real and significant, and, quite frankly, beyond debate."

The government also points out the FISA court has no power to declassify court proceedings. In fact, it argues the court overseeing government surveillance programs doesn't have enough information on hand to make that determination… which is a weird thing to say about people who review surveillance requests.

The Constitution assigns responsibility for classifying and controlling access to national security information to the Executive rather than the judiciary because only the former has the expertise and resources to make the necessary national security determinations.

The ACLU's brief [PDF] argues that FISA court precedent isn't the only precedent the court should consider. It points out that every court that has handled the issue has determined, to some extent, that denial of access to court records is an arguable First Amendment injury.

It then goes on to point out that the few times the FISA court has ordered the release of an opinion, the government has redacted so much that the released documents are useless. On top of its arguments that it should be allowed to proceed with its argument for access, the ACLU also suggests the court take a more active role in moderating the government's redaction efforts. As it points out, prior challenges of government secrecy assertions by the court have shown the government is unable to justify its redaction demands.

Critically, there is no indication in the public record that the FISC had any role in determining which portions of its own opinions should be made public. The government appears to have determined unilaterally which parts of the FISC's orders should be redacted and kept secret. By contrast, in response to a separate access motion brought by the ACLU, the FISC required the government to explain and justify its proposed withholdings in another FISC opinion. That review proved essential to securing public access to the court's opinion. Once required to defend its withholdings, the government abandoned many of them.

It also cautions the court against conflating standing with merit. As the FISA en banc review determined, all that's needed to bring a case is a cognizable injury. The merits of the case will be determined at a later date. The government's brief -- along with the dissenting opinion from the en banc hearing -- wish to substitute merit for standing in order to prevent any further discussion about public access to FISA court documents. All the ACLU wants is a chance to prove its case. The government wants the ACLU to be denied this opportunity altogether.

There's no date set for a ruling so it may be several months before the FISA court hands down a decision. (And several more months after that if the government feels something needs to be redacted.) But this shows the FISA court is at least willing to entertain the ACLU's arguments, even if the end result is a return to the status quo.

Filed Under: first amendment, fisa, secrecy, transparency
Companies: aclu

Minnesota Prosecutor Hits Teen With Child Porn Charges For Taking Explicit Photos Of Herself

from the 'light-touch'-of-a-prosecutor's-bludgeon dept

Child porn laws continue to be used stupidly by state prosecutors to punish teens for consensual behavior. The ACLU has entered a case on behalf of a 14-year-old who sent explicit photos of herself to another teen. This teen then sent the photos to others. At some point, the state decided to step in. What the teen did was demonstrably stupid, but should it be criminal?

Using the law to set an example and shame some teenagers undermines the seriousness and intent of child pornography laws.

Minnesota statute 617.247 clearly states that its intent is to “protect minors from the physical and psychological damage caused by their being used in pornographic work depicting sexual conduct which involves minors.” Yet it is the state, not Jane that is doing the victimizing.

“I’m not a criminal for taking a selfie,” stated Jane Doe. “Sexting is common among teens at my school, and we shouldn’t face charges for doing it. I don’t want anyone else to go through what I’m going through.”

This is clearly a ridiculous reading of Minnesota's law. The law can't "protect" Jane Doe from taking sexually explicit photos of herself -- not unless this is the prosecutor's idea of "protection." If anyone else had taken the photos, Jane Doe would be the victim of child pornography production.

Even more ridiculously, Jane Doe and the teen she sent the photos to would have been in the clear if they'd limited their interaction to sexual intercourse.

Minnesota statutory rape law is violated when a person has consensual sexual intercourse with an individual under age 16, although it is raised to 18 when the offender is an authority figure. If the younger party is 13-15, their partners must be no more than 2 years older, and children under 13 may only consent to those less than 36 months older.

Although it is possible this prosecutor may have decided to wield this law just as badly.

Because there is no such "Romeo and Juliet law" in Minnesota, it is possible for two individuals both under the age of 16 who willingly engage in intercourse to both be prosecuted for statutory rape, although this is rare.

As the ACLU points out in its brief [PDF], the prosecution of Doe serves no conceivable definition of "justice." It doesn't take a child predator off the street and it requires Doe to register as a sex offender even if she pleads to a lesser charge. It robs the term "production" of any meaning by stripping it of context, treating the willing production of explicit material BY a minor as equivalent to the non-consensual production of child pornography by an adult pedophile. The lack of an exploited victim means the prosecutor shouldn't have a legal basis for the prosecution.

But here we are, watching the state of Minnesota attempt to turn someone who took pictures of herself into a criminal. The National District Attorneys Association has suggested prosecutors limit pursuit of teen sexting cases and to deploy a "light touch" in those they do choose to pursue. But the prosecutor isn't interested in following the NDAA's suggestions. As Scott Greenfield points out, leaving sensitive issues like this up to prosecutors rarely works out well for the public.

The problem with relying on prosecutorial discretion to clean up bad laws, to not use the bludgeon in ways that no one really wanted, is that it’s prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor can choose to use a “light hand,” or come down hard. We might disagree with his choice, but the choice is his, not ours. That’s what discretion means. If the prosecutor, for whatever reason, chooses to beat a teen into submission, he can. If the elements of the crime cover her conduct, then it’s a crime and she’s a criminal. That it’s stupid isn’t the point. This is law.

The law may be stupid but we can apparently always count on some prosecutors to be even stupider. There are a wealth of options available to deter Does from sexting in the future -- none of which involve criminal charges or sex offender registration. Parents, family members, schools, community groups… all of these can provide guidance for teens without having to involve law enforcement or a prosecutor's lack of discretion.

Filed Under: child porn, minnesota, selfies, sexting, teenagers
Companies: aclu

Taylor Swift's Legal Rep Tries To Kill Critical Blog Post With Bogus Defamation, Copyright Claims

from the flailing-badly dept

Taylor Swift's legal representation is busy again. Really, her reps are never not busy, thanks to her desire to capture the entirety of the Taylor Swift market, but this particular legal threat -- aimed at a blogger -- oversteps its bounds egregiously.

PopFront editor Meghan Herning wrote a post detailing Swift's unofficial position as a white supremacist hero. While there's nothing in the post claiming Swift has directly encouraged this subset of her following, it did point out that she's remained curiously silent on race issues, as well as made use of Nazi-esque imagery in her videos.

Swift is not amused, apparently. William Briggs of Venable LLP sent threatening letter [PF] demanding the removal of the PopFront post. The letter claims the post is defamatory and filled with "malicious lies." More specifically, Swift apparently doesn't care for the following post content:

The story knowingly regurgitates, repeats, and attempts to expand on a malicious lie. Among other things, the story propagates such hideous falsehoods as: 1) “Taylor’s lyrics play to [a] subtle, quiet white support of a racial hierarchy;” 2) that there are similarities between Ms. Swift and Adolf Hitler; 3) that the “lyrics [of “Look What You Made Me Do”] are the most explicit in speaking to white anger and affirming white supremacy;” and 4) that Ms. Swift’s purported silence regarding white supremacy means she supports Donald Trump and identifies with the white supremacist/al-right movement.

The rest of the cease-and-desist is more of an angry letter to the editor. The legal firmness of Venable LLP's stance takes a backseat to general, non-litigious complaints about the post's assertions. Swift's attorney says his client has done plenty to combat racial inadequacy and is under no obligation to campaign for the Hillary Clintons of the world. Fair enough, but really not the sort of thing actionable legal claims can be built on.

Unfortunately for Swift and Venable LLP, the ACLU has stepped in to represent PopFront and Meghan Herning. It has answered with a letter [PDF] of its own that completely disassembles the stupid, sometimes disingenuous statements made by Swift's legal rep.

First, the blog’s statement that “Taylor’s lyrics seem to play to the same subtle, quiet white support of a racial hierarchy that benefits them,” is protected opinion. As an initial matter, your letter misquotes the blog post by omitting the word “seem,” a term signaling that what follows is an opinion. This omission suggests that you well understand that the actual post is stating an opinion, protected by the Constitution. If you are going to write a letter accusing a person of misrepresentation, you should avoid misrepresenting what she wrote.

The ACLU's letter points out Taylor Swift is a celebrity. The defamation bar is much higher for public figures, especially since the same fame that grants them money, power, and all the other nice things in life also makes them targets for criticism. Criticism isn't immediately synonymous with defamation, no matter how much Swift's lawyer would like it to be. And, again, the ACLU's letter makes this point while knocking the C&D for its attempt to put words into the blog post's author's mouth.

[Y]our letter asserts what the blog does not, “that Ms. Swift’s purported silence regarding white supremacy means she supports Donald Trump and identifies with the white supremacist/al-right [sic] movement.” It is not clear what your statement refers to, because there is nothing in the post that says this. The post does state that “there is no way to know for sure if Taylor is a Trump supporter or identifies with the white nationalist message, but her silence has not gone unnoticed.” But this is a far cry from stating that she supports Trump or identifies with the alt-right. You are of course absolutely right that “Ms. Swift has no obligation to campaign for any particular candidate or broadcast her political views.” But nor does she (or, probably more to the point, her lawyers) have the authority to tell other people the conclusions they can draw from her decision to keep silent.

Thus, however, “hideous” you consider these statements to be, none of them are actionable.

To top it all off, the legal threat came with a paragraph claiming the letter was protected IP and could not be reproduced or published without permission. This is not just rank bullshit but it's also incredibly stupid. There's almost no phrase more guaranteed to result in permissionless publication than this one:

This is a confidential legal notice and is not for publication. Any publication, dissemination or broadcast of any portion of this letter will constitute a breach of confidence and a violation of Copyright Act. You are not authorized to publish this letter in whole or in part absent our express written authorization.

The ACLU makes this point by publishing Venable LLP's letter along with the following paragraphs in its response:

First, the claim of confidentiality can only be described as odd, particularly coming from a lawyer; you cannot really expect that a person who receives a letter like this will feel any duty to keep this matter a little secret between the two of you. And it is not without irony that at one point you ask that your “letter stand as yet another unequivocal denouncement by Ms. Swift of white supremacy and the altright,” but then purport to forbid anybody from making the letter public.

Second, you cannot use copyright law as a weapon to suppress your letter, because reproduction of it here is fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. Attaching the letter to this one transforms it from a clumsy legal threat to suppress constitutionally protected speech into an exposé of that attempt in order to educate others who might receive these types of letters that they need not be intimidated.

PopFront and the ACLU will not be caving in to Swift's bogus legal threats. Nor will they be building a time machine to comply with the demands for a retraction "no later than" one day before the legal threat was actually sent.

And later in the letter:

Stupid defamation claims and bogus copyright language are Streisand-bait. Someone working for a top-tier law firm and representing a top-tier artist should know better. And perhaps attorney William Briggs does know better, but has chosen to serve his client as well as possible given the circumstances. But providing top tier service doesn't necessarily mean acquiescing to every client demand. Briggs and Venable should have taken a pass on this one. Instead, they're going to be the recipient of the sort of criticism they attempted to quell with this misguided demand letter.

Filed Under: alt right, copyright, defamation, fere speech, meghan herning, slapp, taylor swift, threats, william briggs
Companies: aclu, popfront, venable llp

Government Drops Its Demand For Data On 6,000 Facebook Users

from the sunlight-disinfectant dept

It's amazing what effect a little public scrutiny has on government overreach. In the wake of inauguration day protests, the DOJ started fishing for information from internet service providers. First, it wanted info on all 1.2 million visitors of a protest website hosted by DreamHost. After a few months of bad publicity and legal wrangling, the DOJ was finally forced to severely restrict its demands for site visitor data.

Things went no better with the warrants served to Facebook. These demanded a long list of personal information and communications from three targeted accounts, along with the names of 6,000 Facebook users who had interacted with the protest site's Facebook page. Shortly before oral arguments were to be heard in the Washington DC court, the DOJ dropped its gag order.

The last minute removal of the gag order appears to have been done to avoid the establishment of unfavorable precedent. It looks like the government perhaps has further concerns about precedential limitations on warrants served to service providers. As Kate Conger reports for Engadget, the DOJ has decided to walk away from this particular warrant challenge.

In a court hearing today, the Department of Justice dropped its request for the names of an estimated 6,000 people who “liked” a Facebook page about an Inauguration Day protest, the American Civil Liberties Union said. The ACLU challenged several warrants related to protests against President Trump’s inauguration on Friday, one of which included the search, claiming they were over-broad.

The ACLU notes the judge seemed sympathetic to allegations of overreach. In response, the government has apparently reduced its demands to info from two arrested protestors' accounts and further limited the date range from which data is sought.

This isn't a good look for the government. Dropping demands before an order has been issued indicates the DOJ had some idea its demands were too broad. It also shows the government will make concessions, rather than risk adverse rulings.

Then there's the whole issue of seeking personal information on protesters. This sort of thing creates a very real chilling effect by threatening to turn over personal information to the same entity the protesters were protesting. Fortunately, the government has walked back most of its demands in both cases.

Filed Under: disruptj20, doj, inauguration, privacy, social media, warrant
Companies: aclu, facebook

EFF, ACLU Sue Government Over Warrantless Electronic Searches At The Border

from the still-in-US-territory,-but-none-of-your-rights-apply dept

If all goes well, we might have the US border join the rest of the United States in recognizing citizens' Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court's Riley decision made it clear law enforcement needed to obtain warrants before searching people's cellphones. Unfortunately, the so-called "border exception" -- upheld by at least one court -- says securing the border is more important than recognizing people's rights.

The EFF and ACLU -- along with the 10 US citizens and one permanent resident they're representing -- are suing DHS, CBP, and ICE for violating the Constitutional rights of the plaintiffs by warrantlessly searching their devices. Not only did the government search their devices, but in some cases, held onto the devices for weeks. One plaintiff's phone is still in the hands of the CBP, having originally been taken from the plaintiff in January.

The filing [PDF] provides details of the plaintiffs' interaction with government agents at US borders. All plaintiffs were taken to secondary screening where they were coerced into handing over their devices and, in some cases, passwords. This is all being done with zero articulable suspicion or probable cause. Agents imply devices will be returned sooner if those they've detained are compliant. But even complicity can result in citizens having to leave their devices in the hands of the government.

Even when travelers comply with officers’ demands to unlock their devices or provide their device passwords, officers sometimes confiscate the devices anyway. For example, even though Ms. Alasaad provided the password to her phone, and CBP officers had already searched Mr. Alasaad’s unlocked phone, officers still confiscated both of the couple’s phones. CBP kept both phones for approximately 15 days.

These lengthy device confiscations cause significant harm. Many travelers, including Plaintiffs, rely on their electronic devices for their work and livelihoods, as well as for communicating with family members. Losing access to electronic devices and the information they contain for extended periods of time can disrupt travelers’ personal and professional lives. Confiscation of electronic devices is especially harmful to those who need, but do not have or cannot afford, replacement devices, and those who need but did not back up stored data.

As a result, the plaintiffs have spent thousands of dollars replacing devices the government kept without offering a legitimate law enforcement/national security reason for doing so. As the lawsuit points out, this type of behavior is unconstitutional.

When CBP and ICE officers confiscate electronic devices pursuant to their policies and practices for the purpose of searching those devices’ content, such confiscations violate the Fourth Amendment in at least three distinct ways:

a. First, these confiscations are not justified at their inception when they are affected absent probable cause.

b. Second, these confiscations are excessive in scope, because officers confiscate not just the locked devices they are unable to search at the port of entry, but also the unlocked devices they are able to search and that they sometimes have already searched.

c. Third, these confiscations are excessive in duration where the duration of confiscation of locked devices is unreasonable in relation to the time actually needed to search the devices.

In addition to the Fourth Amendment violations, there are also concerns about the First. A few of those participating in this lawsuit are journalists. CBP officers not only searched their phones, but questioned them directly about sources and subjects.

Even the plaintiffs who aren't journalists have valid First Amendment complaints. If the government's going to demand access to writings, photos, videos, and other forms of expression stored on electronic devices, this limits future expressive acts. People whose devices have been seized and searched are less likely to give the government as much to dig through the second time around. This means less writing, fewer photos, and steering clear of any artistic creation the government might somehow misconstrue as threatening, criminal, or simply critical of rote government abuse.

As the plaintiffs point out, these searches aren't Constitutional, but they are allowed by DHS and CBP policies -- which state agents may search and seize phones without reasonable suspicion. To that end, the lawsuit asks the court to find the policies officially unconstitutional and ban the government from searching devices at the border without a warrant.

It's a long shot, given the judicial branch's general deference to all things national security-related. But it will be nice to see the government explain how the Supreme Court's Riley decision somehow doesn't apply to American citizens just because they're entering or leaving the country.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th amendment, border exception, border searches, cbp, computers, doj, ice, phones, warrantless searches
Companies: aclu, eff

California's Top Court Says Cops Have To Hand Over Automatic Plate Reader Records

from the no-more-hiding-behind-abused-exceptions dept

The EFF and ACLU have achieved a victory in an acronym-heavy public records case. The California Supreme Court has ruled the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) will have to turn over data acquired by their automatic license plate readers (ALPRs).

Both entities tried to keep these records from the EFF and ACLU by claiming every single one of the millions of plate records were "investigatory records," exempt from disclosure under California's public records law. This apparently included the millions of "non-hit" records never utilized in any LAPD/LASD investigation. With the plate readers collecting 1.5-2 million records per week, they were basically arguing every driver passing by an ALPR was under investigation.

That's not how the state's Supreme Court sees it [PDF]. The "investigatory records" exemption pertains to targeted, ongoing investigations. The public records law cannot be stretched to cover indiscriminate mass surveillance.

Accordingly, we hold that real parties’ process of ALPR scanning does not produce records of investigations, because the scans are not conducted as part of a targeted inquiry into any particular crime or crimes. The scans are conducted with an expectation that the vast majority of the data collected will prove irrelevant for law enforcement purposes. We recognize that it may not always be an easy task to identify the line between traditional “investigation” and the sort of “bulk” collection at issue here. But wherever the line may ultimately fall, it is at least clear that real parties’ ALPR process falls on the bulk collection side of it.

The court also says the fact that the database of records is routinely searched during current investigations does not make everything in it immune from public records requests. If the law were interpreted this way, all it would take to exempt every one of the millions of plate records from disclosure would be the inclusion of a targeted plate in every batch of ALPR records requested.

The law enforcement agencies also claimed any release of the data would harm law enforcement interests, supposedly by giving criminals the info they needed to avoid plate readers. The Supreme Court finds this far less persuasive than the lower court did.

The trial court appears to have placed significant weight on the possibility that a criminal could use ALPR data to identify law enforcement patrol patterns. The court did so based on the declaration of LAPD Sergeant Daniel Gomez. In pertinent part, Sergeant Gomez claimed that an individual requesting ALPR data “could use the data to try and identify patterns of a particular vehicle.” (Italics added.) However, Sergeant Gomez also seemed to cast doubt on the likelihood that an individual could do so successfully, explaining that “[u]nlike law enforcement that uses additional departmental resources to validate captured [A]LPR information, a private person would be basing their assumptions solely on the data created by the [A]LPR system . . . .” Nevertheless, we will assume, as the trial court found, that a person could at least roughly infer patrol patterns from a week’s worth of plate scan data.

The problem with this aspect of the trial court’s analysis is that, even assuming patrol patterns can be inferred from ALPR data, there is little reason to believe that this possibility points meaningfully toward “a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality” with respect to all the records sought. (Michaelis, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1071.) For one thing, fixed ALPR scanners are just that—fixed— so concerns about patrol patterns are inapplicable to the data they collect. For another, the record does not appear to indicate that knowledge of where law enforcement officers were during a particular week is a reliable guide to where they will be at some precise moment in the future. The trial court did not find, for example, that real parties conduct law enforcement in the same way that they might operate a bus service—moving from point to point at particular times on particular days, never deviating to attend to other business or emergencies. We are not aware of substantial evidence that would have supported such a finding.

The court, however, does find one thing to be concerned with, and it's an issue the LAPD/LASD generally doesn't take into consideration until they're being asked to hand over bulk collection records: privacy.

Although we acknowledge that revealing raw ALPR data would be helpful in determining the extent to which ALPR technology threatens privacy, the act of revealing the data would itself jeopardize the privacy of everyone associated with a scanned plate. Given that real parties each conduct more than one million scans per week, this threat to privacy is significant. We therefore conclude that the public interest in preventing such disclosure “clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of” these records.

This means the ACLU and EFF will end up with the data they seek, but in anonymized form. It's unclear at this point how this will be anonymized, or if the data, in its abstracted form, will show anything interesting. And there's still more discussion to be had on remand before the ACLU/EFF can actually take possession of the one week of ALPR data they requested. But it's still a significant precedent -- one that narrows the scope of an often-abused public records exemption.

Filed Under: alpr, automatic license plate reader, california, california supreme court, la, lapd, lasd, license plate readers, public records, transparency
Companies: aclu, eff