Puerto 80 Appeals: Asks Court To Recognize That Trampling The First Amendment Is Substantial Harm

from the and-here-we-go dept

We had just noted that the government had replied to Puerto 80's motion in the Justice Department's attempt to forfeit the two Rojadirecta domains it had seized earlier this year. In it, we wondered if Puerto 80 was also going to be appealing the earlier ruling from the court refusing to return the domains, saying that Puerto 80 failed to show that a First Amendment violation represented "substantial hardship." It turns out that Puerto 80 is in fact appealing that ruling, as the filing embedded below shows.

To understand what's going on, you have to dig a little bit into the laws around seizure and forfeiture. While similar and related, they're two separate things. Seizure is the preliminary effort, in which the government, with some sort of (often rubberstamped) court approval, goes and takes something. There are specific rules around that, and while the laws are not perfectly clear, it does seem to suggest that the purpose of seizure in most cases is to hold evidence for a future trial, with the thinking being that leaving it in the hands of criminals could mean that the evidence might disappear. Forfeiture is a process that often follows seizure, in which the government makes its case that it should get to permanently keep some property. In many (but not all) cases, the government seizes first, and then forfeits later, in two separate processes.

In the Rojadirecta case, Puerto 80 initially challenged the seizure, including on First Amendment grounds, arguing that seizing such a domain without an adversarial hearing represented a classic case of prior restraint. In response, about a week later, the government then went forward with the separate process of filing to be able to keep those domains via the forfeiture process. So there were actually two parallel processes going on -- one about seizure and the other about forfeiture.

The specific filing against the seizure asked for the domains to be returned, which is allowed under seizure laws if the owner of the property can show "substantial hardship" from the government retaining the property. The judge ruled that a First Amendment violation did not count as a substantial hardship, and that it was the wrong time to raise the First Amendment anyway, suggesting it was better off being raised during the forfeiture fight that was about to start. What we've been writing about this week was the forfeiture fight, since the judge "closed" the seizure part with that previous ruling.

However, even as the forfeiture process is ongoing, Puerto 80 is now officially appealing the ruling on the seizure part of the case and arguing, compellingly, that the seizure itself was prior restraint and that a First Amendment violation is, without question, a "substantial hardship," contrary to the court's original claims. Not surprisingly, Puerto 80 relies on the Fort Wayne Books vs. Indiana case that is pretty damning to the government's rationale:

In Fort Wayne, state and local officials (respondents) filed a civil action pursuant to Indiana’s RICO laws, alleging that the defendant bookstores had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by repeatedly violating Indiana’s obscenity laws. 489 U.S. at 50-51. Prior to trial, respondents petitioned for, and the trial court granted, immediate seizure of the bookstores pursuant to a state law that permitted courts to issue seizure orders “upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a violation of [the State’s RICO law] involving the property in question has occurred.” Id. at 51. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the pretrial seizure order was unconstitutional, stating that “mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circulation.” Id. at 66. As in Fort Wayne, the government here has seized an entire business and effectively suppressed all of the expressive content hosted on it, including political discussions, commentary, and criticism by the site’s users— without it being determined whether the seizure was “actually warranted” under the relevant statutes. Id. at 67.

The prior restraint on Puerto 80 users’ and readers’ First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm of the highest order. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); see also Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Violations of First Amendment rights are commonly considered irreparable injuries for the purposes of a preliminary injunction.”). In CBS, Inc. v. Davis, the Supreme Court stayed the lower court injunction that prohibited CBS from broadcasting video footage documenting unsanitary practices in the meat industry, finding that such prior restraint caused “irreparable harm to the news media that is intolerable under the First Amendment.” 510 U.S. 1315, 1315-16, 1318 (1994) (emphasis added). The deprivation of Constitutional rights is, therefore, ipso facto irreparable injury and subject to expedited review.

In the instant case, the government effectively shut down an entire website, suppressing all of the speech hosted on it, based on an assertion that there was probable cause to believe that some of the material linked to by the website (though not found on the website itself) might be infringing. Puerto 80 was not provided any advance notice, nor was it provided the opportunity to contest the seizure before (or, for that matter, shortly after) the government shut down the site. Nor were the site’s users afforded any notice or opportunity to contest the seizure. That procedural failing itself indicates that the government’s action was an unlawful prior restraint. “[T]he lack of notice or opportunity to be heard normally renders a prior restraint invalid.” United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 312 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968)).

The filing at this point is mainly to convince the court to accept an "expedited appeals" process, rather than a full filing on the reasons why the seizure was prior restraint and why prior restraint is a substantial hardship, but it certainly presents the basics of the argument. What the case may come down to is a question of whether or not "irreparable injury" is the equivalent of "substantial hardship." Not surprisingly, I would argue that an irreparable injury that involves stomping on someone's First Amendment rights is a very substantial hardship. So far one judge has disagreed. We'll see what happens on appeal.

Filed Under: copyright, criminal copyright infringement, doj, domain seizures, forfeiture, free speech, prior restraint, rojadirecta, seizures
Companies: puerto 80, rojadirecta

DOJ: This Case Has Nothing To Do With Puerto 80; Now Here Is Why Puerto 80 Is Guilty

from the dance-doj-dance dept

Following Puerto 80's motion to dismiss the attempt by the US government to forfeit its domains, the Justice Department has filed its response (pdf) in which it more or less mocks Puerto 80's lawyers for "not understanding" what they're fighting about in court. Having read both of the documents and being familiar with the case, I will agree that there is certainly some confusion (perhaps on both sides) about the exact nature of the arguments, but it appears that the government is partly the cause of this, in that it keeps leaping back and forth between arguments, since it can't make a single coherent argument for why forfeiture makes sense under the law.

Specifically, the government is claiming that its sole reason for trying to forfeit the domain (and for seizing it in the first place) is that "those domain names themselves facilitated the commission of a recognized crime." That is, it argues that Puerto 80 is wasting its time in suggesting that Puerto 80 did not engage in criminal copyright infringement, because the government has not charged Puerto 80 with anything. It's just claiming that the domains themselves are property used to commit a crime, and therefore can be forfeited.

But the government seems to want to have its cake and eat it too. That's because, in order to show that the domains were used to commit a crime, it keeps going back to actions done by Puerto 80. But then, when Puerto 80's lawyers keep explaining why Puerto 80 did not violate the law, the government tries to claim that this is meaningless because it's not accusing Puerto 80 of anything.

Talk about a disingenuous Catch-22 sort of argument.

For example, here's the kind of mocking that the DOJ presents against Puerto 80:

Despite what Puerto 80 appears to believe, the Government has neither charged Puerto 80 with a crime, nor has it filed a civil lawsuit against that company. Instead, and as the Complaint makes absolutely clear, the Government has brought a civil action against certain property an in rem proceeding against two domain names that facilitated the commission of criminal copyright infringement and are thus subject to forfeiture pursuant to Section 2323(a)(I) of Title 18, United States Code.

But... then... in making its case, the government still relies on actions of Puerto 80 and not the domains in question. Even worse, contrary to what the DOJ states, nowhere does it make the case that criminal copyright infringement occurred. Now, as we've stated before, for criminal copyright infringement to occur, and as the government clearly states in its filing, the government needs to show:

(1) the existence-of a valid copyright; (2) an act of infringement of that copyright; (3) willfulness on the part of the infringer; and (4) either that (a) the infringement was for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or (b) the infringer reproduced or distributed, during any 180-day period, one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more copyrighted works, with a total retail value of more than $1,000.

(1) and (2) aren't hard to show -- but the infringement is done by third parties (users of the site) rather than Puerto 80. In fact, the government even admits multiple times that the content is not hosted or distributed by Puerto 80, but by third parties. (3) is much, much trickier, and the government fails to show willfulness at all -- except to insist that Puerto 80 had willingness to infringe. Again, note that the government goes back to focusing on Puerto 80 here, even though it keeps insisting that it's not on trial. Even worse, it fails to respond to the pretty clear claims by Puerto 80 in its filing that its actions were clearly not willful since it had been tried and found not guilty of infringement twice in its home country. And yes, as people will point out, we're talking about US law, rather than Spanish law, but it's pretty ridiculous to think that Puerto 80 would go through such a huge legal process at home... and then somehow still think that it was willfully infringing on copyrights.

Point (4) is where an even bigger problem sets in. Once again, the DOJ focuses on Puerto 80 getting commercial gain:

With respect to private financial gain, the Complaint makes clear that when an Internet· user selected an individual link to a particular sporting event from the Rojadirecta website and the corresponding stream of the telecast began to run, advertisements that were separate and distinct from any commercials that may have been aired during the stream of the sporting event broadcast were periodically displayed at the bottom of the video during the live stream. (Compl. ~ 14c). On a motion to dismiss, this Court is required to draw all inferences from the allegations of a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Roth, 489 F.3d at 510. It is certainly a permissible inference for this Court to draw that these advertisements generate revenue and result in private financial gain.

All of that is accurate... but again, it's about Puerto 80 who (again) the DOJ insists is not being sued here. Basically, the government totally fails to properly allege criminal copyright infringement, in that it doesn't show how those four elements all take place by a single party. Instead, they pull from here and there to patch together such a claim. A user of Rojadirecta may infringe... and Rojadirecta may profit from an ad shown on the site, but that's not willful copyright infringement for the purpose of financial gain. Furthermore, as the MP3Tunes case recently showed, merely having ads near infringement is not profiting from infringement: "However the financial benefit must be attributable to the infringing activity.... While Sideload.com may be used to draw users to MP3tunes.com and drive sales of pay lockers, it has non-infringing users." Merely the fact that infringing content can "draw" users to the site doesn't mean that the profit is directly from infringement.

So, while it is true that Puerto 80's lawyers may have argued for much more than the specific issue at stake in this case, it's in part because the DOJ itself keeps shifting its argument. It can make cases for civil infringement against users. It might be able to make a case for civil inducement for Puerto 80... but what it's doing -- quite amazingly -- is mashing together both of those arguments to pretend that two separate civil issues chopped up together can adequately show criminal copyright infringement... and from that they can claim that the domains were used for such things.

If anything, it seems that Puerto 80's lawyers were too clever in arguing ahead of the DOJ, who I'm still not entirely convinced understands what it's really arguing here. Puerto 80's lawyers didn't just try to show that no full criminal copyright claim was presented by the government. It also tried to debunk the two parts of the (4) factors that the DOJ tried to pin on Puerto 80. The government then says it doesn't care what Puerto 80 did, even as it uses its own questionable claims of what Puerto 80 did to make its case. It's really quite stunning.

On a separate note, even though Puerto 80's lawyers chose not to use the First Amendment claim, the Justice Department seems to be begging for it. As we've noted in the past, the ruling in Fort Wayne Books v. Indiana makes it clear that a standard higher than probable cause needs to be used in seizures:

Thus, while the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable cause (and even without a warrant in various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment are involved... It is "[t]he risk of prior restraint, which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth Amendment protections accorded searches for and seizure of First Amendment materials" that motivates this rule.

But here the government is arguing in the other direction saying the standard is even lower than probable cause! It's saying that it just needs "reasonable belief," now that the case has moved on to the forfeiture stage, rather than just discussing the seizure:

Nor is the Government required to show probable cause for forfeiture. See,~, Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 47. Instead, the complaint simply needs to establish a "reasonable belief' that the government will be able to meet its burden at trial. Id. "In other words, the complaint need not allege facts sufficient to show that specific property is tainted, but facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the government can demonstrate" the ultimate trial burden "for finding the property tainted."

I'm at a loss to see how this makes any sense at all. Remember, the judge in the case has already said that Puerto 80 can't challenge the seizures on First Amendment grounds, because trampling your First Amendment rights is not a "substantial hardship." That, alone, seems like something that should be appealed. But it also seems like it wipes out any avenue for challenging the seizure on First Amendment grounds, because the standard now being discussed is merely "reasonable belief." Now, it is true that this is just for the motion to dismiss, and the standard at trial is going to be higher, but, honestly, why should a trampling of free speech have to wait so far into the process before being resolved? Plenty of other cases are willing to put the First Amendment issue upfront and center...

Filed Under: copyright, criminal copyright infringement, doj, domain seizures, forfeiture, rojadirecta, seizures
Companies: puerto 80, rojadirecta

Rojadirecta Sues US Government, Homeland Security & ICE Over Domain Seizure

from the with-top-notch-legal-support dept

This morning, we wrote about the list of sites that ICE knew was challenging its domain seizures, and some people complained that there still were no details. There's been a lot happening behind the scenes, but the first bit of public information is now available, as the company behind Rojadirecta, Puerto80 has officially filed suit against the US government, demanding the return of its domains. Not only that, but it's brought on some top notch legal talent to help them. The company is represented by Ragesh Tangri and Mark Lemley from Durie Tangri. If you're at all familiar with intellectual property law, you know who Lemley is, and know the level of respect he gets within intellectual property circles. In fact, it's interesting to note that one of Lemley's papers is one that we've seen frequently cited by those who believe the domain seizures are legal. The fact that he's arguing on the other side seems pretty telling.

As for the filing itself, it details the stalling by the US government that we pointed out last month:

Contrary to the grounds on which the domain names were seized, the Rojadirecta site is not violating copyright law, let alone criminal copyright law. Rojadirecta explained this to the government when, on February 3, 2011, it sent ICE and the Department of Justice a letter requesting immediate return of the subject domain names pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(f). Following that letter, counsel for Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. (“Puerto 80” or “Petitioner”), the company which owns the sites, repeatedly tried to discuss the seizure with the government, but was unable to engage with the government until it notified the U.S. Attorney’s Office of its intent to seek a temporary restraining order and file a petition for immediate return of the seized domain names. It was not until then that Puerto 80 was able to have a substantive conversation with the appropriate officials. Hoping to avoid burdening the court, Puerto 80 held off filing the instant petition pending the outcome of those negotiations. On May 26, 2011, the government informed counsel for Puerto 80 that the only acceptable “compromise” would entail Puerto 80 prohibiting its users from linking to any U.S. content anywhere on its sites. Because this “solution” would prohibit Puerto 80 from engaging in lawful acts not prohibited by copyright law, Puerto 80 chose instead to challenge the seizure in court.

The filing notes that it is asking the court to speed up the process, as it tried to be patient, but the delays in reclaiming the domain are harming Puerto 80's business. It also notes that "in hopes of avoiding having its property tied up in lengthy forfeiture proceedings, Puerto 80 decided to engage in good faith negotiations with the government and held off filing the instant petition pending the outcome of those discussions." It then lists out all of the detailed attempts to get the domains back. It involves multiple attempts by Puerto 80's lawyers to discuss this with the Justice Department, and as we heard from pretty much all the sites in this process, talking to anyone substantial proved to be quite difficult. It also notes that "the government attempted to dissuade Puerto 80 from filing anything in district court." That supports our contention that the government really wanted to avoid a legal challenge...

As for the specific legal arguments, it starts out by pointing out that under the rules for seized property, there are certain conditions under which the seized property should be returned -- with a key one being that "the property will be available at the time of the trial." As we've discussed at length, the key official reason for seizures is to preserve evidence. That's why this is a key element here: if the evidence will be there, there is no reason for the seizure.

Then out come the big guns, starting with the claim (as we've suggested in the past) that the seizure represents unlawful prior restraint (i.e., a violation of the First Amendment). Here's a big chunk of the filing, included in its entirety (minus footnotes), because it's quite interesting:

The seizure imposes another hardship on Puerto 80, in that it constitutes an invalid prior restraint and suppresses its users’ and readers’ protected First Amendment activities. See Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989) (“[W]hile the general rule under the Fourth Amendment is that any and all contraband, instrumentalities, and evidence of crimes may be seized on probable cause . . . ., it is otherwise when materials presumptively protected by the First Amendment are involved.”). See also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468 (1985) (“The First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material, and requires that the Fourth Amendment be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’ in such circumstances.”) (internal citation omitted); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326, n.5 (1979) (noting that the First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for, and seizures of, presumptively protected materials). In Fort Wayne, state and local officials (respondents) filed a civil action pursuant to Indiana’s RICO laws, alleging that the defendant bookstores had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by repeatedly violating Indiana’s obscenity laws. 489 U.S. at 50-51. Prior to trial, respondents petitioned for, and the trial court granted, immediate seizure of the bookstores pursuant to a state law that permitted courts to issue seizure orders “upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a violation of [the State’s RICO law] involving the property in question has occurred.” Id. at 51. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the pretrial seizure order was unconstitutional, stating that “mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circulation.” Id. at 66. As in Fort Wayne, the government here has seized an entire business and effectively suppressed all of the expressive content hosted on it, including political discussions, commentary, and criticism by the site’s users—without it being determined whether the seizure was “actually warranted” under the relevant statutes. Id. at 67.

In Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2004), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a Pennsylvania statute that permitted the state’s Attorney General or a district attorney to seek a court order requiring an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to “remove or disable items residing on or accessible through” the ISP’s service upon a showing of probable cause that the item constituted child pornography. The district court found that the statute imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. It concluded that under Fort Wayne Books and Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), a court must “make a final determination that material is child pornography after an adversary hearing before the material is completely removed from circulation.” Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (emphasis added). The court further noted that the state statute “allow[ed] for an unconstitutional prior restraint because it prevents future content from being displayed at a URL based on the fact that the URL contained illegal content in the past.” Id.

In the instant case, the government effectively shut down an entire website, suppressing all of the speech hosted on it, based on an assertion that there was probable cause to believe that some of the material linked to by the website (though not found on the website itself) might be infringing. The site’s owner was not provided any advance notice, nor was he provided the opportunity to contest the seizure before (or, for that matter, shortly after) the government shut down the site. Nor were the site’s users afforded any notice or opportunity to contest the seizure. Because case law is clear that “mere probable cause to believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove [protected material] from circulation,” Fort Wayne, 489 U.S. at 66, the seizure of the expressive materials in this case violates the First Amendment. See also Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (finding that a procedure that permits a judge to make an ex parte finding of probable cause that material is child pornography, with no opportunity for the content publisher to receive notice or be heard, violates the First Amendment). This First Amendment deprivation extends not just to registered users of Rojadirecta, but also to anyone wishing to visit the website. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“[T]he protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . . That right may not constitutionally be abridged . . . .”).

If you want the key bit, it's from that third paragraph above. One of the footnotes also points out (as we've noted elsewhere) that the government appears to have made up, whole cloth, the idea that linking to infringing content can be seen as criminal infringement:

Indeed, several courts have held that the act of indexing and linking to copyrighted material— which was the government’s basis for seizing the domain names—is not direct or indirect copyright infringement. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); see also Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654 HLH(BQRX), 2000 WL 525390, at *2 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 27, 2000) (finding that hyperlinking to other sites does not constitute direct infringement); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660, (SHS) 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (unreported) (linking to content does not implicate distribution right and thus, does not give rise to liability for direct copyright infringement); Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1202 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Hyperlinking per se does not constitute direct copyright infringement because there is no copying.”).

Finally, the filing points out that the domain names did not meet the conditions set out under US law to qualify for seizure in the first place, saying that it is not contraband, evidence, "particularly suited for illegal activities" or "likely to be used to commit additional criminal acts." That last one, I assume, is the one that most supporters of the seizures will take issue with, but, the argument is again laid out in tremendous detail:

Puerto 80 does not host any infringing material on the websites which operate under the subject domain names... In the same way a search engine or other site which aggregates links to existing material on the Internet, Rojadirecta provides an index of links to streams of sporting events that can already be found on the Internet through a search for those sites or simply by typing the URL for the site directly. Id. Such activity does not constitute direct copyright infringement, much less criminal infringement. See supra, at note 8. Indeed, United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Or) made this point in a letter he wrote to ICE Director John Morton and Attorney General Holder expressing concern over the government’s seizure of the subject domain names....

Puerto 80’s operation of the Rojadirecta site does not constitute contributory infringement because the subject domain names are capable of—and are, in fact, used for— substantial non-infringing uses. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, reh’g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (summary judgment inappropriate where material fact existed as to whether file-sharing program, which was “used overwhelmingly for infringement,” is “capable of substantial non-infringing uses.”).

Nor is Rojadirecta a site devoted simply to linking to such streams. In addition to providing a forum for discussion on sports, politics, and a variety of other topics, the Rojadirecta site enables users to post links to authorized sports broadcasts. For example, on Saturday, February 12, 2011, the Rojadirecta site (hosted on the rojadirecta.es domain name) provided a link to “9:30am Hockey (NHL): Los Angeles – Washington.”... Clicking on this link opened a new window for the Yahoo! sports website for the National Hockey League, and provided a live stream of the match between the Los Angeles Kings and Washington Capitals. Id.

Nor does Puerto 80’s operation of the Rojadirecta site constitute vicarious liability because it does not have “a right and ability to supervise that coalesce[s] with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.” Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’ns Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 971 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (emphasis added)). Puerto 80 does not receive any revenue that is derived from specific content hosted on, or streamed by, the sites to which it links.... In other words, Puerto 80 does not receive any revenue from any site to which a user can link from the subject domain names based upon the content of that site. Id. To the extent there is any site to which Rojadirecta links that contains infringing material, Puerto 80 receives no specific financial benefit from a user clicking through to that site and viewing such content.... Because Puerto 80’s revenues are not tied to whether or not infringing material is linked to or accessed, the government cannot show that Puerto 80 has a “direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials” which “coalesce[s] with” any right or ability to supervise what is linked to on the site. See Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ’g (USA), Inc., Nos. 93 civ. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994) (direct financial benefit not established where defendant leased space at a trade show for a fixed fee to exhibitors who played infringing music, but defendant’s revenues were not dependant on whether exhibitors actually played music or what they played); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (in DMCA safe-harbor context, “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” not established “where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider’s service”) (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the House Committee on Commerce Report, H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998)).

Furthermore, the filing points out that the government totally failed to meet the requirements to show criminal copyright infringement, and notes that the government cannot show that Rojadirecta meets those requirements.

The full filing is embedded below, but I've pulled out most of the key points above... Earlier this morning we had supporters of the domain seizures insist that no one was actually filing lawsuits in the US over this. It will be interesting to see how they respond to this particular filing.

Filed Under: copyright, criminal copyright infringement, dhs, doj, domain seizures, ice, mark lemley, rojadirecta, seizures
Companies: puerto 80

Can The Government Use The Term 'Music Piracy' In A Criminal Copyright Trial?

from the apparently dept

Via Michael Scott, we learn that there was recently a debate over whether or not the government could use the phrase "music piracy" to describe the actions of an individual who had been charged with criminal copyright infringement. The case involved Adil Cassim, who had been arrested last year and charged with running a "release group," which are the private networks of people online who work hard to get unauthorized copyrighted materials (music, movies, etc.) distributed as quickly as possible. While Cassim was apparently acquitted by the jury (so far, I can't find any more info on what happened... Update: TorrentFreak has some details), there was a discussion over how the gov't could refer to his actions. His lawyer argued that "music piracy" is a prejudicial term, not related to the issues in the lawsuit, and that the gov't should not be allowed to use that term in front of the jury. The judge denied this:

Defendants seeks to exclude any use of the terms "music piracy" from the jury. They argue that this term is not evidentiary, has no probative value, and is highly inflammatory such that it will create undue prejudice. The Government, in response, argues that this term would be highly probative of the Defendants' knowledge of the unlawful object of the conspiracy. The Court finds that, because this term was and is commonly used to refer to the conduct in question, it will be difficult for witnesses and lawyers to generate an adequate substitute during questioning. It need not, therefore, be entirely excluded. However, the Court invites counsel for Defendants to suggest any possible limiting instructions which, if offered to the jury, might mitigate any possible prejudice that the term might create.

However, as Ray Dowd points out in the link above, this doesn't seem to make much sense. The word piracy is not in the statute, and the crime he's charged with is criminal copyright infringement, not piracy, so there's no reason that the proper terms can't be used:

I have litigated many copyright infringement cases without the need to refer to the word "piracy" though as a civil plaintiff it is a nice synonym referring to a person who makes multiple exact duplicates, rather than someone who borrowed portions of a copyrighted work. But it certainly is not necessary in a civil proceeding and would appear to me to be highly improper to use in a criminal proceeding.

Of course, since the guy was acquitted anyway, perhaps the entertainment industry is correct that "piracy" isn't derogatory enough anymore.

Filed Under: adil cassim, copyright, copyright act, criminal copyright infringement, music piracy, release group