Awesome Stuff: New Ways To Play

from the you-done-changed-the-game dept

Kickstarter has launched a lot of brand new games, both video- and otherwise, but it's also home to plenty of people working on ways to enhance and alter existing games, and those people are the stars of this week's Awesome Stuff.

Bridging The Game Gap: Japanese For Gamers

For certain game genres and amongst large portions of the gaming community, Japan is where it's at. Between JRPGs and visual novels, Japan has been pumping out critically acclaimed and hugely popular games whose titles are often barely even heard in the English speaking world, leaving the avid gamers who know about them to campaign for translations and English releases — or to pirate and turn to the fan translation community. This project offers a new alternative for true fans who want to learn something while they're at it: an extensive free video course in speaking Japanese, aimed at gamers with a focus on the language as it is used in video games.

Swirling Lightshow In The Corner Pocket: OpenPool

At this point, pool is timeless — but that doesn't mean it can't be gussied up with some cool technology. OpenPool is a projection mapping system that uses an Xbox Kinect to project a moving, interactive, responsive image onto a pool table. Not only is it a really impressive visual effect, it opens up all kinds of possibilities for new dynamic twists on the game. The coolest part? It's a DIY kit. Combine their software and ceiling mount with your own Kinect, projector and computer, and build an OpenPool system yourself.

Edward Snowden, Jack Of Spades: WIRETAP Cards

I know, I know — I featured a deck of cards two weeks ago too. I wasn't going to include another, but the WIRETAP deck is far too fitting to ignore. It's a full set of original hand-drawn playing cards with suit pips that look at you. The court cards are modelled after important players from the NSA saga and the broader world of privacy and government spying — including Edward Snowden, Jack of Spades.

Filed Under: awesome stuff, edward snowden, japan, pool

The NSA Has An Internal Office Advice Columnist And Yes, She's An Inconsistent Hypocrite Too

from the spy-versus-spy dept

Peter Maass, who I've been fortunate to meet and has had a pretty amazing career as an embedded war journalist, has penned a pretty fantastic read over at Glenn Greenwald's new The Intercept venture. In it, Maass points out that among the ocean of compelling bits buried in the Snowden documents is this strange little fact: the NSA has an advice columnist who routinely provides NSA employees with office politics and interpersonal advice under the pen name "Zelda." Her column, titled "Ask Zelda!," routinely appears for employees with adequate security clearance via the agency's intranet.

Many of the advice columns released via Snowden's document dump deal with perfectly ordinary office politics, like complaints about stealing sodas out of refrigerators, stinky co-workers, or bosses who can't be bothered to respond to e-mails. But Maass points out that one of the more entertaining columns involves complaints by an NSA worker who is concerned about their boss spying on them. In a column signed "Silence in SID," an employee writes in:

"Here's the scenario: when the boss sees co-workers having a quiet conversation, he wants to know what is being said (it's mostly work related). He has his designated “snitches” and expects them to keep him apprised of all the office gossip – even calling them at home and expecting a run-down! This puts the “designees” in a really awkward position; plus, we're all afraid any offhand comment or anything said in confidence might be either repeated or misrepresented."

The tension created by having an overly nosy boss has resulted, the employee claims, in workplace efficiency problems and a growing lack of trust in the establishment:

"We used to be able to joke around a little or talk about our favorite “Idol” contestant to break the tension, but now we're getting more and more skittish about even the most mundane general conversations (“Did you have a good weekend?”). This was once a very open, cooperative group who worked well together. Now we're more suspicious of each other and teamwork is becoming harder. Do you think this was the goal?

Zelda is quite-amusingly shocked by the boss's behavior inside of an agency of spies:

"Wow, that takes “intelligence collection” in a whole new – and inappropriate – direction. …. We work in an Agency of secrets, but this kind of secrecy begets more secrecy and it becomes a downward spiral that destroys teamwork. What if you put an end to all the secrecy by bringing it out in the open?"

So spying over-broadly on people you don't think should be spied upon destroys teamwork, fosters distrust and erodes overall efficiency, huh? Gosh, what if you took that concept and applied it to an entire planet? As Maass notes, at no point while giving advice on spying inside the NSA does Zelda seem to have awareness of the possible lessons that could be applied to spying going on outside the NSA (at least that we get to see):

"Her response to “Silenced in SID” does not acknowledge the irony – or hypocrisy – of an employee at a spy agency complaining about being spied on. But Zelda directly addresses the long-lasting effects of inappropriate surveillance. “Trust is hard to rebuild once it has been broken,” she observes. “Your work center may take time to heal after this deplorable practice is discontinued."

So remember, dear readers: inappropriate surveillance erodes trust, destroys teamwork, damages the overall community, and creates a general downward spiral that's bad for everybody involved. Unless we're doing it to the general public, in which case -- who cares? Now get back to work!

Filed Under: edward snowden, nsa, zelda

Administration And NSA Continue To Avoid The Privacy Vs. Security 'Discussion'

from the more-uncomfortable-than-parents-handling-sex-ed dept

This "discussion" about the whole "security vs. privacy" thing the administration claims it has "welcomed" since the Snowden leaks began? Yeah. Still not happening. As Cal Borchers at BetaBoston reports, government reps at an MIT event focused on "big data and privacy" couldn't have appeared less interested in discussing any of the implications of widespread domestic surveillance.

The kicker came during an afternoon panel discussion, when John DeLong, the National Security Agency's director of compliance, should have been awarded an honorary degree in tongue biting. DeLong sat right next to Carol Rose, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, yet refused to engage when she made pointed comments, like this one: "Everything's being done in secret. But for Edward Snowden, we wouldn't even be having this conversation."

DeLong would look down and away (perhaps there was an interesting piece of metatada on the floor of Wong Auditorium), waiting silently for another panelist to move the discussion away from his agency.

This is nothing new for DeLong. Back in August of last year, he gave the Washington Post permission to quote him "by name and title" after holding a 90-minute interview with the paper, after the White House routed all press queries to him directly. When the paper refused to edit quotes after the government's "internal review" of the interview draft, the administration and the NSA then informed the Washington Post that nothing DeLong said could be used. All of his input was replaced with a bland, prepared statement.

Now, DeLong could have been interested in participating in this discussion, but this previous administration intervention seems to indicate that the NSA and the White House would prefer DeLong keeps his head down and his mouth shut -- at least in cases where it can't push through its own edit of the "discussion."

DeLong wasn't the only government rep uninterested in discussing government surveillance.

Before DeLong's group took the floor, US Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker made a brief speech in which she barely touched on the subject of privacy, then exited quickly without fielding questions.

Someone seated near me, in one of those fake whispers that's really meant to be heard by a lot of people, summed things up nicely: "No questions? Why have a real discussion, right?"

Snickers rippled a few rows in every direction.

As Borchers points out, there was plenty of discussion about private companies and privacy, but when it came to the biggest "company" of all, the US government, no one had much to say. White House counselor John Podesta somehow even managed to "phone in" his phoned-in statement (Borchers describes Podesta's contribution as "bland remarks") to open the event.

This is the US government's idea of "discussion." Canned statements and floor-gazing. The NSA made this bed and now refuses to lie in it. (Although officials will often lie outside of it -- ho, ho! *coughJamesClapper*) The administration plays along, making small gestures but refusing to consider making any substantial statements or changes. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence continues to pass out redacted documents with implied transparency, glossing over the fact that every document release so far has been compelled by an FOIA lawsuit.

This isn't a discussion. This is low murmurs and unintelligible mumbling being passed off as a "discussion" in hopes this new era of faux-openness will soon blow over and allow everyone involved to return to the opacity and darkness they've become accustomed to operating in.

Filed Under: edward snowden, john delong, nsa, privacy, security

Former NSA Official Claims Snowden Set Agency Back A Decade, Tells Putin To 'Return' Whistleblower

from the mostly-fury,-some-sound,-otherwise-insignificant dept

Another former NSA official has offered his contribution to the "Snowden has destroyed the NSA" narrative. Jack Israel, former "technical director for NSA's analysis & production directorate" has posted an op-ed at the Baltimore Sun that makes all the usual stops on the talking point circuit on its way to claiming the leaks have done "permanent damage" to the NSA.

Sept. 11th? Referenced heavily. The bulk of Israel's op-ed recounts the agency's actions after the Sept. 11th attacks, including its newfound interest in the internet. Rather than acknowledging the failure to collaborate that allowed a known terrorist (and 9/11 participant) to reenter the country unnoticed, Israel blames this on another, older leak.

Our sensors were trained on some of al-Qaida's lieutenants, but there were no signs of an impending attack. Years ago, we listened to the communications of Osama bin Laden, but they went off the air when this source was leaked to the press…

So, according to Israel, the NSA decided to take a look at this new thing called the internet.

Much of the conversation the morning after focused on phone calls, a technology that NSA was long familiar with. But about 15 minutes in, someone opined, what about the Internet? This was a relatively new technology, one that some in NSA feared would cause the agency to "go blind" because of the dazzling volumes of information and endless variety of new and emerging communications modes such as chat, email, and even telephone calls over the Internet…

"How do we know they're even using it?" the head of the data collection directorate asked. Several years ago we had sampled communications channels looking for al-Qaida and had not found a trace.

"They are," a senior analyst responded. "They're saying so in their phone calls."

And the internet proved to be a huge source of data. Israel claims that "within six months," the agency had compiled a huge terrorist database, thanks to these collections. But his recollection of this game-changing event glosses over the NSA's apparent failure to surveil the internet. The NSA was already listening to terrorists' calls. This much is apparent. But the terrorists were saying something and the NSA just wasn't hearing it. Let's repeat that last line.

"They are," a senior analyst responded. "They're saying so in their phone calls."

So, if we're to believe Israel's take, then the NSA KNEW Al-Qaeda was "using the internet" but, until after the 9/11 attacks, didn't do anything about it. Several years earlier it had "sampled communications," but despite directly hearing from Al-Qaeda operatives about their internet activities, decided not to pursue that "dead end" again. I guess if we buy that story, then we can see his point about Snowden setting back the agency "ten years." The agency apparently reacts with all the nimbleness of an oil tanker. It knew but did nothing, until it was too late.

But this isn't the nadir of Israel's op-ed. This interjection, hidden in parentheses towards the end of his piece, is. It's not just stupid. It's also poorly written.

To President Vladimir Putin: Give us Snowden. You already know everything from him.

It was made clear months ago that Snowden had completely offloaded his stash of documents before setting foot in Russia. Even if you find that hard to believe, the assumptions that Russian intelligence agencies have somehow either a.) cracked device security to gain access or b.) cracked Snowden himself to gain access are equally unbelievable. If "a" is true, then one needs to question the NSA's inability to discover what documents have been "taken." The "b" assumption relies heavily on other conspiracy theories, like Snowden working in conjunction with Russia or him being worked over to give up what he knows. Israel's wording seems to suggest the latter, despite there being no indication that Putin wants Snowden around for anything more than annoying the US government. (This could change, of course, given the events in the Ukraine, and the US government's stance against Russian intervention...)

"You already know everything from him" is a ridiculous assertion made even worse by Israel's choice to put these exact words in that exact order. This clumsy stab at labeling Snowden a traitor follows a sentence equally abhorrent in its misrepresentation of actual events.

He and his supplicants at major press outlets here and abroad publish his revelations as if the national security of this country and the U.K. matter little.

I won't argue the fact that Snowden's leaks have damaged these agencies' surveillance abilities. "Setting them back a decade" is a bit much. But the focal point of the leaks has mostly been the two agencies' insistence on spying on their own countries. They may kick the surveillance ball back and forth to prevent directly spying on their fellow citizens, but the culture of sharing the GCHQ and the NSA have developed over the years makes this small distinction irrelevant.

The NSA's defenders are running out of steam. They can't seem to find any real justification for these pervasive surveillance programs and have resorted to hurling mealy-mouthed insults at Snowden and various journalistic entities from the relative safety of op-ed pages and anonymous statements.

Filed Under: edward snowden, jack israel, nsa, russia

Snowden's 'Proper Whistleblowing Channel' Finally Speaks And It's All Talking Points, Condescension And Smears

from the those-famous-'whistleblower-protections'-in-action dept

Well, it seems like we've heard an opinion on Ed Snowden from nearly everyone in the intelligence community, barring the rank-and-file. (Of course, we've been assured by "unnamed sources" and various named officials that they're all extremely irate that they've been portrayed as the collective eyeball staring through the national peephole. Curiously, we've been offered no proxy opinion on the multiple abuse incidents...)

Finally, the Inspector General of the NSA has weighed in on the Snowden situation, and his comments are indistinguishable from any other die-hard NSA defender's.

During a day-long conference at the Georgetown University Law Center, Dr. George Ellard, the inspector general for the National Security Agency, spoke for the first time about the disclosures made by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

In addressing the alleged damage caused by Snowden’s disclosures he compared Snowden to Robert Hanssen, a former FBI agent and convicted spy who sold secrets to the Russians.

It seems impossible for anyone connected with the national security framework to even acknowledge that Snowden's intentions might be exactly what he's repeatedly stated they are: to inform the public about the NSA's pervasive surveillance efforts. He's never compared to other whistleblowers. Instead, the NSA Defense Squad compares him to infamous spies. To his credit, Ellard admits the only real comparison between the two is the large number of documents taken.

But then Ellard adds this, which not only plays up the Snowden=spy equivalent, but also exposes a bit more of the national security mindset.

“Hanssen’s motives were venal, for cash perhaps or perhaps they were psychological, a desire to play a very, very dangerous game that is therefore very, very exciting. At the end of his career, Hanssen had almost 30 years in intelligence and counterintelligence. He knew exactly what was of value to his spy handlers and he was very specific in choosing documents to steal. He knew how to control his handlers better than they knew how to control him."

“Snowden, in contrast, was manic in his thievery, which was exponentially larger than Hanssen’s. Hanssen’s theft was in a sense finite whereas Snowden is open-ended, as his agents decide daily which documents to disclose. Snowden had no background in intelligence and is likely unaware of the significance of the documents he stole,” Ellard suggested.

It is quite possible that Snowden grabbed a bunch of documents without vetting them for "public interest," but to call his search efforts "manic" is just a cheap way to downplay both Snowden's technical skill and the agency's astounding lack of internal security.

What's more troubling is how Ellard views the press. Ellard calls the journalists Snowden gave documents to "agents," showing that he (and other national security insiders) view the world through espionage-tinted glasses. Journalists are now "agents," supposedly acting at the behest of their "handler," Edward Snowden. It's a smear thinly disguised as SIGINT shop talk -- a small-minded attempt to portray reporting leaks as a dark and nasty business.

What makes all of this more remarkable than the normal NSA defensive efforts is the fact that Ellard was Snowden's "proper channel."

Ellard has been the NSA’s inspector general since 2007. In this capacity he has not spoken in a public forum before so that made what he said additionally significant. Had Snowden made the decision to report his concerns through approved NSA channels it would have been through Ellard’s office.

The route Snowden supposedly should have taken runs right through Ellard's office. And what Ellard would have given him in exchange for his concerns was a recitation of the NSA's talking points.

Ellard was asked what he would have done if Snowden had come to him with complaints. Had this happened, Ellard says would have said something like, “Hey, listen, fifteen federal judges have certified this program is okay.” (He was referring to the NSA phone records collection program.)

This offer to explain the (alleged) constitutionality of the program may have meant something if Ellard had made this statement at any point before June 2013. Delivering it now -- with all the inside information that's been uncovered since then -- is remarkably tone deaf. It shows that NSA officials still have no idea how to approach potential whistleblowers. Those in that position actually still think delivering stale talking points will somehow dissuade someone who's truly shocked by the vast power and reach of the agency.

If you think this statement indicates Ellard's incredibly out of touch with the reality of the situation, the next assurance effort he offers removes all doubt.

“Perhaps it’s the case that we could have shown, we could have explained to Mr. Snowden his misperceptions, his lack of understanding of what we do. If not, I would have made the Senate and House Intelligence Committees open to him. Given the reaction of by some members of that committee, he would have found a welcome audience."

Really? Mike Rogers? Dutch Ruppersberger? Dianne Feinstein? This is the "welcome audience" Snowden would have faced. They, like Ellard, would have rubbed his boyish head and told him not to worry about all these lawful programs he simply didn't "understand." And then they would have sent him on his way. (And, most likely, reported him to his superiors and redundantly suggested Ellard open an internal investigation.)

The "proper channels" wouldn't have given Snowden anything other than a swift ride to the "EXIT" door and some threats about just how much of a living hell the NSA would make his life if he passed any of his knowledge on to the general public. Ellard's attitude towards Snowden shows how much hostility awaits those who find themselves unable to be good NSA company men/women. Following proper channels means being greeted with condescension, cliches and a lifetime of suspicion.

Filed Under: edward snowden, george ellard, nsa, privacy, whistleblowing

What Happens When You Marry The NSA's Surveillance Database With Amazon's Personalized Marketing?

from the spying-in-the-service-of-seduction dept

By now, most people who shop online are aware of the way in which companies try to tailor their offers based on your previous purchasing and browsing history. Being followed by strangely relevant ads everywhere is bad enough, but what if the government started using the same approach in its communications with you? That's one of the key ideas explored in an interesting new article by Zeynep Tufekci, strikingly presented on Medium, with the title "Is the Internet good or bad? Yes."

Tufekci suggests that neither of the two main metaphors regularly wheeled out for today's global surveillance -- George Orwell's "1984" and Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon -- is right:

To understand the actual -- and truly disturbing -- power of surveillance, it's better to turn to a thinker who knows about real prisons: the Italian writer, politician, and philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who was jailed by Mussolini and did most of his work while locked up. Gramsci understood that the most powerful means of control available to a modern capitalist state is not coercion or imprisonment, but the ability to shape the world of ideas.

The question then becomes: how can people's ideas be shaped so as to control them? Simply bombarding the population with messages only works for a while, until people become jaded and resistant to them. That's where Edward Snowden's revelations about "big data surveillance" come in, Tufekci suggests:

Individually tailored, subtle messages are less likely to produce a cynical reaction. Especially so if the data collection that makes these messages possible is unseen. That's why it's not only the NSA that goes to great lengths to keep its surveillance hidden. Most Internet firms also try to monitor us surreptitiously.

She's worried about this approach being used to influence people's political behavior, and points to a recent study in Nature that explored precisely this area:

By altering a message designed to encourage people to vote so that it came with affirmation from a person's social network, rather than being impersonal, the researchers had shown that they could persuade more people to participate in an election. Combine such nudges with psychological profiles, drawn from our online data, and a political campaign could achieve a level of manipulation that exceeds that possible via blunt television adverts.

Indeed, Tufekci thinks the process has already begun:

During a break [in a conference called "Data-Crunched Democracy"], I cornered the chief scientist on Obama's data analytics team, who in a previous job ran data analytics for supermarkets. I asked him if what he does now -- marketing politicians the way grocery stores market products on their shelves -- ever worried him. It's not about Obama or Romney, I said. This technology won't always be used by your team. In the long run, the advantage will go to the highest bidder, the richer campaign.

He shrugged, and retreated to the most common cliché used to deflect the impact of technology: "It’s just a tool," he said. "You can use it for good; you can use it for bad."

That's hardly very comforting, and neither is Tufekci's concluding thought:

Internet technology lets us peel away layers of divisions and distractions and interact with one another, human to human. At the same time, the powerful are looking at those very interactions, and using them to figure out how to make us more compliant. That's why surveillance, in the service of seduction, may turn out to be more powerful and scary than the nightmares of Nineteen Eighty-Four.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: data, edward snowden, nsa, panopticon, privacy, surveillance
Companies: amazon

Snowden Elected As Glasgow University Rector, Nominated For Nobel Peace Prize

from the you-never-know dept

One of Edward Snowden's many wise decisons was removing himself from the NSA surveillance story to let the leaked documents speak for themselves. He's given very few interviews, and his public statements have been relatively rare (the latest is a short video commentary on Chelsea Manning receiving the Sam Adams Award). That makes his election as rector of Glasgow University for the next three years particularly noteworthy. As The Guardian explains:

The rector not only represents the students but is chairman of the university court, the body that administers the resources of the university.

Given Snowden's inability to leave Russia at the moment, the post is purely symbolic. In an earlier Guardian piece, Chris Cassells, Snowden's spokesperson for the rectorial election campaign, explained the thinking behind the move:

Glasgow University students have a long and proud tradition of electing student rectors to represent their political views -- from Albert Lutuli to Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and, in 2005, the Israeli whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu. The campaign to elect Edward Snowden is set firmly in that tradition. Once every three years we Glasgow University students have a powerful opportunity to air our opinion on an issue of our choosing. This week we have chosen to nominate the whistleblower Edward Snowden in order to show our support for his actions and our disgust with the perverse desire of the security services to monitor our every keystroke.

Here's Snowden's official response to the news, as reported by The Guardian:

"I am humbled by and grateful to the students of Glasgow University for this historic statement in defence of our shared values.

"We are reminded by this bold decision that the foundation of all learning is daring: the courage to investigate, to experiment, to inquire."

He added: "If we do not contest the violation of the fundamental right of free people to be left unmolested in their thoughts, associations, and communications - to be free from suspicion without cause - we will have lost the foundation of our thinking society. The defence of this fundamental freedom is the challenge of our generation, a work that requires constructing new controls and protections to limit the extraordinary powers of states over the domain of human communication.

"This election shows that the students of Glasgow University intend to lead the way, and it is my great honour to serve as their rector."

Interestingly, Snowden has already been nominated by two Norwegian politicians for another "great honor": the 2014 Nobel peace prize....

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

Filed Under: edward snowden, glasgow university, nsa, uk

If Russian And Chinese Intelligence Could Supposedly Get Access To Snowden's Documents So Easily, Why Couldn't The NSA Figure Out What He Has?

from the allegations-are-great-if-you-never-have-to-prove-them dept

Democracy Now! recently hosted a debate between ardent NSA supporter Stewart Baker and whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg. The entire debate is worth watching/reading (a full transcript is provided) but Baker's opening statement reiterated a claim some NSA supporters have made in an effort to portray Snowden as at least an accidental traitor, if not a more deliberate conspirator.

What Edward Snowden did was quite deliberately change jobs to gather as much, perhaps millions of documents, from as many places as he could around the National Security Agency, but involving other agencies, as well. He stored them on a computer and handed them out to—who exactly, we don’t know, but certainly to journalists, and with controls that probably make it likely that sophisticated intelligence agencies have been able to get access to them, and allowed them to be disclosed at the journalists’ discretion, more or less with some guidance from Snowden.

Now, Baker may have misspoken when he said "sophisticated intelligence agencies have been able to get access to [the documents]," but if so, he was never questioned about it. The mention of "controls" would seem to indicate he meant "haven't" instead of "have" (it's "have" in both the transcript and the video), but its not as though this -- that the Chinese/Russians obtained access with or without Snowden's permission -- hasn't been heavily implied before. (And Baker does follow it by stating that the leaks damaged the NSA's ability to "keep an eye on Iranian and North Korean and Chinese and Russian operations.")

Reporter Kurt Eichenwald declared back in November that Snowden "left all of his documents in Hong Kong" and implied the whistleblower was working with the Chinese government. A former NSA official claimed Snowden was a Russian spy and was working in concert with Russian intelligence and Wikileaks to hand over his documents to the Russians. Others have speculated that Snowden's security measures had been subverted the moment he set foot in Hong Kong/Russia.

Back in the real world, the NSA still admits it has no idea what Snowden has in his possession. (Or, rather, what's been distributed to journalists around the world. Snowden apparently "divested" himself of his "holdings" before heading to Russia.)

The underlying implication of these claims is that even with Snowden trying to protect the documents, it's likely that intelligence agencies in these two countries were able to gain access. That claim is either a) ridiculous or b) an indictment of the NSA's internal security and hacking prowess.

If we're to believe the Russians or Chinese gained access before Snowden unloaded the document trove, the question becomes why hasn't the NSA -- arguably the top intelligence agency in the world -- been able to gain access? After all, our spycraft is the best spycraft and the NSA's tools are apparently some of the best in the world. And yet, even with an inside track -- its own internal systems -- the NSA still can't figure out what Snowden grabbed.

If the NSA can't get to Snowden, then it's unlikely any other intelligence agency did either. This puts those pushing this narrative in the position of claiming Snowden worked directly with foreign intelligence agencies to provide them with sensitive documents, an assertion that few of the NSA's most fervent supporters are reluctant to make.

Filed Under: china, edward snowden, nsa, russia

Terrorists Have Known Their Cellphones Are Surveillance Targets For Over A Decade But Suddenly It's Greenwald And Snowden's Fault?

from the al-Qaeda-now-celebrating-'Snowden-Day'-every-June-6th dept

The NSA's defenders (including those on the other side of the pond) have been making the claim for the last several months that each new revelation is enabling terrorists to find ways to beat the surveillance system. But much of what has been revealed has either been a.) something that was long suspected (the Section 215 program, communications being harvested from underseas cables) or b.) something any careful terrorist would have avoided (popular platforms, services and software).

Another minor ruckus was raised when the New York Times screwed up its redaction of documents (again, apparently Snowden's "fault" because he turned sensitive documents over to incompetents) related to cell phone tracking and accidentally exposed one of the program's targets: al Qaeda's operations in Mosul, Iraq. It's no secret al Qaeda has been public enemy #1 since before the 9/11 attacks, which makes claims that stuff like this "tips off" terrorists completely inexplicable. They've been targeted for well over a decade. Why would this be a surprise?

Tracing cellphones, tracking their location and intercepting communications have all been detailed by Snowden's leaks, but not only is this fairly basic (and expected) surveillance, it's also nothing new and nothing that hasn't been previously reported by the national media.

Poyan Nahrvar, a Canadian engineer, tweeted this out on Friday.

Because of @ggreenwald terrorists now know their cellphones are being tracked. Oh wait! http://t.co/HmUHqCHaw9 — Poyan Nahrvar (@poyannah) February 14, 2014

The link in the tweet leads to a 2004 story by The Christian Science Monitor, which details all of the above in its rundown of the success these cellphone-tracking efforts were having in the fight against terrorism.

An ordinary-looking grid map of Riyadh adorns one wall of a command-and-control center deep inside a government building in Saudi Arabia's capital.

The map is higher-tech than it appears at first glance. Tiny embedded lights flash red when certain cellphones - those belonging to suspected terrorists - initiate or receive a call. [O]fficials… decide instantly whether simply to watch and listen to the suspected terrorist - or to send in screaming police cars to nab him…

It doesn't take long for terrorists to figure out how authorities are tracing them and then change methods. Still, the technology has proved helpful in rolling up cells in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and America…

Terrorists, of course, catch on to the new tracking procedures and seek safer ways to communicate. Osama bin Laden, for example, stopped using satellite phones because he found out - with the delivery of a guided missile - that the US was tracking his position via the satellite…

After years of tracking terrorists, investigators have amassed a large database of land-line and traditional cellphone numbers they are watching (or listening to). All it takes is a call from one of those numbers to a phone with a SIM card to discover who's using the undetectable phone.

All of this reported and yet no hand-wringing about how the government's surveillance techniques had been exposed giving the terrorists the upper hand. Everything detailed here isn't too far removed from what's been published in the last seven months. Terrorists have known about cellphone tracking for well over a decade and have been making adjustments ever since.

To imply that it's only now that terrorists are being alerted to surveillance techniques is to be deliberately obtuse and/or intellectually dishonest. Cellphones aren't to be trusted and haven't been for several years. Any terrorist who says, "But I only used it for Angry Birds" (the topic of the New York Times article with the faulty redaction) to his droned companions isn't going to stay alive long enough for the US to finish him or her off. His colleagues will take care of that themselves.

Without a doubt, there are stupid terrorists out there who may only now be aware their cellphone is selling them out to a variety of intelligence agencies, but that's only because they're stupid, not because a majority of the information Snowden leaked is actually new or even unexpected. Snowden's leaks exposed the NSA's programs in greater detail and, more importantly, exposed the fact that the NSA's activities aren't always targeted at terrorism. He also exposed the "collect it all" mentality, which is the most dangerous aspect of its many programs, which goes far beyond its stated "national security" goals. But acting as though terrorists would only now be aware their cellphones are being tracked is asinine.

Filed Under: edward snowden, glenn greenwald, nsa, surveillance, terrorism

UK Government Refuses To Confirm Or Deny If Your Pronunciation Of Its Massive Surveillance Program 'Tempora' Is Correct

from the oh,-come-on,-stop-being-tiresome dept

A few weeks back, we reported that some digital rights groups were challenging GCHQ's spying at the UK's secretive Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT). As Wired UK reports, a first hearing has now taken place, dealing with preliminary matters before the main case in July. Here's one ridiculous problem that had to be addressed:

while the Prism programme has been officially acknowledged, the UK government will not acknowledge the existence of the operation named Tempora, as detailed in the documents released by Edward Snowden. Mr Justice Burton suggested that it might be wise to define the operation in other terms, so that it could be discussed as a factual hypothetical, rather than deal with the inevitable roadblocks that will consistently be encountered if it is called by its code name. Tempora, he said, could be referred to as the "fibre-optic interception programme" for presentational purposes.

This isn't the UK government being purely bloody-minded. By refusing to confirm or deny Tempora's existence, even though there are numerous leaked documents attesting to it, it is trying to persuade the IPT to hold a closed hearing, so as to stop the British public learning anything about what's really going on here. But as the Wired UK report reveals, it's taking this "neither confirm nor deny" policy to absurd lengths:

There was also some jovial discussion in the hearing over the pronunciation of Tempora and whether the emphasis should be on the "Tem" or the "por". When called on to advise as to whether they were pronouncing the code name correctly, government counsel could neither confirm nor deny.

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Filed Under: edward snowden, gchq, ipt, prism, privacy, surveillance, tempora, uk