The Indie Ebook Scene Is Growing: Here's Over 170 Authors Who've Sold More Than 50,000 Copies

from the success-stories dept

We've written a lot about the incredible new ecosystem of independent, self-published ebooks, which in a few short years (with the help of huge success stories like Amanda Hocking and Joe Konrath) has largely eliminated the stigma of what we once called "vanity publishing", to the point that even traditionally published authors are deciding to go it alone.

Though Hocking and Konrath were some of the first names to get some serious attention with their impressive ebook sales, today there are lots of other examples. An anonymous submission points us to a blog dedicated to tracking self-published ebook success stories, which has put together a list of over 170 independent authors who have sold more than 50,000 ebooks, including 33 who have sold more than 200,000. Hocking and Konrath still make the top ten, but they have plenty of company:

Barbara Freethy - over 2 million ebooks sold (April 2012)
Amanda Hocking - 1,500,000 ebooks sold (December 2011)
John Locke- more than 1,100,000 eBooks sold in five months
Gemma Halliday - over 1 million self-published ebooks sold (March 2012)
Michael Prescott - more than 800,000 self-published ebooks sold (Dec 2011)
J.A. Konrath - more than 800,000 ebooks sold (April 2012)
Bella Andre - more than 700,000 books sold (May 2012)
Darcie Chan - 641,000 ebooks sold (May 2012)
Chris Culver - over 550,000 (Dec 2011)
Heather Killough-Walden - over 500,000 books sold (Dec 2011)

The post also points out some encouraging statistics from Amazon:

Kindle Direct Publishing has quickly taken on astonishing scale – more than a thousand KDP authors now each sell more than a thousand copies a month, some have already reached hundreds of thousands of sales, and two have already joined the Kindle Million Club.

Under the old system, many of these authors would likely still be sending out manuscripts, hoping for the lucky convergence of circumstances that puts it in the right pile in front of the right reader when they're in the right mood. There's still some disdain for self-publishing in some circles—but with the open playing field that has been created, the increasing number of authors flocking to it, and a growing roster of success stories, it won't be long before that too starts to change.

Filed Under: amanda hocking, ebooks, joe konrath, kindle, publishing
Companies: amazon

Manufacturer Of Buggy 'Kobo Touch' E-Reader Manages Customer Complaints By... Hiding All Online Reviews

from the there's-no-hole-on-earth-big-enough-to-bury-The-Internet dept

Quick quiz on crisis management, internet-style:

Exercise 1: The product you've just introduced is a buggy mess, short on content and backed with terrible customer service. What do you do?

a.) Bite the bullet and start handing out refunds
b.) Start patching like hell and fire your current Customer Service team
c.) Drain all bank accounts and reorganize under the name Net Sortie, LLC.
d.) Whistle nonchalantly while sweeping bad reviews under the rug

If you answered "d," then congratulations! You've lost the battle and the war!

No matter how many companies line up to play the "I'd Like to Lose at the Internet" game and walk away empty shells of their former selves, there's always another player ready to step up and take a swing at wishing its problems into the Google Cache cornfield.

This week's contender is Rakuten and its Kobo Touch Reader. Billed as sort of a preemptive strike against the expected arrival of Amazon's Kindle in Japan, the Kobo began shipping last week. That's the last of the good news.

Rakuten launched the Kobo Touch in Japan with the expectation that they would dominate their home market. They are native to the country, and Rakuten does have a sizable retail presence there. Given their technical and CS resources, you’d think they would have been able to pull this off.

Unfortunately, it now looks like Rakuten has paved the way for Amazon to dominate yet another ebook market.This launch is rapidly turning into a debacle and it’s going to damage Rakuten’s reputation. And according to some of the tweets I’ve seen (in Japanese) it already is.

So, what went wrong? Well, many, many things. First off, while the firmware was solid, the desktop software was a disaster. If installation failed on the PC, a rather common situation according to the reviews, it pretty much made the Kobo Reader useless. Secondly, Rakuten's promotional work pointed towards 30,000 titles being available at launch. Instead, there were 18,894 titles and, as is pointed out in the comments, many of those were public domain. Last, but not least, purchasers now holding a shiny brick were treated badly by Rakuten's customer service.

Rakuten was understandably perturbed by this failed launch and decided the best course of action would be to pretend it just wasn't happening.

It’s been just under a week since the Kobo Touch started shipping in Japan, and things are going so well that Rakuten has removed from their website all the reviews of the Kobo Touch.

No, seriously, all of the reviews are down – both good and bad. I suppose there were too many people writing things like “I’m going to buy a Kindle” and that upset someone at Rakuten.

For a tech company, you'd think Rakuten would be a bit more familiar with how this "The Internet" works. You can't just pull the electronic wool over everyone's eyes and hope to sneak away undetected. The Internet never forgets. And even if it could, there's always a helpful person or two willing to remind it where all that stuff is stashed.

Luckily one of Rakuten’s potential customers tipped me to the story, including giving me a link to a blog that had collected responses and a screenshot of the review page before Raskuten removed it. That’s why I can show you things like this:

If you can’t see the image above, it says that the Kobo Touch has a 3 star rating largely due to the vast number of 1 star reviews.

And more help arrives:

Update: My source found a Google Cache page of reviews. Thanks, Bibo!

This response is so wrong and yet so common. Donna Barstow, law schools, the freakin' medical community. Pretty much anyone who's ever heard the term Streisand Effect whispered in their general direction has attempted to delete damning content, either of their own or created by others, only to find it resurrected in Google's Cache or the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine. It's definitely a knee-jerk response, but it seems to have a steep learning curve attached to it. Kobo screwed up and then doubled down by hiding the reviews. What does that say about the company and its future relationship with its customers?

Folks, they took the reviews down from the website so new customers wouldn’t be warned about the many problems. I want you to look past the fact they did it and think about how customers will feel once they discover the deception. That is what will make this a major debacle and not merely an embarrassment for Rakuten.

A bad launch could be recovered from. This is closer to being a systematic effort to lie to their customers. Okay, eventually people will forgive Rakuten, but in the short run this debacle could drive readers to Amazon.

Rakuten, by botching its launch, hurt itself a little. By covering it up, it did a ton of self-inflicted damage. You can't just flip "trust" on and off like a light switch. It's earned. And if it wanted to take on Amazon, it couldn't afford a mistake of this magnitude.

Filed Under: competition, japan, kindle, kobo, kobo touch, reviews
Companies: rakuten

Amazon Hides Classic Free Public Domain Ebooks

from the disappointing dept

Via Chris Anderson, we find out that Amazon recently made a big change to the free ebooks it lists on the site, making them much harder to find. The explanation, by Morris Rosenthal, is a bit confusing, but apparently Amazon reassigned ASINs (identification numbers) for most of the public domain classics that were available on the site. In doing so, all of the historical sales info, reviews, comments, etc., were lost. That means that the works, no matter how popular, get pushed way down in searches and in "related" items. It also means tons of links are now dead.

Last weekend Amazon removed the vast majority of free classics that they published (adopted from Project Gutenberg) prior to 2011, after replacing them with the same books using new ASIN’s, meaning new product pages. In doing so, Amazon orphaned millions of links from the web, which now arrive at a “Can’t find what you’re looking for” page, not to mentions tens of thousands of customer created Listmania lists, So You’d Like To guides and Customer Discussions. They are orphaned because Amazon does not redirect, or forward the ASIN’s of eBooks removed from their catalog.

A major side effect, if not prime effect, of changing all of those ASIN’s, is the loss of their historical sales data. In other words, a customer going to the Kindle store and searching for Jane Austen would once have gotten back a list that started off with free editions of her most popular works, starting with Pride and Prejudice. This morning, the only free Austen book appearing in the first page of the search results is “Love and Friendship”, certainly not her most popular title, but there because it hasn’t been updated since 2006.

Rosenthal doesn't think there's anything nefarious going on here -- just a sign of a company that doesn't much care about these public domain works. His post also explains some of the wider impact, including how certain related items results are pointing people to fee-based versions of authors' works, rather than free public domain ones. Obviously, such a result could be seen to benefit Amazon, since Amazon is more likely to make money by pushing you to fee-based books instead of free ones.

There is one silver lining he notes: for those who go straight to the "top free" list of books, most of those old public domain books have disappeared from the list, meaning that newer free books are now more prominent -- and that's not necessarily a bad thing. But, to take all those other classics and effectively hide them seems like a big mistake.

Filed Under: ebooks, free, kindle, public domain
Companies: amazon

The Role Of 'Perceived Value' In Music Is Small And Fading Fast

from the music-aint-gucci dept

anothercultland points us to a post over at Digital Music News (obnoxiously entitled "Want More People to Care About Your Music? Then Charge for It…") which, though massively overstated and oversimplified, actually gets at a point I've been thinking about for a while now. The basic premise is that the power of "perceived value" can make charging for music a better proposition than giving it away for free, based largely on a comment from an indie artist:

The music industry isn't the best at studying pricing (that's for sure), but there's evidence that price tags actually increase overall interest and demand for your music - whether that results in a paid transaction or not. Here's a comment from a seriously DIY artist in the trenches, Steady Fingers, who experienced something unexpected.

"But it's funny that even when I used to give away [my music] for free, there wasn't much traffic nor many downloads, almost nothing. Then we decided that we should put it up for sale so that we might be able to recoup some of the money spent on making the music videos (when it's your brother making the videos, I still consider it DIY.) Anyway, as soon as people saw that the music was up for sale, the website and other related social media gizmos received much more attention. Also, people began looking for ways to download it for free, which isn't always a bad sign."

Welcome to the strange world of 'perceived value,' a murky science that enables all sorts of obscene markups - whether at Starbucks, Gucci, or the Apple Store. But the basic idea is this: the simple presence of an elevated price tag - or a price tag at all - is often enough to convince someone that this product has worth.

There is actually some truth to this idea, but only under specific circumstances and with a whole lot of caveats. Perceived value is a real thing, and it can be pretty powerful—but there are significant limitations on how it can be applied to an infinite good like digital content. A good (non-musical) example is self-published Kindle novels: for an author just starting out, it's actually probably a good idea to charge $0.99 instead of making it free, because of the way Amazon separates the lists of free and paid books. Of course, as authors like Joe Konrath have discovered, books at $0.99 make a lot more money than books at $2.99—so the limitations of perceived value come into force quite quickly. In app stores, paid apps may once have held some clout over free ones—but now many of the top grossing apps are free and ad-supported, and the perceived value of a price tag to download has all but disappeared.

And it's disappearing everywhere, as the lines between professional and amateur get weaker all across the media spectrum. I buy a lot of $5 and $10 albums on Bandcamp, and I also download a lot more free ones—and I can't really remember which is which. For indie music, price is a poor indicator of quality. Besides, pretty much all music can be streamed first in a "try before you buy" fashion now, so any perceived value is quickly supplanted by an actual evaluation of the product. Just as with books in the Kindle store, there may be certain venues in which adding a price tag offers some advantage, but that can only go so far and it could always disappear in an instant.

Beyond that, and perhaps most importantly, there is nothing that says you can't charge for your music and also give it away for free. Or, at the very least, charge for it but accept (or better yet embrace) piracy. When payment becomes optional for fans and prospective fans, then they see it as an affirmative choice to support the artist, and many will make that choice. Dan Bull sold enough copies of his Sharing is Caring single to hit the pop charts, and a lot of the attention came not from the fact that he was charging money, but from the fact that he was also giving it away for free (as he does with all of his music). By offering an option to buy and an option to download for free, you get the best of both worlds: the power of perceived value in those few cases where it counts, and the attention of the growing number of people who don't view content that way anymore.

Filed Under: free, kindle, perceived value, price

Not Only Can You 'Compete With Free' You Have To If You Don't Want Your Business Overrun By Piracy

from the basic-economics dept

Rob Reid, who recently got a ton of well deserved attention for his hilarious TED talk on copyright math, has a WSJ op-ed piece, in which he tries to explain why there's so little ebook infringement, compared to music infringement. The crux of his argument? Even though the big publishers aren't really great about this stuff, rather than fight the technology, they were actually quick to embrace the technology and make authorized works available for purchase. Contrast that to the music industry, which sued every advancement in technology, including the first MP3 player, and didn't actually license an MP3 download store until many, many years after MP3 players were widely available.

Compare this to the situation in books. Although it had some small-time forerunners, the Kindle, like the Rio MP3 player, brought portability to a mass market. But the Kindle launched with licenses rather than lawsuits from the key rights-holders in its domain, and offered more than 90% of the day's best sellers when it shipped.

This meant that consumers discovered digital books through a licensed experience that delighted them. Exciting hardware, a critical mass of titles and Amazon's retail sensibilities were all integrated into a single elegant package that piracy has never matched.

Of course, piracy emerged anyway. Countless unlicensed e-books can be found online, and millions of people use them. But sales figures suggest that relatively few of these downloads represent foregone purchases. Most Kindle, iPad and Nook owners seem to view piracy as a low-rent and time-consuming experience compared with the sanctioned alternatives. They probably wouldn't if the publishers had kicked things off with a five-year content boycott.

This highlights a key point that many of us have been trying to make for a long, long time. The "answer" to the "piracy question" is not greater enforcement or more draconian laws, as the entertainment industry keeps telling us, but rather more legitimate services that can provide good value to consumers. The music industry failed at that for so long, that it really helped drive the culture of infringing music.

For years, we've pointed out that of course you can compete with free. But what Rob's article is highlighting is even more fundamental. Not only can you compete with free, you must compete with free or you're going to lose out. If you don't offer a legitimate alternative, people will flock to the illegitimate ones. Yes, some people will always infringe, but over and over again we see how legitimate services pull people away from file sharing and towards paying -- if they provide enough value at a reasonable price.

Now, I know that some will quibble with one other major difference between books and music that Rob sort of leaps over in his piece: it was much easier to create digital music than ebooks. You could just take CDs and drop it into your computer and there you go. There really wasn't a simple equivalent for books. Sure, lots of people have scanners, but that's a laborious process. Still, I'm not convinced that was really as big a deal as I'm sure some will make of it. That's because once a single copy of a book is digitized, it's very quickly available all over the place. And there were plenty of people working to digitize books long before the Kindle came along. It might have been a limiting factor, but certainly not a complete hindrance to ebook infringement.

Either way, the key takeaway can hardly be challenged: the way to deal with piracy is to offer good legitimate services, and preferably more than just one, so they can compete on adding value. Unfortunately, many in the industry like to just dip their toes in the water with a few services -- and as soon as they become successful, seek to raise prices. That's no way to encourage a long term market success.

Filed Under: compete with free, copyright math, kindle, mp3, piracy, rob reid

Did The Publisher's Own Insistence On DRM Inevitably Lead To The Antitrust Lawsuit Against Them?

from the the-DRM-they-required dept

We've discussed in the past how it was the book publishers' own stupidity that put them in a position of demanding DRM from Amazon when Amazon wanted to launch the Kindle. The end result, of course, went exactly against the publishers' best interests, because it locked everyone in to Amazon as the platform. Because buyers can't easily switch to another platform and take their books with them, they have to keep using the Kindle (or Kindle app) if they want to continue to have access to the books they've bought in the past (because, remember, you don't own what you think you "buy" with ebooks).

Making Amazon such a dominant player in the market was a huge mistake -- and it was totally avoidable. We'd already seen the exact same thing happen with music and iTunes, where the labels originally required DRM, and Apple complied, locking many people into iTunes (a lock-in that was eventually taken away). We couldn't figure out why the publishers were so stupid to give Amazon such power, but it sounds as though it was a combination of technological illiteracy and an irrational fear of "piracy" trumping business sense.

Author Charlie Stross has a great blog post discussing a variety of issues around the history of Amazon and how it became such a dominant player in the market, in which he notes:

However, as subsidiaries of large media conglomerates, the executives who ran the big six had all been given their marching orders about the internet: DRM restrictions would be mandatory on all ebook sales, lest rampant piracy cannibalize their sales of paper books.

(This fear is of course an idiotic shibboleth—we've had studies since 2000 proving that Napster users back in the bad old days spent more money on CDs than their non-pirate peers. The real driver for piracy is the lack of convenient access to desirable content at a competitive price. But if your boss is a 70 year old billionaire who also owns a movie studio and listens to the MPAA, you don't get a vote. Speaking out against DRM was, as more than one editor told me over the past decade, potentially a career-limiting move.)

Once the publishers realized (way too late) that they'd turned Amazon into something of a monopsonistic buying power, they struggled to figure out what to do -- and the end result appears to look something quite like collusion -- which is why they're being sued today by the Justice Department. As the details of the lawsuit make clear, the deal with Apple wasn't just a deal to bring another competitor into the market, but one that was explicitly designed to increase prices for consumers.

As Stross notes, this was plan B. And it has now failed. That means that it's time for Plan C -- and the only reasonable plan C to get out from under Amazon's thumb is to drop DRM:

It doesn't matter whether Macmillan wins the price-fixing lawsuit bought by the Department of Justice. The point is, the big six publishers' Plan B for fighting the emerging Amazon monopsony has failed (insofar as it has been painted as a price-fixing ring, whether or not it was one in fact). This means that they need a Plan C. And the only viable Plan C, for breaking Amazon's death-grip on the consumers, is to break DRM.

If the major publishers switch to selling ebooks without DRM, then they can enable customers to buy books from a variety of outlets and move away from the walled garden of the Kindle store. They see DRM as a defense against piracy, but piracy is a much less immediate threat than a gigantic multinational with revenue of $48 Billion in 2011 (more than the entire global publishing industry) that has expressed its intention to "disrupt" them, and whose chief executive said recently "even well-meaning gatekeepers slow innovation" (where "innovation" is code-speak for "opportunities for me to turn a profit").

And so they will deep-six their existing commitment to DRM and use the terms of the DoJ-imposed settlement to wiggle out of the most-favoured-nation terms imposed by Amazon, in order to sell their wares as widely as possible.

I know there's been some talk about whether or not Apple or Amazon is the more "evil" party in the ebook world -- but it really seems like the publishers dug their own graves here. In their desperation to avoid the dreaded word "piracy," they never bothered to understand the real issues or the obvious results of focusing so strongly on DRM. Handing Amazon so much power was stupid. Colluding with Apple to try to get away from that original stupid decision was potentially even more stupid. The only real path to fixing things is to go back and fix the original stupid decision, and recognize that piracy is a hell of a lot less of a "threat" than handing over the entire market to a single player (or even just two major players).

If only they'd realized this originally -- just as tons of people had warned them.

Filed Under: antitrust, charlie stross, doj, drm, ebooks, kindle, publishing
Companies: amazon, apple, macmillan

How Publishers Repeated The Same Mistake As Record Labels: DRM Obsession Gave Amazon Dominant Position

from the very-predictable dept

One of the more amazing things over the past decade or so is just how clueless legacy content companies are when it comes to the realities of DRM. For years, content creators have misunderstood the issue of online infringement entirely -- assuming that the effort had to be focused on somehow "protecting" works and ratcheting up infringement, rather than giving users more of what they wanted. The dirty secret of DRM is that it does exactly the opposite of what the content companies wanted: rather than protect works, it basically hands all the power in a market to a single tech provider, stripping much of the content companies' abilities to control their own markets.

We saw this in the music market first. Even as Steve Jobs was clear that he thought DRM was a stupid idea for music, he was happy to give the record labels what they "wanted" in the early years: building DRM into the early version of iTunes. Of course, this did absolutely nothing to stop infringement. Because all you need is a single copy to get out in the wild, and then all DRM is completely useless on that particular piece of content. So Apple's DRM did absolutely nothing to stop file sharing... but it did make Apple the most powerful player in the music market. Because the DRM locked people into Apple's platform, and there was no significant competition at the time, once people started using Apple, they were pretty much locked in. And the labels hated it, even though it was their own damn fault in demanding DRM. Eventually, of course, the labels agreed to give up DRM, by which point Apple was already so dominant that no one really challenged their position, though alternatives are finally starting to get more serious.

Three years ago, we noted that book publishers were bizarrely making the exact same mistake with Amazon. Publishers, just like the labels, were so focused on the fear side that they were adamant about having DRM. And, once again, all this has done is lock people into the Kindle platform, and made it (by far) the most dominant player... which people can't really get out of.

I was reminded of this after reading Joe Wikert's call for the end of ebook DRM, noting that all it had really done was give all the power to Amazon:

I often blame Napster for the typical book publisher's fear of piracy. Publishers saw what happened in the music industry and figured the only way they'd make their book content available digitally was to tightly wrap it with DRM. The irony of this is that some of the most highly pirated books were never released as ebooks. Thanks to the magic of high-speed scanner technology, any print book can easily be converted to an ebook and distributed illegally.

Some publishers don't want to hear this, but the truth is that DRM can be hacked. It does not eliminate piracy. It not only fails as a piracy deterrent, but it also introduces restrictions that make ebooks less attractive than print books. We've all read a print book and passed it along to a friend. Good luck doing that with a DRM'd ebook! What publishers don't seem to understand is that DRM implies a lack of trust. All customers are considered thieves and must be treated accordingly.

The evil of DRM doesn't end there, though. Author Charlie Stross recently wrote a terrific blog post entitled "Cutting Their Own Throats." It's all about how publisher fear has enabled a big ebook player like Amazon to further reinforce its market position, often at the expense of publishers and authors. It's an unintended consequence of DRM that's impacting our entire industry.

That Charlie Stross piece is also a great read, and makes the point pretty explicitly that the publishers created their own problem by insisting on DRM'd ebooks:

As ebook sales mushroom, the Big Six's insistence on DRM has proven to be a hideous mistake. Rather than reducing piracy, it has locked customers in Amazon's walled garden, which in turn increases Amazon's leverage over publishers. And unlike pirated copies (which don't automatically represent lost sales) Amazon is a direct revenue threat because Amazon are have no qualms about squeezing their suppliers — or trying to poach authors for their "direct" publishing channel by offering initially favourable terms. (Which will doubtless get a lot less favourable once the monopoly is secured ...)

If the big six began selling ebooks without DRM, readers would at least be able to buy from other retailers and read their ebooks on whatever platform they wanted, thus eroding Amazon's monopoly position. But it's not clear that the folks in the boardrooms are agile enough to recognize the tar pit they've fallen into ...

What's truly amazing about this was just how obvious it was years ago when we (and many others) pointed this out. I mean, with the music execs you could kind of understand the mistake, because if you really don't think through a few steps out, you could be forgiven for thinking that DRM makes sense as a protectionist measure. But if you're a Big Six publisher, you didn't even have to think ahead a few moves. You just had to look at the monster the labels created by demanding DRM in iTunes (something they'd already started to move away from just as the Kindle was ramping up) and realize that demanding DRM would create the same situation with Amazon. But what's even more amazing is the fact that the big publishers still haven't figured this out so many years later.

If the big publishers end up failing, it's their own damn fault for being perhaps the least perceptive strategists around. I can only imagine how bad they are at playing chess.

Filed Under: drm, ebooks, economics, kindle, music, publishers
Companies: amazon, apple

That Didn't Take Long: Amazon Sued For Patent Infringement For New Kindle Fire Tablet

from the up-in-flames dept

The general rule continues to prove itself true: do anything interesting in the tech world, and you will get sued for patent infringement. Just weeks after Amazon announced its new Kindle Fire tablet, the company has been sued for patent infringement by well-known patent troll Smartphone Technologies, a subsidiary of patent trolling giant Acacia. Just a few months ago we noted that Smartphone Technologies/Acacia was buying up more smartphone related patents, as it looks to seriously cash in on anyone actually doing anything in the space.

The patents in question:

• 6,956,562: Method for controlling a handheld computer by entering commands onto a displayed feature of the handheld computer (originally a PalmSource patent)
• 6,466,236: System and method for displaying and manipulating multiple calendars on a personal digital assistant (originally a Palm Inc. patent)
• 6,950,645: Power-conserving intuitive device discovery technique in a bluetooth environment (originally a PalmSource patent)
• 7,506,064: Handheld computer system that attempts to establish an alternative network link upon failing to establish a requested network link (another PalmSource patent).
• RE40,459: Method and apparatus for communicating information over low bandwidth communications networks (and, yet again, PalmSource)

So Palm may be dead and buried inside HP... but at least we know its patent legacy lives on in making products people want more expensive and less able to come to market.

Filed Under: infringement, kindle, patents
Companies: acacia, amazon, palm, smartphone technologies

Amazon's Silk Browser To Be A Data Mining Jackpot

from the is-there-an-encryption-app? dept

We've already discussed whether Amazon's Kindle Fire 'Silk' browser is a copyright lawsuit waiting to happen, for the way it apparently is going to cache and modify content from its own AWS servers. It seems that people are realizing some other potential issues with it as well. Keith Dawson points us to a couple of interesting stories looking at the data mining implications. The first, by Chris Espinosa, summarizes the issue succinctly:

The “split browser” notion is that Amazon will use its EC2 back end to pre-cache user web browsing, using its fat back-end pipes to grab all the web content at once so the lightweight Fire-based browser has to only download one simple stream from Amazon’s servers. But what this means is that Amazon will capture and control every Web transaction performed by Fire users. Every page they see, every link they follow, every click they make, every ad they see is going to be intermediated by one of the largest server farms on the planet. People who cringe at the data-mining implications of the Facebook Timeline ought to be just floored by the magnitude of Amazon’s opportunity here. Amazon now has what every storefront lusts for: the knowledge of what other stores your customers are shopping in and what prices they’re being offered there. What’s more, Amazon is getting this not by expensive, proactive scraping the Web, like Google has to do; they’re getting it passively by offering a simple caching service, and letting Fire users do the hard work of crawling the Web. In essence the Fire user base is Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, scraping the Web for free and providing Amazon with the most valuable cache of user behavior in existence.

So there's that. Of course, there are a few caveats here. In theory, your ISP could have much of the same info -- though you can get around it with encryption. Furthermore, your ISP isn't caching everything, so there are some limitations there. Of course, on the flip side, the Silk browser is only on the Kindle Fire, meaning Amazon is only getting such data based on what people surf over that particular tablet device and its 7-inch screen. It might be interesting to see some data here, but I'd bet the sort of browsing done on such a device is not representative of how people surf the wider web.

Of course, things could get more interesting if Amazon decides to enter the browser wars in a bigger way... such as by releasing Silk as a desktop browser as well. That theory is posited in another article highlighted by Dawson, this one by Joe Brockmeier, which delves deeply into the implications of the Silk browser on a variety of fronts. He's the first person I've seen bring up the idea of Amazon entering the larger desktop browser wars:

But does it seem likely that Amazon will put that much emphasis on Silk just for the Fire? I don't think that's likely. Amazon has several jobs posted for Silk engineers, and while mobile is mentioned, it's not exclusive. I strongly suspect that Amazon is going to be releasing a Silk desktop browser eventually. Probably not in the near future – Amazon needs to make sure that its infrastructure can handle the onslaught of all the Kindle users before trying to scale to an unknown number of desktop users.

Remember when people said the browser wars were over and Microsoft had won? Yeah. Anyway, Brockmeier's article also notes that Amazon won't just have all this aggregate info, but in theory can tie the info specifically to the Amazon account holder:

Each Kindle is tied to an Amazon ID, which gives Amazon a great deal of information about you already. Introducing Silk into the mix and Amazon is going to be in a position to know a great deal about your Web browsing habits along with your buying habits and media habits. Now Amazon is in a position to know what books you buy, what shows you watch, the Web sites you visit and much more.

Perhaps it's not just copyright lawsuits that Amazon will be facing with Silk.

Filed Under: browser, data mining, kindle, kindle fire, silk
Companies: amazon

Is Amazon's New Silk 'Cloud' Browser A Huge Copyright Infringement Lawsuit Waiting To Happen?

from the caching dept

There's been plenty of fanfare over Amazon's new Android-based e-reader, the Kindle Fire, with one interesting feature being the new Silk browser, which is differentiated by the fact that it's built on top of Amazon's cloud web services storage, allowing it to effectively cache and optimize content on its own servers. But this raises a big question. As Stephan Kinsella points out, technically, this may be copyright infringment. First up, here's Amazon's video explanation of the browser: Based on the info in that video, Kinsella explains the legal concerns:

One smart thing Silk does to speed up web browsing as seen by the user of the Kindle Fire by “pre-loading” content into Amazon’s “cache” in its own “Amazon computer cloud” (i.e. Amazon’s servers)–and to optimize them for the Kindle Fire (e.g., a 3MB image is scaled down maybe to 50k because that would look the same on the Kindle Fire as a 3MB image, but could be transmitted more quickly). But to do this Amazon’s servers have to store copies of files obtained from other websites, including images (as explicitly stated at 3:07 to 3:26) and other files which, of course, are covered by copyright. At 3:54, it’s explained that if Amazon’s computing cloud sees you looking at the New York Times home page, and it predicts, based on other user statistics, that you are somewhat likely to next click on some NY Times subpage link, then the Amazon servers will go ahead and download that next link, and cache it, in case you do click on it next, so that it can serve it up more quickly. Now this makes sense technically, but what it really means is Amazon’s servers are making copies of other people’s copyright-protected content: images, files, NYTimes web pages, and serving them up to Kindle Fire users as if the Amazon computer cloud servers are the host of those images. It is a bit like if Amazon ran a site called NYTimes2.com, and had its servers constantly copying content from NYtimes.com and duplicating it on NYTimes2.com, and serving up the content on NYTimes2.com (which was copied from NYTimes.com) to browsers.

Of course, as he notes (and as the people in the video note), this makes tremendous technological sense. It makes for a much better experience. But copyright can and often is used to stop innovations that make tremendous technological sense, because they can upset legacy business models. Of course, one could argue that what Amazon is doing here is no different than what Google does with it's cache -- but that might not stop a potential legal fight, unfortunately.

Filed Under: browsers, copyright, ereaders, kindle, kindle fire, silk browser
Companies: amazon