Suing Social Media Sites Over Acts Of Terrorism Continues To Be A Losing Bet, As 11th Circuit Dumps Another Flawed Lawsuit

from the this-isn't-making-anything-any-better dept

People suing Twitter and Facebook for acts of violence committed by terrorists have yet to talk a court into agreeing with their arguments. Utilizing federal anti-terrorism laws as a way to circumvent discussion of First Amendment and Section 230 issues has worked to a certain extent. It may not have handed any wins to plaintiffs, but it has prevented precedent that would work against these clients (and their law firms -- both of them) when attempting to define "insanity" through repeated failure.

Via Eric Goldman comes another loss in court for plaintiffs attempting to sue social media companies over an act of terrorism, in this case the mass shooting in an Orlando, Florida nightclub that appears to have no ties to any organized terrorist group.

Despite being given multiple attempts to convert the complaint into something actionable, the plaintiffs failed to do so. This is largely because social media companies aren't even indirectly responsible for acts of terrorism. More specifically in this case, the Pulse Nightclub shooting wasn't even, legally speaking, an act of international terrorism. That means there's no cause of action under the plaintiffs' legal vehicle of choice, the Anti-Terrorism Act.

From the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision [PDF]:

We are deeply saddened by the deaths and injuries caused by Mr. Mateen’s rampage, but we agree with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to make out a plausible claim that the Pulse massacre was an act of “international terrorism” as that term is defined in the ATA [Anti-Terrorism Act]. And without such an act of “international terrorism,” the social media companies—no matter what we may think of their alleged conduct—cannot be liable for aiding and abetting under the ATA.

The shooter was an American citizen. He "self-radicalized" with the alleged assistance of social media platforms. He pledged allegiance to ISIS while barricading himself with hostages following the shooting. ISIS arrived shortly thereafter to claim it supported the shooting and the shooter. But there's nothing "international" about this. And the Appeals Court isn't willing to read the ATA as expansively as the plaintiffs choose to.

The Pulse shooting… did not transcend national boundaries in terms of the persons it was “intended to intimidate or coerce.” The plausible inference from the plaintiffs’ allegations is that a mass shooting on United States soil is meant to terrorize American citizens and residents. To come to the contrary conclusion we would have to say (or infer) that any act of domestic terrorism, anywhere in the world, is meant to intimidate or coerce all of humankind. And if that were the case, we doubt that Congress would have included this limiting language in the ATA.

Because these claims fail to carry the lawsuit, the court takes no note of the Section 230 and First Amendment implications. That's a bit unfortunate because dismissing lawsuits under ATA and state law claims hasn't stopped these law firms and lawyers from filing multiple, nearly identical lawsuits attempting to hold social media companies directly responsible for violent acts committed by their users.

At some point, these issues may be addressed at the federal court level. But today is not that day. And if people still believe this is indicative of Section 230's faults, they should apprise themselves of the unavoidable fact that Section 230 does not immunize social media companies from allegations of federal law violations. Yes, it's almost impossible to sue terrorists for violent acts, but suing social media platforms won't actually result in justice, either.

Filed Under: 11th circuit, blame, liability, section 230, social media, terrorism

In Josh Hawley's World, People Should Be Able To Sue Facebook Both For Taking Down Stuff They Don't Like AND Leaving Up Stuff They Don't Like

from the basically-you-should-just-sue-facebook dept

Last year, Josh Hawley introduced one of his many, many pathetic attempts at changing Section 230. That bill, the "Limiting Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act" would create a private right of action allowing individuals to sue any social media company if they were unhappy that some of their content was removed, and to seek a payout. The obvious implication, as with a ton of bad faith claims by populists who pretend to be "conservative" is that websites shouldn't do any moderation at all.

However, this week, Hawley introduced another bill to attack Facebook and to create another private right of action against basically any website -- except this time the private right of action is for anyone who feels their "mental health" was harmed by content on that website. Contrary to what Hawley-loving propagandist rag "The Daily Caller" falsely claims, this bill doesn't actually "amend" Section 230, it simply uses the definition of an interactive computer service from 230, and introduces a weird new liability regime that is in total conflict with 230 (and with Hawley's previous bill -- but when you're culture warrioring and trying to be the face of the new insurrectionists, who has time for little things like consistency?). The Federal Big Tech Tort Act is a bunch of silly performative nonsense.

It used to be that Republicans were the party that was dead set against opening up new private rights of action and giving tort lawyers new ways to drag people and companies into court. No longer, I guess. Amusingly, Hawley's bill shares its DNA with Senator Amy Klobuchar's equally silly bill to hold social media companies liable for misinformation. The key part in the Hawley bill:

PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—An individual who suffers bodily injury or harm to mental health that is attributable, in whole or in part, to the individual’s use of a covered interactive computer service provided by a social media company as described in subsection (b) may bring a civil action against the social media company in an appropriate district court of the United States or a State court of competent jurisdiction

The bill says that the liability applies to individuals who use social media when they are "less than 16 years of age."

So, if someone on social media, like Josh Hawley, contributes to your young teenager's depression by doing incredible dangerous things (like encouraging an insurrection at the Capitol to block the results of a free and fair election), you can now... sue Facebook for the damage to your kid's mental health? Because that makes sense.

Again, this is clearly (1) ridiculous, (2) unconstitutional, (3) completely at odds with Republican philosophy for the past half century, and just (4) an attack on the basic frameworks of how liability works. But none of that matters. The "consistency" for Hawley is that he has to keep attacking "big tech" or the headlines among the Trumpist populists will continue to go to Florida Governor Ron DeSantis or Texas Governor Greg Abbott, and that might make them the front runners for the 2024 Republican nomination instead of Josh Hawley.

Filed Under: content moderation, federal big tech tort act, intermediary liability, josh hawley, liability, mental health, section 230, tort reform
Companies: facebook

The Rule Of Fences, And Why Congress Needs To Temper Its Appetite To Undermine Internet Service Provider Liability Protection

from the ask-not-how-you-can-ruin-the-Internet dept

As Congress takes up yet another ill-considered bill to deliberately create more risk of liability for Internet services, it is worth remembering something President Kennedy once said:

"Don’t ever take a fence down until you know the reason why it was put up."

He was paraphrasing G.K. Chesterton:

In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.

Imagine a real fence to understand why. You may come across one and not be able to tell why it's there. But just because you can't easily see its purpose does not mean it doesn't have one. And if you tear it down, you risk unleashing everything that, unbeknownst to you, the fence was keeping at bay.

It is therefore irresponsible to go around tearing down fences without understanding the job they were doing. And it reflects an arrogant conceit to presume that the answer was nothing, without properly inquiring why they were built in the first place, and what depends on them remaining.

The gate or fence did not grow there. It was not set up by somnambulists who built it in their sleep. It is highly improbable that it was put there by escaped lunatics who were for some reason loose in the street. Some person had some reason for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody. And until we know what the reason was, we really cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable. It is extremely probable that we have overlooked some whole aspect of the question, if something set up by human beings like ourselves seems to be entirely meaningless and mysterious. There are reformers who get over this difficulty by assuming that all their fathers were fools; but if that be so, we can only say that folly appears to be a hereditary disease. But the truth is that nobody has any business to destroy a social institution until he has really seen it as an historical institution. If he knows how it arose, and what purposes it was supposed to serve, he may really be able to say that they were bad purposes, or that they have since become bad purposes, or that they are purposes which are no longer served. But if he simply stares at the thing as a senseless monstrosity that has somehow sprung up in his path, it is he and not the traditionalist who is suffering from an illusion.

In speaking about fences Kennedy and Chesterton were of course speaking about law, because the basic principle is the same. Just as we may not see the stalking lion hiding in the weeds, who now has a clear path to attack once the fence separating him has been removed, we can't always readily see what our existing legal constructs are protecting us from. But just because their utility may not be obvious does not mean they have none. Or that we don't tear them down at our peril. The rule of fences teaches lawmakers that care is needed to assess what might depend on the thing they are hoping to do away with before they do, so that they can anticipate what will happen if they do. After all, we may not be able to see the lion, but if we figure out why the fence was there, we'll be able to infer the lion's presence and take care not to inadvertently release it.

The rule applies no less to Internet law. But every time Congress tries to weaken Section 230, or otherwise ratchet up liability for the service providers enabling the Internet, it's the legal equivalent of tearing down fences, and just as wantonly as Kennedy and Chesterton cautioned against. Liability protection for platforms serves an important purpose to make the good things the Internet delivers possible by holding back pressures that would make such delivery impossible. But when Congress proposes to break down this protection, without understanding the consequences it invites by doing so, it opens the door to all the harm this protection had previously contained.

Naturally, not every fence is necessarily still useful. Nor are we so beholden to our legal ancestors that we are obligated to maintain their institutions even when changes are called for. So if, on examining a fully-developed record, Congress can truly say that the liability protection at issue is no longer fulfilling a worthwhile purpose, then the policy can of course be changed.

But without adequate inquiry into what the existing law and policy are doing, presumptively ripping it up is just reckless. And, despite all the fanfare surrounding these bills, Congress is not actually making that inquiry. It simply encounters various legal constraints, presumes they are but pointless obstructions, and sets about dismantling them, without ever bothering to ensure that doing so won't jeopardize anything Congress would want to preserve. Perhaps it mistakenly thinks its proposed changes are merely minor. But a fence post removed here, maybe another foundation removed there, and it really may not take much at all before everything we needed has collapsed.

Filed Under: fences, jerry nadler, laws, liability, section 230

Rep. Jerry Nadler Pushing New Bill That Will Destroy Online Commerce; Make Sure Only Amazon Can Afford The Liability

from the how-does-this-help dept

'Tis the season for terrible, horrible, no good bills to destroy the open internet. First up, we've got Rep. Jerry Nadler, a close friend of the always anti-internet lobbying force that is the legacy copyright industries. Earlier this year he introduced the SHOP SAFE Act, which is due for a markup tomorrow, and has an unfortunately high likelihood of passing out of committee. The principle behind the Act (which Nadler has now updated with a manager's amendment) is that "something must be done" about people buying counterfeit goods online.

Not addressed, at all, is whether or not counterfeit goods online are actually a real problem. I know that industry folks always insist that counterfeiting is a scourge that costs billions, but actual research on this shows something different entirely. A GAO report from years back showed that most of the stats regarding counterfeiting are completely exaggerated and multiples studies have shown that -- far from "tricking" people -- most people who buy counterfeits know exactly what they're doing, and that for many buyers, buying a counterfeit is an aspirational purchase. That is, they know they're not buying the real thing, but they're buying the counterfeit because that's what they can afford -- and if they can afford the real thing at a later date, they will buy it. But nearly all of the public commentary on counterfeiting assumes that the public is clueless, and being "tricked" into buying "dangerous" counterfeits.

The second bad premise behind the SHOP SAFE Act is that the "real problem" is Section 230 (because everyone wants to assume that Section 230 can be blamed for anything bad online). So the core approach of the SHOP SAFE Act is to add liability to websites that allow people to sell stuff online. However, as EFF notes in its write up about the problems with this bill, if you try to sell something via Craigslist or even just via Gmail, the bill would effectively make those companies liable for your sale.

One measure platforms would have to take under SHOP SAFE is verifying the identity, address, and contact information of any third-party seller who uses their services. Imagine if you had to provide a copy of your driver’s license to Craigslist just to advertise your garage sale or sell a used bike. As over the top as that seems, it’s even worse when you think about how this would apply to services like Gmail or Facebook. Should you really have to provide ID to open an email account, just in case you sell something using it? Requirements like this threaten not only competition but user privacy, too.

I don't know why we need to keep explaining this, but when you add more liability to internet platforms, you get fewer internet platforms. This bill would effectively lock in Amazon and a few other giant companies as the only ones who could leap through the convoluted bureaucratic (and privacy-destructive) nonsense that this bill requires. Again, from EFF:

Other provisions of SHOP SAFE put the burden of rooting out counterfeits on platforms, rather than on the trademark holders who are in the best position to know a real from a fake. Most concerning to us is the requirement that platforms implement “proactive technological measures” for pre-screening listings. This provision echoes calls for mandatory automated content filtering in the copyright context.

Just a few months ago, I wrote about a trial regarding claims of counterfeit goods in an online marketplace, and just how much the lawyers leaned on the fact that the platform must know what's real and what's not (when even the trademark holder's own representative admitted she wasn't sure which products were real and which were counterfeit). Yet this bill, like so many other bad intermediary liability laws, presupposes that platforms -- which often have to handle millions of new product listings -- can magically stop all counterfeits from appearing.

It's disappointing (if not at all surprising) that the ABA's "Intellectual Property Law Section" is super thrilled with this bill (I mean, it's like a full employment act for IP lawyers) and claims that it will "facilitated robust e-commerce removal and reporting" in a manner that makes it sound similar to the DMCA's safe harbor provisions (which already have significant overblocking problems). But as EFF notes, this takes the entire principle of the safe harbor ("you're protected from liability if you take these steps") and flips it on its head.

SHOP SAFE’s requirements go far beyond the DMCA’s, while lacking safeguards like a counternotice procedure and penalties for bad-faith takedowns. SHOP SAFE also takes the DMCA’s safe harbor structure and flips it upside down. The DMCA incentivizes platforms to adopt certain policies and practices by providing a true safe harbor—that is, platforms that choose to satisfy the safe harbor requirements can be confident that they cannot be held liable for infringement by their users. SHOP SAFE doesn’t work this way. Instead, it creates a new, independent basis for secondary infringement liability, and it directs that all covered platforms must implement a range of practices or else be held liable for any trademark infringement by their users. The DMCA’s safe harbor framework is preferable because it incentivizes desired behavior while maintaining flexibility for different approaches by different platforms according to their unique characteristics.

Everything about the SHOP SAFE Act seems designed to create problems for the open internet. I know that Rep. Nadler doesn't care about that, but you and I should. Anyone who regularly relies on the internet for buying and selling things should be concerned about this bill and what it will do to the internet. It will make it that much harder for you and I to buy or sell stuff. It will give more power to the giant e-commerce companies, such as Amazon, who can handle the regulatory burdens here, but it will make it nearly impossible for competitors to come along, and will make it effectively impossible for people to do more informal sales to each other using the internet as an intermediary.

It's a dangerous bill and it should not move forward in its current form.

Filed Under: counterfeiting, counterfeits, jerry nadler, liability, marketplaces, section 230, shop safe, shopping
Companies: amazon

Academic: Problems Created By Undermining Section 230 Can Be Solved... By Undermining Section 230?

from the say-that-again? dept

I remain confused at why so many people endorse Macarthur Genius award winner, Prof. Danielle Citron's views on Section 230. Over and over again people say that her ideas for reforming Section 230 are sensible. Except that they are not. She has falsely insisted that companies have no incentives to moderate and that their incentives are to push the most extreme content. This has been debunked over and over again. If it were true, then every website would turn into 8kun. But that doesn't happen, because most websites realize that when your website is full of garbage people, it drives away other users (including those more likely to support you or your advertisers) and it drives away advertisers.

Citron's big idea is to put in place a duty of care or "reasonableness" standard, but we've explained at length why that's the kind of idea only an academic with no experience running a website could love. It would lead to a ton of costly litigation in which companies would have to repeatedly defend their moderation practices in court. At best this would lead to companies all adopting nearly identical moderation practices to whichever company survived the litigation gauntlet first -- effectively crushing any ability to experiment and innovate in the moderation market, and likely locking in Facebook as one of the few companies that can afford to handle moderation's liability risks.

All that said, I'm even more flabbergasted by Citron's initial response to the (now walked back) news that OnlyFans was planning to phase out sexually explicit content. Many, many people have made the connection between OnlyFans' decision and FOSTA, the last time Section 230 was amended to add more liability to platforms. Of course, as we've now seen, FOSTA has had a massive human cost, is leading to some wacky vexatious civil lawsuits, and according to the GAO's own study, has failed to live up to any of its promises.

In an article at CNN about the OnlyFans decision, Citron makes an absolutely bizarre claim, that the answer to OnlyFans deplatforming sex workers... is to put more liability on OnlyFans so that those sex workers can sue. I only wish I were kidding.

Just like social media companies, payment processors are protected by Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, Citron said. That's the signature law that grants broad legal immunity to Facebook and Twitter for many of the content-moderation decisions they make — and the law that SESTA-FOSTA amended to create an exception for sex ads.

Citron wants to see changes made to Section 230 that could expose platforms to more liability under certain circumstances. Perhaps, she said, those changes might even allow sex workers who feel their businesses have been harmed by payment processors to sue them for tortious interference.

"We're talking about OnlyFans, where we're seeing sex workers doing safe work. It's from their own homes, they're making content on their own terms," Citron said.

So... the answer to sex workers being kicked off platforms that fear that they might face liability under FOSTA hole in Section 230, is to open up another hole in Section 230 so that those sex workers can then sue OnlyFans for tortious interference?!? Um, what?

Even just bringing up tortious interference as a cause of action is bizarre. That's the same sort of argument that people like Laura Loomer have used to say people reporting her to Twitter engaged in "tortious interference" when Twitter kicked her off the platform. Tortious interference in the context discussed here seems like a plan for vexatious nuisance litigation and SLAPP suits, not any kind of legitimate cause of action.

But, even more to the point, how is it a solution to the consequences of adding more liability to say "let's just pile on more liability to deal with those consequences"? It's liability all the way down. But it's completely disconnected from how all of this works in the real world.

Filed Under: danielle citron, duty of care, intermediary liability, liability, reasonableness, section 230
Companies: onlyfans

Senators Klobuchar And Lujan Release Ridiculous, Blatantly Unconstitutional Bill To Make Facebook Liable For Health Misinformation

from the stop-this-nonsense dept

On Wednesday, Senator Amy Klobuchar promised to introduce a bill that would somehow hold Facebook liable for medical misinformation. As we wrote in the post about her claims, that doesn't explain how there would be any legitimate underlying cause of action, because nearly all such medical misinformation is still protected by the 1st Amendment.

Yesterday Klobuchar, along with Senator Ben Ray Lujan, introduced their bill: the Health Misinformation Act of 2021. To say it's unconstitutional would be giving it too much credit. To say that it wouldn't even remotely do anything useful would be to state the obvious. To say that it's a grandstanding piece of absolute nonsense would be about the best thing I could think of. It's garbage in so many ways.

The actual functioning of the bill would be to add an exception to Section 230's protections, saying that they no longer apply -- if it's in the midst of a health crisis -- for medical misinformation. It would add the following "EXCEPTION" to Section 230:

A provider of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of health misinformation that is created or developed through the interactive computer service during a covered period if the provider promotes that health misinformation through an algorithm used by the provider (or similar software functionality), except that this subparagraph shall not apply if that promotion occurs through a neutral mechanism, such as through the use of chronological functionality

And, this law would only be in effect during a public health emergency, as declared by the Secretary of Health & Human Services. The law would also require the Secretary of Health & Human Services to "issue guidance regarding what constitutes health misinformation." That last bit should make you grimace, because that's a hugely problematic thing for the 1st Amendment. Having the government define what is and what is not "health misinformation" cannot possibly pass 1st Amendment scrutiny by a court.

It's also incredibly dumb. First of all, in a "public health emergency" like we're currently going through, what is and what is not "health misinformation" is not always clear, and involves constantly changing information. Remember, we went through this with the whole "wearing masks" thing at the very beginning of the pandemic. Then, you had the WHO and CDC advise against wearing masks. Under this bill, you could have had the HHS boss claim that anyone promoting mask wearing was engaging in health misinformation... and somehow try to make Facebook liable for it. Would that have been a good idea?

Even worse: imagine what kind of information might be declared "health misinformation" by disingenuous grandstanders? Pro-choice information? Information about transgender health?

But, going back a step: what would this law actually do, even if it weren't so blatantly unconstitutional? The answer is absolutely fucking nothing. Because, as we pointed out on Wednesday, you still need an underlying cause of action and there is none here. Okay, so now Facebook is magically "liable" for health misinformation? But as soon as anyone sues, Facebook says "that content is protected speech, so there's no cause of action here" and the court dismisses the case. Whether we like it or not, nearly all misinformation is still protected under the 1st Amendment. And, for the reasons discussed earlier, that's probably a good thing -- because otherwise, you'll have the government declaring things you agree with as misinformation, and that leads to very dangerous places.

This entire bill is not just grandstanding nonsense, but a waste of time. Yes, we should be looking for ways to better educate the public about the actual efficacy of (massively successful) COVID-19 vaccines. And, yes we need to figure out better ways to reach those who are skeptical about vaccines or hesitant to get the vaccine. But this bill does none of that. It just throws a bunch of garbage out so that Klobuchar can stand before the TV cameras and pretend to do something. It's the worst kind of political grandstanding.

And, while we're talking about how ridiculous this is, let's just throw in a giant "oh shut the fuck up" to Facebook as well for putting out a total garbage statement in response:

"We have long supported common industry standards and section 230 reform. We believe clarification on the difficult and urgent questions about health related misinformation would be helpful and look forward to working with Congress and the industry as we consider options for reform."

What a bunch of garbage. Facebook knows that this bill is a mess of nonsense, and that the 1st Amendment would stop it from having any impact. Rather than putting out a compliant, suck up statement, why can't Facebook speak up about what it's actually doing to try to deal with health misinformation on the site? That would be interesting and that has mostly been absent from this discussion beyond whatever uninformed nonsense is being stated by people outside the company about what they think Facebook is doing (which is either "nothing" according to many ignorant folks, or "censoring conservatives!" according to another bunch of equally ignorant folks). If Facebook came out and actually explained what it really is doing that would be helpful. But, of course, Facebook is trying to play the politics of all of this, rather than doing the right thing.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, amy klobuchar, ben ray lujan, cause of action, content moderation, covid-19, health misinformation, liability, misinformation, section 230, vaccine
Companies: facebook

As White House Says It's 'Reviewing 230', Biden Admits His Comments About Facebook Were Misinformation

from the of-course,-not-in-those-words dept

In the never ending stupidity saga, kicked off by the White House picking a fight with Facebook because Facebook hasn't banned 12 individuals (who were named as disinformation dozen by the Center for Countering Digital Hate), things have kicked up a notch -- and nobody involved in the debate seems to know how any of this works. First, the White House has claimed that it is "reviewing Section 230" whatever that means.

"We're reviewing that, and certainly they should be held accountable," Bedingfield told MSNBC when asked about Section 230 and whether social media companies like Facebook should be liable and open to lawsuits for publishing false information that causes Americans harm.

The problem with this, of course, is they can "review" it all they want, but if the people spreading disinformation aren't breaking the law (and, they're not), there would be no underlying cause of action against Facebook with or without Section 230. But, of course, this should be worrisome on multiple levels, not the least of which is that Biden said multiple times during his campaign for President that he wanted to repeal Section 230 entirely, explicitly because he (falsely) thought this would magically make Facebook liable for disinformation.

(As a small aside, it's kind of rich that it's Communications Director Kate Bedingfield claiming that the White House is looking at Section 230, considering in a former life she was VP for the MPAA -- and was literally the chief spokesperson for the MPAA at a time when it was running a secretive campaign to have its own lawyers act as a shadow legal team for state Attorneys General to undermine Section 230 in order to take down tech companies Hollywood disliked. Seems kind of like a conflict, but what do I know?)

Anyway, along with all of this, President Biden walked back his statement on Friday when he said directly that he believed Facebook was "killing people," by not banning certain users. This was a stupid and misleading thing to say. And on Monday, he kind of recognized that what he originally said was not accurate:

“Facebook isn’t killing people, these 12 people are out there giving misinformation,” the president said, citing an administration report last week on online coronavirus vaccine misinformation. “That’s what I meant.”

“My hope is that Facebook, instead of taking it personally … that they would do something about the misinformation, the outrageous misinformation about the vaccine,” Biden continued.

And, again, it's perfectly fair to talk about misinformation, and how the impact of it can be very real and very dangerous. But the blame for that misinformation really ought to be on the people spreading it.

Indeed, in this case, it could easily be argued that the President himself spread misinformation in saying that Facebook was killing people. Misinformation is false or inaccurate information, especially when it's intended to deceive. Biden's statement on Friday certainly could qualify. It was inaccurate to say that Facebook is killing people. It is not. It's arguably deceptive to pin the blame on Facebook rather than on the individuals spreading the disinformation -- and Biden corrected that misinformation on Monday.

And, to be clear, I do think that Facebook should be better about dealing with such misinformation on its platform -- I'm just not so naive as to think that the company can just magically snap its fingers and make misinformation disappear. Should it be doing more to stop the spread of misinformation about vaccines? Yes. Absolutely. Does it help when the White House jumps in like this? Not at all.

And, again, it's not as if there's a clear rule on what is and what is not misinformation. As I noted, it's arguable that Biden's own comments are misinformation. There are no simple rules to distinguish what is and what is not misinformation in these contexts that can easily be applied across billions of users. And the end result of more aggressive removals also likely means the removal of perfectly reasonable content, perhaps that criticizing vaccine deniers and helping to better educate people.

Everyone thinks it's easy to make disinformation go away until you actually have to make the calls yourself.

And the White House isn't doing anyone any favors by claiming that getting rid of Section 230 would actually help. If anything, it would make things way worse, by vastly cutting back on the ability of websites (including Facebook) to experiment with better approaches to actually minimizing the impact of misinformation on their platforms.

On top of that, as some are noting, this appears to be yet another case of the government trying to cover up its own policy failings by blaming social media.

Filed Under: content moderation, disinformation, joe biden, kate bedingfield, liability, misinformation, section 230, vaccines
Companies: facebook

Top EU Court Rules Online Platforms Are Not Liable For Copyright Infringements Of User Uploads, Unless They Actively Intervene

from the nice,-but-likely-to-be-superseded dept

One of the most contentious areas of Internet law is the extent to which sites are responsible for the actions of their users. One issue concerns user-uploaded materials: if these infringe on copyright, should the platform be held responsible too? The EU's highest court, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), has just ruled on two cases touching on this question. One concerned the posting of music recordings to YouTube, while the other involved medical textbooks published by Elsevier, which appeared on some filesharing sites. Both cases were before the Federal Court of Justice in Germany, which asked the CJEU to provide guidance on the liability of online platforms as regards to copyright materials posted by users. The basic decision is straightforward (pdf), explained here by the court's press release:

the Court emphasises the indispensable role played by the platform operator and the deliberate nature of its intervention. That platform operator makes an 'act of communication' when it intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give its customers access to a protected work, particularly where, in the absence of that intervention, those customers would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast work.

In that context, the Court finds that the operator of a video-sharing platform or a file-hosting and -sharing platform, on which users can illegally make protected content available to the public, does not make a 'communication to the public' of that content, within the meaning of [EU] Directive 2001/29 [on copyright], unless it contributes, beyond merely making that platform available, to giving access to such content to the public in breach of copyright.

Put simply, platforms need to be involved in making material available in some active way before they can be held liable.

In an excellent Twitter thread, Julia Reda points out some interesting aspects of the ruling. First, she notes that copyright companies have long tried to push the idea that platforms like YouTube, largely based on user-uploaded material, are automatically playing an "active" role, and are therefore not mere conduits. The latest CJEU ruling says that for a platform to be liable under the EU's eCommerce Directive "it must have knowledge of or awareness of specific illegal acts committed by its users relating to protected content that was uploaded to its platform."

However, a platform may be required to use "appropriate technical measures" to "counter credibly and effectively copyright infringements on that platform". Within the full judgment is the following comment by the judges:

YouTube has put in place various technological measures in order to prevent and put an end to copyright infringements on its platform, such as, inter alia, a notification button and a special alert procedure for reporting and arranging for illegal content to be removed, as well as a content verification program for checking content and content recognition software for facilitating the identification and designation of such content. Thus, it is apparent that that operator has adopted technological measures to counter credibly and effectively copyright infringements on its platform.

Reda points out that YouTube's "technological measures" are regarded by the court as "credible" and "effective", even though they do not use an upload filter of the kind that Article 17 of the EU Copyright Directive is likely to need. As she writes: "Providing a button that allows rightholders to easily notify infringements can be an appropriate technical measure."

That's good news, but it's important to remember that the current CJEU ruling refers to EU law as it was before the Copyright Directive came into force. As such, its views on upload filters are likely to be superseded by the important case brought by Poland, seeking to have them thrown out completely. It may be that the CJEU rules that Article 17's strict upload filters are legal in the EU, which would therefore negate the current judgment's more lenient view of what is needed. The first indication of which way the court may rule will come next month, when a CJEU adviser will offer a preliminary opinion on the matter. Although the new CJEU position on technological measures is welcome, it is the future ruling on Article 17 that will be decisive.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter, Diaspora, or Mastodon.

Filed Under: active role, cjeu, copyright, liability, platforms
Companies: youtube

Salesforce Asks Appeals Court To Say It's Protected Under 230; After Its Own CEO Said We Should Get Rid Of 230

from the incredible dept

We were quite perplexed in late 2019 when Salesforce.com founder and CEO Marc Benioff (never one to shy away from expressing his opinions on anything at all) announced that Section 230 should be abolished. It seemed like an extremely poorly thought-out statement from a CEO who was wholly unfamiliar with the issues, but who has sort of relished tweaking the noses of the big consumer internet companies over the past few years (after spending the first decade or so of Software.com's existence tweaking the noses of enterprise software companies). As we wrote at the time, Benioff didn't seem to understand 230 at all, and seemed just angry at Facebook.

Of course, this is coming back to bite him hard. Just a few months later, lawyer Annie McAdams, who seems to have made it her life's mission to file blatantly silly attacks on Section 230 in court, sued Salesforce.com (and not for the first time!), claiming that because Backpage.com had used Salesforce as its CRM system, Salesforce was somehow magically liable for any sex trafficking that happened on the platform. In the complaint, McAdams cited Benioff's comments:

Salesforce will claim that no matter what role Salesforce played in the development and amplification of Backpage’s business model, they should be completely shielded and not have to answer any questions or be held accountable in any manner by asking the Court to dismiss the case at the initial stage.

The distortion and use of the Communications Decency Act as a sword by technology companies such as Salesforce is an outright distortion of the intent of Congress in regard to the development of the internet.

The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) was never intended to protect technology companies from being held accountable for unlawful conduct or sex trafficking.

Salesforce’s own CEO, Marc Benioff, on October 16, 2019, has demanded Section 230 of the CDA be abolished with the need for “standards and practices be decided by law”

And, in late March, she actually prevailed. In a somewhat terrible decision, federal judge Andrew Hanen refused to grant Salesforce's motion to dismiss, and said that Salesforce's use of 230 here did not let it off the hook with a bizarre ruling that goes against pretty much all 230 precedent on the books:

... the Court cannot hold as a matter of law that CDA 230's protections apply to Salesforce. In particular, the Court is not persuaded that Salesforce is a provider of "an interactive computer service" entitled to protection.

WHAT?!? I mean, every other court has recognized that any website is considered an interactive computer service. I'm honestly having trouble recalling another cases where this definition is even an issue at all.

Moreover, it is unclear to the Court whether CDA 230 is even relevant, because Plaintiff has alleged that Salesforce directly and "knowingly benefitted" from providing services to facilitate sex trafficking. That allegation, if true, would elevate Salesforce's role beyond that of a mere publisher, which is the touchstone of CDA 230(c)(1).

This is also... just wrong. Having knowledge does not, in any way, elevate a website's role "beyond that of a mere publisher." There are multiple cases that say so, and nothing in the law says that knowledge changes anything. The whole thing is bizarre.

For what it's worth, the court did reject a bunch of McAdams' other claims regarding negligence and civil conspiracy, recognizing that it's a stretch to argue that providing the CRM tool to a service that provided tools to other third parties, some of whom used it for trafficking, somehow makes them liable. But, without the 230 immunity, the case still has to go on concerning Texas' anti-sex trafficking law.

Now, Salesforce is in the position of trying to ask the 5th Circuit appeals court to fix this awful ruling. Its first move is just to get the district court to let it pause the case at this point to get the 5th Circuit to take a look. And it's leaning hard on Section 230, the same law its CEO says should be abolished.

Both sides would benefit from resolving sooner rather than later the threshold, potentially dispositive issue whether section 230 of the Communications Decency Act applies to Salesforce and bars this lawsuit in its entirety.

In laying out the argument for why the 5th Circuit should get to review the case at this stage, Salesforce lawyers point out that if this is not allowed, it completely destroys the whole reason that 230 immunity exists in the first place -- to make one immune to these kinds of mistargeted lawsuits:

The section 230 issue presents a controlling question of law—particularly given that the Fifth Circuit considers section 230(c)(1) an “immunity provision[]” and regards its applicability as a threshold legal issue to resolve at the outset of litigation. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 418; accord Diez v. Google, Inc., 831 F. App’x 723, 724 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). That necessity is driven “not because of the expense of litigation but because of the irretrievable loss of immunity from suit.” McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 317 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). So courts “aim to resolve the question of [section] 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that immunity protects [providers] not only from ultimate liability,” but also from litigation itself. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

As a result, an interlocutory appeal is warranted to ensure meaningful appellate review of whether section 230 bars plaintiffs’ suit against Salesforce. If the litigation continues, even though Salesforce may eventually be protected “from ultimate liability,” it will have lost—irretrievably—section 230’s protection against being sued in the first place and “having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.” Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 255 (citation omitted). Thus, as “resolution on appeal . . . would impact the course of litigation and could terminate the suit in this Court,” La. State Conf. of NAACP v. Louisiana, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, No. 19-479-JWD-SDJ, 2020 WL 6130747, at *9 (M.D. La. Oct. 19, 2020), the section 230 issue is a controlling question of law that warrants immediate review.

As Salesforce points out, Judge Hanen's claim that Salesforce might not even be an "interactive computer service" goes against lots of other courts, even those who have reviewed whether or not Salesforce itself qualifies:

The Court’s initial hesitation as to whether Salesforce is an interactive computer service provider covered by section 230 is contrary to at least two other courts that have decided that issue as to Salesforce specifically. And decisions from courts across the country magnify the substantial ground for disagreement on when an interactive computer service provider is “treated” as a “publisher” under section 230.

To start, two other courts have very recently held that Salesforce meets section 230’s definition of an interactive computer service provider in cases involving virtually identical allegations. A California state court determined that “[t]he term ‘interactive computer service’ . . . applies to software providers such as [Salesforce].” Does #1 through #90 v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. CGC-19-574770, slip op. at 4 (S.F. Super. Oct. 3, 2019).

That court explained that Salesforce’s “customer relationship management . . . software” supplies “enabling tools” that users can access through the internet. Does #1 through #90, at 4 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4)). Those software tools, the court concluded, put Salesforce well within the “broad statutory definition[]” of an “access software provider,” because Salesforce provides “software . . . or enabling tools” that “transmit,” “receive,” “cache,” “search,” and “organize” data. Id. at 4–5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4)). And because “multiple users” can “access” the “computer server” with those tools, 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), Salesforce is a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service” under section 230(c)(1), see Does #1 through #90, at 4.

The court also ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims impermissibly “treat[ed] [Salesforce] as the publisher of [third-party] information.” Does #1 through #90, at 5. The court explained that the plaintiffs’ claims relied on third-party content to establish Salesforce’s liability. Simply put, Salesforce could “only be liable if . . . linked to the[ ] advertisements” that were used to traffic the plaintiffs. Id. Because the plaintiffs alleged that Salesforce was linked to the ads for the reason that “its ‘platform and CRM’ [software] enabled Backpage to publish and disseminate” them, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily implicated Salesforce “as a publisher.” Id. The court therefore concluded that the claims were barred by section 230(c)(1)....

A Texas state court has held the same—namely, that Salesforce falls within section 230’s definition of an interactive computer service and that materially identical claims were barred under section 230. In Re: Jane Doe Cases, Tex. MDL Cause, No. 2020-28545, slip op. at 1–2 (Aug. 28, 2020). Thus, whether Salesforce is entitled to section 230 immunity may depend on whether the parties are in state or federal court in Texas—creating a risk of forum shopping between Texas courts that heightens the need for interlocutory review.

Then they note that there are lots of other cases regarding non-Salesforce defendants showing how broad the definition of an ICS truly is.

Relying on the plain statutory text, courts have held that many different types of providers are covered under the statute’s capacious definitions of an “interactive computer service” and “access software provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) & (4); see, e.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2009) (provider of anti-malware software); Davis v. Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C., No. 09-14-00434-CV, 2015 WL 1535694, at *1, *3–4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 2, 2015) (employer whose employee used the company’s “technology and facilities”); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014) (website host).

Other courts might therefore conclude (and indeed have concluded) that Salesforce—a provider of software that “enables . . . access by multiple users to a computer server,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), where those users can use various tools to “transmit,” “receive,” “cache,” “search,” and “organize” customer data, id. § 230(f)(4)— falls within these definitional provisions, too.

As such, they note that plenty of courts -- including the 5th Circuit in which this district court resides -- have held that 230 immunizes websites from all kinds of civil liability if that liability touches on 3rd party content.

Likewise, the Fifth Circuit and a host of other courts have held that the “plain text” of section 230 immunizes interactive computer service providers from “any cause of action” that treats them as a “publisher” by seeking to hold them “liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.” Diez, 831 F. App’x at 724; accord MySpace, 528 F.3d at 418 (negligence claims); see O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 2016) (invasion of privacy and other tort claims); Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2016) (human trafficking claims); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (collecting citations).

Hopefully they succeed, and the 5th Circuit overturns the initial ruling.

However, the bigger question may be whether or not Benioff has learned his lesson and might actually understand why Section 230 is so important for the wider internet, including his company?

Filed Under: fosta, interactive computer service, liability, section 230, sex trafficking
Companies: backpage, salesforce

Google Says Pretty Much Everything Shields It From Being Sued Over Things Telegram Users Said

from the google-to-judge:-your-honor-what-even-is-this dept

An ambassador who last worked as a US ambassador more than two decades ago recently sued Apple and Google for… well, let's go to the tape. Apparently, it's somehow these two companies' fault that Telegram users make anti-Semitic comments and otherwise make "Ambassador Marc Ginsberg" (as the plaintiff refers to himself in his complaints) feel unsafe.

Ginsberg owns two phones -- one of each variety. That's why he's suing both Apple and Google. There's no indication Ginsberg has ever downloaded or used Telegram. Nor is there any indication he's even seen firsthand any of the content he's suing about. But in both lawsuits, he claims the mere existence of Telegram in app stores has personally harmed him and somehow devalued both of the phones he uses.

These lawsuits make no sense. And that's why Ginsberg has retained the representation of Keith Altman, last seen chucking lawsuit after lawsuit into federal courts claiming Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are directly responsible for real-life terrorist attacks. So far, the firms last associated with Altman and his particularly stupid brand of litigation have yet to secure a win at any level of the federal court system.

Google was last to be sued but the first to respond. And it raises the expected defenses, including the "the plaintiff has chosen the wrong defendant." (h/t John Roddy)

Google's motion to dismiss [PDF] starts with a few facts that make it pretty much unnecessary for anyone -- including the presiding judge -- to read any further. Here's the opener:

Plaintiffs Ambassador Marc Ginsberg and the organization he founded, the Coalition for a Safer Web, assert that several of Telegram’s 500 million third-party users have used Telegram to send messages that contain hateful rhetoric or promote extremism. Neither Telegram nor any of its users are parties to this case, and Plaintiffs have apparently not made any effort to pursue claims against them.

Instead, Plaintiffs have sued Google. They seek to hold Google liable for the content of messages exchanged through Telegram’s platform based on Google’s role as the operator of Google Play, an online platform where users can access a wide variety of digital content and download applications, including Telegram. Plaintiffs do not allege that Google played any role in creating, operating, or moderating content on Telegram, or that it contributed to the objectionable content disseminated by Telegram’s users. Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that Google should have removed the Telegram app from Google Play, and that it violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and negligently inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiffs by failing to do so. While Plaintiffs’ goals of combating anti-Semitism and hate speech are important, they have chosen the wrong target for their campaign.

Even if Ginsberg had been slightly less moronic in his litigation, he still wouldn't have been likely to succeed. Telegram's main defense would be the same as Google's: Section 230 immunity applies. It would apply to Telegram if it was being sued for content generated by its users. And it doubly applies to Google, which is another step removed, since its only connection to Telegram is the fact that the app can be downloaded from Google's app store.

There's a recent case directly on point dealing with Section 230 immunity and app store moderation. That's the one Google quotes:

This Court recently applied Section 230 to bar a similar set of claims arising from Google’s alleged failure to remove third-party apps from Google Play. Coffee, 2021 WL 49338, at *6. The plaintiffs there alleged that Google violated state consumer protection laws by allowing certain video game apps to be published. The Court dismissed the claims as a matter of law, explaining that, because plaintiffs “[sought] an order requiring Google to screen apps offered through its Google Play store and exclude those containing [certain content],” they were demanding that Google engage in “conduct that [was] squarely within the role of a publisher.” Id. So too here: “Google cannot be held liable for merely allowing []developers to provide apps to users through the Google Play store, as ‘providing third parties with neutral tools to create web content is considered to be squarely within the protections of § 230.’”

But even if those two assertions are ignored, the case contains another massive failure. To seek redress, you must have an actionable injury. There's nothing here that indicates the Ambassador has suffered anything more than being subjected to bad legal advice.

Even setting aside immunity under Section 230, Plaintiffs still fail to state a claim. First, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue under the UCL. A UCL claim requires economic injury, specifically “lost money or property,” resulting from the alleged misconduct. Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 325-26 (2011). But Plaintiffs have alleged no such injury. Instead, they contend that Ginsberg’s phone supposedly declined in value because Google kept Telegram on Google Play. This theory makes no sense. Ginsberg does not even allege that he downloaded Telegram from Google Play or used the app on his device. He certainly offers no plausible explanation of how his phone could have lost value merely because the Telegram app remained available in Google Play for other people to download and use.

This suit should be tossed immediately. I'm sure the one against Apple will be met with the same defenses and the same early exit for the other target of Ginsberg's garbage litigation. It may suck to find out app users are saying bigoted things about Jews, but there's no legal action to be had here. Even if the former ambassador was able to discover the identities of those saying these things, a lot of it would be protected speech and very little of it would actually create a cause of action worth pursuing in court. The world can be a shitty place. Lobbing stupid sue-balls at the biggest targets you can find doesn't make it any better.

Filed Under: frivolous lawsuits, keith altman, liability, marc ginsberg
Companies: apple, google, telegram