Transparency Report From Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence Shows Government Issuing 50 NSLs Per Day

from the section-702-still-most-efficient-use-of-paperwork dept

In the begrudging spirit of forced openness, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (James "Least Untruthful" Clapper, presiding) has released its First Annual Ever Transparency Report. So, what have our intelligence agencies been up to for the last calendar year? Well, a little of this and whole lot of that, all of it broken down into numbers that don't really provide that much transparency.

The figure that first stands out is related to the Section 702 program. As defined in intelspeak, the 702 program:

facilitates the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning non-U.S. persons located outside the United States, creating a new, more streamlined procedure to collect the communications of foreign terrorists.

In plain English, the Section 702 program does this:

[The] collection done under Section 702 captures content of communications. This could include content in emails, instant messages, Facebook messages, web browsing history, and more.

Like other bulk surveillance programs, Section 702 supposedly targets non-US persons but frequently "incidentally" collects content from US persons and other non-targets. This data on Americans is then searchable via backdoor searches. Much of this information is collected directly off the "Internet backbone" as communications flow through NSA collection points. The authority it operates under is incredibly vague and almost completely without adequate oversight. This last sentence explains the following numbers.


In contrast with sections 703, 704 and pen register requests -- where the number of targets roughly corresponds with the number of orders -- the 702 program operates under one order… which nets over 89,000 targets. Note -- and this is important -- that the report only says how many "targets" are "affected." It does not say how many other people's communications are "incidentally" collected along the away and made open to those backdoor searches. And, rest assured, that number is likely much larger than 89,000 -- especially since we already know that any communication "about" any target gets swept up, but that won't count towards that number. And, as discussed below, the definition of "target" can often mean something entirely different than what you think it means. This broad collection, one that harvests content rather than (supposedly harmless) metadata, is one of the NSA's favorite tools and explains its willingness to discuss alterations to the Section 215 bulk metadata program, but not to change the 702 program at all. (Not that anything much actually happened to the 215 program, even after all of the discussion.)

What's more interesting, though, is the long discussion about the incredibly high number of National Security Letters issued in 2013.


The FBI (along with other agencies) is issuing NSLs at the rate of 53 per day. The ODNI's long explanation attempts to portray this huge number as most certainly not evidence of NSL abuse.

In addition to those figures, today we are reporting (1) the total number of NSLs issued for all persons, and (2) the total number of requests for information contained within those NSLs. For example, one NSL seeking subscriber information from one provider may identify three e-mail addresses, all of which are relevant to the same pending investigation and each is considered a “request.”

So, the FBI (and unnamed other agencies) must issue a new NSL (the "must" is up for discussion) for each account it wishes to collect from, whether it's an email address or some other online account. And if multiple names are used for one target, then new NSLs must be issued to claim that information. And so on, until the government is issuing nearly 20,000 per year.

The ODNI attempts to explain how difficult it is to narrow down how many people are being targeted by NSLs.

We are reporting the annual number of requests rather than “targets” for multiple reasons. First, the FBI’s systems are configured to comply with Congressional reporting requirements, which do not require the FBI to track the number of individuals or organizations that are the subject of an NSL.

Even if the FBI systems were configured differently, it would still be difficult to identify the number of specific individuals or organizations that are the subjects of NSLs. One reason for this is that the subscriber information returned to the FBI in response to an NSL may identify, for example, one subscriber for three accounts or it may identify different subscribers for each account…

We also note that the actual number of individuals or organizations that are the subject of an NSL is different than the number of NSL requests. The FBI often issues NSLs under different legal authorities, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for the same individual or organization.

All well and good, but the DOJ's transparency report (linked to by the ODNI) breaks that number down just fine. (For whatever reason, the ODNI Tumblr post links to a report for 2012. The PDF of the ODNI's report contains a link to the 2013 version. Both are embedded below.)

From the 2013 letter:

In 2013, the FBI made 14,219 NSL requests (excluding requests for subscriber information only) for information concerning United States persons. These sought information pertaining to 5,334 different United States persons.

From the 2012 letter:

In 2012 the FBI made 15,229 NSL requests (excluding requests for subscriber information only) for information concerning United States persons. These sought information pertaining to 6,223 different United States persons.

It appears the FBI has the power to narrow down the number of persons targeted by its NSLs, although something must have happened in 2013 that made it append the following footnote to its FY2013 letter.

In the course of compiling its National Security Letter statistics, the FBI may over-report the number of United States persons about whom it obtained information using National Security Letters. For example, NSLs that are issued concerning the same US. person and that include different spellings of the US. person's name would be counted as separate U.S. persons, and NSLs issued under two different types of NSL authorities concerning the same US. person would be counted as two US. persons. This statement also applies to previously reported annual US. person numbers.

The DOJ's transparency letters again point out that the FISA court is basically approving everything set in front of it. Only one order has been withdrawn in the last two years and only 74 of 3,511 orders presented for "electronic surveillance" and/or "physical searches" were modified. The Section 215 collection requests were sent back for modification more often (roughly 2/3rds of the time) but ultimately, not a single one of those requests were denied.

So, there's more transparency than we're used to, but the 702 program still remains the best kept open secret. One order accesses thousands of "targets," and the ODNI hasn't exactly been forthcoming with additional details. Another explanatory note included does, however, point out inadvertently how useless the word "target" is when deployed by the NSA.

Within the Intelligence Community, the term “target” has multiple meanings. For example, “target” could be an individual person, a group, or an organization composed of multiple individuals or a foreign power that possesses or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence information that the U.S. government is authorized to acquire by the above-referenced laws.

Section 702's "explanation" takes it even farther:

In addition to the explanation of target above, in the context of Section 702 the term “target” is generally used to refer to the act of intentionally directing intelligence collection at a particular person, a group, or organization.

It's a noun, it's a verb, it's pretty much anything the NSA wants it to be, as Marcy Wheeler explains:

Except that it doesn’t admit that, at least in the past, sometimes target means “the switch we know lots of al Qaeda calls to use.” Meaning the term “target” is a misnomer even within the context they lay out.

There's still nothing "targeted" about the NSA's supposedly targeted collections. The collection comes first and the targeting comes later -- sometimes using pre-determined selectors and other times by splashing around in the data until something presents itself. What the NSA means by "target" is nothing more than a term deployed to gain access to massive amounts of communications and data, all under the theory that it's somehow "relevant" to its counter-terrorism work.

The new report is a step towards transparency, but it's a very calculated move that throws out a few vague numbers while withholding anything that could put them into context. In this sense, it follows the administration's idea of transparency: nothing that goes deeper than the surface.

Filed Under: james clapper, nsa, odni, section 702, surveillance, targets, transparency report

Deutsche Telekom Follows Vodafone's Lead With Transparency Report: Disclosing Surveillance Operations

from the a-trend dept

This morning we wrote about Vodafone's decision to release a much more accurate "transparency report" that actually revealed that many governments have direct access to listen in on Vodafone calls. It appears that has now inspired Deutsche Telekom to release similar reports about its surveillance help around the globe, including in the US.

A spokeswoman for Deutsche Telekom, which has 140 million customers worldwide, said: "Deutsche Telekom has initially focused on Germany when it comes to disclosure of government requests. We are currently checking if and to what extent our national companies can disclose information. We intend to publish something similar to Vodafone."

Of course, that "checking" suggests that while it may want to reveal similar to what Vodafone did, it will be limited in how much it can reveal in the US, where companies are often placed under strict (and almost certainly unconstitutional) gag orders. As the report notes, in Europe, this leaves Orange as the only one of the big three mobile operators who has not yet agreed to reveal such transparency on surveillance -- and it may put that company in a tough spot, since it apparently has "deep links" with French intelligence.

Either way, it's nice to see an outbreak in transparency when it comes to government surveillance.

Filed Under: mobile operator, privacy, surveillance, transparency report
Companies: deutsche telekom, orange, vodafone

NSA/FBI Got Access To Content Of Around 40,000 Yahoo/Google User Accounts In First Six Months Of 2013

from the it's-a-lot dept

Last week, we noted that the DOJ and various internet companies had settled their legal fight, which concerned whether or not those companies could reveal the details of how many FISA Court requests they were receiving -- both in terms of how many requests they get and how many accounts are impacted. While Apple immediately released their information, showing very few users impacted, the real interest is in Google, Yahoo and to a lesser extent Facebook. Both Google and Yahoo have put out blog posts updating their transparency report numbers. It appears that both Yahoo and Google decided to go with "option 1" in the settlement, which lets them reports NSLs and FISA orders separately, but in bands of 0-999. The big question with both of them, really, was just how many "customer accounts affected" there would be, and both presented numbers (in slightly different formats). Google showed a historical listing: Yahoo just shows the most recent: If you remember, by choosing Option 1, the companies could actually show "customer accounts affected" -- if they had chosen option 2, they could only show targeted customers, leaving out others who were affected as well. But here we see that the number of accounts affected is much larger than the number of requests (though certainly much more limited than some assumed). That is, these requests (which make up a large part of the PRISM program) impact thousands of users, but not millions or "all" as some have claimed. There may very well be other NSA surveillance programs that get data from many more users, but not the FISA orders/PRISM.

Concerning the Google data, you can see that there's been a pretty big increase in the number of users impacted over the past few years, peaking at the end of 2012, but that drop in the beginning of 2013 may be just seasonal. Meanwhile, it's interesting to see that a much larger number of Yahoo accounts have been impacted. Of course, for all we know, there could have been one FISA order to Google and three to Yahoo and then the number of accounts impacted would be around 10,000 per order. But, without more granularity, it's impossible to tell.

What does seem clear is that there are about 40,000 accounts on Yahoo or Google to which the NSA/FBI and others in the intelligence community have access.

Update: Facebook and Microsoft have updated their info as well and it's more of the same:

Microsoft, a major surveillance partner for the US government, received fewer than 1,000 orders from the Fisa court for communications content during the same period, related to between 15,000 and 15,999 “accounts or individual identifiers”.

The company, which owns the internet video calling service Skype, also disclosed that it received fewer than 1,000 orders for metadata – which reveals communications patterns rather than individual message content – related to fewer than 1,000 accounts or identifiers.

[....] Facebook disclosed that during the first half of 2013, it turned over content data from between 5000 and 5999 accounts – a rise of about 1000 from the previous six month period – and customer metadata associated with up to 999 accounts.

Filed Under: accounts, content, fbi, fisa, fisa orders, fisc, nsa, prism, surveillance, transparency report
Companies: google, yahoo

Feds Reach Settlement With Internet Companies Allowing Them To Report Not Nearly Enough Details On Surveillance Efforts

from the too-bad dept

It appears that the lawsuit that a bunch of big internet companies had filed against the NSA in an attempt to reveal just how often they get FISA court information requests and how many of their users are impacted is now over, as the government has reached a settlement with the companies, allowing them slightly more leeway in sharing information, but in a very limiting way.

Not too long ago, the government had started allowing companies to reveal, for the first time, how many national security letter (NSL) requests they get, but said they had to reveal that number in ranges of 1,000 starting with 0 to 999. However, they did not allow any such reporting on FISA Court (FISC) orders, which covered things like the now infamous PRISM program under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. It appears that the settlement more or less follows the outline of what the government allowed with NSLs. Companies are given two options. One is to basically report FISC requests like NSL requests, in bands of 1,000, and to similarly report "number of customer accounts affected" for NSLs, "FISA orders for content," "number of customer selectors targeted under FISA content orders," "FISA orders for non-content," and "number of customer selectors targeted under FISA non-content orders." All of those can be revealed separately, but always in bands of 1,000, starting with 0 to 999.

Alternatively, if companies are willing to lump these various programs together, they are allowed somewhat more granularity. So, if they lump together NSLs and FISA orders into a single number, they can reveal the details in bands of 250, starting with 0 to 249. Similarly, they can list the lumped together "customer selectors targeted" under combined NSLs and FISA orders in bands of 250.

This is a step forward, but it's not nearly far enough. As Kevin Bankston notes:

"Asking the public and policymakers to try to judge the appropriateness of the government’s surveillance practices based on a single, combined, rounded number is like asking a doctor to diagnose a patient’s shadow: only the grossest and most obvious problem, if even that, will be ever be evident."

Among the problems here, are that while they can reveal the number of customer accounts impacted for NSLs, that's not what they can do with FISC orders. Instead, they can only reveal "customer selectors targeted." That can be very different. You can imagine a "customer selector" that impacts many, many user accounts. And that's what many people are worried about -- and with this agreement, we won't actually know.

Furthermore, the agreement has a ridiculous clause that says if a FISA court order covers a "new capability" (i.e., getting access to a service that previously was not being tapped by the NSA/FBI), the companies cannot share that information for two years. The thinking here is rather obvious. Say, for example, a company launches a new voice communications service, like Skype -- and then gets hit with a FISA court order demanding that the NSA be able to listen in. The companies would be blocked from revealing that for two years. Clearly, the idea is to keep people from knowing how quickly the NSA is able to tap into any new form of communication, but that also opens up plenty of opportunities for the NSA to abuse its powers.

There is still some indication that Congress may require greater transparency here. I can understand why the tech companies agreed to settle, but it's a bit disappointing that they threw in the towel so quickly.

Apple has already updated its transparency report to note 0 - 249 "national security orders" and 0 - 249 "total accounts affected." Since they're doing ranges of 250, they're clearly lumping together both national security letters and FISC orders as "national security orders" though that's a bit confusing. Also, I don't think Apple is actually allowed to say "total accounts affected" from the terms of the agreement. When it comes to FISC orders, they can only list "customer selectors targeted," and saying "accounts affected" would suggest more information than the agreement appears to allow. Still, the obvious suggestion is that the government isn't requesting that much information directly from Apple, though other reports suggest it gets plenty of information, not directly via Apple, but by hacking their way into iOS devices....

Filed Under: doj, fisa orders, fisc, internet companies, national security letters, nsls, transparency, transparency report
Companies: apple, facebook, google, linkedin, microsoft, yahoo

Verizon Finally Releases Transparency Report Showing Many Requests, But Scale Of Those Requests Is Missing

from the details-please dept

After quite a lot of pressure, both Verizon and AT&T agreed last month to issue transparency reports like those that Google has offered for years, and which most of the other large internet companies have started offering in the last year or two. Verizon released its first one today, showing that it's pretty busy handling government requests. These are the numbers from 2013:

• Suboenas: 164,184
• General court orders: 62,857
• Pen Registers/Trap & Trace: 6,312
• Wiretap orders: 1,496
• Warrants: 36,696
• "Emergency requests" from law enforcement: ~50,000
• National Security Letters (NSLs): between 1,000 and 1,999

The report provides some further explanation. For example, it notes that over half of the subpoenas requested customer info -- i.e., the name and address of someone based on a phone number or IP address. Verizon does not say how often it refuses to provide information in response to a subpoena. In terms of getting access to content, Verizon notes that 14,500 of the warrants were for "stored content" which would be things like emails or text messages stored on Verizon's servers.

Of course, what this leaves out may be more interesting than what's included. While it lists the numbers for these requests, it gives no indication how many of its users are targeted. A single subpoena could, for example, request information on everyone. While that may be an extreme example, the point is that the number of requests doesn't really tell you very much overall. Or, perhaps not an extreme example. This report doesn't show, for example, what Verizon hands over under orders from the FISC under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. We already know that Section 215 has resulted in FISA orders for metadata on every Verizon mobile phone customers. That's probably counted as one single "court order" in that big list above. Similarly, as has been revealed in the past, the NSA works with telcos to directly tap the internet backbone for information. Where is that included in the list above?

Point being, this isn't all that "transparent," because bare numbers don't really mean that much.

Filed Under: government requests, transparency, transparency report, warrants
Companies: verizon

AT&T Finally Caves; Agrees To Issue A Transparency Report

from the but-how-transparent-will-it-be? dept

With Verizon agreeing to issue a transparency report concerning government requests for information (catching up with pretty much every major internet company), it was really only a matter of time until the other major telco holdout, AT&T caved. And, indeed, just about 24 hours later, AT&T agreed to issue a similar transparency report. The press release is also the first time that AT&T appears to have made any actual statement concerning the reports of its detailed cooperation with the NSA:

• Protecting our customers' information and privacy is paramount. Everywhere we operate, we go to great lengths to make sure our customers' data is safe and secure. And we do so in compliance with the laws of the country where the service is provided.
• When we receive a government request for customer information, whether it's a court order, a subpoena, or other method, we ensure that the request and our response are completely lawful and proper in that country.
• We work hard to make sure that the requests or orders are valid and that our response to them is lawful. We've challenged court orders, subpoenas and other requests from local, state and federal governmental entities – and will continue to do so, if we believe they are unlawful.
• We do not allow any government agency to connect directly to our network to gather, review or retrieve our customers' information.
• We only provide wireless customer location data in response to a court order except in the rare cases in which an emergency compels us to do so. Examples include when law enforcement enlists us to locate a missing child or a kidnapping suspect, and they provide us assurance that a real emergency affecting human life exists.

That fourth bullet point, claiming that the company doesn't allow any government agency to connect directly to the network is simply false. AT&T engineer Mark Klein revealed otherwise years ago. Furthermore, multiple reports have shown how AT&T has employees embedded directly with law enforcement to make sifting through customer info more efficient. Oh, and then there's the issue of Snowden documents revealing how the big telcos appeared to voluntarily reach out to the NSA in the wake of September 11th, seeking to provide more info on their customers to the government.

Just the fact that it's taken over six months for AT&T to even remotely say anything on this, and that they finally make this announcement just as everyone's disappearing for the holidays, suggests how "seriously" the company actually takes this issue.

Filed Under: privacy, transparency report
Companies: at&t

Google's Latest Transparency Report Mocks The Gag Order FISC Puts On Them Over NSA Requests

from the not-so-subtle dept

Google has released the latest version of its transparency report concerning government requests. While they focus on how government requests for information have doubled over the past three years, they also have a not-at-all-subtle jab at the FISA Court and the DOJ for continuing to block their efforts to reveal how many FISA Amendments Act Section 702 requests (the so-called PRISM requests) they get from the government, and how many people it impacts. As you hopefully already know, Google (along with other tech companies) is in the process of suing the government over this restriction on its free speech. You can see that demonstrated pretty clearly in the bottom righthand quadrant of the graphic they released. Just call it the "redacted" infographic. Google's legal director on this issue, Richard Salgado, explains:

We want to go even further. We believe it’s your right to know what kinds of requests and how many each government is making of us and other companies. However, the U.S. Department of Justice contends that U.S. law does not allow us to share information about some national security requests that we might receive. Specifically, the U.S. government argues that we cannot share information about the requests we receive (if any) under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. But you deserve to know.

Earlier this year, we brought a federal case to assert that we do indeed have the right to shine more light on the FISA process. In addition, we recently wrote a letter of support (PDF) for two pieces of legislation currently proposed in the U.S. Congress. And we’re asking governments around the world to uphold international legal agreements that respect the laws of different countries and guarantee standards for due process are met.

The longer the government keeps this form of censorship up, the worse it looks. What could possibly be "revealed" by letting Google and others say how many requests they've received under that act? The pervasive secrecy from the NSA may be a cultural trait, but there is no basis for it here.

Filed Under: first amendment, fisa amendments act, gag order, nsa, section 702, surveillance, transparency, transparency report
Companies: google

Facebook Finally Joins Google, Twitter & Microsoft With A Transparency Report; But Locks It Behind A Registration Wall

from the not-so-transparent dept

Over the years, we've been happy to see Google launch and then continue to expand its "Transparency Report," highlighting both government and private attempts to censor content or get information on users. Given how successful that's been, Twitter and Microsoft have joined in as well, with similar transparency reports.

In fact, there's been an ongoing argument between these tech companies and the DOJ, seeking permission to be able to include more data concerning FISA court orders to their transparency reports in order to be more transparent and complete -- something we'd hope the government should want, but so far, has been fighting.

The latest entrant is Facebook, who has finally released a transparency report covering government requests for data (so, no info on other types of requests, such as copyright takedowns). The report shows that Facebook is certainly rejecting a decent number of requests that it feels are inappropriate. It also shows the data on the US using "ranges" (unlike every other country). So, for the US, they note that there were between 11,000 and 12,000 requests, impacting 20,000 to 21,000 accounts (and they complied with 79% of the requests). The use of ranges is consistent with Google, Twitter and Microsoft's reports, where the government has only allowed such reports to include data on national security letters if there was a range given. This is stupid and petty by the DOJ. Having the exact aggregate number of requests -- which might include other kinds of warrants/subpoenas as well as NSLs or FISC orders -- isn't going to reveal anything dangerous.

What's interesting is that the included FAQ insists that this report "contains every request for user data we received for the first six months of 2013." If that's true then that suggests that Facebook is including FISC orders as well as NSLs. However, other companies, like Google and Microsoft have indicated that they haven't been allowed to include FISC orders, which are often under gag orders.

Oddly, and for no clear reason, Facebook put the "transparency" report behind its registration wall -- meaning that you can't see it if you're not a Facebook member or if you're not logged in. That doesn't seem very transparent, frankly. Perhaps Facebook's legal team is similarly confused about Facebook's own privacy settings, and forgot to set this page to be shareable with "the public." Thankfully, there is a screenshot of the page so you can check it out:

Filed Under: government data, requests for information, transparency report
Companies: facebook, google, microsoft, twitter

DOJ Says Tech Companies Can Sort Of Release FISA Numbers, But.. In A Way That Decreases Transparency

from the that's-not-good dept

Last week, we noted that Google had publicly requested from the DOJ that it be allowed to reveal information about the FISA surveillance requests it gets, and put them in its well-respected transparency report. Facebook, Microsoft and Twitter quickly followed with similar requests. Late Friday, the DOJ "gave permission," but in perhaps the most useless way possible. Facebook was the first to post the data that the DOJ allowed it to post, and you might immediately see the problem:

As of today, the government will only authorize us to communicate about these numbers in aggregate, and as a range...

For the six months ending December 31, 2012, the total number of user-data requests Facebook received from any and all government entities in the U.S. (including local, state, and federal, and including criminal and national security-related requests) – was between 9,000 and 10,000. These requests run the gamut – from things like a local sheriff trying to find a missing child, to a federal marshal tracking a fugitive, to a police department investigating an assault, to a national security official investigating a terrorist threat. The total number of Facebook user accounts for which data was requested pursuant to the entirety of those 9-10 thousand requests was between 18,000 and 19,000 accounts.

Right. So you may notice that this tells us absolutely nothing about the FISA requests. Because the only way that it could actually reveal anything was to bury them in with every other possible type of request. Facebook did, properly, point out that this wasn't really all that transparent:

This is progress, but we’re continuing to push for even more transparency, so that our users around the world can understand how infrequently we are asked to provide user data on national security grounds.

Microsoft posted something quite similar. And equally useless.

Here is what the data shows: For the six months ended December 31, 2012, Microsoft received between 6,000 and 7,000 criminal and national security warrants, subpoenas and orders affecting between 31,000 and 32,000 consumer accounts from U.S. governmental entities (including local, state and federal).

Microsoft, too, noted the limitation that the DOJ gave them:

We are permitted to publish data on national security orders received (including, if any, FISA Orders and FISA Directives), but only if aggregated with law enforcement requests from all other U.S. local, state and federal law enforcement agencies; only for the six-month period of July 1, 2012 thru December 31, 2012; only if the totals are presented in bands of 1,000; and all Microsoft consumer services had to be reported together.

There is one interesting tidbit:

We have not received any national security orders of the type that Verizon was reported to have received that required Verizon to provide business records about U.S. customers.

Considering that this surveillance program -- the so-called "business records" search, which comes from Section 215 of the Patriot Act with a still-secret interpretation by the FISA Court that appears to allow blanket requests for pretty much all data -- is the much more serious issue, it's nice to see Microsoft being able to say that it has received no such orders.

Google and Twitter also both received the same "permission," but both quickly realized that this was not transparency at all. Lumping in FISA requests with everything else does absolutely nothing to reveal the extent of those FISA requests. In fact, it obfuscates them:

“We have always believed that it’s important to differentiate between different types of government requests,” a Google spokesperson said in a statement. “We already publish criminal requests separately from National Security Letters. Lumping the two categories together would be a step back for users. Our request to the government is clear: to be able to publish aggregate numbers of national security requests, including FISA disclosures, separately.”

Twitter responded with a simple tweet (you expected more?) from legal director Ben Lee, saying:

We agree with @Google: It's important to be able to publish numbers of national security requests—including FISA disclosures—separately.

So, once again, we have the federal government pretending to be transparent, when it's really not. It's only trying to hide the actual number of FISA requests and the number of users impacted. Frankly, this whole demand for excess secrecy over these things makes no sense at all. What could we possibly be "alerting our enemies" to if there were broad general numbers of the number of FISA requests that were sent to Google, Twitter, Facebook and Microsoft? Sure, the actual information requested should remain secret. But the number of requests? That makes no sense at all.

Filed Under: doj, fisa, fisa court, fisa requests, fisc, transparency, transparency report
Companies: facebook, google, microsoft, twitter

Google Asks Feds For Permission To Publish FISA Requests In Its Transparency Report

from the the-feds-should-say-yes dept

In the wake of the revelation of PRISM last week, Google admitted that it does not include FISA requests in its transparency report -- which has led some to question the value of the transparency report. Now, Google has sent a public letter to Attorney General Eric Holder and FBI boss Robert Mueller, requesting permission to add FISA requests to its transparency report, suggesting that such transparency would be helpful in clearing up how frequently the government is asking Google for information.

Assertions in the press that our compliance with these requests gives the U.S. government unfettered access to our users’ data are simply untrue. However, government nondisclosure obligations regarding the number of FISA national security requests that Google receives, as well as the number of accounts covered by those requests, fuel that speculation.

We therefore ask you to help make it possible for Google to publish in our Transparency Report aggregate numbers of national security requests, including FISA disclosures—in terms of both the number we receive and their scope. Google’s numbers would clearly show that our compliance with these requests falls far short of the claims being made. Google has nothing to hide.

Google appreciates that you authorized the recent disclosure of general numbers for national security letters. There have been no adverse consequences arising from their publication, and in fact more companies are receiving your approval to do so as a result of Google’s initiative. Transparency here will likewise serve the public interest without harming national security.

It would be somewhat ridiculous for the DOJ to refuse this request, but we're used to the DOJ doing stupid things these days.

Filed Under: doj, eric holder, fbi, fisa, fisa requests, robert mueller, transparency report
Companies: google