The FISA Amendments Act Is Clearly Unconstitutional; And Congress Doesn't Care

from the but-but-terrorism dept

We've been discussing the now annual rush to re-approve the FISA Amendments Act, despite the fact that the original bill was on shaky constitutional ground, and it's been made much (much, much) worse due to a secret interpretation of what the law means (a secret interpretation that many in Congress apparently have no interest in finding out about). Andrew Napolitano, a former judge, has penned an interesting column laying out many of the reasons why the whole thing is completely unconstitutional. First, he notes that the establishment of FISA itself is likely a violation of the 4th Amendment:

The constitutional standard for all search warrants is probable cause of crime. FISA, however, established a new, different and lesser standard -- thus unconstitutional on its face since Congress is bound by, and cannot change, the Constitution -- of probable cause of status. The status was that of an agent of a foreign power. So, under FISA, the feds needed to demonstrate to a secret court only that a non-American physically present in the U.S., perhaps under the guise of a student, diplomat or embassy janitor, was really an agent of a foreign power, and the demonstration of that agency alone was sufficient to authorize a search warrant to listen to the agent's telephone calls or read his mail.

Already troubling enough, but, as Napolitano notes, things weren't just left there. They've continued to stretch and change the conditions, taking it further and further into unconstitutional realms:

Over time, the requirement of status as a foreign agent was modified to status as a foreign person. This, of course, was an even lesser standard and one rarely rejected by the FISA court. In fact, that court has rarely rejected anything, having granted search warrants in well over 97 percent of applications. This is hardly harmless, as foreign persons in the U.S. are frequently talking to Americans in the U.S. Thus, not only did FISA violate the privacy rights of foreigners (the Fourth Amendment protects "people," not just Americans); it violated the rights of those with whom they were communicating, American or non-American.

It gets worse. The Patriot Act, which was enacted in 2001 and permits federal agents to write their own search warrants in violation of the Fourth Amendment, actually amended FISA so as to do away with the FISA-issued search warrant requirement when the foreign person is outside the U.S. This means that if you email or call your cousin in Europe or a business colleague in Asia, the feds are reading or listening, without a warrant, without suspicion, without records and without evidence of anything unlawful.

It's just those Patriot Act amendments (the FISA Amendments Act) that is being debated right now. And given some of the questions being asked by politicians who understand the "secret interpretation" of the FISA Amendments Act, it appears that it actually gives law enforcement the ability to go even further. So it's not even just about emailing or calling your cousin in Europe, but as long as law enforcement (a) claims that it's related to a terrorism investigation and (b) they have no specific knowledge at the time of acquisition only that the communication is domestic -- then they can collect just about anything. So, under that interpretation, it appears that the NSA can just collect well, almost anything, by saying that it's all for the sake of a permanent and all encompassing terrorism investigation, and since they're just collecting absolutely everything, they have no specific knowledge at the time of acquisition that the communication is domestic.

Considering that Napolitano's argument starts from the idea that FISA itself is unconstitutional, looking at where we are now from where we started, we're no longer just in "unconstitutional" mode, in which we've tip toed over the boundary. We're now in a full on, 100% "let's mock the Constitution" mode. And, Napolitano, like many others, wonders why almost no one in Congress is willing to point this out:

Moreover, everyone in Congress has taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, which could not be more clear: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects..." shall not be violated, except via a warrant issued by a neutral judge upon the judge finding probable cause of crime. If we let Congress, which is a creature of the Constitution, change the Constitution, then no one's liberty or property is safe, and freedom is dependent upon the political needs of those in power.

The President and the leadership of both political parties in both houses of Congress have abandoned their oaths to uphold the Constitution. They have claimed that foreigners and their American communicants are committed to destroying the country and only the invasion of everyone's right to privacy will keep us safe. They are violating the privacy of us all to find the communications of a few. Who will keep us safe from them?

It's no secret that politicians use fear to increase their own power and to cut away at civil liberties. We have plenty of history that demonstrates that. It's just a real shame that so few people seem willing to speak out about this -- or that so few people even seem to care that the government has done this.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, congress, constitution, fisa, fisa amendments act, privacy, warrants

Negotiations Continue Over Extension Of Feds Ability To Spy On Americans; But No Debate On The Issues

from the of-course-not dept

With the end of the year approaching, Senator Ron Wyden has admitted that he's willing to drop the hold on the renewal for the FISA Amendments Act in exchange for allowing some key amendments to be voted on. As summarized by David Kravetz at Wired:

Wyden said he would lift his hold in exchange for a Senate floor vote on an amendment requiring the government to account for how many times Americans’ communications have been accepted, and another amendment prohibiting U.S. spy agencies from reviewing the communications of Americans ensnared in the program.

If that doesn’t go over, he’d lift the hold so the Senate could vote on brief extension of the act so his amendments and others could be fully debated next year.

“I’m willing to go along with a short-term extension as long as we have a chance in the early future, in 2013, to have a debate,” Wyden said.

Of course, we've seen this before. Just last year we had a "short-term extension" on these things for the sake of debate, but the "debate" never came. Instead, everyone waits until now, when the rules are about to expire, and then demand that it be renewed, sans debate, or else "terrorism!" The whole process is really kind of unfortunate. There should have been a debate years ago, before the FISA Amendments Act was rushed into law. But, unfortunately, actually considering the implications of these laws -- and how they're used and interpreted -- just doesn't seem to be a major issue for Congress.

Filed Under: debate, fisa, fisa amendments act, hold, negotiations, ron wyden

National Security Bosses Still Claiming It Would Violate National Security To Tell You If They Violate Your Privacy

from the whose-security-are-we-talking-about? dept

Via Julian Sanchez we learn that Senator Ron Wyden has released some updated responses from our national intelligence bosses concerning the questions that Wyden (and a few other Senators) have been asking for years. It's been pretty clear that a "secret" interpretation under the FISA Amendments Act (related to the Patriot Act) has meant that the NSA is scooping up tons of American communications, even as its mandate is that it only cover foreign intelligence—and Wyden has been pushing for more information.

It appears that there are some pretty significant loopholes that have allowed the NSA to go a lot further. For example, it isn't allowed to collect information on Americans if "it's known at the time of acquisition" that the communications are domestic. So as long as it doesn't look when it's acquiring (but does look later) there's no problem. Similarly, it appears that the secret interpretation also means as long as the target of the investigation being conducted -- and not necessarily the person whose communication is being intercepted -- is a foreign terrorist, the communication is fair game. That is, so long as the NSA can claim that they're collecting the information to go after Al Qaeda, they can claim that it's valid to intercept almost anything, as it "targets" foreign communications, even if it's collecting purely domestic communications. The key to all of this is reports that the NSA is likely collecting a massive chunk of information, possibly including pretty much all mobile phone records. Senator Wyden keeps asking about how many Americans have had their data collected, and what interpretation the NSA is using. These seem like completely valid questions, but the NSA and James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, keep refusing to answer.

After the NSA responded to yet another request from Wyden for answers to these questions, Wyden once again demanded answers from James Clapper, the Director of National Security. Wyden, along with Senators Jeff Merkeley, Tom Udall and Mark Udall, sent a letter simply asking Clapper to respond to four simple questions -- many of which could be answered with a simple yes or no:

First, we asked if any entities have made any estimates -- even imprecise estimates -- about how many US cmmunications have been collected under section 702 of the FISA statute (which is the central provision of the FISA Amendments Act). You did not answer this question. Please provide an answer. We would expect this answer to be unclassified, but if you disagree please provide your reasons for keeping this answer secret.

Second, we asked if it was possible to estimate the order of magnitude of this number. (For example, is the number of US communications collected under section 702 closer to 100. or 100.000. or 100 million?) You did not answer this question directly, however the Director of the NSA has made public statements that appear to estimate this order of magnitude. Specifically, the NSA Director has said that "the story that [the NSA] has millions or hundreds of millions of dossiers on people is absolutely false." Please explain whether this statement should be understood to mean that the number of US communications collected under section 702 is less than "millions or hundreds of millions." Since the NSA Director made this statement publicly, we would expect this answer to be unclassified as well.

Third, we asked if any wholly domestic American communications had been collected under section 702 authorities. Your response was classified. We do not understand how simply stating whether any wholly domestic communications have been collected under section 702 authorities would have any impact at all on US national security interests. if you believe that it would, please explain why. And if you agree that it would not, please provide an unclassified answer to this question.

Fourth, we noted that the FISA Amendments Act does not prohibit searching through communications collected under section 702 to find the communications of particular Americans, and asked if the US government has ever attempted to search for the communications of a specific American in this way without a warrant or emergency authorization. Your response was classified. We do not understand how providing a 'yes' or 'no' answer to this question would impact US national security interests in any way, and we ask that you provide an unclassified response.

They further note, via a footnote, that the idea that it's reasonable to answer these questions in a classified manner because Senators can read the classified answers makes little sense concerning the important debate on renewing the FISA Amendments Act, since the key staffers who Senators hire to understand this stuff probably can't read those classified responses.

We note that classifying these answers does not just keep them secret from the public. Most members of Congress including eleven of the thirteen senators that signed our letter - do not have any staff who are cleared to read your attachment, which will make it extremely difficult for most members to review and understand these" answers.

The whole thing is ridiculous... and making it even more ridiculous is the response sent by Clapper which basically ignores the questions and says that he's happy to meet directly with any Senator in a classified setting to answer questions:

We cannot provide additional answers to your questions in an unclassified format. Rather than provide you with imprecise, unclassified information, I reiterate our offer to meet with you -- and any other Members of Congress -- in a classified setting to discuss these authorities and answer any questions you might have.

Of course, that defeats the point of letting the public know about how these laws are being interpreted and how much of their communications are being collected by the NSA. Furthermore, it fails to take into account the footnoted point that the key staffers who help elected officials understand this stuff may not be allowed to learn about these answers. Clapper's letter is even more ridiculous when he explains the justifications for not answering the questions. Basically, he gives a blanket "national security" answer, claiming that he's "balancing" the issues of security and public debate:

I also share your interest in an informed public debate on the government's use of its intelligence collection authorities. As you know, it is my responsibility under the law to protect critical intelligence activities from public disclosure in order to safeguard sensitive sources and methods, including the government's acquisition of vital foreign intelligence information through FAA authorities. Our earlier publicly available letters, including my August 24, 2012 unclassified letter (with classified annex) responding to your July 26, 2012 inquiry, and General Alexander's November 13, 2012 letter, properly balance protecting classified information and informing the public of the manner in which FAA is implemented.

That is, to put it simply: hogwash. As the original letter makes clear, there is no reason that national security is threatened by answering the basic questions being asked. Saying whether or not an estimate has been made on how many Americans have had their communications intercepted (not even saying what that number is) is not going to violate national security. As for the NSA letter from General Alexander that Clapper mentions, Wyden has released that too and it's equally ridiculous -- again, insisting that the answers to such basic questions need to be classified.

In the end, it looks like the NSA and the National Intelligence Director aren't so interested in protecting national security with these non-answers, but their own job security. Claiming that such information needs to be kept secret may allow them to keep quiet how they've been using unique interpretations of the law to collect American citizens' communications, even as Congress pretends that the bill is being interpreted as written, whereby domestic communications are off limits. The whole thing has become a joke, and shows what intelligence officials will do when there's no real oversight, and they can spy on citizens at will under a flimsy secret interpretation of the law that they never have to reveal.

The government spying on Americans using "secret interpretations" of laws, where intelligence officials get to play word games, rather than answer straight questions from Congress? That's not the way these things are supposed to work.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, fisa, fisa amendments act, james clapper, keith alexander, nsa, privacy, ron wyden

Supreme Court Puzzles: How There Can Be Oversight Concerning Warrantless Wiretapping If No One Can Sue?

from the that-would-appear-to-be-a-problem dept

One of the more ridiculous things about the government's ongoing campaign of secret surveillance on Americans is how hard it's fought back against anyone who has sought to have the policy tested in the courts. If the feds were confident that what they were doing was legal, they wouldn't be so aggressive in blocking each and every attempt. When the ACLU and others filed suit over the warrantless wiretapping under the FISA Amendments Bill (the Clapper v. Amnesty International case) the lower court rulings were especially troubling, because it was ruled that there was no standing to sue, because there was no direct proof of such spying. So that leaves the public in quite a bind. They can't complain about the program unless they can prove they've been spied upon, but they can't do that unless they know more about the program, which is secret. Someone page Joseph Heller.

The part of the case now at the Supreme Court is only over whether or not there is significant standing for Amnesty International and the ACLU to move the case forward. The government insists, quite vehemently, that as long as no one knows it's spying on them, they can't sue. The SCOTUS blog has a nice recap, saying that the Justices were "sensitive" to the lawyers who want to sue, but as we've warned before, what Justices say at oral hearings is not always a good barometer for how they'll eventually rule. Still, we might as well go through the transcript for some key points. The report kicked off with Solicitor General (and former entertainment industry litigator) Donald Verrilli being quizzed on the fact that, under his interpretation, no one could ever bring a lawsuit until after they were charged with a crime and knew about the details. That's neither fair, nor reasonable. Verrilli tries to cook up some other scenarios, but they all appear quite unlikely.

And, thankfully, Justice Ginsburg calls him on this point:

General Verrilli, can you be specific on who that person would be? Because, as I understand it, it's unlikely that, for example, the lawyers in this case would be charged with any criminal offense. It's more probable that their clients would be; but, according to the government, their clients have no Fourth Amendment rights because they are people who are noncitizens who acted abroad.

So it's hard for me to envision. I see the theoretical possibility, but I don't see a real person who would be subject to a Federal charge who could raise an objection.

In other words: "don't we have a problem when any effective oversight is written out of the law?"

Later, Ginsburg also wonders if the government will just claim state secrets to get out of having to provide info anyway. In the end, the debate comes down to if a lawyer just thinking that the government is spying on his phone calls, such that he's already modifying his behavior, is a form of "harm," and whether or not we trust the special FISA court (set up to monitor this stuff) to do a good job in weeding out abuses. Concerning "thinking" that the government is spying on a call, Verrilli tried to claim that there's no real harm there because a lawyer has an ethical obligation to take greater precautions. Seriously:

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, is it really such speculation, General? I mean, just imagine that -- yourself in this lawyer's position, and the lawyer says, I'm representing a person associated with a terrorist organization, I'm representing KLM in the case of one of these lawyers, and I'm going to be talking to that person's family members and associates and trying to find out everything that I can.

Now, as a lawyer, would you take precautions, or would you pick up the phone and start writing e-mails to all those people?

GENERAL VERRILLI: If I took precautions, it would be because of a belief that I had to comply with an ethics rule, and the ethics rule would be the cause of me taking those precautions. It doesn't change the standard.

JUSTICE KAGAN: I don't even think it has to do with an ethics rule. If you're a good lawyer -forget the ethics rule and how the ethics rules apply. Are you really going to tell me that you, as a lawyer, would just pick up the phone in the face of this statute and talk to these terrorists' associates?

On the side of the lawyers seeking standing, their lawyer, Jameel Jaffer, tried to build on the hypothetical that the Justices raised, in which there's a "substantial risk" of having communications intercepted, leading them to change their behavior. Here Chief Justice Roberts kept pushing back that the standard is "certainly impending" rather than "substantial risk."

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You have two arguments; one is likelihood of future injury and the other is present obligations or cause. I want to focus on the former. Our standard is certainly impending, and you articulated it by saying, substantial risk. There is obviously a vast difference between those two.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I don't think, Your Honor, that the Court has settled on certainly impending. The cases that the -- the Government cites are cases like -- I think that the one that the Government cites, relies on most heavily is Summers. But in Summers, the distinction between likelihood and certainly impending was not one that the Court relied on in -- in that decision. The Court said that plaintiffs couldn't meet even the lower standard. So I think that the discussion of certainly impending -

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But both in Summers and Monsanto the Government tells us: We knew that the governmental act was occurring, and then once we knew that, the question was substantial risk.

MR. JAFFER: Justice Kennedy, the -- the -the cases that we rely on, Monsanto, Laidlaw, Meese v. Keene, these are cases in which the Court didn't look to the certainly impending standard at all. The question that the Court asked in those cases was: Is there a substantial risk? Is there a substantial risk that effectively compels the plaintiffs to act in the way they are -- they are acting?

Meanwhile, Justice Scalia seemed to think that the FISA Court could really be trusted to automatically ferret out 4th Amendment violations without, say, lawyers being spied upon being able to raise the issue themselves. Scalia, it would appear, is tremendously trusting in the powers of the FISA Court to actually stop excessive surveillance. While Jaffer points out that the current fight to renew the FISA Amendments Act suggests otherwise, since it removed the basic tests that the FISA Court had to look at the specifics (about the particular person or location being monitored) and gives the government much more leeway to spy broadly:

JUSTICE SCALIA: Does that assessment take into account the fact that a court is going to pass upon the Government's ability to intercept these communications?

MR. JAFFER: It does, Justice Scalia. I mean you -- you are right that there is a court that in some sense stands between plaintiffs and the future injury that they -- that they fear.

JUSTICE SCALIA: With the obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment.

MR. JAFFER: I don't think it's that simple. The -- the -- the court, the FISA court, is tasked with assessing the reasonableness of targeting and minimization procedures. But the statute itself forecloses the court from imposing the kinds of limits that plaintiffs think the Fourth Amendment requires. So for example, the statute itself in section (g)(4) says that the Government is not required to identify the facilities to be monitored. And the statute itself in defining targeting procedures defines them to be procedures intended to ensure that the targets are outside the United States.

JUSTICE SCALIA: But if as you say those procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, it doesn't matter what the statute says.

MR. JAFFER: Well, the Court would have to -

JUSTICE SCALIA: If those statutory provisions would produce a violation of the Fourth Amendment, they are null and void, right?

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think that's right.

The -- the court -

JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So the FISA Court would presumably know that.

MR. JAFFER: Well, I think if that had happened over the last 4 years, the Government wouldn't be seeking reauthorization of the statute now.

Later, he pushes back again, noting that the FISA Court doesn't get enough details to make the determination:

JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see how the rest of your challenge or your challenge to the remainder of this statute can be characterized as a facial challenge, because it necessarily assumes that the FISA court will mistakenly say that there has been no Fourth Amendment violation, doesn't it?

MR. JAFFER: I don't think that's so, Justice Scalia. Our concern is not -- not that -- that the FISA court will make mistakes, although it well might. The concern -- the main concern is that the reasonableness inquiry that the FISA court engages in is a narrowly cabined one. They court can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified the facilities. They can't say this is unreasonable because you haven't identified a specific target.

On the whole, it does seem like it may be difficult to convince a majority of the Justices that there is standing here. This is unfortunate, because clearly some of the Justices are worried about the implications of the federal government being able to pass a law for secret spying that no one can ever challenge since they'll never know about it. But, if they can't prove that the spying actually took place, then it's tough for them to be able to show the actual harm. Hopefully the Court recognizes that the uncertainty surrounding the likely monitoring of communications is legitimate harm... but it seems like a longshot.

Filed Under: fisa, fisa amendments act, standing, supreme court, surveillance
Companies: aclu, amnesty international

Washington Post: Yes, We Need To Give Up Liberty For Security

from the oh-really-now? dept

By now you've probably seen the paraphrase of a Ben Franklin quote that those who give up liberty for security, deserve neither (he said similar things a few different ways, but the standard actual quote is: "Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.") Whatever the actual quote is, there is quite a lot of truth to it. Giving up liberty for the sake of security rarely works out as planned. Either way, it appears that the editorial board of the Washington Post is either wholly unfamiliar with the quote, or believes it to be untrue. It has come out with an editorial arguing in favor of extending the FISA Amendments Act (and against an ACLU/EFF challenge to the law, to be heard today at the Supreme Court, even with the crazy weather) saying that it is perfectly fine to "give up liberty" for security:

Discomfort with the government’s capacity, technical or legal, to collect and retain massive amounts of personal information is understandable. But the 2008 FISA amendments sought a compromise between two essential goals: preserving American liberty and robustly defending Americans’ lives and property. We favored the law and believe that it should be extended.

That's somewhat ridiculous. After all, as we've noted over and over again, almost no one seems to understand what's actually in the FISA Amendments Act, in part because there's a secret interpretation of it that only the government knows. This means that many, many people, including those in Congress, are clearly misrepresenting what's in the law. The fact that the NSA refuses to say how often it has used this secret interpretation to spy on Americans should be a pretty big warning sign -- especially as politicians who are either clueless or ignorant claim that it can't be used to spy on Americans.

And really, this is the root of the "don't give up liberty for security" quote. Once you do that, you're cooked, because it's a situation that only expands in one direction. Those who seek to hold back liberty will always make use of scare stories and FUD to seek to be able to spy further. You would think that the editorial board of the Washington Post, which has been covering this kind of mess for quite some time, would actually have some sort of ability to look back at history. Apparently its historical knowledge is close to nil.

Filed Under: fisa, fisa amendments act, liberty, security, spying, surveillance
Companies: washington post

Credit Where It's Due: DOJ Changes Its Tune On FISA Transparency

from the now-let's-see-what-happens dept

Earlier this week, I complained that the Department of Justice seemed to be stonewalling a Freedom of Information Act request I’d filed seeking copies of mandatory semi-annual reports to Congress on the National Security Agency’s compliance with the procedures and civil liberties safeguards of the FISA Amendments Act--which the House voted yesterday to reauthorize for another five years. After sitting on the request for two months (the statutory deadline is 20 business days), DOJ had finally replied with a letter claiming they could "neither confirm or deny the existence" of reports that were required by federal law. I thought this was a little ridiculous. Fortunately, there were officials at the Justice Department who thought so too.

Having appealed the denial of my request, I got an impressively prompt reply on Tuesday evening from the director of the Office of Information Policy at DOJ, assuring me that she recognized the agency's initial response had been "incorrect," and that a new one would be forthcoming immediately. By Wednesday morning, their stance had changed entirely: They had found the reports I sought, and were forwarding them to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for review to determine what would need to be redacted before release--with a request that ODNI seek to expedite its analysis to compensate for their own delay.

Now, to be sure, I'd rather have had this response a month ago, and the documents before the House vote, but at this point DOJ appears to be doing exactly what they're supposed to and making a good faith effort to facilitate the redaction and release of these important assessments. So it seemed appropriate to follow up on my initial blog post to acknowledge that--and in particular Office of Information Policy director Melanie Pustay, who straightforwardly acknowledged the error and acted quickly to correct it. We'll see soon enough whether a similar spirit of transparency reigns at ODNI.

Cross-posted from Cato-at-Liberty.

Filed Under: doj, fisa, fisa amendments act, foia, freedom of information, mistakes, odni

How A Random Lawsuit About Telco Policy Probably Resulted In Broad, Secret Law Enabling NSA To Spy On You

from the well-that's-fun dept

We've written many times about the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), of which there is a secret interpretation that certainly appears to allow the NSA to spy on all sorts of email communications without a warrant -- something that is not at all obvious upfront (and, in fact, which many in Congress apparently do not know about). While Senators Wyden and Udall have been working hard to try to force the government to reveal either the secret interpretation or how many Americans have been spied on, the rest of Congress appears to not want to know, while rubber stamping the renewals to let the effort continue.

There have been some questions about how all of this came about, and just why law enforcement officials keep insisting the FAA is so vital. Julian Sanchez may have worked out some key details, and provides a very compelling explanation. Seven years ago, the Supreme Court ruled in the Brand X case (the same day the Grokster ruling came out), basically saying that cable networks did not qualify for "common carrier" status, because they were "information services" rather than telco services. The direct end result was that broadband providers no longer had to share lines with service providers. But, as Sanchez notes, there may have been an unrelated indirect impact: by removing the common carrier designation, the NSA may have lost its legal authority to "tap" live communications on such networks without a warrant. Sanchez explains the nitty gritty:

“If FISA’s reference to ‘common carrier’ were interpreted in accord with the Communications Act,” Kris and Wilson explain, explicitly citing the Brand X decision, “information (such as e-mail) being carried on a cable owned and offered by a cable modem service provider would not be a ‘wire communication’ under FISA, and acquisition of such information would not be ‘electronic surveillance’ under” the definition that applies to traditional phone calls.

Sanchez provides a lot more detail, which is worth reading in full, because it's quite complex. However, it suggests that the Bush administration's focus on "deregulating" cable may have undercut the NSA's "spy on everyone" program through a simple definition change. The FAA, then, was put in place (partly) to once again enable the NSA to get access to a bunch of live communications legally, whereas it's quite possible that the FISA court had found, in light of Brand X, that the efforts had been against the law. Now, you can argue that the change due to the Brand X decision is no big deal, because it was just clarifying some rules, and dealing with antiquated language in the statute. But, again, since so much of this happened in secret, if Sanchez's story is accurate, it more or less allowed the government to write very broad rules, such as those now allowing such broad surveillance.

So the FISA Amendments Act allows the government to target foreigners and capture conversations with Americans — with no warrant required, so long as they aren’t actually trying to wiretap the American via a technical loophole.

But if the government’s problem is an inability to reliably determine the location of parties to a communication, it’s not clear why we should be confident that interception under this broad new authority can reliably avoid acquiring many purely domestic communications. Even if it can, blanket authority to acquire the international communications of Americans — with no requirement that the foreign side of the conversation be suspected of any connection to terrorism or espionage‹seems like an incredibly broad way of addressing the issue.

Perhaps Kris and Wilson are correct that a narrower solution to the problem would have been unworkable. On the other hand, perhaps legislators would have tried a bit harder to craft a viable narrow solution if they, and the general public, had clearly understood exactly what the problem was.

Sanchez goes on to point out that if this story is accurate, and if the FISA court had basically upended the feds' spying program becuase of some definitional issues, a more reasonable and transparent approach would simply be to work together with lawmakers and civil liberties experts to actually focus in on the specific problem. Instead, it appears they may have used this loophole to massively expand spying capabilities, with no public oversight at all.

Filed Under: common carrier, deregulation, fisa, nsa, privacy, spying, telco policy
Companies: brand x

Feds Wait Until Late Friday To Admit That, Yeah, They Ignored The 4th Amendment

from the congress-will-ignore-it-anyway dept

While Senator Wyden has been banging the drum about privacy violations committed by the federal government under the FISA Amendments Act for quite some time, the rest of Congress seems perfectly content to stay ignorant and pretend that there's no possible way that the feds might be abusing the powers that let them spy on nearly anyone without much (if any) oversight. So it's interesting that Wyden was finally able to squeeze out of the Director of National Intelligence an admission that, oh yeah, the feds violated the 4th Amendment. As covered by the always awesome reporting by Spencer Ackerman at Wired:

The head of the U.S. government’s vast spying apparatus has conceded that recent surveillance efforts on at least one occasion violated the Constitutional prohibitions on unlawful search and seizure.

The admission comes in a letter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassifying statements that a top U.S. Senator wished to make public in order to call attention to the government’s 2008 expansion of its key surveillance law.

The letter is embedded below. There are two key admissions in there that are new:

• It is also true that on at least one occasion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court held that some collection carried out pursuant to the Section 702 minimization procedures used by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
• I believe that the government's implementation of Section 702 of FISA has sometimes circumvented the spirit of the law, and on at least one occasion the FISA Court has reached this same conclusion.

Of course, they chose to release this bit of information late on a Friday evening -- exactly the time you release something when you want to bury it. The public should not let this news die. They should be asking their elected officials why they're rushing to re-approve the FAA, and have so far refused to have even the slightest curiosity about what the feds are doing with these powers -- even to the point of claiming that since they've seen no evidence of abuse (not that they've asked for it) they shouldn't assume that there is any. Well, now there's some evidence of abuse. Shouldn't Congress be seeking more information, rather than just rubber stamping a renewal of such powers?

Filed Under: 4th amendment, abuse, faa, fisa, fisa amendments act, privacy, ron wyden

Congress Plays See-No-Evil, Pretend-There's-No-Evil, Let-The-Evil-Continue With NSA Domestic Spying

from the wtf dept

We're still completely perplexed at how anyone in Congress could recognize that the NSA has refused to tell Congress how often it's violated the privacy of Americans without a warrant under the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) -- and then still vote to renew it. What kind of "oversight" is that? As Julian Sanchez recently wrote, it's no oversight at all. As he notes, the law requires the NSA to "prevent" the spying on folks when both parties in communication are in the US -- but here, the NSA is admitting that it has no mechanism to actually do that. Either (a) it's lying or (b) it's admitting that it cannot do what the law requires.

If we care about the spirit as well as the letter of that constraint being respected, it ought to be a little disturbing that the NSA has admitted it doesn’t have any systematic mechanism for identifying communications with U.S. endpoints. Similar considerations apply to the “minimization procedures” which are supposed to limit the retention and dissemination of information about U.S. persons: How meaningfully can these be applied if there’s no systematic effort to detect when a U.S. person is party to a communication?

Normally, this should be the point at which Congress steps in and says "no more" to the NSA. Instead, it shuns those who even ask the basic questions -- and as in the case of Rep. Dan Lungren, pretends that as long as no one proves to them that the NSA is abusing its power, there's simply no reason to demand evidence. That's not oversight. That's willful ignorance.

And... given that they're choosing to ignore their own oversight obligations over the NSA's spying on Americans, it should come as no surprise that the House Intelligence Committee unanimously voted to extend the FAA for five more years. Why not? It's not like Congress is actually going to make sure that the NSA is playing by the rules. The NSA apparently just needs to say that it would be too much work to do what the law requires and Congress says, "here, have a gift of five more years to spy on Americans against the specifics of the law." And, once again, as Sanchez points out, there are plenty of ways that the NSA could at least estimate how many Americans they're spying on.

But why would it do that? As Sanchez also points out, the NSA seems to redact anything even remotely embarrassing from its reports... including data on how often it failed to follow the law:

More generally, these reports contain a good deal of redacted statistical information that there is simply no plausible excuse for keeping secret. A table of “statistical data relating to compliance incidents,” for example, is included—but entirely blacked out. Are we to believe that the national security of the United States would be imperiled if the public knew the number of times the NSA had difficulty following the law? The reviewers conclude that the “number of compliance incidents remains small, particularly when compared with the total amount of activity”—but is there any legitimate reason for barring the public from knowing what counts as a “small” number, or just how massive the “total amount of activity” truly is?

How do folks in Congress who vote for this kind of thing defend such actions? They can't say that it's to protect Americans, when they refuse to even seek to get the data on whether or not Americans are being illegally spied upon.

Filed Under: congress, fisa, fisa amendments act, nsa, oversight, privacy, spying, warrants

Lamar Smith & House Judiciary Committee Don't Want To Know How Often The NSA Spies On Americans

from the fingers-in-ears-approach dept

Once again, we are left stunned by the sheer ridiculousness of Congress. In a House Judiciary Committee markup concerning the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), a proposed amendment to require the NSA to reveal how many times it had spied on Americans was voted down 20 - 11, led by chair Lamar Smith who just kept talking about how "important" it was get past the markup phase and pass the bill. Meanwhile, Rep. Dan Lungren lashed out at those who wanted the NSA to explain how often it had spied on Americans without warrants under this bill by saying (and I kid you not): "What evidence is there that it is being used to spy on Americans?"

You see, that's the problem. The NSA doesn't have to tell anyone -- and whenever officials ask, they're given ridiculous answers, like the claim that it would violate the privacy of Americans to tell Congress how many Americans' privacy the NSA violated. It's stunning that our elected officials -- many of whom don't know themselves what the NSA is doing -- seem to have no qualms passing this update to the bill without even being willing to ask a simple question: how many Americans have been spied on using this regulation?

On the Senate side, as we've noted, Senators Wyden and Udall have been indicating (within the limitations they have, due to security clearances) that the NSA is quite clearly using this law incredibly broadly -- perhaps to the level of scooping up all phone data, which goes way, way, way beyond the text of the law. If some in Congress are so sure that there's no evidence that it's being used to spy on Americans, then have the NSA answer the damn question. But, no, instead, they insist that we just have to push it through, or, as Lamar Smith says, "We have a duty to ensure the intelligence community can gather the intelligence they need to protect our country."

You know who you have an even bigger duty to? The American public. That's who you represent. Not the intelligence community. The failure of our elected officials to give even the most basic oversight to the NSA is astonishing. It's shameful. We all deserve better.

Filed Under: congress, faa, fisa, house judiciary committee, lamar smith, marc udall, nsa, ron wyden