Appeals Court Rejects Clearview's Attempt To Dodge A State Lawsuit By Trying To Make It A Federal Case

from the yeah...-it's-a-little-weird dept

Clearview's attempt to dodge a potential class-action lawsuit filed against it in Illinois has just been booted back to the Illinois court system by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Clearview -- facial recognition's current supervillain -- was sued in Illinois by Illinoisans alleging violation of Illinois law. Multiple times.

The plaintiffs claimed Clearview's scraping of publicly available photos, location data, and other information from a variety of websites and social media platforms violated the state's law, which requires companies to obtain permission from people before harvesting and selling access to this data.

This same law netted a $550 million settlement from Facebook for its preemptive tagging of people in photos, something a court found to be a violation the law passed by the state in 2008. This settlement appeared to rattle Clearview, which filed documents with the court stating it would no longer do business in Illinois or knowingly collect biometric information from Illinois residents.

This lawsuit continues, however, thanks to the Seventh Circuit. In a somewhat novel move, the plaintiffs argued they do not have standing to pursue this lawsuit in federal court. Clearview argued otherwise, hoping to establish enough standing to take the lawsuit federal, at which point it would agree the plaintiffs did not have enough standing to move the case forward.

It's not often plaintiffs argue against their own standing, but the plaintiffs want this case in a state court, where they can pursue Clearview for violation of state laws. The only federal hook is Clearview's existence as a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York. State courts will normally allow lawsuits like these to be moved to federal court because the plaintiffs and defendant aren't located in the same state.

The district court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs: they did not allege any federal harms or anything else that would make the case better served at the federal level. The opening of the Seventh Circuit's opinion [PDF] highlights the bizarre nature of this appeal:

Oddly, [plaintiff Melissa] Thornley insists that she lacks standing, and it is the defendant, Clearview AI, Inc., that is championing her right to sue in federal court. That peculiar line-up exists for reasons that only a civil procedure buff could love: the case started out in an Illinois state court, but Clearview removed it to federal court. Thornley wants to return to state court to litigate the BIPA claims, but Clearview prefers a federal forum. The case may stay in federal court, however, only if the more stringent federal standards for standing can be satisfied; Illinois (as is its right) has a more liberal attitude toward the kinds of cases its courts are authorized to entertain. The district court held that Thornley has alleged only a bare statutory violation, not the kind of concrete and particularized harm that would support standing, and thus ordered the action remanded to the state court.

The court notes this reversal of roles has led to an equally unusual appeal. Normally, plaintiffs argue in favor of their standing to sue. In this case, the plaintiffs are arguing against this because it runs contrary to their interests and in favor of Clearview's. After examining far more precedent than one would imagine would be on hand, the Appeals Court says the case must exit the federal court system and return to Illinois.

The Appeals Court says the plaintiffs are free to craft their allegations as narrowly as they'd like. And as much as Clearview would like to be accused of even greater violations to (briefly) take the case federal for an easier dismissal, it's not up to the courts to tell plaintiffs how to craft their arguments or shuffle things from state to federal just because something a federal court could handle could plausibly be alleged.

[Thornley] does not contest either the existence of minimal diversity (she is a citizen of Illinois, and Clearview is a citizen of Delaware and New York) or the fact that more than $5,000,000 is at stake. Instead, she has simply offered a class definition that is narrower than it might have been. We have no reason to believe that the district court, acting on its own initiative, would certify a different and broader class; to that extent, the rule that the plaintiff controls her own case applies. And unlike the situation in Standard Fire, people who fall outside Thornley’s class definition are totally unaffected by this litigation. If they wish to sue Clearview, either alone or under a class definition that includes an allegation of injury, they are free to do so. Indeed, as we noted earlier, there are a number of class actions pending against Clearview, many of which appear to be broader than this one. We know of nothing that would prevent a putative class representative from taking a conservative approach to class definition. And if the plaintiffs change their tune in the state court, Clearview will be able to attempt to remove again to federal court, though we do not predict the outcome of such an effort.

Clearview's counterintuitive attempt to make a federal mountain out of the plaintiff's state molehill fails. The case remains in the state court system and limited to a specific violation of state law. Clearview will still have to defend itself against these claims.

Filed Under: facial recognition, illinois, jurisdiction, privacy, removal, standing
Companies: clearview

District Court Rejects CDT's Challenge Of Trump's Ridiculous Executive Order On Section 230

from the no-standing dept

Back in May, you may recall, Donald Trump issued his silly executive order on Section 230 in response to Twitter adding a couple fact checks to blatant conspiracy theory nonsense that Trump was posting. A week later, the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) sued over the executive order, arguing that it was unconstitutional, and clearly retaliatory against Twitter.

When CDT filed the lawsuit I noted that the big question would be whether or not CDT could show standing in order to challenge the order, as it would be harder to prove that it impacted CDT directly. CDT argued that because the executive order would divert its attention and resources away from other, more important, fights regarding free speech online and government surveillance, it injured the organization.

On Friday, a judge agreed with my initial gut reaction and said that CDT failed to show standing. Basically, since the order only directed the government to do a bunch of stupid things, it didn't really impact CDT.

But Order 13,925 is most notable at this point for what it does not do. It imposes no obligation on CDT (or any other private party), but it merely directs government officials to take preliminary steps towards possible lawmaking. CDT’s claimed injury is not concrete or imminent and is thus insufficient to establish Article III standing. Even if CDT managed to clear the standing hurdle, it faces redressability and ripeness problems too. The Court will therefore dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

The claim that this silly waste of time diverted resources from more serious issues doesn't impress the court:

If an organization alleges “only impairment of its advocacy,” that “will not suffice” to show standing. Turlock, 786 F.3d at 24; see also Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 919 (“Our precedent makes clear that an organization’s use of resources for litigation, investigation in anticipation of litigation, or advocacy is not sufficient to give rise to an Article III injury.”). “This is true whether the advocacy takes place through litigation or administrative proceedings.” Turlock, 786 F.3d at 24. More, “an organization does not suffer an injury in fact where it expends resources to educate its members and others unless doing so subjects the organization to operational costs beyond those normally expended.” Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 920 (cleaned up).

Though somewhat ridiculously the judge, Trevor McFadden (appointed by Donald Trump), actually throws in an incredibly silly line, claiming that CDT should be applauding Donald Trump's executive order, which he suggests (laughably) is about protecting free speech online.

CDT has not met its burden to show an injury to its interests. To begin, there does not appear to be a “direct conflict” between Order 13,925 and CDT’s stated mission. The Order expresses “the policy of the United States to foster clear ground rules promoting free and open debate on the internet.” ... CDT asserts a similar mission—to “advocat[e] in favor of First Amendment protection for speech on the Internet.” ... One would think that CDT would applaud the President’s desire to prevent online censorship. But no matter. The Court will take CDT at its word and assume that Order 13,925 directly conflicts with its interests. ... It still has not established an Article III injury.

That seems quite silly. Just because Trump's exec order claimed to be promoting free and open debate on the internet, the whole point was to move to stifle speech online, and that's what CDT was pointing out. Still, the standing point is a big one and CDT can't jump over that hurdle:

CDT has not alleged that Order 13,925 has “perceptibly impaired” its “ability to provide services.” Turlock, 786 F.3d at 24 (cleaned up). It claims that because of the Order it will have to “devote substantial resources to”: “participating in the planned FCC rulemaking proceeding,” “monitoring federal agencies’ reports,” “tracking any FTC action,” “participating in any proceedings that the Commission institutes,” and “engaging with federal and state policymakers.”...

This is plainly deficient. Circuit precedent is “clear that an organization’s use of resources for . . . advocacy is not sufficient to give rise to an Article III injury,” Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 919, “whether the advocacy takes place through litigation or administrative proceedings,” Turlock, 786 F.3d at 24. CDT’s alleged injury—resources spent monitoring federal agencies, participating in their proceedings, and working with lawmakers—is one to its advocacy work, which is not a cognizable injury. ... In other words, CDT has shown that it is engaging in business as usual, not that Order 13,925 “causes an inhibition of [its] daily operations.” ...

All in all this is disappointing, but not unexpected. In the meantime, the executive order has already created its own mess in the form of the NTIA petition to the FCC to reinterpret Section 230, which the FCC, led by total hypocrite Ajit Pai, has agreed to move forward with.

CDT may not have had standing to challenge the bogus order, but the order has still created a huge mess for the open internet. It was the kind of mess that principled people could have stopped much earlier, but they all went along with it, either because they're too clueless to understand Section 230 or they're too afraid of Donald Trump pointing his angry temper tantrums in their direction. One hopes that the issue will die with the new administration, but with recent moves like appointing the author of the NTIA petition to the FCC, and some other rumors -- combined with Biden's top tech advisor pushing to ditch 230 entirely -- the trail of destruction this executive order is causing isn't likely to end any time soon.

Filed Under: donald trump, executive order, section 230, standing
Companies: cdt

Judge Who Originally Approved Sketchy UNC 'Silent Sam' Settlement Now Voids Deal, Realizing 'Confederate' Group Had No Standing

from the maybe-shoulda-checked-earlier dept

Back in December, we wrote about the crazy situation in North Carolina, mostly unearthed by lawyer Greg Doucette, that the University of North Carolina had "settled" a lawsuit before it was even filed. The background story was crazy, and this is only the briefest of summaries. The "Silent Sam" statue was put onto the UNC campus by the "United Daughters of the Confederacy" in 1913 as part of a process that happened throughout the south many decades after the Confederacy lost the Civil War to try to put in place racist monuments and to pretend that there was some noble cause behind the war to defend enslaving people. As more and more people have recognized the racist purpose, history and intent of these monuments, many have been removed. Students at UNC toppled the Silent Sam statue a few years ago, and the University has basically just tried to avoid talking about it since, especially as racist-celebrating officials tried to legislate that such monuments to racism must stay put.

Then, the day before Thanksgiving, the Sons of Confederate Veterans (not the Daughters...) announced that it had "settled" a lawsuit with UNC, in which it would be receiving $2.5 million and the statue from the University, and would be building some sort of museum to house it off campus. But among the many oddities involved in this was that UNC had approved the settlement a few minutes before the lawsuit was filed, and then the judge in the case, Allen Baddour, had approved the settlement literally minutes after the case had been filed. It seemed pretty clearly that this was a coordinated effort to create a fictitious scaffolding on which to tell a face-saving story, rather than a legitimate use of the courts.

Indeed, as Doucette quickly turned up -- only to then face a bogus DMCA takedown notice over -- the head of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Kevin Stone, had sent around an email to his group's members, flat out admitting that the group had no standing to sue. Since then, various students have tried to intervene in the case, which the Judge rejected. However, now, at this belated date, he seems to have recognized that the Sons of Confederate Veterans (as they themselves admitted) had absolutely no standing to sue, and thus has voided the settlement.

Orange County Superior Court Judge Allen Baddour — who originally signed off on that settlement — ruled Wednesday that the group lacked standing to bring its lawsuit in the first place.

The judge announced his decision at a hearing in Hillsborough, N.C., as five UNC students and a faculty member, represented by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, intervened to try to stop the settlement.

Incredibly, UNC is still defending its decision to not just give this monument to racism to a group that celebrates its racist history, but to give them a huge chunk of money as well:

"The Board of Governors knew from the very beginning that this was a difficult but needed solution to meet all their goals to protect public safety of the University community, restore normality to campus, and be compliant with the Monuments Law," Rand said in a statement. "The Board of Governors will move forward with these three goals at the forefront and will go back to work to find a lasting and lawful solution to the dispute over the monument."

While it is true that North Carolina's ridiculous Monuments Law might put the University in a difficult position with regards to complying with that law -- nothing in that law says they also need to fund a group with $2.5 million to celebrate a racist legacy.

Filed Under: greg doucette, kevin stone, sham lawsuits, silent sam, standing
Companies: sons of confederate veterans, unc

Welcome News: DC Circuit Revives The Constitutional Challenge Of FOSTA

from the appealing-decision dept

We've written several times before about the constitutional challenge to FOSTA in the case Woodhull Freedom Foundation, et al. v. U.S. That challenge hit a roadblock when the district court dismissed that lawsuit for lack of standing by the plaintiffs. Per the district court, the plaintiffs had not been hurt by the statute, nor were they likely to be hurt by it, and thus they had no right to challenge it in the courts. The plaintiffs appealed, and we supported the appeal with an amicus brief.

Back in September I attended the oral argument in the appeal and came away cautiously optimistic that the DC Circuit would see the matter differently. While the way the DOJ read the statute would mean that the plaintiffs had nothing to fear, what the court honed in on was that it was not the only plausible way to read the statute. And with these other plausible reads the plaintiffs would indeed have something to worry about.

On Friday the court issued its ruling, and, as I'd suspected/hoped, it reversed the dismissal of the case by finding standing for at least two of the plaintiffs, which the court decided was enough for purposes of reviving the litigation. [p. 12]. For plaintiffs like Eric Koszyk, a licensed massage therapist whose ability to earn a living was harmed when Craigslist prohibited ads for therapeutic services in the wake of FOSTA, [p. 9], the court found they had standing based on the issue of "redressability." In other words, while the direct harm them was due to actions taken by a third party (in Koszyk's case when Craigslist prevented him from posting any more of the ads he had posted for years and depended on to find his clientele), the court found that the harm was really attributable to FOSTA and thus likely to be remediated if the law were found unconstitutional. [p. 17-18].

Meanwhile, for plaintiffs like Alex Andrews, who runs a website called "Rate That Rescue," "which is a sex worker-led, ratings and review website that provides a resource for sex workers to learn more about the various organizations that provide services for them," [p. 8-9], the ambiguous language of the statute put their constitutionally-protected activity in jeopardy.

Andrews has established an Article III injury-in-fact because she has alleged “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Her alleged conduct is “arguably affected with a constitutional interest,” because Andrews’ intended future conduct involves speech. Andrews operates a website that allows sex workers to share information. Her conduct is “arguably proscribed” by FOSTA because it is a crime to own, manage, or operate an “interactive computer service[]” with the intent to “promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person,” 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(a). FOSTA does not define “promote” or “facilitate,” nor does it specify what constitutes “prostitution,” a term undefined by federal law. Nor are these terms limited by a string of adjacent verbs (such as advertises, distributes, or solicits) that would convey “a transactional connotation” that might narrow the statute’s reach. [p. 13].

These terms, “promote” and “facilitate,” the court continued, “are susceptible of multiple and wide-ranging meanings.” [p. 13]

Because the verbs “promote” and “facilitate” are disjunctive, FOSTA arguably proscribes conduct that facilitates prostitution. The common meaning of facilitate is “‘to make easier’ or less difficult, or to assist or aid.” […] Alternatively, the term “facilitate” could be interpreted “as a synonym for ‘terms like ‘aid,’ ‘abet,’ and ‘assist,’” in which case the term’s meaning would be limited by the background law of aiding and abetting. Even reading the term “facilitate” narrowly, Andrews has adequately alleged her intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably proscribed by FOSTA. [p. 13-14].

And that wasn't all. Back when amicus briefs were filed in support of the government, we noticed a strange one submitted by twenty-one state attorney generals. The problem was, for the government to win the appeal and keep the constitutional challenge dismissed, it needed to convince the appeals court that the plaintiffs had not been hurt and would not be hurt. But then the state attorney generals filed their brief, which proudly made the point that they just hadn't used the power FOSTA granted them to hurt people like the plaintiffs yet. The court noticed that brief, and how it served to bolster the plaintiffs' standing argument:

Furthermore, Section 2421A provides a private right of action for any person injured by an aggravated violation. 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(c). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he credibility of [a] threat is bolstered” where “the universe of potential complainants is not restricted to state officials who are constrained by explicit guidelines or ethical obligations.” And Congress amended Section 230 to allow prosecutions under state law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of Section 2421A. Twenty-one states emphasize that “the State need not wait for the Department of Justice to prosecute traffickers operating in the State.” Amicus Br. for the State of Texas, et al., 9. This amicus brief also cites pending legislation in Texas that would enact a local FOSTA. Id. at 9 n.3. These states have not disavowed any intention to prosecute individuals like Andrews. [p. 16-17]

All in all, this decision is good news, but it doesn't end the matter. With standing now found, the case has been revived and remanded back to the district court for further proceedings to determine FOSTA's constitutionality. One note of caution for those hoping for such a result, however, is that one of the three judges on the panel, Judge Katsas, while agreeing with the ultimate finding that the plaintiffs did indeed have standing, articulated some reservations about how that standing was found. To him FOSTA's language simply wasn't quite as vague and all-encompassing as the plaintiffs claimed:

Properly construed, FOSTA does not arguably cover the advocacy, education, assistance, or archiving done by plaintiffs Woodhull Freedom Foundation, Human Rights Watch, and Internet Archive. Nor does it arguably cover Andrews’s website insofar as it provides information about “support and rescue” organizations that either discourage prostitution altogether or seek to mitigate its harmfulness. But as my colleagues explain, the website also provides prostitutes with information about “online payment processors like PayPal,” which directly assists the exchange of sex for money. In context, such postings might support an inference that Andrews has the requisite intent to “promote or facilitate the prostitution” of someone besides herself. Because Andrews thus arguably engages in activities proscribed by FOSTA, I agree with my colleagues that she has standing to challenge it. [concurrence p. 2-3]

So, although this decision is a win, there will be lots more for the plaintiffs to fight about in order to get FOSTA finally set aside.

Filed Under: alex andrews, cesta, dc circuit, fosta, standing
Companies: woodhull foundation

DC Circuit Hears Oral Argument In The Constitutional Challenge Of FOSTA

from the cautious-optimism dept

It is impossible to read the tea leaves at an oral argument and come away with any dependable prediction of how the judges will rule. But at the oral argument last Friday at the DC Circuit it appeared that the judges at least understood what they needed to in order to rule in the plaintiffs' favor and revive their Constitutional challenge of FOSTA.

Which does not mean they necessarily agreed with the plaintiffs' argument for why the law is unconstitutional. But they don't have to right now. The only question before them was whether the plaintiffs have the standing needed to make that case.

The district court originally ruled that they did not. In its decision it basically said, "You've not been hurt, and, based on this particular way of reading the statute, you are not going to be hurt." At the hearing last week the DOJ continued to push this sort of reading, which would find the plaintiffs' activities to be beyond the statute's reach.

But, as the panel pointed out, the DOJ's reading of the statute was not the only possible reading of it. The court considered how so many others had read it, noting the changes Reddit had made and, in particular, how Craigslist had responded, which, the court recognized, also bore directly on one of the plaintiff's cited injuries. This plaintiff, Eric Koszyk, a masseuse, had been advertising without incident on Craigslist for 12 years. It was only after FOSTA was passed that this outlet disappeared as Craigslist deleted the sections he had used to advertise, with the statement that it hoped it could someday bring those now-deleted sections back. Surely this widespread reaction to FOSTA's passage is indicative of it presenting an actual risk of liability, the panel pressed. But the DOJ argued that such a conclusion was speculative. Furthermore, when Craigslist said it hoped it could someday bring its sections back, the DOJ argued, it was not a dig at FOSTA but merely an expression of the wish that someday Craigslist could be assured that its site wouldn't be abused.

Of course, given that every site is prone to abuse, which is why we have Section 230 in the first place, the DOJ's read of that comment is as suspect as its overly benign reading of FOSTA. But even if it were correct, on either front, it might not matter. As Judge Katsas observed, the question for the court to consider at this stage was whether the way the plaintiffs read the statute, prompting the fear of liability for its activities, is unreasonable. And at this stage, as Judge Griffith reminded, the case law told the court that it needed to "tread lightly." In other words, it was the government's burden to show that the plaintiffs' read of the statute was unreasonable, and it did not seem like the panel was convinced it had met it.

Especially not when, as Judge Katsas also noted, the DOJ would not be the only authority interpreting the statute. It's all well and good, the court seemed to say, that the DOJ said it would only enforce the statute in the limited way it represented to the court, but FOSTA is also going to be enforced in state courts in civil litigation and by state authorities who may well have their own read of the statute. The DOJ could not bind anyone involved with adjudicating those actions to read the statute the way it did.

It's also questionable whether the DOJ itself feels limited to a benign interpretation of FOSTA. At one point Judge Rogers stated a belief that there was never a suggestion that sex worker advocates would be prosecuted, to which the plaintiffs pointed out several ways the DOJ had already threatened to.

Much of the discussion ultimately hinged on the significance of the statutory language referencing the prostitution "of another person," and whether the "of another person" bit truly limited the scope of the statute. The court also spent time analyzing what the term "facilitating" meant, but no consensus was ever reached. Not only is there the general semantic question of whether the word "facilitating" can really be read as "aiding and abetting," but there is also the substantive question of what kind of behavior this "facilitating" language could still target. If there is a website where people teach sex workers how to use PayPal, thus buttressing their own agency and making them less likely to be exploited by pimps, is that still "facilitating" prostitution?

Also, one of the problems with FOSTA is that it makes a mess of mens rea by being unclear about how much knowledge a website can have about how users use their systems. Judge Katsas pointed out that a site like Backpage might not actually have knowledge of individual transactions, yet that's the sort of site the law ostensibly was intended to target. And if it could target Backpage even with this sort of attenuated knowledge of user activity, then whom else could it reach, and how would the plaintiffs not potentially fall within its sights? Judge Rogers commented that FOSTA would seem to catch anyone who simply wanted to make these unlawful acts safer.

Overall, though, the biggest takeaway from the hearing is that it is itself striking that three appellate judges and a very able DOJ lawyer could not come to a firm and shared conclusion about how the statute should be read. When some of the most capable legal minds in the country cannot come to such a consensus it is not a hallmark of a well-written or effective statute. It may in fact instead be evidence that it indeed poses a significant threat of constitutional injury that parties like the plaintiffs have standing to complain of, since no one can assure them that it doesn't.

Filed Under: dc circuit, fosta, harms, section 230, standing

DC Court: State Secrets Privilege Trumps Any Citizens' Right To Know Whether Or Not Their Own Gov't Is Trying To Kill Them

from the DFA2K19 dept

The government can try to kill you without due process as long as it can successfully invoke state secret privileges. That's the jist of the decision [PDF] just released by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the DC District Court.

Journalist Bilal Abdul Kareem believes he has been placed on the US government's "kill list." Kareem, due to the nature of his reporting, spends a fair amount of time talking to militants involved with terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. After a series of Syrian airstrikes that narrowly missed him, Kareem concluded the government must have decided he was a terrorist worth killing, even though he was only reporting on terrorist activity in Syria.

His case was allowed to proceed in 2018 by Judge Collyer (a former FISA judge), but now she is ending it. The state secret privilege invoked by the government is just too high to surmount, even for an American journalist who has expressed legitimate concern his own government is trying to kill him. At least Collyer has the honesty to deliver the crushing blow right up front.

What constitutional right is more essential than the right to due process before the government may take a life? While the answer may be none, federal courts possess limited authority to resolve questions presented in a lawsuit, even when they are alleged to involve constitutional rights. This is such a case. Despite the serious nature of Plaintiff’s allegations, this Court must dismiss the action pursuant to the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege.

At least this part is blunt, concise, and mostly coherent. Going into greater detail (as Collyer's decision does) just puts the blinding glory of the government's Heller-esque powers on full display.

There is still a question as to whether the unavailability of the requested information is fatal to Mr. Kareem’s complaint. A court must dismiss a case in which a privilege of state secrets is sustained when: (1) disclosure is necessary for the plaintiff to make its prima facie case; (2) disclosure is necessary for the defendant to defend itself; or (3) further litigation would present an unjustifiable risk of disclosure. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1087. The United States focuses on Mr. Kareem’s prima facie case, arguing that Mr. Kareem cannot establish his standing to sue without the information. The Court agrees and notes that all three reasons justify dismissal.

See how that works? If a plaintiff needs certain info to pursue claims against the government, the government can simply declare the info a state secret, instantly depriving the plaintiff of standing. Sure, there are other ways to handle this, like limited release of info to the judge and attorneys with security clearance, but the US is claiming Kareem's possible inclusion on a "kill list" is too secret to discuss even in secret… even when it has discussed its drone strike program publicly before.

It all comes down to this, which is an extremely disheartening thing to read in a nation whose government took the time to establish the rights this same government is now willing to walk all over with its invocation of state secrets privilege:

To prove his prima facie case, Mr. Kareem must be able to show he was in fact targeted by the United States with lethal force. The Court previously found Mr. Kareem alleged facts sufficient, if proven, to survive a motion to dismiss, but having now held that the government is not required to disclose whether Mr. Kareem has been targeted as alleged, it is impossible for Mr. Kareem to obtain the necessary information to prove his claims. Without access to the privileged information, Mr. Kareem is unable to establish whether he was targeted by lethal force or what information was considered in reaching the alleged decision to target him. Mr. Kareem is “incapable of demonstrating that [he has] sustained a violation of” his constitutional rights without the withheld information.

The end result of this circular reasoning is a decision that basically allows the government to act as if no rights violation has occurred. It's a cake and eat it too situation for the US government, which can go forward with any other plans it has to deprive other Americans of their due process rights by targeting them for extrajudicial killings. If any of those find themselves a bit too close to drone strikes, they have no avenue of redress that isn't blocked by state secrets privilege. The house always wins.

Filed Under: bilal abdul kareem, due process, evidence, kill list, right to know, rosemary collyer, standing, state secrets

Third Circuit Says TSA Officers Can Be Sued Directly For Abuses And Rights Violations

from the trimming-the-edges-of-sovereign-immunity dept

Good news has arrived for the long, long, oh so very long list of travelers who've had their rights abused by TSA agents. Reversing its own decision, the full panel of Third Circuit Appeals Court judges has removed TSA agents from "can't be sued" list.

Originally, the court had held that Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) were immune from civil lawsuits under the Federal Tort Claims Act. For the most part, federal government employees can't be sued directly. Previously, this covered TSA employees, whom the Third Circuit claimed were not "investigative or law enforcement officers" -- one of the few exemptions from this blanket immunity.

That ended Nadine Pellegrino's lawsuit against the TSA agents who behaved abusively during her "extended screening." Here's a description of those events from the Third Circuit's reversal:

As Pellegrino passed through the security checkpoint, she was randomly selected for additional screening. A TSO began examining her bags, but she stopped him and requested a more discreet screening. In a private room, several TSOs combed through Pellegrino’s luggage, papers, and other effects. One allegedly counted her coins and currency, examined her cell phone data, read the front and back of her membership and credit cards, and opened and smelled her cosmetics, mints, and hand sanitizer. Per Pellegrino, the TSO also spilled the contents of several containers and was so rough with her belongings that her jewelry and eyeglasses were damaged. Frustrated, she told the TSOs that she would report their conduct to a supervisor.

The screening ended, but the TSOs’ alleged torment did not. Pellegrino was left to clean up the mess created by the search, a task that took several trips to and from the screening room. As she was repacking her first bag, one of the TSOs claimed that Pellegrino struck her with it. On a trip to retrieve another bag, another TSO allegedly blocked Pellegrino’s access to it, forcing her to crawl under a table to reach it. When she did so, the table tipped over, and the TSO claimed Pellegrino struck her in the leg while she was collecting the bag. Pellegrino denies striking either TSO and alleges she heard both say to one another, “[Y]ou saw her hit me, didn’t you?”

It got worse from there. The TSOs decided to respond with a complaint of their own. They took a bunch of bullshit allegations to local prosecutors, which resulted in Pellegrino being charged with ten (!) criminal acts, including assault, making terroristic threats (!!), and "possession of an instrument of crime" (her luggage) (!!!).

All of those charges eventually vanished when the TSA failed to produce a recording of the extending screening and a TSO gave contradictory testimony in court.

This decision [PDF] revives Pellegrino's lawsuit. The court says TSOs are authorized to search people and their belongings. This moves them into "investigative/law enforcement" territory and out from underneath the immunity blanket.

The court finds that TSOs meet every requirement needed to become the sort of federal employee that can be sued directly. No more sovereign immunity for these agents, who are officers "empowered by law to execute searches."

To repeat, the complete proviso definition for an “investigative or law enforcement officer” is “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). By its plain terms, the phrase “empowered by law” narrows the scope of “officer[s]” covered from the set of all “officer[s] of the United States” to the subset of those with the authority to, among other things, “execute searches.”

Turning, then, to the statutory authority of TSOs, they are empowered by law to conduct “the screening of all passengers and property.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). Screening, in turn, is defined in part as a “physical examination,” including a “physical search.” Id. § 44901(g)(4) (regarding screening of luggage). Hence TSOs are “empowered by law” within the meaning of the proviso.

As to the "searches" part of the provision:

TSO screenings are “searches” (i) as a matter of ordinary meaning, (ii) under the Fourth Amendment, and (iii) under the definition provided in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Attempts to distinguish (iv) between administrative and criminal “searches” are divorced from the plain text, and any distinction, if one must be made, should account for (v) the fact that TSA searches extend to the general public and involve examinations of an individual’s physical person and her property.

The government tried to argue that passengers cannot sue over alleged Fourth Amendment violations because they trade their rights for the privilege of boarding airplanes. The court says this isn't correct and it certainly isn't a voluntary exchange.

The Government does not dispute that holding. Instead, it contends that consent by passengers cancels the Fourth Amendment’s effect. But the presence or absence of consent does not determine whether a search has occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. [...] In any event, TSO screenings are not consensual. As noted, per TSA regulations any individual who does not consent to a “search or inspection” may not board a flight.

The government also tried to save TSOs from lawsuits by claiming these highly-intrusive airport searches were merely "administrative," the groin-grabbing equivalent of grabbing regulatory files from a local business. The court not only disagrees, but dunks on the government's terrible argument.

To begin, TSO screenings often involve invasive examinations of the physical person. As even the panel majority in this case acknowledged, TSA searches are “rigorous and intimate for individuals.” Pellegrino, 896 F.3d at 230. This sets them apart from other administrative searches that involve only inspections of property or the environment.

[...]

Next, the risk of abuse is greater for TSO screenings than for most other administrative searches. Because TSA searches affect the public directly, the potential for widespread harm is elevated. This potential for abuse in borne out by Pellegrino’s own experience. There is a reason that FDA meat inspectors do not generate headlines about sexual assault and other intimate violations.

The final word on TSOs and their immunity? They no longer have any.

Words matter. This core tenet of statutory interpretation channels our conclusion today: TSOs are “investigative or law enforcement officers” as defined in the Tort Claims Act at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). They are “officer[s] of the United States” by dint of their title, badge, and authority. They are “empowered by law to execute searches” because, by statutory command and implementing regulation, they may physically examine passengers and the property they bring with them to airports. And the TSOs’ searches are “for violations of Federal law” given that their inspections are for items that federal law bans on aircraft (often with criminal consequences).

If security officers violate rights (they do) and damage people's property (they do), then they should be held accountable for their actions. The TSA certainly doesn't seem interested in doing this, so it's left up to the courts to handle it. In this circuit, TSOs can be sued, but this doesn't change anything for those residing outside of this jurisdiction. If the government decides to challenge this decision, it may open itself up to a Supreme Court declaration that gives the entire nation the ability to directly sue TSA security officers. It will be interesting to see what it chooses to do, given the potential downside for its employees.

Filed Under: 3rd circuit, abuse, federal tort claims act, nadine pellegrino, screening, searches, security theater, standing, tsa, tso