WikiLeaks Wants To Crowdsource $100K Reward For Leak Of TPP Text, As Doubts Grow About Agreement's Value

from the fanciful-geopolitics dept

The TPP saga is entering a critical phase. After the excitement of the initial rejection of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA -- "fast track") in the Senate, followed by the vote in its favor shortly afterwards, attention is now focused on the House, where the outcome is still in doubt. Meanwhile, Australian politicians have finally been granted access to the negotiating text -- but under humiliating conditions, as The Guardian reports:

They were told they could view the current TPP negotiating text on Tuesday "subject to certain confidentiality requirements" and were shown a document they would be required to sign before any viewing.

Here are some of the "confidentiality requirements" (pdf) the politicians were obliged to sign up to:

I will not divulge any of the text or information obtained in the briefing to any party.

I will not copy, transcribe or remove the negotiating text.

The following condition is interesting:

I therefore agree that these confidentiality requirements shall apply for four years after entry into force of the TPP, or if no agreement enters into force, for four years after the last round of negotiations.

This confirms what Techdirt wrote back in 2011: that aside from the final agreement, all the other negotiating texts will be kept secret for four years after the conclusion of the talks. And yet, bad as the Australian deal is, it's more than the public gets when it comes to accessing the text being negotiated in its name. Fortunately, we have WikiLeaks, which has already published three chapters of TPP, and now hopes to leak the rest:

Today WikiLeaks has launched a campaign to crowd-source a $100,000 reward for America’s Most Wanted Secret: the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).

As we wait for those leaks, the only thing we have to fall back on are the economic models, which try to predict what effects TPP might have, based on various assumptions. The Economist has been reviewing the results:

The most influential, by Peter Petri, Michael Plummer and Fan Zhai, for the East-West Centre, a research institute, forecasts that the deal would raise the GDP of the 12 signatories by $285 billion, or 0.9%, by 2025. It is their numbers that America's government cites when it says TPP will make the country $77 billion richer.

But other researchers predict far more modest gains from TPP:

[The researchers Ciuriak and Xiao] calculate that TPP will raise the GDP of the 12 countries by just $74 billion by 2035, a mere 0.21% higher than baseline forecasts. Others see an even smaller impact. In a paper for the Asian Development Bank Institute, Inkyo Cheong forecasts that America's GDP will be entirely unchanged by TPP.

Given those small, perhaps non-existent, economic benefits, it's perhaps not surprising that US proponents of TPP have shifted their emphasis, claiming that TPP is not so much about economics, as about geopolitical influence -- President Obama's famous "pivot to Asia." A perceptive analysis in the Boston Globe explains why that makes no sense:

The administration's geopolitical case for TPP is fanciful. In the real world, there is no way that new rules for trans-Pacific trade, written without regard to China and without Chinese participation, will somehow pivot the United States into a lasting position of supremacy in China’s backyard.

Four basic facts explain why that is so: First, China is now everybody's biggest trading partner, including America's prospective partners in TPP. Second, the Chinese market represents the major growth opportunity for all these nations.

Third, whatever their concerns about China's increasing military power, Asian leaders have no interest in distancing themselves economically from China -- or from the supply chains that converge there. Fourth, most economists expect China's economic growth will continue to be much faster than that of the United States.

That means that as well as offering the US marginal economic benefits at best, TPP might also damage its chances of engaging meaningfully with China. Sadly, it's probably too much to hope that US politicians will pay much attention to either point once the next round of Congressional haggling over TPA starts again.

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Filed Under: bounty, crowdfunding, leaks, tpp, trade agreements, wikileaks

Financial Info On 100,000 Taxpayers Now In The Hands Of Criminals, Thanks To The IRS's Weak Authentication Processes

from the time-for-everyone-to-start-lying-about-their-first-pet's-name dept

The government that wants so badly to be the world's leading cyberwarfare force still seems largely unable to fence in its own backyard. In Yet Another Breach™, the sensitive financial information of thousands of Americans is now in the hands of criminals.

The IRS announced today that criminals used taxpayer-specific data acquired from non-IRS sources to gain unauthorized access to information on approximately 100,000 tax accounts through IRS’ “Get Transcript” application. This data included Social Security information, date of birth and street address.

These third parties gained sufficient information from an outside source before trying to access the IRS site, which allowed them to clear a multi-step authentication process, including several personal verification questions that typically are only known by the taxpayer.

So, not actually "hacking," per se, as much as the gaming of system just begging to be gamed. The information criminals needed to obtain this data may have been "specific" to each registered taxpayer, but it was also information that rarely, if ever, changed.

This sort of authentication, called knowledge-based authentication, is highly vulnerable to fraud. It's based on information that never changes, and such data is widely available to anyone willing to pay for it from stolen financial information marketplaces. The transcripts that were fraudulently downloaded were likely made accessible due to leaked Social Security numbers and other personal data from any one of the many recent data breaches, including those at health insurers Anthem and CareFirst. In fact, security reporter Brian Krebs reported on the risks inherent in the IRS' transcript request system way back in March. He warned taxpayers to sign up for accounts on IRS.gov if only to prevent someone from creating a fraudulent account for their records first.

The IRS is reassuring Americans that its "core systems" remain secure, something of little comfort to the 100,000 taxpayers who will be receiving mea culpa letters (and free credit monitoring) from the agency over the next few weeks. What the IRS considers to be adequate protection is apparently not nearly adequate enough. Once the data is out there, verification information can be used to gain access to credit cards, bank accounts or anywhere else the same sort of canned questions are presented during the signup process. The 50% success rate suggests unique personally-identifiable information isn't necessarily all that unique.

In all, about 200,000 attempts were made from questionable email domains, with more than 100,000 of those attempts successfully clearing authentication hurdles.

The IRS is quick to add that 23 million records were "safely" downloaded during this same time period, which isn't really the comforting statement it means it to be. All this means is that millions of downloads weren't linked to "questionable" email domains. That's not the same thing as 23 million downloads going to the actual owners of that information.

The IRS is vowing to "strengthen its protocols" going forward. This is the only response it can offer, unfortunately. Stronger processes are needed, but additional steps and more obscure verification questions will manifest themselves as hurdles a certain percentage of taxpayers won't be willing to leap for online IRS access. Going paperless won't seem nearly as advantageous, not when a motherlode of financial information can be pulled out of the ether by cybercrooks armed with the fruits of years of financial breaches, both public and private.

Filed Under: data breach, irs, leaks, privacy, private info, security

New Whistleblower Claims UK's Nuclear Submarine Fleet A 'Disaster Waiting To Happen'

from the inspiring-others dept

There were, of course, many whistleblowers before Edward Snowden. But it is undeniable that his sudden appearance across the world's news outlets two years ago has ignited a debate about the role, rights and responsibilities of whistleblowers. One manifestation of this new interest is the creation of the Courage Foundation, dedicated to helping them:

The Courage Foundation is an international organisation that supports those who risk life or liberty to make significant contributions to the historical record. We fundraise for the legal and public defence of specific individuals who fit these criteria and are subject to serious prosecution or persecution. We also campaign for the protection of truthtellers and the public's right to know generally.

Currently the Courage Foundation is supporting two whistleblowers: Edward Snowden and Jeremy Hammond. So news that it has set up an emergency fund to help a new, and hitherto unknown, whistleblower, is significant. Here's the background:

Able Seaman William McNeilly is a 25-year-old British Engineering Technician Weapons Engineer Submariner who has blown the whistle on major safety risks and cover-ups within the British Royal Navy's Trident nuclear weapons programme, stating, "We are so close to a nuclear disaster it is shocking, and yet everybody is accepting the risk to the public."

Here are some of his claims:

Among the most startling of McNeilly’s revelations include the fact that three missile launch tests failed, missile safety alarms were ignored, torpedo compartments were flooded and bags were not properly checked for security risks. He also claims that [UK nuclear submarine] HMS Vanguard crashed into a French submarine in February 2009. McNeilly says there was a "massive cover up of the incident. For the first time the no personal electronic devices with a camera rule was enforced." At the time, the Guardian reported that "the Ministry of Defence initially refused to confirm the incident" and that Vanguard suffered mere "scrapes", but McNeilly says one officer told him, "We thought, this is it -- we’re all going to die."

You can read the long and detailed document written by McNeilly on a dedicated Wikileaks page. It includes a comment attributed to him that may sound familiar:

"Please make sure this information is released. I don't want to be in prison without anyone knowing the truth."

That's pretty much what Snowden said when he went public. Although there's no evidence that McNeilly was inspired by Snowden, it would have been hard for him to avoid the huge publicity around the leaks over the last two years. It would be interesting to know whether that played any part in his decision to publish his statement. Unfortunately, unlike Snowden still ensconced in his Russian exile, it looks almost certain that McNeilly will indeed be going to prison:

A Royal Navy spokeswoman said: “We can confirm that AB McNeilly was apprehended last night and is now in the custody of the Royal Navy police at a military establishment in Scotland where he is being afforded the duty of care that we give to all of our people.

The spokesperson went on to say:

“The Royal Navy disagrees with McNeilly’s subjective and unsubstantiated personal views but we take the operation of our submarines and the safety of our personnel extremely seriously and so continue to fully investigate the circumstances of this issue.”

As that makes clear, the UK authorities are trying to play down McNeilly's serious allegations as "subjective and unsubstantiated personal views" in the hope that public interest in the story will wane. But his decision to publish the claims and accept the consequences -- like Snowden -- looks as if it will bring about some scrutiny, not least because UK politicians have taken up his cause alongside the Courage Foundation, which is helping him with his defense costs. That's key, since it may encourage yet more whistleblowers to come forward hoping to achieve the same result.

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Filed Under: leaks, nuclear sub, nuclear submarine, tritan, uk, whistleblower, whistleblowing, william mcneilly

US Officials Leak Info About ISIS Raid More Sensitive Than Anything Snowden Ever Leaked

from the but-no-one-says-anything dept

Over the weekend, the US government announced that special forces soldiers entered Syria to conduct a raid that killed an alleged leader of ISIS, Abu Sayyaf. In the process, anonymous US officials leaked classified information to the New York Times that's much more sensitive than anything Edward Snowden ever revealed, and it serves as a prime example of the government's hypocrisy when it comes to disclosures of secret information.

Here's how the New York Times described how the US conducted this "successful" raid:

The raid came after weeks of surveillance of Abu Sayyaf, using information gleaned from a small but growing network of informants the C.I.A. and the Pentagon have painstakingly developed in Syria, as well as satellite imagery, drone reconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping, American officials said. The White House rejected initial reports from the region that attributed the raid to the forces of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

Read that carefully and pretend it was Snowden who leaked this information, instead of nameless Pentagon spokesmen. US officials would be screaming from the rooftops that he leaked extremely timely and sensitive intelligence (it was literally only hours old), that he will cause specific terrorists to change their communications behavior, and most importantly, he put the lives of informants at risk. (Note: none of Snowden's leaks did any of these things.)

Yet despite the fact that the ISIS raid was discussed on all of the Sunday shows this week, no one brought up anything about this leak. Contrast that with Snowden's revelations, where government officials will use any situation to say the most outlandish things possible in an attempt to smear his whistleblowing—regardless of their basis in reality. Take former CIA deputy director and torture advocate Mike Morrell, for example, who is currently on a book promotion tour and has been preposterously suggesting that Snowden's leaks somehow led to the rise of ISIS.

For the sake of hypothetical argument, let's take Morrell's claims at face value. Let's put aside the fact that, despite their "sky is falling" rhetoric, the US government has consistently refused to release specific information showing that terrorists have "changed their behavior" due to the Snowden leaks, and that terrorists were sophisticated users of encryption for more than a decade before anyone heard Snowden's name. Let's also ignore that the US government has been caught blatantly exaggerating how leaks have "damaged" national security in the past, and that officials have already admitted their nightmare scenarios in this case have not actually come to pass.

Here is what Morrell told NPR when asked about Edward Snowden and the damage he thinks he caused to national security:

So I can't get into specifics, but I'll tell you that there was a program that he disclosed that was vital to the United States' ability to see what terrorists are doing. And they all changed their communication habits because of that disclosure - al-Qaida in Pakistan, al-Qaida in Yemen and al-Qaida in Iraq, which morphed into ISIS. So there is no doubt in my mind that that change in behavior on the part of al-Qaida in Iraq and ISIS contributed to ISIS's rise.

And here's what he said on 60 Minutes the same week:

"What Edward Snowden did has put Americans at greater risk because terrorists learn from leaks and they will be more careful, and we will not get the intelligence we would have gotten otherwise."

Every single thing Morrell said applies to what US officials leaked this weekend, if not more so. But since the leak about the ISIS raid was meant to glorify the Obama administration, instead of embarrassing it or exposing wrongdoing, everyone in the US government will pretend like it never happened.

Either leaks exposing the "sources and methods" of surveillance are damaging to national security or they are not. Administration officials can't have it both ways.

Republished from the Freedom of the Press Foundation

Filed Under: abu sayyaf, cia, ed snowden, government, isis, leaks, mike morrell, surveillance

Ex-CIA Officials To New York Times: Don't Try To Hold The CIA Accountable. The CIA Will Hold The CIA Accountable.

from the w/special-guest-Michael-D'Andrea,-drone-strike-architect dept

Prominent alumni of the intelligence community have a problem with the New York Times publishing the name of the CIA's drone strike "architect." Although Michael D'Andrea's connection to the program had been sussed out nearly two years earlier and was apparently common knowledge to the governments of countries CIA drones launched from, the CIA still didn't want his name publicly disclosed. Their officials pushed New York Times executive editor Dean Baquet. He pushed back.

Now, a letter to the editor signed by 20 ex-CIA officials is arguing that Baquet was wrong to do so. The attendant irony of known "leakers" Leon Panetta and David Petraeus signing this indignant ode to CIA secrecy can't be allowed to pass without noting. Panetta handed off plenty of classified information, including names of personnel operating under "cover," to the makers of Zero Dark Thirty. Petraeus handed over eight notebooks full of sensitive info to his mistress/biographer. Both have escaped any serious repercussions for their actions. But they're righteously pissed that Baquet published the name of the person overseeing the CIA's drone strike program.

The letter is a mess. If it's meant to make a solid argument for members of media acquiescing to every government request to withhold information, it fails spectacularly. If anything, it helps demonstrate why those whose powers are shrouded by layers of opacity should be exposed more often.

When your lead-off acknowledges that you're more angry than informed, you're going to fail to land solid blows. Pointing to Dean Baquet's interview with the Lawfare blog in which he defended his actions, the 20 ex-CIA officials all agree they really haven't done their homework.

We profoundly disagree — not because we have analyzed this particular case (we have not), but because in our view he misstates the purpose of cover generally.

But rather than moving on to correcting this perceived error, the letter instead shifts to arguing that the law Baquet didn't violate should actually have been violated, if only Congress hadn't have screwed up more than three decades ago.

Congress overwhelmingly enacted the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 precisely to protect the dedicated men and women whose lives would be at risk if their names became widely publicized.

What Congress could not have anticipated at the time, of course, is that any name published in The Times would reside forever on the Internet, searchable by any terrorist with a laptop. It is true that certain foreign governments may know their names, but that is altogether different from making the name accessible to ISIS, Al Qaeda and every other murderer on the planet.

The law contains loopholes that apply to Baquet's actions, as Lawfare's Jack Goldsmith points out. These ex-officials are now stating these loopholes shouldn't apply. Because the Internet. And this assertion is backed up by the portrayal of said internet as infested with "every other murderer on the planet." This hyperbole is expected, as is the intelligence community's confidence that it -- and only it -- knows what Congress did or didn't foresee when passing laws related to surveillance and spycraft.

In this particular case, Congress couldn't have foreseen an easily-searchable internet when passing a 1982 law. Fair enough, I suppose, but governing entities like Congress and the judicial system are immediately granted Nostradamus-esque powers of foresight whenever it works to the advantage of the entities performing long-delayed interpretations of Congressional intent. This same "power" is revoked the moment it becomes inconvenient to those seeking expanded powers with a minimum of accountability.

The letter then goes on to claim the press has no business attempting to increase government accountability. It's doing a fine job of policing itself, thank you very much.

Officials who work on covert operations do not escape accountability. Their actions are carefully reviewed by the C.I.A.’s general counsel, the inspector general, White House officials, congressional overseers and Justice Department attorneys.

Would this be the same CIA general counsel that cleared the CIA of all wrongdoing in the Senate spying debacle? Are these the same DOJ attorneys who couldn't be bothered to examine the Senate's claims of CIA spying during the creation of the Torture Report? Is this the same government that finally admitted it was wrong to torture people but refused to hold anyone accountable for the CIA's abuse of detainees? Is this the same vaunted oversight that seemed constantly surprised by the programs detailed in Snowden's leaks?

"Oversight" is a word covert agencies use when they don't want anyone taking a closer look at their programs or operations. When these officials point to "oversight," all they're really pointing to is the skeletal framework that remains after years and years of deliberately weakening oversight standards and processes. No one believes the government has the capability -- much less the desire -- to hold these agencies accountable for their actions. And the agencies know this.

The New York Time's refusal to grant continued secrecy to the man behind the agency's transformation into an efficient, impersonal killing machine may not result in direct responses from the oversight these officials claim works oh so well, but at least it prevents them from pretending they have no idea who was behind the program.

Filed Under: cia, classified, david petreaus, drones, journalism, leaks, leon panetta, michael d'andrea, reporting, under cover
Companies: ny times

Wikileaks Releases Transcript Of German Inquiry Into Growing NSA Spy Scandal

from the not-dead-yet dept

Compared to its early days, when releases of material like Collateral Murder dominated public discourse for weeks, Wikileaks is now only a shadow of its former self, eclipsed largely by Snowden's leaks. That's understandable, perhaps: Julian Assange has been holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London for nearly three years, and it has been hard for the organization to raise funds to pay Wikileaks' running costs. However, that reduced visibility and activity doesn't mean it's not still releasing valuable material, particularly in the area of trade agreements. Today, it has published another interesting set of documents, this time from the field of surveillance:

WikiLeaks releases ten months of transcripts from the ongoing German Parliamentary inquiry into NSA activities in Germany. Despite many sessions being technically public, in practice public understanding has been compromised as transcripts have been withheld, recording devices banned and reporters intrusively watched by police.

WikiLeaks is releasing 1,380 pages of transcripts from the unclassified sessions, covering 34 witnesses – including 13 concealed witnesses from Germany's foreign intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The transcripts cover from the start of the inquiry in May 2014 through to February 2015.

WikiLeaks has also written summaries of each session in German and English as the inquiry, due to its subject matter, is of international significance.

This underlines an important aspect of Wikileaks' work: the fact that it seeks to make the documents it releases useful by providing commentary, summaries and indexes. Those valuable additions are often overlooked, but can play a crucial role in helping people understand the raw material provided.

The German parliamentary inquiry has been rumbling on for a year now, but has gained renewed importance with the recent revelations that the German spy service, the BND, has been searching through its databases using "selectors" (keywords) provided by the NSA, with apparently no oversight. Not only were many of the targets for those selectors EU citizens, but they included senior politicians and industry figures, too. Here's Wikileaks' summary:

One of the biggest scandals to emerge from the inquiry so far is the recent "selector" spy target list scandal where a BND official revealed that the agency was expected to spy on thousands of targets at the instruction of the NSA. These targets included members of the French government and European industry. This put into question Germany's suitability in taking a leadership role in the European Union. It also showed that international co-operation on mass surveillance, which has been marketed in public as a counter-terrorism measure, is in practice also used by the United States for the purposes of industrial espionage and geopolitical advantage vis-a-vis members of the European Union. The committee requested the full "selector" list of targets provided to the BND by the NSA. The committee was told that the US would first need to be asked permission for the list to be revealed to the committee (even in confidence). Last Wednesday, 6 May 2015, when the answer was meant to be delivered, stalling tactics were used, leaving the German public, and the Parliamentary inquiry, without any ability to understand what their own secret services are up to.

The "selector" scandal has now reached the highest political echelons in Germany, with Angela Merkel's earlier outrage over NSA spying -- not least against herself -- looking hypocritical at best, or dangerously naive at worst. Wikileaks' latest release therefore comes at just the right moment for those seeking to understand what has been going on in Germany. It's also a timely reminder that Wikileaks is still able to perform an important service in this respect, despite its straitened circumstances.

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Filed Under: germany, interviews, leaks, nsa, surveillance, transparency, wikileaks
Companies: wikileaks

Under President's New Cybersecurity Executive Order... Is Wikileaks Now An Evil Cyberhacker For Releasing Trade Deal?

from the broad-definitions,-broad-powers dept

Yesterday we talked about the ridiculousness of President Obama's new cybersecurity executive order, in which he declares a national emergency around "malicious cyber-enabled activities" and enables his own government to do mean things to anyone they think is responsible for cyber badness (that his own NSA is the primary instigator of serious cyberattacks gets left ignored, of course). One of the points we made is that the definitions in the executive agreement were really vague, meaning that it's likely that they could be abused in all sorts of ways that we wouldn't normally think of as malicious hacking.

Helpfully, the ever vigilant Marcey Wheeler has provided some examples of how the vague language can and likely will be twisted:

The EO targets not just the hackers themselves, but also those who benefit from or materially support hacks. The targeting of those who are “responsible for or complicit in … the receipt or use for commercial or competitive advantage … by a commercial entity, outside the United States of trade secrets misappropriated through cyber-enabled means, … where the misappropriation of such trade secrets is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States” could be used to target journalism abroad. Does WikiLeaks’ publication of secret Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations qualify? Does Guardian’s publication of contractors’ involvement in NSA hacking?

And, that's not all. How about encryption providers? Not too hard to see how they might qualify:

And the EO creates a “material support” category similar to the one that, in the terrorism context, has been ripe for abuse. Its targets include those who have “provided … material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of” such significant hacks. Does that include encryption providers? Does it include other privacy protections?

We've already seen some -- including government officials -- argue that Twitter could be deemed to be providing "material support" to ISIS if it didn't take down Twitter accounts that support ISIS. Twitter wouldn't directly qualify under this executive order (which targets non-US actors), but it shows you how easy it is to stretch this kind of thinking in dangerous ways.

Making sure the technology we use every day is secure is important. But vaguely worded executive orders and an over-hyped "national emergency" isn't the solution. Instead, it's likely to be abused in serious ways that harm our freedoms.

Filed Under: cybersecurity, executive order, leaks, material support, tpp
Companies: wikileaks

Corporate Sovereignty Provisions Of TPP Agreement Leaked Via Wikileaks: Would Massively Undermine Government Sovereignty

from the dangerous-games,-played-out-behind-closed-doors dept

For years now, we've been warning about the problematic "ISDS" -- "investor state dispute settlement" mechanisms that are a large part of the big trade agreements that countries have been negotiating. As we've noted, the ISDS name is designed to be boring, in an effort to hide the true impact -- but the reality is that these provisions provide corporate sovereignty, elevating the power of corporations to put them above the power of local governments. If you thought "corporate personhood" was a problem, corporate sovereignty takes things to a whole new level -- letting companies take foreign governments to special private "tribunals" if they think that regulations passed in those countries are somehow unfair. Existing corporate sovereignty provisions have led to things like Big Tobacco threatening to sue small countries for considering anti-smoking legislation and pharma giant Eli Lilly demanding $500 million from Canada, because Canada dared to reject some of its patents noting (correctly) that the drugs didn't appear to be any improvement over existing drugs.

The US has been vigorously defending these provisions lately, but with hilariously misleading arguments. The White House recently posted a blog post defending corporate sovereignty, with National Economic Council director Jeff Zients claiming the following:

ISDS has come under criticism because of some legitimate complaints about poorly written agreements. The U.S. shares some of those concerns, and agrees with the need for new, higher standards, stronger safeguards and better transparency provisions. Through TPP and other agreements, that is exactly what we are putting in place.

There's something rather hilarious about saying that there needs to be "greater transparency" and promising that the secret agreement you're negotiating behind closed doors and won't share with the public has those provisions in them somewhere.

Either way, thanks to Wikileaks, we now have the "Investment" Chapter (or at least what it was as of January 20th), and it shows that, as per usual, the US is being entirely misleading in its claims. As Public Citizen highlights:

The leaked text would empower foreign firms to directly “sue” signatory governments in extrajudicial investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) tribunals over domestic policies that apply equally to domestic and foreign firms that foreign firms claim violate their new substantive investor rights. There they could demand taxpayer compensation for domestic financial, health, environmental, land use and other policies and government actions they claim undermine TPP foreign investor privileges, such as the “right” to a regulatory framework that conforms to their “expectations.”

The leaked text reveals the TPP would expand the parallel ISDS legal system by elevating tens of thousands of foreign-owned firms to the same status as sovereign governments, empowering them to privately enforce a public treaty by skirting domestic courts and laws to directly challenge TPP governments in foreign tribunals.

Existing ISDS-enforced agreements of the United States, and of other developed TPP countries, have been almost exclusively with developing countries whose firms have few investments in the developed nations. However, the enactment of the leaked chapter would dramatically expand each TPP government’s ISDS liability. The TPP would newly empower about 9,000 foreign-owned firms in the United States to launch ISDS cases against the U.S. government, while empowering more than 18,000 additional U.S.-owned firms to launch ISDS cases against other signatory governments. (These are firms not already covered by an ISDS-enforced pact between the United States and other TPP negotiating governments.)

As for all that "transparency" that the White House promised? Yeah, don't count on it:

As revealed in Section B of the leaked text, these tribunals would not meet standards of transparency, consistency or due process common to TPP countries’ domestic legal systems or provide fair, independent or balanced venues for resolving disputes. For instance, the tribunals would be staffed by private sector lawyers unaccountable to any electorate, system of precedent or substantive appeal. Many of those involved rotate between acting as “judges” and as advocates for the investors launching cases against governments. Such dual roles would be deemed unethical in most legal systems. The leaked text does not include new conflict of interest rules, despite growing concern about the bias inherent in the ISDS system.

Contrary to claims from the Obama administration that the TPP’s investment chapter would somehow limit the uses and abuses of the controversial ISDS regime, much of the leaked text would replicate, often word-for-word, the terms found in past U.S. ISDS-enforced agreements. However, some terms would widen the scope of domestic policies and government actions that could be challenged before extrajudicial tribunals, without offering meaningful new safeguards for those policies.

The basic concept behind early ISDS/corporate sovereignty provisions may have made sense -- in which companies that were afraid to invest in developing nations out of fear the government would come in and seize their factory or whatever -- but expanding it to cover basically all international trade, while the definitions are interpreted to mean companies can challenge any law they don't like in front of a set of private judges (who also work for those same companies in other cases) is ridiculously problematic.

And, once again, we see why the USTR absolutely refuses to be transparent about this by releasing this information publicly. It knows that such a deal would be bad for the American public, so it keeps them secret until nothing can be done. I guess if you're undermining democracy by giving corporations power over lawmakers, you might as well go all the way and hide your proposals from the voting public at the same time.

Filed Under: corporate sovereignty, isds, leaks, tpp, transparency

Move Over Ed Snowden, Al Jazeera Has A Huge New Stack Of Spy Documents

from the and-the-revelations-just-keep-on-coming dept

There have been questions of when (not if) the next "Ed Snowden" situation would show up. There certainly have been a few recent leaks that appear to have been from folks other than Snowden, but they've mostly been one-off leaks. However, this morning, Al Jazeera is claiming that it got its hands on a huge trough of spy documents, in the form of cables from South Africa's spy agency, the State Security Agency (SSA), and it will begin reporting on what's in those documents, in collaboration with reporters at The Guardian:

Spanning a period from 2006 until December 2014, they include detailed briefings and internal analyses written by operatives of South Africa's State Security Agency (SSA). They also reveal the South Africans' secret correspondence with the US intelligence agency, the CIA, Britain's MI6, Israel's Mossad, Russia's FSB and Iran's operatives, as well as dozens of other services from Asia to the Middle East and Africa.

The files unveil details of how, as the post-apartheid South African state grappled with the challenges of forging new security services, the country became vulnerable to foreign espionage and inundated with warnings related to the US "War on Terror".

As Al Jazeera points out, this is not "signals intelligence" (SIGINT) material, but rather "human intelligence" (HUMINT) of the kind normally done by the CIA, rather than the NSA. It's about spies on the ground -- and also, according to Al Jazeera, their humdrum daily office existence. Honestly, it almost sounds like the plot of a bad sitcom: come work at a premier national intelligence agency... and bitch about the lack of parking:

At times, the workplace resembles any other, with spies involved in form-filling, complaints about missing documents and personal squabbles.... One set of cables from the Algerian Embassy in South Africa relates to a more practical concern. It demands that "no parking" signs are placed in the street outside. The cable notes that the British and US embassies enjoy this privilege, and argues that it should be extended to Algeria as well.

Whether or not this latest leak turns up anything more interesting than parking disputes, it is worth noting that another trove of intelligence documents have leaked...

Filed Under: cia, fsb, leaks, mi6, mossad, south africa, ssa, surveillance, whistleblower
Companies: al jazeera, guardian

Eric Holder Says Putting Reporter James Risen Through Hell Is A Good 'Example' Of DOJ Process For Leak Investigations

from the that's-one-way-to-put-it... dept

Attorney General Holder raised some eyebrows earlier this week when answering a question about his Justice Department's notorious crackdown on leaks, and by extension the press, most notably saying this about its notorious pursuit of New York Times reporter James Risen, while claiming the DOJ did nothing wrong:

If you look at the last case involving Mr. Risen, the way in which that case was handled after the new policies were put in place [is] an example of how the Justice Department can proceed.

The District Sentinel aptly took apart most of Holder's comments, and they also provoked a stinging rebuke from Risen himself last night on Twitter. However, I think the facts of Risen's case deserve a closer look to see just how unbelievable Holder's statement is.

Let's recap: since the very start of the Obama administration (read: for SIX years), the Justice Department was trying to subpoena James Risen. It fought for him to testify at a grand jury of CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling, which he refused to do, and when they were rejected by the court, it fought to have him testify in Sterling's trial. They fought Risen on this all the way up to the Supreme Court.

Also, keep in mind, while the "new" media/leak guidelines that Holder bragged about are certainly a step forward, the old guidelines that applied to Risen's case should have protected him just the same from the start—if they were actually enforced. He doesn't get to pretend the preceding five and a half years didn't happen just because he stregthened the Justice Department's rules after public protest.

The case cost Risen and his publisher an untold fortune in legal fees, dominated his life, took away from time he could've spent reporting, and likely cost the taxpayers millions of dollars.

Along the way, we found out that the government had spied on virtually every aspect of James Risen's digital life from phone calls, to emails, to credit card statements, bank records and more. (By the way, we still have no idea how they got this information. That's secret.)

The Justice Department argued in court that not only was there no reporter's privilege whatsoever -- either embedded in the First Amendment or in Fourth Circuit common law -- but also that journalists protecting sources was analogous to protecting drug dealers from prosecution.

As a result, the Justice Department got an appeals court to destroy the previously established reporter's privilege in the Fourth Circuit. So now all journalists in the Fourth Circuit -- which covers Virginia and Maryland where the vast majority of national security sources live and work -- will have no protection if the government comes after them in future cases.

After all this (along with a large public outcry), the government decided to drop its pursuit of James Risen. And of course were able to easily convict Jeffrey Sterling anyways, using evidence gleaned from digital surveillance.

Now the Justice Department wants a pat on the back. While it is unequivocally excellent news that Risen will not be forced into jail, the DOJ's behavior in this case was and still is deplorable. It has done damage to long-term press freedom rights that will be very hard to undo, and the idea that this should be looked at as a "model" for future leak investigations is troubling to say the least.

Reposted from the Freedom of the Press Foundation

Filed Under: doj, eric holder, investigations, james risen, journalism, leaks, reporters