Daily Deal: The Electrical And Circuits Engineering Bundle

from the good-deals-on-cool-stuff dept

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Filed Under: daily deal

Google Facing Yet Another Antitrust Lawsuit Over Its App Store Practices, Even Though Android Is Quite Permissive

from the not-sure-I-get-this-one dept

Another day, another antitrust lawsuit against Google. This one, filed by 36 states and Washington DC, says that the company's practices regarding its Android app store violate antitrust law. This is now the fourth antitrust lawsuit filed by various governments in the US against Google. There's the DOJ lawsuit, one from nine state AGs, another from 10 state AGs, and now this new one. I get that everyone wants to hate on the big tech companies these days, and they also want to throw a bunch of things at the wall, but would it really have been that difficult to go through all of this in one single lawsuit?

As with the previous lawsuits, this one leaves me scratching my head. I kept expecting there to be some bombshell or some smoking gun. But, once again, this lawsuit seems to take things that were done for perfectly reasonable reasons and attack them as anti-competitive.

The oddest thing, of course, is that of any "app store" out there, Android is the most permissive around. Apple's iOS is much more restrictive. You can't get apps onto an iPhone without first getting them approved by Apple. Ditto for other proprietary platforms like video game consoles. Google, on the other hand, allows users to sideload apps and also to install alternative app stores entirely. For example, Amazon has long had its own Android app store (and, notably, in the new version of Windows, users will be able to install Android apps on their desktop machines via Amazon's app store). That's a lot more open than most similarly situated platforms.

The complaint makes a big deal about how Google "discourages" people from sideloading apps or using alternative app stores:

Although Google leaves open the technical possibility for Android consumers to acquire some apps without using the Play Store, this can only be accomplished through a competing app store installed on the device (either through preloading by an OEM or through the user sideloading the store), or through sideloading of individual apps. Google takes various steps to discourage OEMs from directly competing or sponsoring any app store competition. Google makes the sideloading process unnecessarily cumbersome and impractical by adding superfluous, misleading, and discouraging security warnings and by deterring users by requiring them to grant permission multiple times for a single app installation (discussed in more detail in Sections I.C. and I.D. below). The effect of Google’s conduct is to practically eliminate competition in Android app distribution.

But, uh, this kinda leaves out some of the details here -- which is that earlier, when Google was much more permissive about sideloading apps, there were lots of complaints about the dangers of sideloading and third party app stores. Indeed, some device makers used to refer to Android allowing sideloading as creating a "chaotic cesspool" of security problems and piracy.

In response, Google did get more serious about making sure users really understood the risks and really wanted to install 3rd party apps. But, again, it still does allow this -- much more readily than others. And yes, it's true that this probably makes it more difficult for third party app stores to survive, but if Google didn't do this it would also be slammed left, right, and center by everyone for not "policing" its phones and allowing security risks and piracy to run rampant. It's a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation.

I don't disagree that it would be nice if Google were more open to 3rd party app stores, and didn't necessarily make you jump through so many hoops, but is that seriously an antitrust violation? Even the market definition (the key to any antitrust case) is... weird. Obviously, how you define the market will show whether or not there's a monopoly -- and if you define the market as "the products that only this company makes" then of course that's a monopoly. But that's not really relevant for a question of whether or not there is anti-competitive behavior. But here, these states have come up with a market definition that is basically just Android. They're not even doing the "mobile operating system" market. Instead, they claim that the relevant market is specifically "the licensable mobile OS market" -- meaning that Apple iOS (which is not licensable from Apple) is excluded.

The licensable mobile OS market also excludes OSs that are unsuitable for mobile devices, such as OSs for simple cell phones, “flip phones,” or feature phones, or for other electronic devices (such as laptop computers, desktop computers, and gaming consoles, e.g., Nintendo DS, Xbox, PlayStation) that are not mobile devices.

If I'm reading this right, they're actually suggesting that if Google had decided not to license its OS, and not to let competing device manufacturers build their own competing phones, then they would have less of an antitrust case against Google. And that seems... weird? And kind of nonsensical.

Maybe I'm missing something here, but it seems like Apple's control of iOS is a lot more strict, ditto for Nintendo, Microsoft with Xbox, and Sony with the PlayStation. Google's decision to license its OS and enable much wider competition, as well as allowing some sideloading and 3rd party app stores, seems a hell of a lot more competitive than all those other services -- and yet that's all being used against Google, but not the others?

It also seems like this lawsuit may run into the same problem that resulted in various states' lawsuits against Facebook to get tossed: why now? Android has acted this way for years, and why are these state AGs suddenly deciding it's a problem?

I'm all for having more competition at every level of the stack, but I'm confused as to how this is a legitimate antitrust claim.

Filed Under: 3rd party app stores, android, antitrust, app store, competition, licensable mobile operating system, market definition, mobile operating systems, play store, sideloading
Companies: google

Community Broadband Dominates List Of Fastest US ISPs

from the if-you-build-it-they-will-come dept

For years, a growing number of US towns and cities have been forced into the broadband business thanks to US telecom market failure. Frustrated by high prices, lack of competition, spotty coverage, and terrible customer service, some 750 US towns and cities have explored some kind of community broadband option. And while the telecom industry (and the lawmakers, regulators, and policy wonks paid to love them) routinely tries to paint such projects as radical socialist boondoggles that always end in failure, that's never actually been true.

The latest case in point: once a year PC Magazine offers a breakdown of the fastest broadband networks in the United States. And this year, as usual, the list is dominated by community-owned and operated broadband networks. Look at the list of the fastest ISPs in the nation overall:

Three of the fastest ISPs are directly owned by the city (Longmont, Colorado’s Nextlight, Chattanooga, Tennessee’s EPB Fiber, and Cedar Falls, Iowa’s CFU). These same ISPs, not coincidentally, also tend to score really well on overall consumer satisfaction studies. And the fastest ISP in the country (Empire Access) makes heavy use of an open access middle mile fiber network funded in large part by the public. Other companies, like Ting and Google Fiber are tightly partnered with local municipalities and regional fiber networks as well.

Data just keeps showing how locally-owned and operated public networks routinely offer better, faster, and cheaper service. But instead of embracing such options, our heavily compromised US regulators have either tried to hamstring them via dodgy state laws, or exploit myopic partisanship to demonize them ("socialism!" "government run amok!" "a terrible affront to the miraculous free market!"). Despite such networks seeing broad, bipartisan public support, House Republicans just this year tried to ban them completely across the entire United States. It's just blisteringly ignorant corruption.

As the Institute for Local Self Reliance notes, it's easier and cheaper for a politically powerful regional telecom monopoly like AT&T to pay off a few lawmakers than it is to actually try harder. But try as they may to demonize such projects, their popularity and effectiveness continues to speak for itself:

"Monopoly providers have often trotted out the claim that modern network infrastructure is too complicated and costly for local communities to build and operate successfully. It’s an argument that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny, and even less so given that not only do modestly sized cities beat out the national ISPs for pure speed, they do it twice as fast, lapping the competition."

But it's also important to note that community broadband isn't some either/or option. Many areas are creating a healthy symbiosis between municipalities, cooperatives, community broadband networks, public/private partnerships, and private companies. COVID just got done educating us as to the essential nature of broadband connectivity. Efforts to hamstring or ban productive regional solutions continue to be ignorant and counterproductive.

Filed Under: broadband speeds, competition, municipal broadband

After All That, Nintendo Can't Even Get $50 A Month Out Of RomUniverse

from the time-and-money-well-spent dept

The saga of how RomUniverse, a site dedicated to offering ROMs for classic Nintendo games, came to its end is both frustrating and very dumb. Back in 2019, Nintendo launched a massive war on ROM sites, coinciding with the release of a mini version of Nintendo's NES console. Eventually, the company's sights turned to RomUniverse. Run solely by Matthew Storman, the site first tried and failed to crowdfund its legal expenses, made the lame argument that somehow the first sale doctrine meant that Storman could legally offer up digital versions of bought Nintendo games, only to see Storman represent himself in court and eventually lose. While Nintendo always had the law on its side, it was also true that sites like RomUniverse existed for a long, long time and Nintendo wasn't injured enough by any of this for it to be on the radar prior to the ROM War of 2019. In fact, I would argue that ROM sites for a long, long time kept up the interest in these classic games that created a market for Nintendo's classic console releases.

I would also argue that the whole thing was a giant waste of time and money, an assertion backed up by the fact that the victorious Nintendo reportedly can't even get $50 a month out of Storman, despite court orders.

You can’t get blood from a stone, and you can’t squeeze a relatively measly $50 payment out of a guy whose primary source of income was the video game rom site you sued into oblivion. Earlier this year Nintendo’s 2019 lawsuit against website RomUniverse concluded with the site being shut down and Nintendo awarded $2.1 million dollars in damages. That’s $35,000 for each of the 49 Nintendo games found on the site plus $400,000 in trademark damages. The chances of Matthew Storman, who defended himself in court and whose only source of income was the now-defunct rom site, being able to pay those damages are incredibly slim. In a recent court filing obtained by Torrentfreak, Nintendo complains that Storman hasn’t made his court mandated monthly payment of $50.

As a result, Nintendo is seeking a permanent injunction against Storman to keep him from ever re-launching RomUniverse. That, frankly, may be what the company was after this entire time.

But that doesn't make the futility of this whole legal enterprise any more sensical. Nintendo managed to legally pummel a single man who was, admittedly, infringing their copyrights. But one is free to wonder aloud if this legal route was really the only method Nintendo had for getting the site shut down. If Storman truly cannot manage a $50/month sanctions payment to Nintendo, there is no hope of them recovering the $2.1 million awarded in court, an amount that Storman also appears by all accounts to be unable to pay.

And so Nintendo has a legal victory without any monetary award, Storman's own actions have resulted in his fiscal life likely being in shambles, and we all go on our merry way. Again, this is really how this had to happen?

Filed Under: classic video games, copyright, matthew storman, nes, old video games, roms, trademark, video games
Companies: nintendo, romuniverse

Fourth Circuit Appeals Court Says Right To Access Court Documents Begins When The Documents Are Filed

from the suck-it,-clerks dept

Courthouse News Service has obtained a significant win in its lawsuit against court clerks in Virginia -- one that soundly affirms the First Amendment right to access court documents. This isn't the only place CNS is fighting for its First Amendment rights, but this decision affects everything in the Fourth Circuit, which covers Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.

Here's the battle Courthouse News Service has been fighting on several fronts, assisted by several other news agencies and First Amendment activists.

The right of access at the core of the legal slug fest, which included attempts by the clerks to hide evidence of delay, is a tradition that goes far back in time. When cases were filed in paper form, news reporters traditionally checked the new civil complaints at the clerk’s counter where they were usually gathered in a box or tray.

That stack of new complaints regularly contained news about major legal disputes in the community covered by the court, ranging from financial wrongdoing to environmental disputes to accidents and disasters.

The intake clerk placed new paper cases in the box when they crossed the counter — in other words, contemporaneously with their filing.

That tradition was carried forward into the electronic age by federal courts and a long list of state courts in Hawaii, California, Nevada, Utah, Georgia, Alabama, New York and Connecticut.

But a similar list of courts broke with tradition. They took advantage of the switch to e-filing and pushed the press and public behind clerical functions that, in St. Louis for example, took between a week and two weeks to complete. Those delayers include courts in Maine, Vermont, Oregon, North Carolina and Texas.

In this particular case, court clerks in Norfolk and Prince William County (both Virginia) decided they no longer needed to provide prompt access to filed lawsuits, claiming the move to electronic filing justified delays that were sometimes measured in weeks. Courthouse News said this was ridiculous. Also, unconstitutional. The district court agreed. The clerks appealed, and now have established precedent [PDF] that forces them to speed up processing of filed lawsuits.

Here's how things were going before CNS filed its lawsuit:

[I]n May 2018, the City of Norfolk court made only 19% of the complaints available on the day of filing, and 22% of the complaints were not available until two or more court days after filing. Similarly, in July 2018, the Prince William County court only made 42.4% of the complaints available on the day of filing and 41.5% of the complaints were not available until two or more court days after filing.

And here's what it looked like after its lawsuit was filed:

[B]oth Clerks significantly improved access to documents in their courts without hiring any new employees or changing employee or court hours. By the end of November 2018, the Norfolk City court made 92.3% of newly filed civil complaints available on the day of filing and 100% of complaints available within one court day of filing. Similarly, for the last three months of the tracking period, the Prince William County court made at least 88.1% of the complaints available on the day of filing and approximately 96.5% of complaints were available within one day of filing.

So much for the argument that the intricacies of modern day electronics made it impossible to provide same-day service. Given this new alacrity -- one apparently instigated by litigation -- the lower court said clerks must make newly-filed complaints available on the same day of filing. Minor deviations were acceptable "due to extraordinary circumstances," but the baseline was as close to "contemporaneous" as possible.

The Clerks appealed. They raised several procedural arguments, but the Fourth Circuit doesn't like any of them. To begin with, the case certainly isn't moot, not without the clerks' offices not making a formal change in policy that instructs clerks to make filings available the same day they're filed.

While the Clerks’ improvements in rates of access are commendable, absent the relief Courthouse News sought, “nothing bars [them] from reverting” to the allegedly unconstitutional rates of access in the future. Porter v. Clarke, 852 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 2017). The case is thus not moot.

They also argued the district court had overstepped by meddling in a case involving city and county officials. Wrong again, says the court. No injunction was granted so the court isn't setting policy for local officials. Instead, this court -- like the court before it -- is handing down a declaratory judgment that sets the standard for constitutionality, which even state and local officials must follow.

The clerks also argued that, while there is a presumption of access to court documents, this presumption doesn't override the clerks' right to take their time making documents available. According to the clerks, the First Amendment right of access doesn't attach until a judge takes action in a case. You could not be more wrong, says the Appeals Court.

That argument misreads precedent — the analytical approach complements the experience and logic test without supplanting it. Of course, a First Amendment right of access exists as to some documents “submitted in conjunction with judicial proceedings that themselves would trigger the right to access.” Id.; see also In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986). But that does not mean that the First Amendment right of access to a document never exists independent of and prior to a related judicial proceeding. Rather, the experience and logic test can and sometimes does independently furnish the basis for a First Amendment right of access to a judicial document or to judicial proceedings. See, e.g., In re United States, 707 F.3d 283 (applying the experience and logic test to § 2703(d) orders); Baltimore Sun Co v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989) (same, to search warrant affidavits). And as in a similar case recently decided by the Ninth Circuit, nothing in the record before us demonstrates that the tradition of access to complaints “conditions [that] access on judicial action.” Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 947 F.3d 581, 592 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Planet III”). In sum, the experience prong supports a First Amendment right of access to civil complaints, even before any judicial action in the case.

The court holds that in this judicial district, the First Amendment attaches as soon as lawsuits are filed. Excessive delays in making them available is unconstitutional.

The press and public enjoy a First Amendment right of access to newly filed civil complaints. This right requires courts to make newly filed civil complaints available as expeditiously as possible. After considering all of the evidence offered at trial, the district court found that the facts of this case demonstrate that the Clerks did not do so, and so violated the First Amendment.

After months of being jerked around by clerks who obviously had the capability to make filings available nearly immediately, Courthouse News walks away with an affirmed win and some handy precedent that should make its other legal battles run a bit more smoothly.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, 4th circuit, access, court documents
Companies: courthouse news

FBI Cites Guidelines That Don't Actually Forbid Social Media Monitoring As The Reason It Was Blindsided By The January 6 Attack

from the some-monitoring-is-more-equal-than-others dept

The FBI has spent thousands on social media monitoring software. These contracts are public, making it literally unbelievable the agency has managed to stave off FOIA requests by handing out "neither confirm nor deny" non-answers. A court didn't buy the FBI's excuse for its Glomar, pointing out that confirming public information would not give criminals a heads-up on surveillance software the FBI is currently using.

The FBI's inability to honestly discuss its social media monitoring programs continues. The January 6th raid on the US Capitol building has resulted in hundreds of arrests. A lot of the evidence for these prosecutions has come from social media posts by members of the ad hoc raiding party.

The FBI continues to provide contradictory responses when questioned about its social media monitoring programs. Its Congressional testimony has kind of eluded direct questions about the FBI's incursions into First Amendment territory -- something the FBI is now using to explain why it wasn't more aware of the impending threat prior to January 6th.

Quinta Jurecic's post for Lawfare points out the FBI lack of awareness was somewhat stunning, given the vast amount of publicly available information circulating social media prior to the Capitol raid.

The only document the FBI produced warning about Jan. 6 was a single bulletin issued by the bureau’s Norfolk, Virginia, field office. This absence of warning is particularly striking given that a significant amount of the planning for the Jan. 6 riot took place in public on social media platforms like Facebook, Gab and Parler. Anyone with a Twitter account and an hour of time to kill could have warned about the potential for violence on Jan. 6—and many did.

FBI Director Chris Wray has been questioned about the FBI's lack of preparedness. And his responses haven't cleared much up. According to Wray, FBI guidelines forbid agents from camping out on social media and searching for evidence of potential criminal activity.

“We’re not allowed to ... just sit and monitor social media and look at one person’s posts … just in case,” Wray told the House Judiciary Committee recently.

But that's not strictly true. The agency's guidelines do not strictly forbid this activity. The FBI can monitor social media platforms. It just usually doesn't. Wray says guidelines prevent agents from "collecting First Amendment activities," but there's nothing in the rules that says the FBI can't monitor open-source information like public posts.

This has been Wray's line through several hearings this year. But the guidelines say something completely different.

[A]ssessments may be undertaken proactively with such objectives as detecting criminal activities; obtaining information on individuals, groups, or organizations of possible investigative interest, either because they may be involved in criminal or national security-threatening activities or because they may be targeted for attack or victimization by such activities; and identifying and assessing individuals who may have value as human sources. For example, assessment activities may involve proactively surfing the Internet to find publicly accessible websites and services through which recruitment by terrorist organizations and promotion of terrorist crimes is openly taking place…

So, perhaps the problem was the January 6th raid was carried out by the wrong kind of terrorists. The FBI is certainly proactive when it comes to monitoring the Muslim community "just in case." When it comes to white insurrectionists, the agency apparently just hangs back and lets things take their course until it becomes imperative for the FBI to get involved.

Wray, at best, is only partly right.

In other words, Wray is correct that the bureau needs an authorized purpose to review social media, and that First Amendment considerations are involved. But his testimony leaves out the fact that the DIOG specifically authorizes FBI employees to review social media posts potentially protected by the First Amendment under certain circumstances—circumstances that could well have been met in the case of the soon-to-be Capitol rioters. After all, wouldn’t Facebook posts announcing plans to invade a government building raise criminal or national security concerns under the FBI’s definition of “authorized purpose”?

It's not that we should be encouraging the FBI to engage in more proactive monitoring of social media -- something that's sure to raise some First Amendment issues. It's that the FBI has never been shy about focusing this attention on certain kinds of people while appearing to ignore others who haven't historically been considered a threat to national security by the agency.

Perhaps this take isn't accurate and the FBI takes a similar hands-off approach when keeping an eye on other potential threats involving less-white people. But given the FBI's long history of utilizing social media to radicalize local adherents of Islam into attempting to commit criminal acts, it hardly seems likely the FBI follows these guidelines (the ones that don't say what the FBI Director says they do) consistently. It has experienced this sort of colorblindness in the past. And the conclusion one can easily draw -- especially when the FBI hasn't offered up a better explanation for why it missed the warning signs for the January 6th attack -- is that the agency largely feels white people are nothing to worry about.

Filed Under: chris wray, fbi, insurrection, january 6th, public information, social media, social media monitoring

It Can Always Get Dumber: Trump Sues Facebook, Twitter & YouTube, Claiming His Own Government Violated The Constitution

from the wanna-try-that-again? dept

Yes, it can always get dumber. The news broke last night that Donald Trump was planning to sue the CEOs of Facebook and Twitter for his "deplatforming." This morning we found out that they were going to be class action lawsuits on behalf of Trump and other users who were removed, and now that they're announced we find out that he's actually suing Facebook & Mark Zuckerberg, Twitter & Jack Dorsey, and YouTube & Sundar Pichai. I expected the lawsuits to be performative nonsense, but these are... well... these are more performative and more nonsensical than even I expected.

These lawsuits are so dumb, and so bad, that there seems to be a decent likelihood Trump himself will be on the hook for the companies' legal bills before this is all over.

The underlying claims in all three lawsuits are the same. Count one is that these companies removing Trump and others from their platforms violates the 1st Amendment. I mean, I know we've heard crackpots push this theory (without any success), but this is the former President of the United States arguing that private companies violated HIS 1st Amendment rights by conspiring with the government HE LED AT THE TIME to deplatform him. I cannot stress how absolutely laughably stupid this is. The 1st Amendment, as anyone who has taken a civics class should know, restricts the government from suppressing speech. It does not prevent private companies from doing so.

The arguments here are so convoluted. To avoid the fact that he ran the government at the time, he tries to blame the Biden transition team in the Facebook and Twitter lawsuits (in the YouTube one he tries to blame the Biden White House).

Pursuant to Section 230, Defendants are encouraged and immunized by Congress to censor constitutionally protected speech on the Internet, including by and among its approximately three (3) billion Users that are citizens of the United States.

Using its authority under Section 230 together and in concert with other social media companies, the Defendants regulate the content of speech over a vast swath of the Internet.

Defendants are vulnerable to and react to coercive pressure from the federal government to regulate specific speech.

In censoring the specific speech at issue in this lawsuit and deplatforming Plaintiff, Defendants were acting in concert with federal officials, including officials at the CDC and the Biden transition team.

As such, Defendants’ censorship activities amount to state action.

Defendants’ censoring the Plaintiff’s Facebook account, as well as those Putative Class Members, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it eliminates the Plaintiffs and Class Member’s participation in a public forum and the right to communicate to others their content and point of view.

Defendants’ censoring of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes viewpoint and contentbased restrictions on the Plaintiffs’ and Putative Class Members’ access to information, views, and content otherwise available to the general public.

Defendants’ censoring of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members violates the First Amendment because it imposes a prior restraint on free speech and has a chilling effect on social media Users and non-Users alike.

Defendants’ blocking of the Individual and Class Plaintiffs from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint and content-based restriction on the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members’ ability to petition the government for redress of grievances.

Defendants’ censorship of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint and contentbased restriction on their ability to speak and the public’s right to hear and respond.

Defendants’ blocking the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates their First Amendment rights to free speech.

Defendants’ censoring of Plaintiff by banning Plaintiff from his Facebook account while exercising his free speech as President of the United States was an egregious violation of the First Amendment.

So, let's just get this out of the way. I have expressed significant concerns about lawmakers and other government officials that have tried to pressure social media companies to remove content. I think they should not be doing so, and if they do so with implied threats to retaliate for the editorial choices of these companies that is potentially a violation of the 1st Amendment. But that's because it's done by a government official.

It does not mean the private companies magically become state actors. It does not mean that the private companies can't kick you off for whatever reason they want. Even if there were some sort of 1st Amendment violation here, it would be on behalf of the government officials trying to intimidate the platforms into acting -- and none of the examples in any of the lawsuits seem likely to reach even that level (and, again the lawsuits are against the wrong parties anyway).

The second claim, believe it or not, is perhaps even dumber than the first. It asks for declaratory judgment that Section 230 itself is unconstitutional.

In censoring (flagging, shadow banning, etc.) Plaintiff and the Class, Defendants relied upon and acted pursuant to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

Defendants would not have deplatformed Plaintiff or similarly situated Putative Class Members but for the immunity purportedly offered by Section 230.

Let's just cut in here to point out that this point is just absolutely, 100% wrong and completely destroys this entire claim. Section 230 does provide immunity from lawsuits, but that does not mean without it no one would ever do any moderation at all. Most companies would still do content moderation -- as that is still protected under the 1st Amendment itself. To claim that without 230 Trump would still be on these platforms is laughable. If anything the opposite is the case. Without 230 liability protections, if others sued the websites for Trump's threats, attacks, potentially defamatory statements and so on, it would have likely meant that these companies would have pulled the trigger faster on removing Trump. Because anything he (and others) said would represent a potential legal liability for the platforms.

Back to the LOLsuit.

Section 230(c)(2) purports to immunize social media companies from liability for action taken by them to block, restrict, or refuse to carry “objectionable” speech even if that speech is “constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).

In addition, Section 230(c)(1) also has been interpreted as furnishing an additional immunity to social media companies for action taken by them to block, restrict, or refuse to carry constitutionally protected speech.

Section 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) were deliberately enacted by Congress to induce, encourage, and promote social medial companies to accomplish an objective—the censorship of supposedly “objectionable” but constitutionally protected speech on the Internet—that Congress could not constitutionally accomplish itself.

Congress cannot lawfully induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 US 455, 465 (1973).

Section 230(c)(2) is therefore unconstitutional on its face, and Section 230(c)(1) is likewise unconstitutional insofar as it has interpreted to immunize social media companies for action they take to censor constitutionally protected speech.

This is an argument that has been advanced in a few circles, and it's absolute garbage. Indeed, the state of Florida tried this basic argument in its attempt to defend its social media moderation law and that failed miserably just last week.

And those are the only two claims in the various lawsuits. That these private companies making an editorial decision to ban Donald Trump (in response to worries about him encouraging violence) violates the 1st Amendment (it does not) and that Section 230 is unconstitutional because it somehow involves Congress encouraging companies to remove Constitutionally protected speech. This is also wrong, because all of the cases related to this argument involve laws that actually pressure companies to act in this way. Section 230 has no such pressure involved (indeed, many of the complaints from some in government is that 230 is a "free pass" for companies to do nothing at all if they so choose).

There is a ton of other garbage -- mostly performative throat-clearing -- in the lawsuits, but none of that really matters beyond the two laughably dumb claims. I did want to call out a few really, really stupid points though. In the Twitter lawsuit, Trump's lawyers misleadingly cite the Knight 1st Amendment Institute's suit against Trump for blocking users on Twitter:

In Biden v. Knight 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021), the Supreme Court discussed the Second Circuit’s decision in Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, No. 18- 1691, holding that Plaintiff’s threads on Twitter from his personal account were, in fact, official presidential statements made in a “public forum.”

Likewise, President Trump would discuss government activity on Twitter in his official capacity as President of the United States with any User who chose to follow him, except for seven (7) Plaintiffs in the Knight case, supra., and with the public at large.

So, uh, "the Supreme Court" did not discuss it. Only Justice Clarence Thomas did, and it was a weird, meandering, unbriefed set of musings that were unrelated to the case at hand. It's a stretch to argue that "the Supreme Court" did that. Second, part of President Trump's argument in the Knight case was that his Twitter account was not being used in his "official capacity," but was rather his personal account that just sometimes tweeted official information. Literally. This was President Trump appealing to the Supreme Court in that case:

The government’s response is that the President is not acting in his official capacity when he blocks users....

To then turn around in another case and claim that it was official action is just galaxy brain nonsense.

Another crazy point: in all three lawsuits, Donald Trump argues that government officials threatening the removal of Section 230 in response to social media companies' content moderation policies itself proves that the decisions by those companies make them state actors. Here's the version from the YouTube complaint (just insert the other two companies where it says YouTube to see what it is in the others):

Below are just some examples of Democrat legislators threatening new regulations, antitrust breakup, and removal of Section 230 immunity for Defendants and other social media platforms if YouTube did not censor views and content with which these Members of Congress disagreed, including the views and content of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members

But, uh, Donald Trump spent much of the last year in office doing exactly the same thing. He literally demanded the removal of Section 230. He signed an executive order to try to remove Section 230 immunity from companies, then demaned Congress repeal all of Section 230 before he would fund the military. On the antitrust breakup front, Trump demanded that Bill Barr file antitrust claims against Google prior to the election as part of his campaign against "big tech."

It's just absolutely hilarious that he's now claiming that members of Congress doing the very same thing he did, but to a lesser degree, and with less power magically turns these platforms into state actors.

There was a lot of speculation as to what lawyers Trump would have found to file such a lawsuit, and (surprisingly) it's not any of the usual suspects. There is the one local lawyer in Florida (required to file such a suit there), two lawyers with AOL email addresses, and then a whole bunch of lawyers from Ivey, Barnum, & O'Mara, a (I kid you not) "personal injury and real estate" law firm in Connecticut. If these lawyers have any capacity for shame, they should be embarrassed to file something this bad. But considering that the bio for the lead lawyer on the case hypes up his many, many media appearances, and even has a gallery of photos of him appearing on TV shows, you get the feeling that perhaps these lawyers know it's all performative and will get them more media coverage. That coverage should be mocking them for filing an obviously vexatious and frivolous lawsuit.

The lawsuit is filed in Florida, which has an anti-SLAPP law (not a great one, but not a horrible one either). It does seem possible that these companies might file anti-SLAPP claims in response to this lawsuit, meaning that Trump could potentially be on the hook for the legal fees of all three. Of course, if the whole thing is a performative attempt at playing the victim, it's not clear that that would matter.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, class action, content moderation, donald trump, jack dorsey, mark zuckerberg, section 230, state actor, sundar pichai
Companies: facebook, twitter, youtube

Daily Deal: The Complete 2021 Beginner to Expert Guitar Lessons Bundle

from the good-deals-on-cool-stuff dept

The Complete 2021 Beginner to Expert Guitar Lessons Bundle has 14 courses to help you master playing guitar. By the end of these courses, you'll be playing chords in songs, soloing, strumming various patterns, reading the guitar tab, and generally understanding your guitar. You'll be able to teach yourself any song you want to learn. Courses will also introduce you to electric guitar, blues and jazz guitar, and more. It's on sale for $30.

Note: The Techdirt Deals Store is powered and curated by StackCommerce. A portion of all sales from Techdirt Deals helps support Techdirt. The products featured do not reflect endorsements by our editorial team.

Filed Under: daily deal

Biden Executive Order Will Try To Address Some 'Right To Repair' Harms

from the you-don't-own-what-you-buy dept

Back in 2015, frustration at John Deere's ham-fisted repair restrictions and draconian tractor DRM helped birth a grassroots tech movement dubbed "right to repair." The company's crackdown on "unauthorized repairs" turned countless ordinary citizens into technology policy activists, after onerous restrictions not only significantly drove up repair costs, but forced owners to often haul their equipment hundreds or thousands of miles to an authorized repair location.

John Deere's multi-year promise to do a better job providing access to tools, documentation, and repair options simply never materialized. And of course John Deere is just one of numerous companies engaged in this kind of behavior across numerous sectors, driving major public support for proposed legislation in more than a dozen states that would put a major dent in technology repair monopolies.

In a small win for farmers and right to repair advocates, Biden is apparently planning to include some right to repair mandates in an upcoming executive order on competition. The order itself will urge the FTC to craft tighter rules to address the problem:

"U.S. President Joe Biden wants the Federal Trade Commission to limit the ability of farm equipment manufacturers to restrict tractor owners from using independent repair shops or complete some repairs on their own, a source briefed on the matter told Reuters Tuesday. Biden's planned executive order on competition, expected to be released in the coming days, will encourage the FTC to address the issue, the source said. Some tractor manufacturers like Deere & Co use proprietary repair tools and software to prevent third parties from performing some repairs. Deere and the FTC did not immediately comment.

The problem is that the FTC's rule creation and enforcement authority is arguably narrow under the FTC Act (not to mention limited by funding and staffing constraints). Most of the agency's enforcement authority rests on whether something is clearly "unfair and deceptive." But most repair monopolies, like Apple, obfuscate their greed by insisting onerous repair restrictions are necessary to protect consumer safety and security. Ideally you'd prefer clear and well crafted state and federal laws, but companies like Apple have worked overtime to insist such legislation would also harm the public.

In 2017, Apple insisted that passing a right to repair law in Nebraska would turn the state into a "mecca for hackers." More recently, the auto industry tried to claim that expanding Massachusetts' existing consumer tech law, to make sure that independent garages could access tools and diagnostic gear, would result in a "boom in sexual predators." Sony, Microsoft, and others eager to monopolize repair options for their game consoles can routinely be found making the same or similar arguments about how better consumer protection would create a parade of unforeseen horribles.

But a recent bipartisan FTC report found that the majority of the claims coming from companies like Apple were false (the company bullies independent repair shop owners to protect revenues, not out of some broad altruism). The report went on to note that stricter state and federal laws and tougher antitrust enforcement would go a long way toward addressing this kind of behavior. In other words, even the FTC acknowledges it's going to take more than just an EO punting the problem to the FTC if right to repair reform is to be taken seriously.

Filed Under: copyright, drm, executive order, ftc, joe biden, right to repair, unauthorized repairs