It Can Always Get Dumber: Trump Sues Facebook, Twitter & YouTube, Claiming His Own Government Violated The Constitution

from the wanna-try-that-again? dept

Yes, it can always get dumber. The news broke last night that Donald Trump was planning to sue the CEOs of Facebook and Twitter for his "deplatforming." This morning we found out that they were going to be class action lawsuits on behalf of Trump and other users who were removed, and now that they're announced we find out that he's actually suing Facebook & Mark Zuckerberg, Twitter & Jack Dorsey, and YouTube & Sundar Pichai. I expected the lawsuits to be performative nonsense, but these are... well... these are more performative and more nonsensical than even I expected.

These lawsuits are so dumb, and so bad, that there seems to be a decent likelihood Trump himself will be on the hook for the companies' legal bills before this is all over.

The underlying claims in all three lawsuits are the same. Count one is that these companies removing Trump and others from their platforms violates the 1st Amendment. I mean, I know we've heard crackpots push this theory (without any success), but this is the former President of the United States arguing that private companies violated HIS 1st Amendment rights by conspiring with the government HE LED AT THE TIME to deplatform him. I cannot stress how absolutely laughably stupid this is. The 1st Amendment, as anyone who has taken a civics class should know, restricts the government from suppressing speech. It does not prevent private companies from doing so.

The arguments here are so convoluted. To avoid the fact that he ran the government at the time, he tries to blame the Biden transition team in the Facebook and Twitter lawsuits (in the YouTube one he tries to blame the Biden White House).

Pursuant to Section 230, Defendants are encouraged and immunized by Congress to censor constitutionally protected speech on the Internet, including by and among its approximately three (3) billion Users that are citizens of the United States.

Using its authority under Section 230 together and in concert with other social media companies, the Defendants regulate the content of speech over a vast swath of the Internet.

Defendants are vulnerable to and react to coercive pressure from the federal government to regulate specific speech.

In censoring the specific speech at issue in this lawsuit and deplatforming Plaintiff, Defendants were acting in concert with federal officials, including officials at the CDC and the Biden transition team.

As such, Defendants’ censorship activities amount to state action.

Defendants’ censoring the Plaintiff’s Facebook account, as well as those Putative Class Members, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it eliminates the Plaintiffs and Class Member’s participation in a public forum and the right to communicate to others their content and point of view.

Defendants’ censoring of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes viewpoint and contentbased restrictions on the Plaintiffs’ and Putative Class Members’ access to information, views, and content otherwise available to the general public.

Defendants’ censoring of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members violates the First Amendment because it imposes a prior restraint on free speech and has a chilling effect on social media Users and non-Users alike.

Defendants’ blocking of the Individual and Class Plaintiffs from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint and content-based restriction on the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members’ ability to petition the government for redress of grievances.

Defendants’ censorship of the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates the First Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint and contentbased restriction on their ability to speak and the public’s right to hear and respond.

Defendants’ blocking the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members from their Facebook accounts violates their First Amendment rights to free speech.

Defendants’ censoring of Plaintiff by banning Plaintiff from his Facebook account while exercising his free speech as President of the United States was an egregious violation of the First Amendment.

So, let's just get this out of the way. I have expressed significant concerns about lawmakers and other government officials that have tried to pressure social media companies to remove content. I think they should not be doing so, and if they do so with implied threats to retaliate for the editorial choices of these companies that is potentially a violation of the 1st Amendment. But that's because it's done by a government official.

It does not mean the private companies magically become state actors. It does not mean that the private companies can't kick you off for whatever reason they want. Even if there were some sort of 1st Amendment violation here, it would be on behalf of the government officials trying to intimidate the platforms into acting -- and none of the examples in any of the lawsuits seem likely to reach even that level (and, again the lawsuits are against the wrong parties anyway).

The second claim, believe it or not, is perhaps even dumber than the first. It asks for declaratory judgment that Section 230 itself is unconstitutional.

In censoring (flagging, shadow banning, etc.) Plaintiff and the Class, Defendants relied upon and acted pursuant to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

Defendants would not have deplatformed Plaintiff or similarly situated Putative Class Members but for the immunity purportedly offered by Section 230.

Let's just cut in here to point out that this point is just absolutely, 100% wrong and completely destroys this entire claim. Section 230 does provide immunity from lawsuits, but that does not mean without it no one would ever do any moderation at all. Most companies would still do content moderation -- as that is still protected under the 1st Amendment itself. To claim that without 230 Trump would still be on these platforms is laughable. If anything the opposite is the case. Without 230 liability protections, if others sued the websites for Trump's threats, attacks, potentially defamatory statements and so on, it would have likely meant that these companies would have pulled the trigger faster on removing Trump. Because anything he (and others) said would represent a potential legal liability for the platforms.

Back to the LOLsuit.

Section 230(c)(2) purports to immunize social media companies from liability for action taken by them to block, restrict, or refuse to carry “objectionable” speech even if that speech is “constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).

In addition, Section 230(c)(1) also has been interpreted as furnishing an additional immunity to social media companies for action taken by them to block, restrict, or refuse to carry constitutionally protected speech.

Section 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) were deliberately enacted by Congress to induce, encourage, and promote social medial companies to accomplish an objective—the censorship of supposedly “objectionable” but constitutionally protected speech on the Internet—that Congress could not constitutionally accomplish itself.

Congress cannot lawfully induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Norwood v. Harrison, 413 US 455, 465 (1973).

Section 230(c)(2) is therefore unconstitutional on its face, and Section 230(c)(1) is likewise unconstitutional insofar as it has interpreted to immunize social media companies for action they take to censor constitutionally protected speech.

This is an argument that has been advanced in a few circles, and it's absolute garbage. Indeed, the state of Florida tried this basic argument in its attempt to defend its social media moderation law and that failed miserably just last week.

And those are the only two claims in the various lawsuits. That these private companies making an editorial decision to ban Donald Trump (in response to worries about him encouraging violence) violates the 1st Amendment (it does not) and that Section 230 is unconstitutional because it somehow involves Congress encouraging companies to remove Constitutionally protected speech. This is also wrong, because all of the cases related to this argument involve laws that actually pressure companies to act in this way. Section 230 has no such pressure involved (indeed, many of the complaints from some in government is that 230 is a "free pass" for companies to do nothing at all if they so choose).

There is a ton of other garbage -- mostly performative throat-clearing -- in the lawsuits, but none of that really matters beyond the two laughably dumb claims. I did want to call out a few really, really stupid points though. In the Twitter lawsuit, Trump's lawyers misleadingly cite the Knight 1st Amendment Institute's suit against Trump for blocking users on Twitter:

In Biden v. Knight 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021), the Supreme Court discussed the Second Circuit’s decision in Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, No. 18- 1691, holding that Plaintiff’s threads on Twitter from his personal account were, in fact, official presidential statements made in a “public forum.”

Likewise, President Trump would discuss government activity on Twitter in his official capacity as President of the United States with any User who chose to follow him, except for seven (7) Plaintiffs in the Knight case, supra., and with the public at large.

So, uh, "the Supreme Court" did not discuss it. Only Justice Clarence Thomas did, and it was a weird, meandering, unbriefed set of musings that were unrelated to the case at hand. It's a stretch to argue that "the Supreme Court" did that. Second, part of President Trump's argument in the Knight case was that his Twitter account was not being used in his "official capacity," but was rather his personal account that just sometimes tweeted official information. Literally. This was President Trump appealing to the Supreme Court in that case:

The government’s response is that the President is not acting in his official capacity when he blocks users....

To then turn around in another case and claim that it was official action is just galaxy brain nonsense.

Another crazy point: in all three lawsuits, Donald Trump argues that government officials threatening the removal of Section 230 in response to social media companies' content moderation policies itself proves that the decisions by those companies make them state actors. Here's the version from the YouTube complaint (just insert the other two companies where it says YouTube to see what it is in the others):

Below are just some examples of Democrat legislators threatening new regulations, antitrust breakup, and removal of Section 230 immunity for Defendants and other social media platforms if YouTube did not censor views and content with which these Members of Congress disagreed, including the views and content of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members

But, uh, Donald Trump spent much of the last year in office doing exactly the same thing. He literally demanded the removal of Section 230. He signed an executive order to try to remove Section 230 immunity from companies, then demaned Congress repeal all of Section 230 before he would fund the military. On the antitrust breakup front, Trump demanded that Bill Barr file antitrust claims against Google prior to the election as part of his campaign against "big tech."

It's just absolutely hilarious that he's now claiming that members of Congress doing the very same thing he did, but to a lesser degree, and with less power magically turns these platforms into state actors.

There was a lot of speculation as to what lawyers Trump would have found to file such a lawsuit, and (surprisingly) it's not any of the usual suspects. There is the one local lawyer in Florida (required to file such a suit there), two lawyers with AOL email addresses, and then a whole bunch of lawyers from Ivey, Barnum, & O'Mara, a (I kid you not) "personal injury and real estate" law firm in Connecticut. If these lawyers have any capacity for shame, they should be embarrassed to file something this bad. But considering that the bio for the lead lawyer on the case hypes up his many, many media appearances, and even has a gallery of photos of him appearing on TV shows, you get the feeling that perhaps these lawyers know it's all performative and will get them more media coverage. That coverage should be mocking them for filing an obviously vexatious and frivolous lawsuit.

The lawsuit is filed in Florida, which has an anti-SLAPP law (not a great one, but not a horrible one either). It does seem possible that these companies might file anti-SLAPP claims in response to this lawsuit, meaning that Trump could potentially be on the hook for the legal fees of all three. Of course, if the whole thing is a performative attempt at playing the victim, it's not clear that that would matter.

Filed Under: 1st amendment, class action, content moderation, donald trump, jack dorsey, mark zuckerberg, section 230, state actor, sundar pichai
Companies: facebook, twitter, youtube

Corporations Are Being Forced To Take Consumer Complaints Back To Court After Arbitration Push Backfires Spectacularly

from the the-devil-you-know dept

For years, AT&T worked tirelessly to erode its customers' legal rights, using mouse print in its terms of service preventing consumers from participating in lawsuits against the company. Instead, customers were forced into binding arbitration, where arbitrators, chosen and paid by the companies under fire, unsurprisingly rule in favor of companies more often than not. Initially, the lower courts derided this anti-consumer behavior for what it was, noting that however brutally flawed the class action is, binding arbitration, at least the way we let companies designed it, in many ways made things worse.

But these lower court roadblocks quickly evaporated when the Supreme Court ruled in 2011 (Mobility v. Concepcion) that what AT&T was doing was perfectly OK. While lower courts saw this as an "unconscionable" abuse of consumer rights and the law, the Supreme Court bought into the ongoing myth that binding arbitration is a hyper-efficient, modern alternative to class actions. In reality, it shifted things to a form of binding arbitration that was costly, lopsided, and cumbersome for consumers, and less transparent for those used to visiting Pacer to dig up legal histories.

Fast forward to a few years ago, when a growing number of companies and services (like Fairshake) began streamlining the arbitration process, making it easier and less expensive for consumers (and yeah, class action lawyers). This shifted the balance of power back toward consumers, and starting in 2018 or so companies like Uber, AT&T and Comcast began to complain they were being swamped with arbitration feuds. Now, a year later, even giants like Amazon are being forced to take consumer complaints back to the courtroom, in part because a system they constructed to dodge accountability is no longer helping them do that:

"With no announcement, the company recently changed its terms of service to allow customers to file lawsuits. Already, it faces at least three proposed class actions, including one brought May 18 alleging the company’s Alexa-powered Echo devices recorded people without permission.

The retail giant made the change after plaintiffs’ lawyers flooded Amazon with more than 75,000 individual arbitration demands on behalf of Echo users. That move triggered a bill for tens of millions of dollars in filing fees, according to lawyers involved, payable by Amazon under its own policies."

To be very clear, the existing class action system is broken as well, usually doling out relatively pathetic payouts to impacted consumers, while class action lawyers get new boats. But the premise that the binding arbitration system (at least as implemented) was somehow better, at least in the way we implemented it in the States, has never been true. If you ask lawyers that represent companies like Amazon and AT&T, the fact that folks developed new systems that shifted the balance of power ever so slightly back toward consumers and class action lawyers is seen as terribly unfair:

"It has the potential to be pretty unfair to the company,” said Patrick Bannon, an employment lawyer at Seyfarth Shaw LLP who has represented clients facing mass arbitrations. The arbitration fees put intense pressure on businesses to settle, he said, “whether the claim is valid or not."

But if you ask the folks actually fighting for consumers (and not all of them are ambulance chasers), they see it as fair play:

"Companies thought they were getting out of liability altogether,” by adding arbitration clauses, said Chicago lawyer Travis Lenkner, whose firm filed the majority of the Amazon claims. “Now they’re seeing exactly what they bargained for, and they don’t like it."

In short, corporations (beginning with AT&T) spent the better part of the last decade fighting for an arbitration system that resulted in fewer payouts, fewer successful complaints, and less overall transparency. And while happy about that initially, the second the internet and technology shifted the balance of power in the other direction, they were eager to flee back to the devil they knew. It should be curious to see if other giants like AT&T also begin stripping binding arbitration out of their end user agreements, or if this is just a temporary setback on the path toward less accountability.

Filed Under: arbitration, binding arbitration, class action, class action lawsuits, consumer rights, consumers

Judge Lets False Advertising Case Against Apple Over 'Buying' Music You Didn't Buy Move Forward

from the you-don't-own-what-you-bought dept

A decade ago we wrote a post about what we called Schrodinger's Download, which was that the big companies in the music space would refer to digital downloads as a sale or a license in varying ways depending on which benefited them the most. This was most evident in lawsuits between artists and labels, especially with contracts signed in the pre-digital era, where the royalties for "licensing" were much higher than the royalties for "sales." In those cases, the labels tried to claim that MP3 downloads were "sales" in order to pay lower licensing fees -- but, on the flip side, when there were cases about reselling those files, suddenly the labels would insist that wasn't allowed, since it wasn't actually a sale, but a license.

And, of course, over the years, we've seen this play out in many ways -- especially with our never ending series of posts on how you don't own what you've bought, as more and more companies try to use technology and DRM to retain control over things you've "purchased." Last year, we wrote about someone suing Amazon for claiming that she had "purchased" movie downloads, but the fine print showing that she was merely "renting" them. The argument was that this was false advertising. That case is still going, but what we hadn't realized was that someone else had filed a very similar case against Apple, arguing the same thing. And, yes, it's the same lawyers on both cases...

And even though the Apple case was filed three months after the Amazon case, it's actually seen more progress. This week the judge denied Apple's motion to dismiss (first spotted on Courthouse News), saying that there's enough of a case to move forward. Apple tried to argue that the harm here is merely speculative. It hasn't actually removed the plaintiff's downloads. But the court says that Apple's wrong about that:

Apple argues that Plaintiff’s alleged injury — which it describes as the possibility that the purchased content may one day disappear — is not concrete but rather speculative.... This, however, as Plaintiff points out, misconstrues the injury. Plaintiff responds that his injury is not that he may one day lose access to his content.... Rather the injury Plaintiff asserts, is that he spent money purchasing the content that he wouldn’t have otherwise as a result of Apple’s misrepresentation.... This occurred at the time of purchase.

Another point raised by Apple is that "no reasonable consumer would believe" that when you buy a digital file, it means that it will always be available for you on iTunes. But the Court says, uh, yeah, actually, plenty of reasonable consumers probably would believe that, because that's what "buy" means:

Apple contends that “[n]o reasonable consumer would believe” that purchased content would remain on the iTunes platform indefinitely. Id. at 12. But in common usage, the term “buy” means to acquire possession over something. Buy Definition, merriam-webster.com, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/buy (13 April 2021). It seems plausible, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, that reasonable consumers would expect their access couldn’t be revoked.

The court did dismiss a few extraneous claims, but the key ones can now move forward -- and there's a decent chance that this will eventually become a class action lawsuit.

While some might argue that it doesn't really matter that much whether or not you're "buying" or "renting" this content, it really does matter in the legal sense, and big companies have used the distinction to their own advantage (often swapping out the words when convenient, as noted up top). Forcing the companies to actually be upfront about this stuff would be much better -- and might even get them to provide some more accurate descriptions of what they're really providing.

Filed Under: buying, class action, digital goods, licensing, ownership, purchase, renting, truth in advertising
Companies: amazon, apple

After Years Of Litigation, AT&T Customers Get A Measly $22 For Being Lied To Over 'Throttling'

from the what-accountability-doesn't-look-like dept

Way back in 2014 the FTC sued AT&T for selling "unlimited" wireless data plans with very real and annoying limits. The lawsuit noted that, starting in 2011, AT&T began selling "unlimited" plans that actually throttled upwards of 90 percent of your downstream speeds after using just two or three gigabytes of data. AT&T spent years trying to wiggle out of the lawsuit via a variety of legal gymnastics, including at one point trying to claim that the very same net neutrality and FCC Title II rules AT&T was attempting to kill, prevented the FTC from holding it accountable.

In late 2019 AT&T agreed to a $60 million settlement with the FTC without actually admitting any wrongdoing. Consumers who were lied to and ripped off for years nabbed somewhere around $12 each. Another, separate California class action recently came to a close with AT&T agreeing to a $12 million settlement. There too, consumers are expected to get somewhere around $10 to $11 each because they likely would have seen even less after a full trial:

"The new class-action settlement says that, on average, settlement-class members exceeded the throttling thresholds during 7.5 monthly billing periods. This means customers paid AT&T an average of $225 for unlimited data in months they were throttled. Despite that, plaintiffs concluded that the $10 or $11 settlement payments are a good deal compared to what they would likely get at trial."

Years of litigation, two major settlements, and $22 per consumer was the end result. Though lawyers wound up doing okay, grabbing their fair share of the $12 million:

"Here's how the numbers in the new settlement shake out. Of the $12 million, $462,000 is set aside for administrative costs and up to $3 million for attorneys' fees and expenses. The remainder would be distributed to the class, which is defined as California residents who bought unlimited mobile data from AT&T and exceeded the data usage threshold "for one or more monthly billing cycles such that the user would have been eligible for data usage slowing or deprioritization by AT&T in those billing cycles under AT&T's network management policies."

And this of course could have been worse had AT&T succeeded in flinging these folks toward binding arbitration, a system advertised as more effective than class actions despite being demonstrably even more lopsided and pathetic.

Wireless carriers have been advertising "unlimited" plans and then lying about their very real limits for the better part of fifteen years now. Many are still doing it and will continue to do it. Why? The penalty is always a tiny, tiny, fraction of the money earned by being misleading. The only real lesson here for AT&T is that stalling and litigation can easily blunt accountability for misleading or predatory business practices.

Filed Under: class action, fcc, throttling, truth in advertising, unlimited
Companies: at&t

Appeals Court Upholds Ruling Saying PACER Overcharged Users

from the refund-form-available-for-$0.10/page dept

A lawsuit against PACER for its long list of wrongs may finally pay off for the many, many people who've subjected themselves to its many indignities. The interface looks and runs like a personal Geocities page and those who manage to navigate it successfully are on the hook for pretty much every page it generates, including $0.10/page for search results that may not actually give users what they're looking for.

Everything else is $0.10/page too, including filings, orders, and the dockets themselves. They're capped at $3.00/each if they run past 30 pages, but for the most part, using PACER is like using a library's copier. Infinite copies can be "run off" at PACER at almost no expense, but the system charges users as though they're burning up toner and paper.

Back in 2016, the National Veterans Legal Services Program, along with the National Consumer Law Center and the Alliance for Justice, sued the court system over PACER's fees. The plaintiffs argued PACER's collection and use of fees broke the law governing PACER, which said only "reasonable" fees could be collected to offset the cost of upkeep. Instead, the US court system was using PACER as a piggy bank, spending money on flat screen TVs for jurors and other courtroom upkeep items, rather than dumping the money back into making PACER better, more accessible, and cheaper.

A year later, a federal judge said the case could move forward as a class action representing everyone who believed they'd been overcharged for access. A year later, it handed down a decision ruling that PACER was illegally using at least some of the collected fees. The case then took a trip to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals with both adversarial parties challenging parts of the district court's ruling.

The Appeals Court has come down on the side of PACER users. Here's Josh Gerstein's summary of the decision for Politico:

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a district court judge’s ruling in 2018 that court officials inflated fees for the Public Access to Court Electronic Records or PACER system by including costs for flat-screen courtroom televisions, electronic alerts to victims and police, as well as computer systems to manage jurors.

The three-judge appeals court panel unanimously ruled that Congress gave the federal courts permission to charge for systems that improve public access to court files, but did not create a technology slush fund that could be used to subsidize almost any purchase of electronics by the federal judiciary.

This potentially means millions of dollars of refunds will be headed back to users once all the details are sorted out. The suit only covers fees collected from 2010 to 2016 (the initiation of the lawsuit) and the Appeals Court -- while not thrilled a paywall continues to sit between citizens and access to court documents -- will send this back to the lower court for a closer examination of PACER's actual expenses.

The decision [PDF] says both parties are reading the law wrong, but the government is reading it wrongest. There is no obligation for PACER to charge fees. The flip side of that is there is also no obligation for the US court system to provide a free service either.

Whereas the judiciary previously was required to charge fees for electronic access to court information, after the 2002 amendment it could choose whether to do so. The language “only to the extent necessary” certainly suggests that Congress sought to encourage the judiciary to limit its imposition of such fees—since otherwise the amendment could have simply swapped “shall” for “may.” But, as we continue to stress, the text lacks a clear object or purpose of the supposed limitation (“only to the extent necessary” to what?) and we are unwilling to supply one of our own—or one of plaintiffs’—making. If Congress had intended to limit fees only to the extent necessary to reimburse expenses incurred in providing access to PACER, it would have said so more clearly. We can give full effect to the 2002 amendment by reading it as removing the electronic access fee obligation and encouraging the judiciary to rein in fees—without imparting any specific limitation on the fee-setting.

At this point, PACER can still charge users for access. Those fees may be reduced in the future, but for now nothing is changed. The money it collected in the past, however, may be headed back to PACER users. That's good news. Hopefully this decision is another step down the road to the removal of the paywall standing between citizens and the court documents their tax dollars have already paid for.

Filed Under: charging, class action, law, open law, pacer, refunds

Amazon Sued For Saying You've 'Bought' Movies That It Can Take Away From You

from the this-could-be-interesting dept

For well over a decade we've talked about the many problems that arise when copyright is compared to "property" -- and people try to simply move over concepts from physical, tangible property into the world of digital. A key aspect of this: when you "purchase" something digital online, is it really a "purchase" or is it a "license" (especially a license that could be revoked)? If it was a true "purchase" then you should own it and the seller shouldn't be able to take it back. But in practice, over and over and over again, we've seen stories of people having things they supposedly "bought" disappear. The situation is so crazy that we've referred to it as Schrödinger's Download, in that many copyright holders and retailers would like the very same thing to be a "sale" some of the time, and a "license" some of the time (the "times" for each tend to be when it hurts the consumers the most). This has, at times, seeped into physical goods, where they've tried to add "license agreements" to physical products. Or, worse, when some copyright folks claimed that buying a DVD means you don't actually own what you bought, but rather are merely "purchasing access" to the content, and that could be revoked.

Anyway, I'm amazed that we don't see more lawsuits about this kind of thing -- but one was recently filed in California. Someone named Amanda Caudel is suing Amazon for saying that you've "purchased" a video download, which Amazon might disappear from your library whenever it wants. As the lawsuit makes clear, Amazon directly says that you are buying the movie (as opposed to renting it). From the lawsuit filing itself:

And, they point out, in your account there's a listing of "Your Video Purchases & Rentals." But, the lawsuit claims, what you purchase doesn't seem to behave like a real purchase:

Reasonable consumers will expect that the use of a “Buy” button and the representation that their Video Content is a “Purchase” means that the consumer has paid for full access to the Video Content and, like any bought product, that access cannot be revoked.

Unfortunately for consumers who chose the “Buy” option, this is deceptive and untrue. Rather, the ugly truth is that Defendant secretly reserves the right to terminate the consumers’ access and use of the Video Content at any time, and has done so on numerous occasions, leaving the consumer without the ability to enjoy their already-bought Video Content.

Defendant’s representations are misleading because they give the impression that the Video Content is purchased – i.e. the person owns it - when in fact that is not true because Defendant or others may revoke access to the Video Content at any time and for any reason.

In so representing the “Purchase” of Video Content as true ownership of the content, Defendant took advantage of the (1) cognitive shortcuts made at the point-of-sale, e.g. Rent v. Buy and (2) price of the Video Content, which is akin to an outright purchase versus a rental.

Though some consumers may get lucky and never lose access to any of their paid-for media, others may one day find that their Video Content is now completely inaccessible. Regardless, all consumers have overpaid for the Video Content because they are not in fact owners of the Video Content, despite have paid extra money to “Buy” the product.

The plaintiff (or rather, her lawyers) are trying to make this a class action lawsuit, and are arguing that (among other things) this is false advertising. I am, not surprisingly, sympathetic to the plaintiff -- and remain disappointed at how copyright and similar restrictions are being used to chip away at ownership and actual property rights. That said... I'm not that optimistic the case will get very far. In the past, companies have been able to wiggle out of similar claims, and I'm pretty sure that Amazon tries to push disputes like this to binding arbitration, meaning that the lawsuit may be dead on arrival.

Still, it's yet another reminder of how copyright is chipping away at real property.

Filed Under: amanda caudel, buy, class action, copyright, digital goods, end of ownership, false advertising, ownership, property, property rights, purchase, rent
Companies: amazon

AT&T Loses California Case After Lying To Consumers About 'Unlimited' Data Throttling

from the ill-communication dept

Back in 2014 the FTC sued AT&T for selling "unlimited" wireless data plans with very real and annoying limits. The lawsuit noted that, starting in 2011, AT&T began selling "unlimited" plans that actually throttled upwards of 90 percent of your downstream speeds after using just two or three gigabytes of data. AT&T spent years trying to wiggle out of the lawsuit via a variety of legal gymnastics, including at one point trying to claim that the very same net neutrality and FCC Title II rules AT&T was trying to kill prevented the FTC from holding it accountable.

Nearly a decade after the battle began, the company agreed last fall to a $60 million settlement with the FTC without actually admitting any wrongdoing. That $60 million, after lawyers get a cut, will be split among millions of customers who signed up for AT&T unlimited data plans before 2011. Moving forward, AT&T also has to clearly disclose any limits on its "unlimited data plans" in a conspicuous manner (read: not hidden via fine print or embedded in a hyperlinked asterisk).

But AT&T took another hit last week in a different five-year-old case in California over the throttling. There, AT&T's attempt to ban consumers from suing it for bad behavior was initially upheld by a court ruling in 2016. But a 2017 California Supreme Court decision effectively changed the state's arbitration law, resulting in that AT&T victory being overturned in 2018. AT&T appealed that decision but last week lost the appeal, allowing the case to proceed:

"AT&T appealed that ruling to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but a three-judge panel at that court rejected AT&T's appeal in a ruling issued Tuesday. Judges said they must follow the California Supreme Court decision—known as the McGill rule—"which held that an agreement, like AT&T's, that waives public injunctive relief in any forum is contrary to California public policy and unenforceable."

"Because we are bound by our decision in Blair [another case involving the McGill rule], we hold that AT&T's arbitration agreement is unenforceable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying AT&T's motion to compel arbitration," judges wrote Tuesday."

While class action lawsuits certainly have problems (lawyers getting new boats while plaintiffs get pennies being chief among them), they have been known to shift corporate behavior now and again. And however flawed the US class action system is, the binding arbitration system is arguably worse, giving even more power to giant corporations like AT&T, who've already successfully lobbied federal consumer protection and antitrust enforcement into an apathetic coma.

Folks upset at states amping up their consumers protection efforts (see: net neutrality, privacy) should place the blame where it belongs: a wholly corrupted federal government that threw serious consumer protection and corporate accountability overboard thirty to forty years ago.

Filed Under: california, class action, data throttling, fcc, ftc, truth in advertising, unlimited
Companies: at&t

Court (Barely) Allows Class Action Lawsuit Over Google's Location Tracking To Move Forward

from the tough-to-cry-'foul'-when-you're-opting-in dept

A 2018 lawsuit [PDF] against Google over location tracking survives, but only just. The lawsuit -- filed after a report showed Google was still collecting location data even after users shut off location services on Android phones -- alleges Google violated California laws and privacy protections by tracking users (including children) after it had been told not to.

The lawsuit has been dismissed [PDF], but the court is giving the plaintiffs a chance to amend the lawsuit and suggesting there are issues the court alone can't decide. (via FourthAmendment.com)

The plaintiffs allege they were led to believe Google would no longer collect and store location data when "Location History" was shut off. They cite Google's own support page, which (formerly) stated "With Location History off, the places you go are no longer stored." The court says this language could have misled users, no matter what Google's Privacy Policies and Terms of Services actually said about location data.

Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, a reasonable user could believe that disabling Location History prevented Defendant from collecting and storing geolocation data. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that many people were mislead by the effect of disabling Location History. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 4. Moreover, the support page Defendant points the Court to was created after this litigation had already commenced. At the time Plaintiffs’ original complaints were filed, the page described Web & App Activity as merely a means to “[s]ave your search activity on apps and in browsers to make searches faster.” Id., Ex. 28. The page did not expressly state that geolocation data may be collected.

Google argues that users consent to sending location info to Google when using some of its services. That may be, but the court points out people agreeing to send some data to Google when using products like Google Maps is not the same thing as granting Google permission to store that data indefinitely. No good, says the court.

The Court thus rejects Defendant’s contention that by consenting to transitory use, Plaintiffs consented to geolocation collection. To the contrary, it is plausible that Plaintiffs gave a narrow consent to geolocation tracking, exclusive of data storage.

Either way, it's probably not going to be settled at this stage of litigation, which is already in its sixteenth month.

It is plausible that Plaintiffs only consented to transitory use tracking and revoked any consent to the storage of their geolocation history. It is also plausible that they did not revoke such consent. The Court cannot conclude either way—factual disputes remain. “This is an issue for the jury.” Opperman, 205 F. Supp.3d at 1073 (holding that the plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence showing they did not consent to the defendants’ actions). For these reasons, the Court holds Plaintiffs have plead sufficient facts to show they did not consent to the storage of their geolocation information

The court does dismiss the plaintiffs' CIPA (California Invasion of Privacy Act) claims. By conceding they gave Google permission to collect location data when using Maps or checking "showtimes for movies playing nearby," the litigants have undercut this claim.

Hence, Plaintiffs issue is not with Defendant tracking them during application use, rather their issue is with the storage of that data. See Opp. at 3–4 (“[I]n accepting the transitory use of location information for an immediate, discrete purpose, Plaintiffs in no way consented to indefinite storage of their daily locations and movements . . . .”). For this reason, Plaintiffs’ CIPA claim fails as a matter of law because CIPA, by its plain terms, is not concerned with data storage but focuses on unconsented data tracking, which is not at issue.

That claim is dismissed with prejudice as the court sees no way the plaintiffs can amend this particular claim to make it actionable.

The California-based invasion of privacy claim fails as well, but not as badly. Invasion of privacy claims are Fourth Amendment-related, but the court sees nothing in Google's actions that could possibly be a Fourth Amendment issue, even with recent Supreme Court decisions expanding citizens' expectations of privacy.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s surreptitious collection and storage of comprehensive and highly sensitive location data violates their information privacy rights. Opp. at 15. Even if the collection of granular and specific location data establishes an information privacy interest, Plaintiffs’ theory is undercut by the admission that Defendant only tracked and collected data during use of Google services. Accordingly, Defendant’s “profile” of a user is only as specific as their use of Google services. Carpenter v. United States and United States v. Jones do not undercut this conclusion.

What Google collected was far less than what the plaintiffs' cellphone providers collected, and yet, the lawsuit only alleges a violation by Google.

First, there was no claim that MetroPCS and Sprint, the phone companies holding the cell-site location information, violated the plaintiff’s right of privacy by having such robust geolocation records. Id. at 2212. The case thus does not stand for the proposition that geolocation collection violates the right of privacy.

Second, the cell-site location information discussed in Carpenter was comprehensive—the cell-site location information provided cellular companies with a rough “map” of a customer’s fluid movements. Id. at 2211. Such comprehensive data collection is not at issue here; Plaintiffs’ geolocation information depends on how often they use Google’s services. Defendant’s collection of geolocation data is not automatic; it does not happen by the routine “pinging” of a cell-phone tower.

[...]

Here, unlike the continual GPS tracking in Jones, not all of Plaintiffs movements were being collected, only specific movements or locations. Such “bits and pieces” do not meet the standard of privacy established in Carpenter or Jones.

This allegation is being allowed to move forward, though. But it probably won't live on for long if the plaintiffs can't find something more specific to allege than a theoretical "mosaic" of the plaintiffs' movements, which possibly included visits to "sensitive or confidential locations."

It's not that Google is in the right if it misled phone users into thinking they weren't being tracked when they were being tracked. It's also not right just because cellphone service providers track location almost continuously. But if the claim is that Google collected users' location data when users utilized services they knew would send that data to Google, then the lawsuit should fail.

Filed Under: class action, location history, location tracking
Companies: google

Yahoo Hack Victims Line Up To Get $100 (Or Less) For Historic Hack

from the timid-and-pointless dept

It seems like only yesterday that we learned of the historic hack of Yahoo, resulting in the leaked data of more than 500,000 subscribers. Granted, like most hack stories, it didn't take long before we learned that the impacted number of subscribers was far far larger, with in fact several different hacks resulting in the leaked data of roughly 3 billion potential users, or pretty much everybody that had ever used the service.

Granted like other similar hacks, the $117.5 million settlement "holding Yahoo accountable" didn't do anything of the sort. The settlement website has gone live, and is informing impacted users that they may be entitled to $100 as a result of the breach. Of course, just like the flimsy Equifax hack and settlement, users are also being told that they shouldn't actually expect to get that money depending on the number of folks interested in actually being compensated:

"Settlement Class Members are encouraged to submit a claim to receive a minimum of two years of future Credit Monitoring Services. If you already have Credit Monitoring Services, you may still sign up for this additional protection. Alternatively, if you verify that you already have a credit monitoring service that you will keep for at least one year, you may submit a claim for a cash payment of $100.00 instead of receiving Credit Monitoring Services through the Settlement. Payment for such a claim may be less than $100.00 or more (up to $358.80) depending on how many Settlement Class Members participate in the Settlement."

That $358 tally is never going to happen given people like free money. Much like the "historic" settlement in the Equifax case, users are being promised either free credit reporting software or a cash payout the settlement isn't robust enough to actually support. But as we've noted previously, credit reporting is largely a useless perk; it's already been given away free as the result of an endless series of previous similar hacks, and it's usually only included in these kinds of cases to give the illusion of a fatter pot, letting feckless regulators proclaim "record" settlements.

At least in this case, the Yahoo settlement makes it clear you probably won't be getting that full $100, something the Equifax settlement administrators and the FTC only revealed after the fact while proclaiming "surprise" at the number of people eager to be modestly compensated.

As it stands, the option to nab either worthless credit monitoring (or cash you probably won't actually see) is available to US or Israeli residents who had a free Yahoo account at any time between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2016. Like the Equifax settlement users may also be eligible for up to $25,000 if they can prove the hack directly resulted in financial harm via identity theft (no easy feat). The settlement is still pending final approval, but impacted users must make their claim for free credit monitoring or a cash payout by July 20, 2020.

Ultimately, no matter how many times regulators proclaim these kinds of settlements involve "record" financial tallies, they're doing little to nothing to either aid users, or hold companies accountable for making securing private user data an afterthought.

Filed Under: class action, data breaches, hacks, payments, settlements
Companies: yahoo

Equifax Victims Jump Through Hoops To Nab Settlement Money They Won't Get Anyway

from the dysfunction-junction dept

So we've noted that the FTC's settlement over the Equifax hack that exposed the public data of 147 million Americans is a bit of a joke. The FTC originally promised that impacted users would be able to nab 10 years of free credit reporting or a $125 cash payout if users already subscribed to a credit reporting service. But it didn't take long for the government to backtrack, claiming it was surprised by the number of victims interested in modest compensation, while admitting the settlement failed to set aside enough money to pay even 248,000 of the hack's 147 million victims.

This week, the Equifax Settlement Administrator sent out an email doubling down on the dysfunction, demanding that users who applied for their $125 prove they already have credit monitoring services. Users are being told they need to prove they subscribe to such services by October 15, or they won't get the money. Worse perhaps, the notice reiterates that even if you can prove you subscribe to credit monitoring services, you probably won't get anywhere near $125 because the settlement failed to set aside enough money to fulfill even a fraction of its promise:

"This latest email again reminds users that even if you can prove you have credit reporting already, you still may not get the full $125 thanks to the limitations of the settlement. In response to what it’s calling “overwhelming” demand, the FTC also urges those who submitted a claim for $125 switch to the free credit reporting offer instead."

One problem is that "free credit monitoring" is largely a useless perk. Such services are routinely doled out for free every time there's a major hack or privacy breach, which drop at a rate of around once a week now. Usually these services are included as a settlement freebie to make the settlement itself seem more substantive than it actually is. But the other major problem is that the FTC and its settlement partners gave the impression that users would at least get $125 for their troubles, set aside a tiny fraction of the money they'd need, then acted shocked when users signed up.

Most of the legal experts I've talked to about this say it would have been fairly easy to strike a more productive, less chaotic settlement. Instead of free credit reporting, the settlement could have simply requested victims have their credit reporting temporarily frozen (until needed), something which costs nothing. And while it still may have been underwhelming, the settlement also could have promised individual users a cash payout they could have actually met. The general consensus remains that the settlement, as structured, teeters somewhere between negligence and incompetence:

"James Grimmelmann, a professor of law at Cornell Tech and Cornell Law School told Motherboard the FTC’s failure to predict the public’s interest teeters toward negligence. “Even a single-digit percentage claim rate for this one would have exhausted the $31 million 50 times over,” he says. “It was negligent on the part of the FTC not to expect that more victims would choose the cash payment in a case this prominent and this egregious, instead of the worthless credit monitoring.”

Users can still apply for up to $20,000 in compensation if they can clearly prove the hack directly contributed to concrete harm like identity theft, but by and large the settlement is the poster child for meaningless privacy wrist slaps. Outside of bad press coverage, there's absolutely nothing here that would deter Equifax from future lax security and privacy practices, and consumers get little to compensate them for what is one of the biggest data breaches in American history. The FTC's primary function appears to have been to act as a PR proxy for Equifax's reputation, primarily by pretending the company had been held accountable via a "record" fine, inflated to appear far more meaningful than it actually is.

Filed Under: class action, credit monitoring, ftc, settlement
Companies: equifax