Spotting Counterfeit Chips Is Hard; Spotting Digital Piracy Is Even Harder

from the harder-than-it-looks dept

One of the favorite techniques of those pushing for ever-more severe penalties for copyright infringement is to blur the distinction between analog counterfeits and digital copies. The argument then becomes: "counterfeit drugs can kill people, therefore we must come down hard on online filesharing." This trick can be seen most clearly in ACTA, which stands for "Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement", but where the most problematic sections concern digital piracy, not counterfeits.

That false equivalence between counterfeits and digital copies is also employed to give the impression that since cheap knock-offs are pretty obvious, it's easy to tell the difference between a legal digital file, and one that is unauthorised. However, unauthorised digital files are generally exact copies of authorised ones, making it impossible to tell them apart. What counts is whether the distribution is authorized, and there are all kinds of legal considerations like fair use or Creative Commons licensing that can make it very hard to tell without detailed legal scrutiny in a court.

Even the assumption that physical copies are relatively easy to spot is dubious, as this fascinating essay from Andrew 'bunnie' Huang about counterfeit chips in military hardware explains. Here's the background:

Amendment 1092 to the Defense Authorization Act of 2012 is a well-intentioned but misguided provision outlining measures designed to reduce the prevalance of counterfeit chips in the US military supply chain.

< ...>

Under the proposed anti-counterfeit amendment, first-time offenders can receive a $5 million fine and 20 years prison for individuals, or $15 million for corporations; a penalty comparable to that of trafficking cocaine.

Huang then runs through the myriad ways in which counterfeits can be produced – and why spotting them is hard.

Alongside "trivial external mimicry" – authentic-looking but empty packages – he mentions the following: refurbished parts (authentic parts recovered from e-waste); rebinned parts (authentic but with markings changed to a higher specification); ghost-shift parts (produced in the official factory by employees, but unofficially); factory scrap (rejects and pilot runs recovered from the scrap heap); and second-sourcing gone bad (pin-compatible replacements produced by competitors remarked as superior brands.)

As Huang points out:

It’s one thing to inspect fruits and vegetables as they enter the country for pests and other problems; but it is misguided to require Customs officers to become experts in detecting fakes, and/or to burden vendors with the onus of determining whether parts are authentic, particularly with such high penalties involved and the relative ease that forgers can create high-quality counterfeit parts.

Indeed; and much the same could be said about asking local enforcement authorities or ISPs to detect whether digital copies are legal or not. It's yet another reason why ACTA is likely to have a chilling effect on the legitimate use of copyright materials online, and to throttle the next generation of digital innovation as a result.

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Filed Under: acta, conflation, counterfeits, digital, piracy

European Trade Committee Chair Defends Continued Secrecy On ACTA

from the but-of-course dept

The ridiculous secrecy behind ACTA still hasn't stopped, even as the document has long been made public, and most of the negotiating countries have signed on. The EU bloc of countries has not signed on, as they've been awaiting some legal analysis to determine if the text of ACTA is in accordance with existing EU law. Apparently, the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA) has planned a meeting for November 23rd, in which it will hear the European Parliament legal service's opinion on ACTA's current status with existing EU law. However, that meeting and the report from the legal service... will be kept secret. Some concerned folks sent an open letter protesting this secrecy, and were given a doublespeak response from the chair of INTA, Vital Moreira. As best as I can figure out, Moreira's argument is we're keeping the meeting and the analysis secret, because it's secret, thus we have to keep it secret.

...the opinion of the Legal Service is, for the time being, a confidential document; therefore its presentation is foreseen to take place in an “in camera” part of the Committee meeting.

... as to the question whether there is an overriding public interest in disclosure of the opinion under Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001: under legislation in force and related jurisprudence, it is for the institution concerned to balance the interest to be protected by non-disclosure and public interest in disclosure.

So here's the thing that I don't understand: why is it in the public interest to have this document be confidential and secret. I can't think of any single compelling reason that doesn't involve corruption. If it's merely a legal analysis of the status of ACTA under existing law, there should be nothing to keep confidential. The only reason to keep such a thing confidential is if the intent is to change the analysis before it actually does go public. That would indicate undue pressure by some on what should be an objective analysis. Assuming that the European Parliament legal service is not, in fact, corrupt, then what other possible reasons could there be for keeping such a document secret.

Filed Under: acta, copyright, eu, inta, secrecy, vital moreira

Good News, Bad News: ACTA, TPP And Lessons Not Learned

from the enough-is-never-enough dept

As attention gradually shifts from the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) to the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, Kimberlee Weatherall at the University of Queensland, Australia, has had the excellent idea of looking at them as part of a larger trend in a study entitled "Intellectual Property in ACTA and the TPP: Lessons Not Learned":

In this paper I am interested in what ACTA as it emerged from the negotiating process has to teach us about the negotiation of international agreements in IP, and in whether we can see any evidence that those lessons have been learned or are being applied to the TPP negotiations.

What emerges is a fascinating picture of good news and bad news. For example, the bad news is that ACTA goes well beyond the enforcement provisions of the previous benchmark trade agreement TRIPS:

The provisions of ACTA are far more elaborated than any other existing multilateral agreement. The obligations included in ACTA extend considerably beyond TRIPS as the latter relates to enforcement. Examples of TRIPS-plus provisions include the obligations to provide for an account of profits as a remedy for IP infringement, to provide statutory or at least additional damages and legal costs, obligations on an infringer or alleged infringer to provide information about the origin and distribution network of the infringing goods, powers for customs authorities to provide right holders with information where goods have been seized at the border, broader criminal provisions including secondary criminal liability for aiding and abetting activities and liability of corporate persons, an optional camcording offence, and provisions on enforcement in the digital environment that have no equivalent in TRIPS and include detail not found in the relevant WIPO Treaties.

But the good news is that ACTA was originally much worse, and lacked many crucial safeguards:

However, the final text of ACTA concluded in December 2010 is very different from the early leaked texts that started to emerge in January 2010. The Final Text retreats from some of earlier proposals for even stronger and less qualified IP enforcement measures.

Overall, the finalised version of the ACTA introduced a series of safeguards, exceptions and protections for users and parties to litigation, backed away from significant strengthening of the enforcement apparatus in relation to patents and geographical indications; left the scope of border measures in the hands of individual countries, almost completely abandoned any attempt to dictate the way that enforcement will occur in the digital environment or the ways that intermediaries in that environment will be regulated, and significantly watered down the provisions on criminal enforcement. In all these areas, the countries who have, historically, been the most enthusiastic proponents of strong IP law and strong IP enforcement, could not reach agreement.

Weatherall draws an important conclusion from this retreat:

One way to see ACTA, then, is as an exemplar of the maximum level of enforcement that will draw support from these important countries, and, hence, as a maximum set of provisions that could conceivably be multilateralised in some future global negotiations, even before the interests of large developing countries and the BRIC countries are taken into account.

In a sense, bad as ACTA is, it represents the worst that might receive support from other nations around the world, particularly the key ones who were not involved in ACTA – Brazil, Russia, India and China.

And yet despite this failure to get its more extreme proposals accepted by the other participants during the ACTA negotiations, the US does not seem to have drawn the same conclusion. Based on the few leaked documents we have from the secretive TPP talks, Weatherall notes:

Assuming these leaked documents are genuine, they demonstrate a divide between the largely TRIPS-consistent, broad and general suggestions of New Zealand and Chile on the one hand, and very detailed US proposals which are not only TRIPS-plus, but go further than the chapters included in previous US trade agreements and further, notably, than ACTA.

Further, the TPP draft produced by the US includes none of the safeguards for users and parties to litigation which were negotiated into the ACTA, such as the inclusion of a reference to TRIPS Articles 7 and 8, allowance for the protection of privacy, a requirement that procedures be fair, equitable, and proportionate, and that measures not create barriers to legitimate trade.

For TPP, then, the US is trying to rewind the clock on the ACTA negotiations, and start once more from a negotiating position that even fellow ACTA participants thought went too far.

In sum, the US is treating neither its existing FTAs which the US has agreed with parties involved in the TPP negotiations, nor its past negotiations with Congress in the form of the May 10, 2007 Agreement, nor ACTA, as a ceiling for the IP provisions it will seek to include in the TPP. Rather, the US appears to be treating past FTAs and ACTA as a starting point on which to build further and stronger IP-related obligations. The wisdom of this approach is questionable, to say the least.

Once again, that's both good news and bad news. It's good news that the US may be setting itself up for yet another climbdown in this area, as happened with ACTA, if the other nations simply refuse to accept those positions. That would mean that the TPP agreement won't be as bad as it looks in the leaks.

The bad news is that the US clearly does not currently accept that there will ever be a "ceiling" or "maximum level of enforcement" as Weatherall puts it. Put another way, however few counterbalancing rights the public has now in the realm of intellectual monopolies, the US aims to reduce them further.

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Filed Under: acta, copyright, tpp, trade negotiations

US Trying To Force Governments To Pay Much Higher Prices For Needed Drugs Through Secretive TPP

from the the-opposite-of-free-trade dept

With ACTA now signed, and the US also pushing through a few more anti-free trade protectionist agreements with a few countries, the big focus is on the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which Hollywood and the USTR are betting will allow them to sneak through everything they couldn't get into ACTA. That's why the negotiators for the TPP are trying to keep it even more secretive than ACTA. Of course, as with ACTA, you can expect some leaks.

And... one of the recent leaks was the section concerning pharmaceutical pricing, which pretty clearly demonstrates why this is an anti-free trade bill, rather than a free trade bill. That's because it not only looks to prop up monopolies (such as patents), but it even argues for blatant price fixing to avoid market pricing when governments are buying. That is, this section -- which is being pushed by the USTR -- basically takes the big pharmaceutical's position that foreign governments should not be allowed to bargain for discounts on drugs to keep their own citizens healthy. It mandates, instead, that governments have to buy at a much higher fixed prices, and actually is even more pro-big pharma than the previous administration, which sought to make it easier for developing nations to access necessary drugs.

Sean Flynn from American University has a detailed and useful critique showing how this plan, pitched by the Obama administration, only serves to help big pharmaceutical companies, while putting lives at risk in an extremely anti-free market way:

Although the provisions are styled as “transparency” provisions, in fact they regulate the substance of drug pricing programs. The heart of the proposal would require that countries establish new administrative and judicial appeal systems to contest whether public drug reimbursement rates “appropriately recognize the value” of pharmaceutical patents. Similar provisions have led to higher drug prices and more challenges by pharmaceutical companies in the one country to implement similar provisions – Australia.

At the core of this proposal is a false distinction between government reimbursement prices and “market” prices. Government reimbursement prices ARE market prices. Suppliers can refuse to supply to governments, just as they can with any private purchaser demanding a better deal. The fact that governments obtain better prices than atomized consumers does not make their roles as purchasers anti-market. Drug price restraint is a natural, inevitable and beneficial result of public health expenditure or any other form of pooled purchasing. Large purchasers in free markets obtain better prices; governments obtain better prices when they pool consumers and negotiate as a volume purchaser.

Furthermore, Flynn points out that this kind of backroom secret agreement, which is clearly a huge gift to the big pharmaceutical firms, should be much more open and transparent. He points out that pharmaceutical price fixing "is an inappropriate subject for closed door trade negotiations" since it's not so much a trade issue, as it is a public health policy. Furthermore, he notes that it would be contrary to current best practices within the US itself:

Ironically and ominously, US drug pricing programs do not comply with the standards that the US is proposing. In particular, the operation of preferred drug lists by the Federal Medicaid program would violate the terms of the agreement, including because they do not provide appeals for pharmaceutical companies on whether the prices achieved adequately value patents. Previous FTAs with Australia and Korea carefully exempted all U.S. programs from their coverage, including through a footnote defining the federal Medicaid program as a “regional,” rather than “central,” level government program. That footnote has been removed from the draft TPP proposal. This may indicate that the US has not decided whether to propose exempting Medicaid from the TPP requirements or to give in to demands of other countries for full reciprocity in the agreement.

No matter how you look at it, this is clearly the US government looking out for the best interests of the big pharmaceutical companies over pretty much all else. Well, perhaps not their own political careers.

Filed Under: acta, free trade, pharma, tpp

EU Legal Review Agrees With US: ACTA Dreadfully Written; Wide Open To Interpretation

from the this-is-not-a-good-thing dept

Earlier this year, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) did a legal review of ACTA to see if it conformed with existing US law. While the USTR tried to keep the report buried, it eventually came out -- and basically said that ACTA was drafted in a dreadfully confusing and opaque way. The issue? It's not even clear if US law conforms to ACTA, because ACTA can be interpreted in many different ways -- some of which suggest the US is in compliance, and some of which say we're not.

The EU Parliament's legal service recently conducted a similar review and came to an identical conclusion: ACTA may or may not be legal... depending on how you interpret it.

This should be seen as a massive problem. When you're crafting a giant international agreement that is binding on various countries (and, yes, the US pretends it's not binding, but the other signers insist it is binding, meaning under international law, they likely can hold the US to a claim that it's binding), the fact that it's so vague that what is and what is not legal under it is totally wide open to interpretation means you've drafted a really bad agreement that shouldn't be approved. In the meantime, any country signing such a document should be ashamed of itself, because it doesn't even know what it's bound itself to.

Filed Under: acta, interpretation, legal review, vague

Out ACTA-ing ACTA: All TPP Negotiating Documents To Be Kept Secret Until Four Years After Ratification

from the it's-a-secret-it's-a-secret dept

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has now been signed by several nations – even if its actual status is by no means clear. But that doesn't mean governments have finished with their trade negotiations behind closed doors. As Techdirt reported earlier this year, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement is, in some ways, even worse than ACTA, and looks to be a conscious attempt to apply the tricks developed there to circumvent scrutiny yet further.

For example, like ACTA, TPP is being negotiated in secret. But that, apparently, is not enough: a memorandum has been signed that stipulates only the final treaty will be revealed at the conclusion of the negotiations:

The parties have apparently agreed that all documents except the final text will be kept secret for four years after the agreement comes into force or the negotiations collapse. This reverses the trend in many recent negotiations to release draft texts and related documents. The existence of agreement was only discovered through a cover note to the leaked text of the intellectual property chapter.

Not only that, but it seems that even the memorandum about secrecy is going to remain secret:

An open letter to Prime Minister John Key and Trade Minister Tim Groser from unions, civil liberties, church, public health, development, environmental and trade justice groups has demanded the release of the secrecy document. The Green Party and Mana Movement have both endorsed the call.

The release of the secrecy memorandum was requested during the Chicago round of negotiations in early October. New Zealand lead negotiator Mark Sinclair has asked for responses from the other countries, but there is no guarantee they will agree.

In fact, if the ACTA negotiations are anything to go by, they certainly won't, because the US won't let them – it blocked attempts by other negotiating parties to release ACTA drafts.

It's not hard to see why the US wants to keep its dirty laundry private. Like the recently-signed bilateral trade agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea, these treaties are incredibly one-sided, essentially giving the US media companies everything they are demanding in an attempt to prop up their dying business models through disproportionate copyright enforcement legislation around the world. The drafts would presumably make that much clearer.

Of course, that these US industries should seek such advantageous terms is only natural. What's not so clear is why other countries continue to acquiesce, when the treaties are plainly bad for both their citizens and their own creative industries (although various Wikileaks cables give us a hint). A good first step in re-asserting their sovereignty would be to insist on real transparency as a pre-condition for trade negotiations with the US – and no more secret memoranda about secrecy.

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Filed Under: acta, secrecy, tpp, trade negotiations

Senator Wyden Asks President Obama: Isn't Congress Required To Approve ACTA?

from the good-question dept

As the US Trade Rep (USTR) under the Obama administration has made it clear that it has no intention of allowing Congress to ratify ACTA, but instead believes it can sign it unilaterally, we've finally seen someone in Congress notice that this appears to be unconstitutional. Senator Wyden has sent President Obama a letter asking some basic questions. From the letter:

Although the USTR insists that current U.S. law, and its application, conform to these standards, there are concerns that the agreement may work to restrain the U.S. from changing such rules and practices. As you know, the executive branch lacks constitutional authority to enter binding international agreements on matters under Congress's plenary powers, including the Article I powers to regulate foreign commerce and protect intellectual property. Yet, through ACTA and without your clarification, the USTR looks to be claiming the authority to do just that.

The letter also responds to the repeated claims of the USTR that it can have this signed as an executive agreement because it doesn't require changes to US law, by pointing out that's not the rule:

The statement by the USTR confuses the issue by conflating two separate stages of the process required for binding the U.S. to international agreements: entry and implementation. It may be possible for the U.S. to implement ACTA or any other trade agreement, once validly entered, without legislation if the agreement requires no change in U.S. law. But, regardless of whether the agreement requires changes in U.S. law, a point that is contested with respect to ACTA, the executive branch lacks constitutional authority to enter a binding international agreement covering issues delegated by the Constitution to Congress' authority, absent congressional approval.

Wyden details the situations under which the US can take part in binding international agreements, and points out that: "ACTA appears to be none of these." He then asks President Obama to make clear that ACTA creates no international obligations for the US:

Mr. President, if you allow the USTR to express your assent to ACTA, then the agreement can bind the U.S. under international law even without Congress' consent, because international law, not U.S. law, determines the binding effect of international agreements. According to many international law scholars, customary international law recognizes the ability of the chief executive of a country to bind its nation to an international agreement regardless of domestic legal requirements.

I request that as a condition of the U.S. putting forward any official instrument that accepts the terms of ACTA that you formally declare that ACTA does not create any international obligations for the U.S. -- that ACTA is not binding. If you are unwilling or unable to make such a clarification, it is imperative that your administration provide the Congress, and the public, with a legal rationale for why ACTA should not be considered by Congress, and work with us to ensure that we reach a common understanding of the proper way for the U.S. to proceed with ACTA. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Filed Under: acta, barack obama, constitution, copyright, executive agreement, ron wyden, ustr

Brazil Drafts An 'Anti-ACTA': A Civil Rights-Based Framework For The Internet

from the who's-leader-of-the-*free*-world-now? dept

One of the striking features of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is that it is mainly being signed by Western/“developed” countries – with a few token players from other parts of the world to provide a fig-leaf of nominal inclusiveness. That's no accident: ACTA is the last-gasp attempt of the US and the EU to preserve their intellectual monopolies – copyright and patents, particularly drug patents – in a world where both are increasingly questioned.

Much of the challenge to the old order is coming from the BRICS group of emerging countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – none of which has been involved in ACTA. Of those, the one in the vanguard of adopting innovative approaches to making knowledge widely accessible in the Internet age is Brazil.

For example, the federal government has actively supported open source software by creating a Public Software Portal. The country has also been at the forefront of open content use: just this week, the city of São Paulo specified that all educational materials produced for it must be released under the Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA license.

It's true that there have also been some mixed signals recently, notably the re-surfacing of the punitive “cybercrime bill”, which Techdirt reported on a couple of months ago. But here's some positive news coming out of the country, in the shape of a draft of a bill for a civil rights-based framework for the Internet:

The draft bill proposition for a Civil Right’s Based Framework for Internet in Brazil has just reached Congress. The English translation of this version is available here.

It is the result of an initiative from the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the Center for Technology and Society of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (CTS/FGV), to develop a collaborative online/offline consultation process in which all the actors from Brazilian society could identify together the rights and responsibilities that should guide the use of the Internet in Brazil. The process, which resulted in a Bill of Law, is an example of the importance and the great potential of multistakeholder involvement on policy-making.

NGOs, universities, internet service providers (collectively though associations, as well as individually), business companies, law firms, law enforcement agencies, individuals, Brazilian Embassies from all over the world, and many other participants have joined the online public hearing. The participation of several stakeholder groups has promoted the diversity of opinions and the availability of high quality information and expert advise, which have helped the government to draft a balanced bill. The openness and transparency of the process, entirely conducted online, in the public eye, has improved the legitimacy of the bill. Marco Civil was introduced in Congress with the political weight and the legitimacy that the Bill would be expected to have after a complex multistakeholder discussion.

Among its fundamental principles:

I – safeguarding freedom of speech, communication, and manifestation of thought, in the terms of the Constitution;

II – the protection of privacy;

III – the protection of personal data, in accordance to the law;

IV – the preservation and safeguarding of net neutrality, in compliance with further regulation;

And this is *real* net neutrality, not the compromised US kind:

Article 9. The party responsible for the transmission, switching or routing of data has the obligation of granting equal treatment to every data package, with no distinction by content, origin and destination, service, terminal or application; any traffic discrimination or degradation that does not arise out of the technical requirements necessary to the adequate provision of services is prohibited, in accordance to further regulation.

It also comes out strongly in favor of guaranteeing access to the Internet, respect for personal privacy online, and against any kind of “three strikes” laws cutting off users for alleged copyright infringement:

Article 7. Access to the Internet is essential for the exercise of citizenship, and the following rights are secured to its users:

I – the non-violation and secrecy of communications on the Internet, except under judicial order, in the hypotheses and form established by law, for criminal investigations or the gathering of evidence for criminal procedures;

II – the non suspension of Internet connections, except for debts directly related to their use;

It has plenty to say on the vexed issue of keeping users' access logs, including:

Article 10. The storage and disclosure of the connection logs and Internet application access logs regulated by this law must preserve intimacy, private life, the reputation and image of the parties directly or indirectly involved.

§1 The Internet service provider responsible for the storage of logs will only be constrained to disclose the information that allows the identification of the user under a judicial order

Nor is ISP liability overlooked:

Article 14. Internet connection providers shall not be responsible for damage arising from content generated by third parties.

Article 15. Except otherwise established by law, Internet application providers can only be responsible for the damages caused by content generated by third parties if, after receiving a specific judicial order, they do not take action to, in the context of their services and under the established time frame, make unavailable the infringing content.

And the crucial issue of judicial requests for logs is also spelled out in detail:

Article 17. Interested parties may, for the purpose of gathering evidence in civil and criminal proceedings, of either accidental or autonomous nature, request a judge to order the party responsible for storing Internet service access logs, or connection logs, to disclose these logs.

Sole Paragraph. Without prejudice of other legal requirements, the application shall contain, under penalty of not being admissible:

I – solid evidence of the occurrence of an illegal act;

II – a motivated justification for the utility of accessing the requested logs, for the purposes of investigation or the gathering of evidence;

III - the period that the logs refer to.

Article 18. It is the obligation of judges to take the measures necessary to guarantee the secrecy of the information received, and the preservation of the intimacy, private life, honor and image of Internet users. Judges are capable, for that purpose, to constitute the information as secret, including with respect to requests for the storage of logs.

All-in-all, it's a remarkable document, forming in effect an "anti-ACTA" that guarantees many of the protections for Internet users that ACTA seeks to eradicate, and forbids repressive measures that ACTA aims to introduce.

However, two big questions hang over the draft. First, whether it will be passed by the Brazilian Congress in its present form (or at all), and, second, how it can be squared with the harsh penalties proposed in the “cybercrime” bill mentioned above if that too comes into force. But whatever happens, Brazil has already shown leadership by drafting a bill that dares to question and oppose the copyright maximalist orthodoxies underlying ACTA – something signally lacking in other countries.

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Filed Under: acta, brazil, copyright, net neutrality, privacy

What Does Japan Need To Do To Deal With The Aftermath Of The Devastating Earthquake? Apparently Pass ACTA!

from the say-what-now? dept

This past weekend, as you know, Japan held a signing ceremony for ACTA. While that's already been covered, the folks at StopACTANow pointed out something really bizarre in the Japanese announcement concerning the signing ceremony. It lists out five points. The first four are all more or less understandable via paraphasing: (1) there's a signing ceremony in Japan (2) ACTA was kicked off by suggestions from Japan, and driven by the US (3) a bunch of other countries participated and (4) all of the participants will be at the signing, and those who are ready to sign, will. But the bizarre thing is the fifth point, which reads as follows:

On the preceding day, Friday, September 30, an international symposium entitled, “Global Intellectual Property Strategy and the Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake: Eliminating Counterfeit and Pirated Products through ACTA”, will be held in Sendai as a side event of the signing ceremony.

By now this has already happened, and we haven't seen any info about it, but, seriously? What does the Great East Japan Earthquake have to do with intellectual property at all? And is Japan really suggesting that ACTA plays some sort of role in rebuilding Japan? Perhaps ACTA supporters and their efforts to keep any outside influence away from the negotiators has gone to their head, such that they think they can say any insane thing and people won't notice.

Filed Under: acta, copyright, earthquakes, japan

As Countries Sign ACTA, Many Finally Admit Their Copyright Laws Will Need To Change

from the of-course-they-did dept

It will come as little news to most people that, as was expected, the US signed the ACTA treaty (while pretending it was an "executive agreement") this weekend in Japan. While the EU, Mexico and Switzerland at least had the sense to wait until they had more of a chance to review the legality of the document, the US dove right in, despite huge Constitutional questions about its ability to sign the agreement -- especially as more evidence was put forth showing that (contrary to the US's claims) ACTA is inconsistent with US law.

The US, of course, was not the only one to sign -- and not the only one to recognize that ACTA is inconsistent with local laws, despite promises to the contrary. Canada signed as well, and used it to say that Canada now needs to implement more copyright reform to keep Canada in line with the treaty:

Fast’s office said the government still needs to create and pass legislation to implement the anti-counterfeiting agreement in Canada.

Funny, since all along we kept hearing how ACTA wasn't about changing laws in various countries, but just coming to agreements on how enforcement would be carried out. In fact, when criticized about ACTA, the former Canadian Minister of Industry insisted that ACTA would not require changing Canadian law. Amazing that the Canadian government admits that this was false the day they sign it.

Another signatory? Why, New Zealand, of course. Last year, New Zealand (which already recently changed its copyright laws) said that it didn't foresee any changes to copyright law because of ACTA. And yet... now the New Zealand government admits that changes will be needed to local copyright law before the treaty is ratified.

Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Japan (of course) and Morocco also all signed on. Australia's and New Zealand's signings don't mean quite as much, as their legislatures need to ratify the agreement (the part the US is trying to skip).

Not surprisingly, the RIAA put out a ridiculous statement "saluting" the "will" of ACTA negotiators to complete ACTA. Yeah. The will to continue to hide the agreement from public scrutiny until it was "done" and no changes were allowed? The "will" to pretend that it's an "executive agreement" rather than a treaty, as per the Constitution? The "will" to insist that ACTA is consistent with domestic laws when it's not? Sorry. That's not worth saluting. That's worth not being allowed to participate in these kinds of negotiations any more.

Filed Under: acta, australia, canada, copyright, legal changes, new zealand, signatures, us