Twitter Suspends Hundreds Of Thousands Of Terrorist Accounts, Gives Everyone Its 'Quality Filter'

from the today-twitter-settles-all-its-business dept

Twitter's had a bit of a busy day. It made two big announcements within an hour, first saying that it had suspended 235,000 accounts since February for "promoting terrorism." It followed that up by announcing that it was opening up its "quality filter" for everyone. The quality filter used to only be available to "verified accounts" and was apparently one of the few actual benefits for being a "verified" account. Here's how Twitter explains it:

When turned on, the filter can improve the quality of Tweets you see by using a variety of signals, such as account origin and behavior. Turning it on filters lower-quality content, like duplicate Tweets or content that appears to be automated, from your notifications and other parts of your Twitter experience. It does not filter content from people you follow or accounts you’ve recently interacted with – and depending on your preferences, you can turn it on or off in your notifications settings.

From people who have it, they've indicated that it can do a decent, but not perfect, job in blocking purely trollish behavior. However, I still think that my own suggestion from last week makes more sense: rather than building a universal algorithm like this, give every user the tools to build their own quality filters (and to share the "recipes" of those filters). Not everyone has the same determination of what "quality" is. It's fine if Twitter wants to offer its own such filter, but why not open it up and let anyone create quality filters to use and share?

As for the removal of terrorist accounts, this still feels kind of pointless. Twitter talks about how it's getting faster at removing these accounts, and they're not able to build up many followers before they're shut down again, making Twitter a less useful platform for terrorist or terrorist supporters to use. But, again, if we think about Twitter as a protocol like email or a system like the telephone, this feels... weird. No one's clamoring for "we must stop ISIS from making phone calls." Besides, the intelligence community has said, repeatedly, that they get good intel from watching ISIS' social media activity. Shutting down their accounts may seem like a good thing (no one wants ISIS using their technology...), but what if it's actually making it more difficult for the intelligence community to track them?

Filed Under: abuse, isis, quality filter, social media, terrorism, trolls
Companies: twitter

Donald Trump Says He'll Turn Off The Internet For Terrorists

from the uh,-how? dept

This isn't the first time he's said this, but on Monday, Presidential candidate Donald Trump once again insisted that part of his plan to "Make America Great Again" is to stop bad people from using the internet:

My Administration will aggressively pursue joint and coalition military operations to crush and destroy ISIS, international cooperation to cutoff their funding, expanded intelligence sharing, and cyberwarfare to disrupt and disable their propaganda and recruiting. We cannot allow the internet to be used as a recruiting tool, and for other purposes, by our enemy – we must shut down their access to this form of communication, and we must do so immediately.

Almost no one covered this because everyone was focused on other stuff in the speech about his new "tests" for letting foreigners into the country. But this still remains a pretty big concern, in part because of just how technically clueless this is. Sure, we've seen some others suggest similarly dumb ideas, but no one seems to bother to think through how this might be done and what a mess it would create.

There's no way you can "disrupt" or block them from using the internet without also cutting off millions of innocent people -- many of whom almost certainly rely on the internet for all sorts of important things. And, on top of that, any solution would be of only limited effectiveness in the long run anyway. There are increasingly new ways and new paths to get online -- whether through wireless mesh networks or, eventually, from things like drones and satellites. Thinking that you can magically take an entire group of people off the internet is profoundly silly.

At the same time, as we've noted, the most ridiculous part in this idea that we should kick terrorists off the internet is the fact that the intelligence community has said that tracking what they're saying online has been tremendously beneficial in tracking terrorists, their views and their plans. Why would you want to cut off such a source of intelligence gathering?

The whole thing, like so much of this Presidential campaign, seems to be yet another example of a candidate saying what people want to hear with little to no thought about what it actually means, whether it would do any good or how to implement the plan.

Filed Under: donald trump, free speech, internet, isis, open internet, terrorists

French Government Wants A 'Global Initiative' To Undermine Encryption And Put Everyone At Risk

from the this-is-a-bad,-bad-idea dept

Some bad ideas never seem to die. It appears that the French government is working to enlist other countries to try to undermine encryption and put us all at much greater risk. That's about the only way to read the news that French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve is promoting a "global initiative" to "fight" messaging encryption used by ISIS.

Messaging encryption, widely used by Islamist extremists to plan attacks, needs to be fought at international level, French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve said on Thursday, and he wants Germany to help him promote a global initiative.

He meets his German counterpart, Thomas de Maiziere, on Aug. 23 in Paris and they will discuss a European initiative with a view to launching an international action plan, Cazeneuve said.

Remember, of course, that much of the planning and communications for the Paris attacks last year were done without encryption, and in fact much of the planning was done fairly out in the open with little effort to mask what was happening. Of course, that won't always be true -- and certainly it's quite likely that people are plotting all sorts of nasty stuff with encryption -- but even then that doesn't actually result in law enforcement "going dark" as they'd have you believe. First of all, encryption is still difficult to use and easy to mess up. In fact, most reports suggest that ISIS is pretty bad about its opsec when it comes to encryption. And, even if they are successfully using encryption, they still leave plenty of other breadcrumbs for law enforcement and the intelligence community to track.

On top of that, any effort to weaken encryption is both dangerous and pointless. A mandate for backdoors or something similar only introduces vulnerabilities into encryption that will be targeted by criminals (and possibly terrorists!) putting many, many, many more people at risk. And it's pointless because there are enough open source encryption products at this point that trying to regulate other products won't help much. ISIS will just focus on using code they already have access to.

So none of this adds up, other than as a stupid reactionary move out of fear and ignorance. A "global initiative" to fight encryption ignores the fact that encryption isn't some invisibility cloak that masks all terrorist activity. It also makes us all less safe, and probably won't stop ISIS from actually using strong encryption. So what is the point other than shadowboxing and making it look like politicians are doing something, when they're not sure what to do about possible attacks?

Filed Under: bernard cazeneuve, encryption, france, global initiative, going dark, isis

Judge On Whether Twitter Is Legally Liable For ISIS Attacks: Hahahahahaha, Nope.

from the decision-in-140-characters-or-less dept

This is not a surprise, but the judge overseeing the case where Twitter was sued by a woman because her husband was killed in an ISIS attack has tossed out the case. We fully expected this when the lawsuit was first filed, and the judge was clearly skeptical of the case during a hearing on it back in June. The order dismissing the case comes in at slightly longer than 140 characters, but you get the feeling that was really about all that was needed to point out how ridiculous this case was. As we expected, Twitter pointed to CDA Section 230 to say it's simply immune from such a claim and the judge agrees:

As noted above, courts have repeatedly described publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) as including decisions about what third-party content may be posted online.... Plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory is slightly different, in that it is based on Twitter’s decisions about whether particular third parties may have Twitter accounts, as opposed to what particular third-party content may be posted. But it is not clear to me why this difference matters for the purposes of section 230(c)(1). Under either theory, the alleged wrongdoing is the decision to permit third parties to post content – it is just that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would be liable for granting permission to post (through the provision of Twitter accounts) instead of for allowing postings that have already occurred. Plaintiffs do not explain why this difference means that the provision of accounts theory seeks to treat Twitter as something other than a publisher of third-party content, and I am not convinced that it does. Despite being based on Twitter accounts instead of tweets, the theory is still based on Twitter’s alleged violation of a “duty . . . derive[d] from [its] status or conduct as a publisher.”

Even if Section 230 wouldn't have resulted in the case being tossed, Judge William Orrick notes a number of other problems with the lawsuit, including that the claims in the lawsuit don't even make sense (that seems like a big problem). The judge first focuses on how the plaintiffs' arguments shift back and forth between whether it's the mere providing of service to ISIS members that's the problem or the failure of Twitter to prevent the spread of ISIS content. These two things are different, but the lawyers for the plaintiff don't do much to distinguish the two from one another.

Plaintiffs characterize these allegations as “focus[ed] on [Twitter’s] provision of . . . accounts to ISIS, not the content of the tweets.” ... But with the exception of the statement that “ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” ..., all of the allegations are accompanied by information regarding the ISIS-related content disseminated from the accounts. Plaintiffs allege not just that ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts, but that ISIS used those accounts to post at least 90 tweets per minute, ... not just that Al-Furqan maintained a Twitter page, but that it maintained one “where it posted messages from ISIS leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000 followers,” ... not just that Twitter failed to stop an ISIS-linked account from “springing right back up,” but that an inflammatory message was tweeted from this account following the shooting attack in San Bernadino, California in December 2015....

The rest of the FAC is likewise riddled with detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, and videos disseminated through Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of that content. The FAC also includes a number of allegations specifically faulting Twitter for failing to detect and prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the Twitter platform.

That issue is a big part of the reason why Twitter's Section 230 defense works. The lawyers for the plaintiff argued that it wasn't a 230 issue because it's about the provisioning of services, not the content of the tweet, but their complaint focuses almost exclusively on the content, which clearly keeps liability off of Twitter.

And then there's the other big, non-230, problem with the lawsuit: there's nothing whatsoever in the lawsuit arguing that Twitter had anything directly to do with the ISIS attack that killed Lloyd Fields.

The third problem with the provision of accounts theory is that plaintiffs have not adequately alleged causation. Although the parties dispute the exact formulation of the appropriate causal test for civil liability under the ATA, they agree that the statute requires a showing of proximate causation....

Even under plaintiffs’ proposed “substantial factor” test, ..., the allegations in the FAC do not support a plausible inference of proximate causation between Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of Fields and Creach. The only arguable connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter identified in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother told reporters that Abu Zaid had been very moved by ISIS’s horrific execution of al-Kassasbeh, which ISIS publicized through Twitter.... That connection is tenuous at best regardless of the particular theory of liability plaintiffs decide to assert. But the connection is particularly weak under the provision of accounts theory because it is based on specific content disseminated through Twitter, not the mere provision of Twitter accounts.

The plaintiff, Tamara Fields, can still file an amended complaint that tries to fix these problems, but it's not clear how she'll get past them. I imagine that the various copycat lawsuits that have been filed against Twitter, Facebook and Google in the past few months will all face similar fates.

Filed Under: isis, lloyd fields, material support, section 230, tamara fields, terrorism, william orrick
Companies: twitter

Newt Gingrich: Merely Visiting An ISIS Or Al Qaeda Website Should Be A Felony

from the say-what-now? dept

Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich is making some news today for some silly remarks he made on Fox News last night in response to the attack last night in Nice, France. It comes right at the beginning of this video: All of the press -- for good reason -- is focusing on the first part of what he said, about deporting anyone "of Muslim background" (whatever that means) who "believes in Sharia." We'll skip over why this is totally clueless and unconstitutional, because plenty of other news sites are handling that.

Instead, we'll move on to the second craziest thing he said, right after that first statement, which is something that fits much more with Techdirt's usual themes: Gingrich then claims two ridiculous things, each only slightly less ridiculous than his first statement:

Anybody who goes on a website favoring ISIS, or Al Qaeda, or other terrorist groups, that should be a felony and they should go to jail. Any organization which hosts such a website should be engaged in a felon. It should be closed down immediately. Our forces should be used to systematically destroy every internet based source...

He then goes on to note that if we can't take them off the internet, we should just kill them all. Which, you know, I'm sure won't anger any more people against us.

Either way, this is idiotic. Merely visiting a website should put you in jail? What if you're a journalist? Or a politician? Or a researcher trying to understand ISIS? That should be a felony? That's not how it works. This also assumes, idiotically, that merely reading a website about ISIS will make people side with ISIS. It's also not, at all, how the law works. Same with the second part about it being a felony to host such content. We're already seeing lawsuits against social media sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube for hosting accounts from ISIS, and many are voluntarily taking down lots of those accounts. But making it a felony to keep them up? That's also not how the law works.

Reacting to a very real problem with stupid unconstitutional solutions suggests someone who has no clue what he's doing.

Filed Under: al qaeda, free speech, hosting, intermediary liability, isis, newt gingrich, sharia, websites

Yes, ISIS Is Using Encryption -- But Not Very Well

from the a-comedy-of-errors dept

I've been seeing a few anti-encryption supporters pointing to a new ProPublica report on terrorists using encrypted communications as sort of proof of their position that we need to backdoor encryption and weaken security for everyone. The article is very detailed and thorough and does show that some ISIS folks make use of encrypted chat apps like Telegram and WhatsApp. But that's hardly a surprise. It was well known that those apps were being used, just like it's been well known that groups like Al Qaida were well aware of the usefulness of encryption going back many years, even predating 9/11. It's not like they've suddenly learned something new. So, the fact that they're now using tools like WhatsApp and Telegram is hardly a surprise. It also kinda highlights the idiocy of trying to backdoor American encryption. Telegram is not a US company and WhatsApp's encryption is based on the open source Signal protocol, meaning that any American backdoor encryption law isn't going to be very effective.

But, really, what strikes me, from reading the whole article beyond the headline notion of "ISIS uses encryption," is that it lists example after example of the fact that folks in ISIS use encryption badly and often seem prone to revealing their information. This is not unique to ISIS. Lots of people are not very good about protecting themselves. Hell, I'm probably not very good about my own use of encryption. But, of course, I'm also not trying to blow things up or kill people. Either way, story after story after story in the article highlights the rather bumbling aspects of teaching ISIS supporters how and why to use encrypted communications and to avoid surveillance. My favorite example:

On Jan. 4, 2015, an exasperated coordinator repeatedly explained to a befuddled caller with a Lebanese accent that he could only bring a basic cell phone to Syria, according to a transcript.

“The important thing is that when you arrive in Turkey you have a small cell phone to contact me,” the coordinator said. “Don’t bring smart phones or tablets. OK, brother?”

For the fourth time, the recruit asked: “So we can’t have cell phones?”

“Brother, I said smart phones: iPhone, Galaxy, laptop, tablet, etcetera.”

Sounding a bit like a frustrated gate agent at a crowded airport, the coordinator added: “Each of you can only bring one suitcase. If you come alone, just bring one suitcase. That is, a carry-on and one suitcase.”

“I didn’t understand the last thing, could you explain?”

“Brother, call me when you get to Turkey.”

Then there was the case where someone planned a plot using an encrypted WhatsApp conversation, but police were already bugging the guy so they heard what he was saying anyway:

In April, Italian police overheard a senior figure in Syria urging a Moroccan suspect living near Milan to carry out an attack in Italy, according to a transcript. Although the voice message had been sent through an encrypted channel, the Moroccan played it back in his car, where a hidden microphone recorded it.

In the message, the unidentified “sheik” declared: “Detonate your belt in the crowds declaring Allah Akbar! Strike! (Explode!) Like a volcano, shake the infidels, confront the throng of the enemy, roaring like lightning, declare Allah Akbar and blow yourself up, O lion!”

The suspects exchanged recorded messages over WhatsApp, an encrypted telephone application that is widely used in Europe, the Arab world and Latin America

All of these examples keep making the same point that many people have been making for a long time. Yes, encryption hides some aspect of communications. That's part of the point. But the idea that it creates a "going dark" situation is massively exaggerated. There are many other ways to get the necessary information, through traditional surveillance and detective work. And the report suggests that's working. And the fact that many ISIS recruits are particularly unsophisticated in understanding how and when to use encryption only makes that kind of thing easier for people tracking them. In discussing the Paris attacks, for example, the article notes that while some of the attackers were told to use encryption, they didn't.

Abaaoud’s operatives did not always follow security procedures, however. In June of last year, Turkish immigration authorities detained Tyler Vilus, a French plotter en route to Paris with someone else’s Swedish passport. Allowed to keep his cellular phone in a low-security detention center, Vilus brazenly sent an unencrypted text message to Abaaoud in Syria, according to a senior French counterterror official.

“I have been detained but it doesn’t seem too bad,” the message said, according to the senior official. “I will probably be released and will be able to continue the mission.”

Instead, U.S. spy agencies helped retrieve that text and French prosecutors charged Vilus with terrorist conspiracy.

Anyway, it's no surprise that terrorists are going to use encryption. Of course they have been for over a decade and will continue to do so. The issue is that it's not as horrible as law enforcement is making it out to be. Just as plotters have always been able to plan in ways that law enforcement has been unable to track (such as discussing in person, in other languages, or through simple ciphers or codes). That's always happened and somehow we managed to get by. Yes, sometimes law enforcement doesn't get to know absolutely everything about everyone. And that's a good thing. And sometimes, yes, that means that terrorists will be able to plan bad things without law enforcement knowing it. But that's part of the trade-off for living in a free society.

Filed Under: encryption, fud, going dark, isis, law enforcement, terrorism
Companies: telegram, whatsapp

This Will Backfire: Google/Facebook Using Copyright Tools To Remove 'Extremist' Content

from the slippery-slippery-slope dept

They've been pressured to do this for a while, but according to a Reuters report over the weekend, both Google and Facebook have started using some of their automation tools to start automatically removing "extremist" content. Both are apparently using modifications to their copyright takedown technology:

The technology was originally developed to identify and remove copyright-protected content on video sites. It looks for "hashes," a type of unique digital fingerprint that internet companies automatically assign to specific videos, allowing all content with matching fingerprints to be removed rapidly.

In other words, the companies aren't (yet) using these tools to automatically determine what's "extremist" and block it, but rather they're just keeping it from being posted. Of course, we're all quite familiar with how badly this can fail in the copyright context, and it's quite likely the same thing may happen in this context as well. Remember, in the past, under pressure from a US Senator, YouTube took down a Syrian watchdog's channel, confusing its documentation of atrocities with extremist content. And, hell, the same day that this was reported, a reporter on Twitter noted that her own Facebook account was suspended because she posted a picture of a friend of hers who had been killed in Syria. And that's a big part of the issue here: context totally matters. One person's extremist content may be quite informative/useful in other contexts.

Yes, I know that there's a big push for "countering violent extremism" online these days. And the government, in particular, has been putting lots of pressure on the big tech companies to "do something." But I'm curious what anyone thinks this is actually doing. The people who want to see these videos will still see these videos. It still seems like a fairly exaggerated threat to think that someone just watching some YouTube videos will suddenly decide that's why they're going to join ISIS. And, if that is the case, it seems like a much better response is counterspeech -- put up other videos that rebut the claims in the "extremist" videos, rather than blocking them across the board. Of course, if they're being matched via ContentID, even someone offering commentary on a video to debunk claims may suddenly find out that their videos are being taken down as well. I can't see how that's at all helpful.

Filed Under: censorship, contentid, copyright, isis, platforms, radical extremism, videos
Companies: facebook, google

DOJ Rushed To Link Orlando Shooter To ISIS, Now Plans To Redact What He Said During 911 Call For... Reasons

from the huh? dept

The FBI/DOJ had no problem rushing out claims last week that Omar Mateen, the guy who killed 49 people in a rampage at a club in Orlando last weekend, had "pledged allegiance" to ISIS. James Comey delivered remarks that said as much last Monday:

It is also not entirely clear at this point just what terrorist group he aspired to support; although, he made clear his affinity, at the time of the attack, for ISIL, and generally, leading up to the attack, for radical Islamist groups. He made 911 calls from the club, during the attack, at about 2:30 in the morning, Sunday morning. There were three different calls. He called and he hung up. He called again and spoke briefly with the dispatcher, and then he hung up, and then the dispatcher called him back again and they spoke briefly. There were three total calls.

During the calls he said he was doing this for the leader of ISIL, who he named and pledged loyalty to, but he also appeared to claim solidarity with the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombing, and solidarity with a Florida man who died as a suicide bomber in Syria for al Nusra Front, a group in conflict with Islamic State. The bombers at the Boston Marathon and the suicide bomber from Florida were not inspired by ISIL, which adds a little bit to the confusion about his motives.

By now, it's pretty clear that the link to terrorism is basically non-existent, and that he fits the profile of a "typical mass shooter" rather than someone doing this for ISIS or any other terrorist reasons. As Marcy Wheeler points out, this also may explain why even though the FBI had checked out Mateen twice, including using the FBI's infamous "confidential informants" who often push people to join them in made up terrorist plots, they decided he wasn't a threat. It appears that Mateen didn't give any indication that he was really into aligning himself with ISIS or any other terrorist group, and Wheeler wonders if the FBI cared that he might do other damage, since they're so focused just on terrorism these days.

Instead, it appears, the FBI assessed Mateen for one and only one thing: whether his bogus claims of ties to terrorist organizations were real. There have been a slew of articles, such as this one or this one, wondering why the FBI didn’t “identify” Mateen as a “real” terrorist in its two investigations of him. But it appears the FBI was assessing only whether he was likely to commit violence because of–and with the support of–an Islamic terrorist group. It appears they weren’t assessing whether he was, like the overwhelming majority of men who commit mass shootings in this country, really screwed up, expressing it in violent ways, and seeking attention with such actions.

It is true that Islamic extremists want to attack this country. It is also true that far, far more Americans die when men carry out mass killings because they’re fucked up and begging for attention. If you’re Muslim, the easiest way to get attention right now is to say that word, “ISIS,” because it’s a guarantee law enforcement and politicians will give that killing more due then they might give the next disturbed mass shooter.

Of course, now that the DOJ seems to be realizing that this wasn't based on any connection to middle east groups, it seems to want to bury the issue. Attorney General Loretta Lynch has declared that when the transcript of Mateen's 911 calls are released, they're going to redact his claims to be doing it for ISIS for [reasons].

LORETTA LYNCH:

Yes, I’ll be going to Orlando on Tuesday to continue my briefings in the case. Actually though what we are announcing tomorrow is that the F.B.I. is releasing a partial transcript of the killer’s calls with law enforcement from inside the club. These are the calls with the Orlando P.D. negotiating team who were trying to ascertain who he was, where he was, and why he was doing this, all the while the rescue operations were continuing. That’ll be coming out tomorrow and I’ll be headed to Orlando on Tuesday.

CHUCK TODD:

Including the hostage negotiation part of this?

LORETTA LYNCH:

Yes. It will be primarily a partial transcript of his calls with the hostage negotiators.

CHUCK TODD:

You say partial. What’s being left out?

LORETTA LYNCH:

Well, what we’re not going to do is further proclaim this individual’s pledges of allegiance to terrorist groups and further his propaganda.

CHUCK TODD:

So we’re not going to hear him talk about those things?

LORETTA LYNCH:

We will hear him talk about some of those things, but we’re not going to hear him make his ascertains of allegiance and that. This will not be audio. This will be a printed transcript. But it will begin to capture the back and forth between him and the negotiators. We’re trying to get as much information about this investigation out as possible. As you know, because the killer is dead, we have a bit more leeway there. And so we will be producing that information tomorrow.

Marcy Wheeler again points out how absolutely ridiculous this is, including the idea that releasing such statements would "re-victimize" people. That makes absolutely no sense:

If releasing these claims of affiliation would “revictimize” the victims, then releasing them in the first place served to victimize them. So the much better approach would be the release the full transcripts and admit the Department fucked up, both in its assessment of a potential mass killer, and in rushing to blame ISIS in the first place. Not to mention that this will just feed conspiracy theories.

If DOJ fucked up — and the claim this could revictimize people is tacit admission it seriously fucked up — then admit that and make it right. Pay the political consequences of admitting that our obsessive focus on terrorism has distracted us from the more general, and therefore more lethal, problem with mass killings. Don’t try to pretend there’s a good reason for suppressing the very same claims you made a big deal of a week ago.

If DOJ now believes the claims served to do nothing more than give Mateen’s rampage more attention — and it was a key part of generating that attention — then it needs to come clean.

And, of course, as everyone knows, redacting such information is only calling more attention to it, and almost certainly feeding into the typical plot lines of conspiracy theorists. Why not just release the full transcripts (as required under Florida's public records laws) and with it a full explanation for why the claims of being associated with various groups (many of which are in conflict with each other) make no sense. That is, why not try to calm down the kneejerk reaction the DOJ set off in the first place?

Filed Under: doj, fbi, isis, omar mateen, redactions, streisand effect

Twitter, Facebook & Google Sued For 'Material Support For Terrorism' Over Paris Attacks

from the like-suing-automakers-for-car-bombs dept

It's an understandable reaction to tragedy. When faced with the unthinkable -- like the death of a loved one in a terrorist attack -- people tend to make bad decisions. We saw this recently when the widow of a man killed in an ISIS raid sued Twitter for "providing material support to terrorists." Twitter's involvement was nothing more than the unavoidable outcome of providing a social media platform: it was (and is) used by terrorist organizations to communicate and recruit new members.

That doesn't mean Twitter somehow supports terrorism, though. Like most social media platforms, Twitter proactively works to eliminate accounts linked with terrorists. But there's only so much that can be done when all that's needed to create an account is an email address.

As difficult as it may be to accept, platforms like Twitter, Facebook, etc. are not the problem. Like any, mostly-open social platform, they can be used by terrible people to do terrible things. But they are not responsible for individual users' actions, nor should they be expected to assume this responsibility.

Another terrorist attack and another death has prompted a similar lawsuit [PDF] from the father of Nohemi Gonzalez, who was killed in the Paris terrorist attacks. The lawsuit contains a number of allegations, but every single one can be countered by Section 230. Reynaldo Gonzalez claims that Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube all provide "support" for terrorism by both refusing to take terrorist-related content/accounts down and not proactively policing their platforms for terrorist-linked users.

The lawsuit contains several quotes from pundits, terrorism experts, and government officials about ISIS's successful use of social media platforms. What it doesn't contain, however, is anyone offering support for the lawsuit's position: that social media platforms should be held directly responsible for terrorist attacks. But that's the sole purpose of this lawsuit: to make the platforms pay for a death they had nothing to do with.

There are calls from government and law enforcement officials for these platforms to "do more" contained in the lawsuit as well. But if there's anything we'll never run out of, it's government officials calling for "x non-government entity" to "do more" in response to [insert latest tragedy here].

As was pointed out earlier, Section 230 immunizes the defendants against lawsuits of this sort. And the fact that there's no direct connection between the terrorist attack and Twitter/Facebook/YouTube's actions means there's no way for Gonzalez's father to seek damages from these defendants for a terrorist attack carried out on foreign soil, as Twitter pointed out the last time it was sued for "providing material support for terrorism."

Whether or not Section 230's protections will hold up remains to be seen. This case has been filed in the Ninth Circuit, which just recently handed down a decision opening up service providers to new levels of liability if they fail to warn users about other, possibly more dangerous users. This isn't exactly the best fit for the bad en banc decision, but with the circuit leaning that direction thanks to recent precedent, lower courts may be more willing to reinterpret Section 230 in ways that will make the internet worse.

Filed Under: isis, material support, nohemi gonzalez, section 230, terrorism
Companies: facebook, google, twitter, youtube

Not Funny: How The OFAC Is Outlawing Even The Lamest Attempts At Humor Over Terrorist Fears

from the humor-me dept

It's only been a couple months since we discussed some of the problems stemming from the US Treasury Department's terrorism scary names of brown people list, namely that non-scary people with names similar or identical to maybe actual scary people suddenly can't seem to use online services. Some term this "Islamophobia", whereas I prefer to mark it as the type of government laziness combined with carpet-bomb approaches to governance that is far too common. Add to that the fact that banking institutions are also suddenly being tasked with checking their payment services against this watchlist, nabbing all kinds of innocents in the process, and you have a process that could be funny if it weren't so frustrating.

But, when it comes to terrorism, we're legislating funny out of the equation altogether, it seems. For example, one man's $42 payment to a friend to reimburse him for drinks has been held in limbo because he tried to get funny in the memo section of the payment.

Telling a friend you’re paying him back for “ISIS beer funds!!!” is not a particularly good joke. I knew this as I was typing it at 2am on a Sunday, but what I did not know is that it’s an even worse joke on Venmo because the federal government will detain your $42.

Almost immediately after I hit send, Venmo—you know, the app that allows people to send money to each other via their phones—blasted an e-mail into my inbox. The company wanted to “better understand a recent payment.”

Obviously this started because of some automatic flag on the word "ISIS." And for that, one can hardly blame Venmo. Is it unlikely that a terrorist is going to send $42 to another terrorist to pay him back for alcohol, of all things, as part of their terrorist-y network? Sure, that's unlikely. But do we want the financial system running some general check against common terror groups and references to make sure money isn't falling into their hands? Of course.

But when Ben Guarino responded to Venmo to try to explain, choosing to call the whole thing a typo error instead of an admittedly lame joke, that meant that someone from Venmo was manually looking at the situation. And the result wasn't any better.

Venmo wasn’t buying it. “Unfortunately,” wrote someone who signed the e-mail as Heather, “due to OFAC regulations, we are not allowed to give the funds back to you or issue a refund.” Because I don’t regularly bump into terrorists or sicarios at Whole Foods, I had no clue what an OFAC was. As it goes, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is a decades-old institution, quietly working to keep money out of the hands of America’s enemies. In 1962, the Division of Foreign Assets Control—which President Harry Truman had used to block transfers destined for North Korea and China—metamorphosed into OFAC. This association now has to deal with tipsy hipsters grasping at wit through instant payment apps.

And that's where this whole practice breaks down into the land of the dumb. Look, Guarino's joke was both dumb and not particularly funny, by my estimation. But here's the thing: if your terrorist money-traps are nabbing hipster dudes trading 42 whole dollars for drinks, with a full explanation of where the drinks were had as well, then the program is no longer serving its purpose. Instead, we should admit that we've let fear grip our government institutions to such a degree that those institutions are trying to pass off annoying our citizens as a necessary trade for our safety. If that isn't the stated goal of terrorism, I don't know what is.

As of this writing, the OFAC still has Guarino's $42 sitting in limbo, having given him a case number for his request to have it released and nothing else. And America lived to see another day, I suppose.

Filed Under: isis, money, ofac, payments, terrorism
Companies: venmo