Court To Revenge Porn Bro Suing Twitter: You Agreed To Twitter Picking The Courtroom Every Time You Created A New Alt Account

from the pro-se-at-life dept

Craig Brittain's $1 billion lawsuit against Twitter is still rolling slowly towards its inevitable dismissal. Bringing with him his usual legal expertise -- which includes badly misreading the Knight Institute v. Trump decision and asking for some weird hybrid judgment/injunction/perma-unbanning -- Brittain has so far forced Twitter to… move his case to another venue. (via Eric Goldman)

Twitter invoked the forum selection clause of its terms of service -- terms Brittain agreed to time and time again as he created new accounts only to have them permanently suspended later. The terms say Twitter can move your lawsuit to its preferred venue (California federal court) and if you don't like it, well… you can just not use Twitter and/or sue Twitter.

Brittain's attempt to avoid having his Arizona lawsuit moved to California contains some rather novel legal arguments. First, he claimed Twitter's terms of service were invalid because [checks filing] it doesn't contain the mandatory "option" of arbitration. Here's the court's take [PDF]:

Brittain asserts that the Terms are unconscionable because they contain no arbitration clause and “have changed over time without arbitration.” Doc. 27 at 4. But Brittain cites no legal authority suggesting that Twitter is required to include an arbitration clause in its Terms. Nor has he otherwise shown that the Terms are unconscionable or illusory.

Second, he claimed it would be impossible for him to continue his doomed lawsuit in another state because he has no way of getting to California. It may be true -- and forum selection does tend to create unnecessary expenses for plaintiffs/defendants -- but in this case it isn't because the federal courts are accessible by those with limited travel options.

Brittain asserts that his status makes it “gravely difficult” for him to participate in the litigation. Doc. 27 at 2, 5. He notes that he “is traveling primarily by bicycle and/or public transportation to file, upwards of 40 miles per trip[.]” Id. at 2. But the Northern District of California permits filing by mail, eliminating the need for Brittain to bicycle or use public transportation to file court documents.3 The fact that Brittain is a self-represented, indigent litigant is no basis for not enforcing the forum selection clauses. As noted, the private interests of the parties must be weighed in favor of the preselected forum. See Yei, 901 F.3d at 1087. Brittain has not shown that litigating in California “will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.” M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18.

Brittain also claims millions of social media users would cry out at once and be silenced if Twitter was allowed to take Craig's unwinnable lawsuit to California. Brittain asserts… reasons.

Brittain further asserts that enforcement of the forum selection clauses would “contravene a strong public policy of the venue in which the suit was brought,” and “the public policy of . . . the District of Arizona is superior to that of the requested forum.” Doc. 27 at 5. He cites the purported “public interest of over one billion total users,” including “tens of millions who have been censored, deverified, or suspended by Twitter,” but draws no connection between the interests of those alleged users and Arizona public policy.

The court is not swayed.

Twitter notes, correctly, that Arizona public policy favors enforcing forum selection clauses. Doc. 30 at 8. “Enforcement of a forum selection clause such as the one[s] at issue does not contravene any strong Arizona public policy as Arizona courts routinely hold that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and that the party claiming the oppressiveness or unreasonableness needed to invalidate such a clause must meet a heavy burden of proof.”

Brittain's lawsuit is still alive for the time being. He'll just have to lose it in California, rather than in front of the home crowd.

Filed Under: content moderation, craig brittain, jurisdiction, pro se, revenge porn
Companies: twitter

Sixth Circuit Appeals Court Latest To Say It's Cool If The FBI Broke The Law During Its Playpen Investigation

from the deterrents-never-used-will-rarely-exhibit-a-deterrent-effect dept

The seventh Appeals Court to weigh in [PDF] on the FBI's Network Investigative Technique deployed in the Playpen child porn investigation has weighed in. Unfortunately, it makes the Sixth Circuit the seventh appeals court to find the FBI's warrant problematic, but willing to apply the "good faith" band-aid.

The problem with the application of the "good faith exception" is it assumes good faith on behalf of the FBI. There's no reason to believe the FBI acted in good faith, though. While it was in the process of obtaining a single warrant allowing it to search computers all over the world, it was well aware Rule 41 limited searches to the jurisdiction where the warrant was obtained. It knew this because the DOJ was in the process of asking the Supreme Court and Congress to change Rule 41 to remove the jurisdiction limits while it was pursuing this investigation.

The Appeals Court grants good faith anyway, despite this background. It does do us (and the appellant) the favor of discussing good faith in light of the DOJ's simultaneous attempt to codify searches it was already performing, but just because the discussion is expanded a bit doesn't mean it makes much sense. Here's the opening of the Sixth Circuit's federal forgiveness pitch:

The good-faith exception is not concerned with whether a valid warrant exists, but instead asks whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that a search was illegal.

A "well-trained officer" should never have sought the search warrant in the first place, because a "well-trained officer" would have known search warrants were limited to the jurisdiction they were issued in. But the agent sought the warrant anyway and a magistrate judge actually approved it. The judge's approval means more to the Sixth Circuit than the FBI's bad faith proposition.

For the same reasons articulated in Master, we conclude that the good-faith exception is not categorically inapplicable to warrants found to be void ab initio. The difference between a state court judge acting without authority and a federal magistrate judge acting without authority is of little significance—in both instances, the individual who signed the warrant (arguably) had no power to do so. Master’s holding that the good-faith exception applies to one applies with equal force to the other. Accordingly, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not categorically inapplicable to warrants that are void ab initio because of a magistrate judge’s jurisdictional error.

But the case cited (Master) isn't applicable to this situation. In that case, an officer presented a warrant request to the wrong county judge, accidentally obtaining permission to search outside of the judge's jurisdiction. A similar mistake could not have possibly been made with this warrant request. A federal magistrate -- whose jurisdiction covers an entire state -- could not have been mistakenly approached to grant permission to search an entire nation. The FBI's warrant affidavit clearly states it sought to search computers without knowing where any of the targets were located. The judge saw this and signed it anyway. Even if the judge blew the call, there's no way anyone can argue with a straight face the FBI did not know the warrant request violated the law as it stood when it requested permission to deploy its NIT.

It may have been "reasonable" for the FBI agent to rely on the issued warrant, but only if you ignore what was happening at the DOJ during the time this investigation was occurring. In fact, it can be argued this investigation and a similar one in 2014 expedited the DOJ's efforts on this front as it surely recognized some judges were going to find its NIT warrant invalid.

This explanation by the Sixth Circuit of its decision to extend good faith to the FBI agent doesn't help. In fact, it doesn't make sense.

But reasonable jurists have come to different conclusions about whether the NIT Warrant was valid. Compare United States v. Austin, 230 F. Supp. 3d 828, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (finding the NIT Warrant does not violate Rule 41(b) because it is the equivalent of a “tracking device” and therefore falls under the ambit of Rule 41(b)(4)), with United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1089 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (concluding that the magistrate judge lacked authority to issue the NIT Warrant), overruled on other grounds by Horton, 863 F.3d at 1052. We cannot, therefore, expect officers to have known that this type of warrant was invalid at the time it was sought. See Workman, 863 F.3d at 1321 (“[I]f a violation took place, it has escaped the notice of eight federal judges who have held that the same warrant complied with federal law and the federal rules even though data was being extracted from computers outside the Eastern District of Virginia. . . . [E]xecuting agents could reasonably have made the same mistake and reasonably relied on the magistrate judge’s decision to issue the warrant.”).

The court is saying an FBI agent -- requesting a warrant in 2015 -- can be excused for his Rule 41 ignorance because court decisions made 1-2 years after the warrant was sought suggest the NIT warrant area might have been a bit more gray than previously imagined. Furthering the retroactive forgiveness, the court goes on to point out -- as others have -- that Rule 41 changes, which went into effect more than two years after the warrant was obtained, now makes this sort of search legal. Since suppressing evidence is supposed to deter bad behavior by law enforcement, a past abuse that has been codified into law does not present further opportunities for exactly this same abuse of authority.

Certainly it would be impossible to violate rights in the same exact way again, what with the rules having been changed following the abuses contained in this investigation. But the deterrent effect of suppression would discourage law enforcement from seeking permission to perform illegal searches, even if there's a chance those searches may become Constitutional in the future due to changes in the law. This is the court telling law enforcement to roll the dice in edge cases because you just never know what the future might bring. This encourages misconduct because it demonstrates the extent of the federal courts' capacity to forgive.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 6th circuit, doj, fbi, good faith, jurisdiction, playpen

EU Court Adviser Says Google Shouldn't Have To Enforce A French RTBF Request Anywhere But In Europe

from the jurisdictional-limitation-is-not-exactly-a-novel-concept dept

The "Right to Be Forgotten" -- a European construct that allows people to erase their internet history at the drop of a takedown request -- should only apply in countries affected by the law. That would seem to be obvious but, so far, it hasn't played out that way. There has been insistence by a few judges and governments that delisting orders should cover anywhere Google's search engine can be used, rather than just in the originating country.

The abusable system has led to questionable delisting requests, which almost always results in the person making the dubious request generating even more URLs to target with the next round of takedowns. That's the nature of the internet, and that's why some judges think content delisted in one country should be made unavailable everywhere in the world.

For a while, it appeared the EU was inclined to agree with French regulators who believed they should be able to control the distribution of content worldwide from an office in Paris. Fortunately, it doesn't appear these regulators will get to control the internet. Reuters reports the EU court is probably going to end up siding with Google in this dispute.

Google can limit the “right to be forgotten” to internet searches made in the European Union, an adviser to the bloc’s top court said on Thursday, backing an appeal by the U.S. search giant against a French fine.

Now, this isn't guaranteed to happen. The Reuters report notes the EU Court normally follows the advice of its legal advisers, but not always. The French government doesn't appear willing to back down, despite this recommendation.

France’s CNIL data protection authority said it noted the opinion and restated its view that the right to privacy should apply regardless of the geographical origin of the person doing an internet search.

This "right" should be watched closely and exercised cautiously. Its short history shows this hasn't been the case. Google is compliant with most requests it receives, but there are still a number of bad faith efforts making their way through the system. Just like DMCA notices, some RTBF requests target legitimate and newsworthy content solely for the purpose of making embarrassing or inconvenient facts vanish from the web. Allowing a European country to control the world's search results will do little more than encourage further abuse.

Filed Under: censorship, cjeu, eu, eu advocate general, eu court of justice, free speech, global rtbf, jurisdiction, right to be forgotten, rtbf
Companies: google

Ninth Circuit Aligns With Other Circuits: The FBI's Playpen Warrant Was Bad, But The FBI's Faith Was Good

from the winning-by-losing dept

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the latest appeals court to find the FBI's warrant for malware deployment during a child porn investigation to be invalid, but still close enough for government work. The FBI's NIT (Network Investigative Technique) was sent to visitors of a dark web child porn site called Playpen. The hitchhiking software then traveled out of the district the server was housed in (Virginia) to send back identifying info from computers and devices all over the world.

At the time the warrant was sought, warrants were only valid in the district they were issued. Multiple courts found the FBI's malware was a search under the Fourth Amendment. A smaller subset found the extrajurisdictional search unsupported by current law and the underlying warrant invalid from the moment it was issued. Challenges to the extrajurisdictional searches have all run into dead ends at the appellate level.

The First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all refused to suppress evidence, even if the courts found the search warrant invalid. The reasoning? There was no deterrent effect served by suppressing the evidence because the law changed after the warrant was issued and the malware deployed to allow the FBI to engage in extrajurisdictional searches. In essence, this is retroactive application of a law that changed after the warrant was sought, giving it the sort of blessing courts won't extend to victims of law enforcement misconduct that happened to occur before precedential decisions explicitly declared that particular form of misconduct unconstitutional.

In addition to the retroactive application of Rule 41 jurisdictional changes, these appeals courts have also granted the government "good faith." Somehow, it's believed an FBI agent seeking a warrant for a search that he knew would violate Rule 41 limits when executed wasn't the FBI rolling the dice on favorable rulings and a potential future mooting by changes to the law.

There's more of the same in the Ninth Circuit decision [PDF]. The court says the warrant was bad but the faith was good, so no harm, no foul, no suppression. (h/t Brad Heath)

We agree with Henderson that Rule 41(b) is not merely a technical venue rule, but rather is essential to the magistrate judge’s authority to act in this case.

[...]

The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, defines the scope of a magistrate judge’s authority, imposing jurisdictional limitations on the power of magistrate judges that cannot be augmented by the courts.

[...]

Relevant here, § 636 authorizes magistrate judges to exercise “all powers and duties conferred or imposed” by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1). In turn, Rule 41(b) has been asserted as the sole source of the magistrate judge’s purported authority to issue the NIT warrant in this case. But, as we have explained, in issuing such warrant, the magistrate judge in fact exceeded the bounds of the authority conferred on magistrate judges under Rule 41(b). Thus, such rule plainly does not in fact confer on the magistrate judge the authority to issue a warrant like the NIT warrant. Without any other source of law that purports to authorize the action of the magistrate judge here, the magistrate judge therefore exceeded the scope of her authority and her jurisdiction as defined under § 636.

Thus endeth the bad news for the government -- bad news severely tempered by the fact the government still gets to keep its evidence. Even though the court recognizes the warrant was invalid the moment it was signed, it still gives the government points for effort. The Ninth says it's ok for law enforcement to rely on invalid warrants, so long as they've been signed by a magistrate. And good faith or not, the court says there's no reason to suppress the evidence because the house always wins there's no future misconduct to deter.

[T]here is no evidence that the officers executing the NIT warrant acted in bad faith. “To the extent that a mistake was made in issuing the warrant, it was made by the magistrate judge, not by the executing officers.”

[...]

Further, suppression of the evidence against Henderson is unlikely to deter future violations of this specific kind, because the conduct at issue is now authorized by Rule 41(b)(6), after the December 2016 amendment. The exclusionary “rule’s sole purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations,” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–237 (2011), and we see no reason to deter officers from reasonably relying on a type of warrant that could have been valid at the time it was executed—and now would be.

With four circuits weighing in and reaching the same conclusions, it seems unlikely any further appellate challenges will upset the FBI's malware apple cart. And if the same conclusions continue to be reached, there will no compelling reason for the Supreme Court to weigh in. Add to that the post-facto codification of the tactics used by the FBI in this investigation and you've got dozens of unconstitutional searches being laundered into Fourth Amendment compliance by courts unwilling to penalize the FBI for overstepping its bounds.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, 9th circuit, doj, fbi, good faith, jurisdiction, nit, playpen, rule 41, warrants

Free Law Project Takes A Stand Against Attempt To Use GDPR To Disappear A Public Court Docket

from the good-for-them dept

We recently wrote about how a guy in France, Michael Francois Bujaldon, was using the GDPR to try to delete a public court docket involving a case in which he is a defendant, and has been sued for real estate and securities fraud. As we noted, at least two websites that host public court dockets have felt compelled to either delete or change that particular docket.

Last week, the Free Law Project, who operates the CourtListener website (and runs RECAP -- the very useful system that will help automatically free up costly PACER dockets and documents that other RECAP users visit) noted that it, too, had recently received a GDPR demand about a docket (they do not say if it was the same one) and then go into a detailed description of why they are not taking action. The post notes that the general policy of the site has always been that they won't remove a docket without a court order (though it may remove links from search engines).

More importantly, however, the Free Law Project notes that it is not subject to the GDPR:

As a California public benefit corporation with 501(c)(3) non-profit status in the United States, we categorically reject the notion that we are subject to laws or regulations promulgated by the European Union or its member states.

We collect United States legal materials for a U.S. audience. Our principal place of business, our Executive Director, our board members, our servers, our ISP, and all of our regular activities are located within California. We place no advertisements in European jurisdictions, and have never purposefully directed any of our activities at any European state or its citizens.

This certainly sounds good, though folks in the EU may disagree. The GDPR was written to strike fear into non-EU businesses that they, too, are covered by the law, which raises all sorts of jurisdictional fights. I've suggested in the past, and I stand by the idea that sooner or later a GDPR claim is going to come up against the SPEECH Act, which says that foreign judgments that would be found unconstitutional under the First Amendment cannot be enforced in the US. I would imagine trying to delete public dockets might fit that bill, though who knows if anyone's going to sue the Free Law Project (for the record: I certainly hope no one does).

The Free Law Project then goes even further, noting that even if it was subject to the GDPR (which it is not), it wouldn't need to remove the content as requested:

First, the GDPR recognizes a right of freedom of expression, and Free Law Project firmly believes that its freedom to speak includes the right to make available these U.S. primary legal materials.

Second, the GDPR also recognizes an exception for archiving purposes in the public interest, for scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes. This is precisely the activity of Free Law Project, which aims to create an archive of U.S. legal materials for the public interest and for scientific, statistical, and historical research purposes.

This also makes sense (and the blog post goes into even more detail). But, again, we've already seen at least two other sites feel they were required to act and remove or alter the dockets. So while it's great that the Free Law Project/CourtListener feels okay in pushing back against this claim, it doesn't change the fact that these efforts have already been successful. It also doesn't change the fact that the Free Law Project has to spend a lot of time and effort trying to figure out how it needs to deal with a law in a totally different continent.

We're going to see many more examples of this sort of thing. I know lots of people cheered on the GDPR, arguing that any law that says it's to help you protect your data and privacy must be good, but the consequences of this law are incredibly far reaching, and it will be years, if not decades, before people understand just how much damage it has created as well.

Filed Under: dockets, free speech, gdpr, jurisdiction, michael francois bujaldon, pacer, right to be forgotten
Companies: court listener, free law project

That Bizarre Trademark Suit Between Music Promoters Over An 'Ultra' Trademark Nobody Owned Is Still Going On

from the not-so-swift-justice dept

I'll forgive the average reader here if they cannot recall the post we did nearly a year and a half ago about a trademark dispute between Worldwide Entertainment Group Inc. of Florida and Adria MM Productions Ltd. of Croatia. It's by far my favorite trademark story ever. It has all the hallmarks of a typical trademark bullying story that we would cover: from a fairly generic term ("Ultra") in a really broad industry (music festivals) being licensed for use overseas in Europe by Worldwide to Adria, only to have the former ratchet up its licensing fee and control demands over the trademark it had on the term "Ultra." Pretty standard fare, even when we get to the part where Worldwide sends Adria notice that it is in breach of the licensing agreement and demanding the stoppage of all use of the term "Ultra."

But where this all turned into my favorite trademark story ever was when Adria MM sued Worldwide, stating this:

AMM says that at that time it discovered that Ultra didn’t have any rights over proprietary marks in Europe, specifically in Croatia.

Yes, according to Adria, Worldwide didn't actually have registered trademarks for "Ultra" in Europe at all, making the licensing arrangement it first signed and then tried to use as a weapon against Adria a brilliant piece of bluffery. What should be fairly clear, however, is that the entire basis of the licensing contract was built upon a lie. With that clearly in mind, Adria moved to have this all decided in the summary judgement phase.

And, because everything about this story is designed to be as funny as possible. shortly after filing its suit, there was a scramble at the trademark offices that honestly should have been accompanied by an instrumental replaying of Yakety Sax.

Five days after the filing the lawsuit, both companies filed to register the trademark “within 34 minutes of each other,” as quoted in the court ruling, with Adria filing in Croatia and Worldwide with the European Union. Both companies protested the filing of the other, and after filing legal actions in the state of Florida, both requested summary judgment in their favor.

And both were denied that summary judgment. In the order, the court relies on the notion that there are material facts in dispute regarding the validity of the original licensing agreement. Summary judgment is only supposed to be granted when material facts are not in dispute and the parties simply want a ruling based on those facts. What makes this odd, however, is that the order's background section appears to accept as fact that the Worldwide did not hold any valid trademarks under the "Ultra" terms in the EU or Croatia specifically for the entire term of the original contract. The only fact that appears to not be in question is whether that agreement is valid anyway. Which... how? If it was entered into under false pretenses, it's unclear exactly how that agreement could be valid.

Regardless, it appears this will go to a jury trial where, if common sense prevails, it seems unlikely things will go well for Worldwide Entertainment Group.

Filed Under: croatia, europe, jurisdiction, music, promoters, trademark, ultra
Companies: adria mm productions, worldwide entertainment group

On Speech And Subpoenas, New York Giveth And Taketh (First, The Good News On Platform Jurisdiction)

from the I-love-New-York-decisions-like-this dept

There are a few recent cases to note out of New York that address speech and subpoenas on third parties. This first post is about a good one, and soon we'll have another... less good one. In Amelius v. Grand Imperial LLC a court in New York has recently reaffirmed that a New York-issued subpoena is only enforceable on an Internet platform if the New York courts have jurisdiction over the platform. Furthermore, relying on a 2014 US Supreme Court ruling, Daimler AG v. Bauman, the court in Amelius concluded that having merely registered to do business as an out-of-state company is not enough to give New York jurisdiction over platform companies with no other connection to the state than that, nor is their having information that might be relevant to a New York case. Instead the platform would either need to be incorporated or headquartered in New York for its courts to have jurisdiction over them.

Which does not mean that out-of-state platforms like Yelp (the platform at issue in this case) cannot be subpoenaed to supply information relevant to a New York case. What it does mean, however, is that the New York subpoena would need to be "domesticated" in the platform's home jurisdiction so that its own local courts would be able to enforce it. It is not necessarily hard to do this: for instance, in California, pretty much all that needs to happen is for a California court clerk, or even just a licensed California attorney, to add a California subpoena form to the out-of-state subpoena for it to become an enforceable California subpoena.

But what's good about this arrangement is that platforms can have some control over what laws will govern the subpoenas propounded against them and anticipate which courts will be able to compel them to act. In fact, they can choose to base themselves in states that offer the best laws and procedural rules most protective to them and their users' speech, because not all states do so equivalently. For instance, the test for whether a subpoena can be allowed to unmask an anonymous speaker in California is the Krisnky test (which requires the pleading to make a prima facie case against the speaker), but in other states the test is either the Dendrite test, the Cahill test, the "good faith" test (as was the case in the Virginia Hadeed Carpet case, which raised similar jurisdictional issues as this one), or no test at all (thus rendering all the subpoenas potentially enforceable, no matter what the effect on speech). These tests obviously vary greatly in the protection they afford to anonymous speakers.

California also includes mandatory fee-shifting to help deter abusive subpoenas and to compensate those who have had to fight them off. Like the anti-SLAPP statute does for unmeritorious litigation Section 1987.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows for mandatory recovery of fees for unmeritorious unmasking subpoenas that courts quash. Unfortunately, like robust anti-SLAPP laws, not all states have such a provision, which is another reason why it's important that platforms not be exposed to these other jurisdictions simply because they may have completed the purely ministerial task of registering with the Secretary of State or having some users there and not any more substantive connection. Platforms are in the business of facilitating speech, and they should be able to choose which laws to expose themselves to that will give them the best ability to do it.

Filed Under: california, free speech, jurisdiction, new york, platforms, subpoenas
Companies: amelius, grand imperial, yelp