Mobile Providers: No One Has Complained* About Our Service, So Net Neutrality Shouldn't Apply To Us

from the *based-on-our-very-convoluted-definition-of-complained dept

From our innovation economy to the free exchange of ideas, the United States is a shining example to the world of the promise of an open Internet. It is widely embraced by policymakers, innovators and consumers alike, particularly with respect to mobile broadband. We remain the global leader in mobile innovation and have embraced openness across the ecosystem. So much so, that not a single formal complaint against wireless providers has been made to the Federal Communications Commission since it first adopted open Internet rules in 2010.

Subjecting wireless broadband networks to rules that dictate how wired broadband networks are designed and operated would be a mistake. Instead, wireless network managers need maximum flexibility to keep networks expanding and clear. And wireless companies need the ability to differentiate their products and services without having to ask permission. This is our best guarantee that we maintain an open and innovative Internet—one in which mobile broadband retains its virtually limitless capacity to transform our lives.

In commenting on last month’s vote for Scottish independence, President Obama turned to an old maxim that retains a modern ring of truth: ‘If it ain’t broke; don’t fix it.’ When it comes to maintaining the open Internet and all the momentum surrounding mobile broadband, we couldn't agree more.

Filed Under: fcc, meredith attwell baker, net neutrality, rules, wireless
Companies: ctia

White House Says Its Rules Limiting Drone Attacks To Avoid Civilians Don't Apply In Syria

from the rules?-fuck-the-rules dept

At the same time, however, Hayden said that a much-publicized White House policy that President Obama announced last year barring U.S. drone strikes unless there is a “near certainty” there will be no civilian casualties — "the highest standard we can meet," he said at the time — does not cover the current U.S. airstrikes in Syria and Iraq.

The “near certainty” standard was intended to apply “only when we take direct action ‘outside areas of active hostilities,’ as we noted at the time,” Hayden said in an email. “That description — outside areas of active hostilities — simply does not fit what we are seeing on the ground in Iraq and Syria right now.”

Filed Under: civilians, drones, extrajudicial killing, obama administration, rules, syria

DOJ's History Of Ignoring The Rules When Getting Phone Records Of Journalists

from the not-the-first-time dept

Despite the seizure of the phone records, a Justice Department spokesman said the agency valued freedom of the press and was “always careful and deliberative in seeking to strike the right balance between the public interest in the free flow of information and the public interest in the fair and effective administration of our criminal laws.”

On November 5, [redacted], the case agent sent an e-mail asking another Special Agent in the [redacted] Field Office to inquire, in the other agent's capacity as his squad's liaison to the CAU, whether the on-site communications service providers could obtain telephone toll records of U.S. persons making [redacted] calls [redacted]. The case agent's November 5 e-mail listed 12 [redacted] telephone numbers, 8 of which were identified in the e-mail as belonging to Washington Post reporters [redacted] and Washington Post researcher [redacted] and New York Times reporters [redacted] The email identified a 7-month period -- a few months before and a few months after the published articles -- as the time period of interest for the leak investigation.

[....] However, in absence of any request from the case agent or anyone in the FBI, the CAU SSA issued an exigent letter dated December 17, [redacted], to Company A for telephone records of the reporters and others listed in the case agent's November 5, [redacted], e-mail. We determined that the SSA did this without further discussion with the case agent or the Special Agent who had asked only whether such records could be obtained through on-site providers, not that the records should be obtained.

The CAU SSA's exigent letter sought records on nine telephone numbers, seven of which were identified in the e-mail exchanges described above as belonging to Washington Post and New York Times reporters or their news organizations' bureaus in [redacted].....

The exigent letter did not specify the 7-month interval noted in the case agent's November 5 e-mail, or contain any date restrictions. The exigent letter also stated that the request was made "due to exigent circumstances" and that "subpoenas requesting this information have been submitted to the U.S. Attorney's office who will process and serve them formally on [Company A] as expeditiously as possible." However, this statement was not accurate. A subpoena request had not been sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office at the time the exigent letter was served, or at any time thereafter.

Filed Under: doj, eric holder, exigent letters, fbi, nsls, phone records, privacy, regulations, reporters, rules

NATO 'Cyberwar' Manual Says Hacktivists Must Wear A Uniform

from the dressed-to-kill dept

Last year, Techdirt wrote about an interesting article suggesting that we should welcome "cyberwar" since it would be so much less painful than the ordinary kind. Of course, that begs the question what we actually mean by "cyberwar", since some forms are probably less humane than others. As we have pointed out, the use of the totally embarrassing "cyber" prefix is really just an excuse for more government controls and for security companies to get fat contracts implementing them.

Against that background, the following news from The Verge about an attempt to pin down what exactly "cyberwar" might be, is particularly interesting:

A landmark document created at the request of NATO has proposed a set of rules for how international cyberwarfare should be conducted. Written by 20 experts in conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the US Cyber Command, the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare analyzes the rules of conventional war and applies them to state-sponsored cyberattacks.

That's because conventional war makes a distinction between combatants -- those fighting in regular armies -- and those who are "unprivileged belligerents". The difference is crucial: the former enjoy important rights, for example to be treated as prisoners of war if captured, whereas "unprivileged belligerents" do not. The distinction between the two groups is relatively obvious in traditional warfare, where combatants are organized and subject to clear command structures. Hacktivists, by contrast, may decide to defend their country by taking part in group attacks from their home or from a local café, say; the issue then becomes whether or not they are to be considered combatants with rights, or "unprivileged belligerents" without them.

The following section from the Tallinn Manual shows the experts floundering here -- and just how hard it is to come up with sensible rules for this "cyberwar" stuff:

Combatant status requires that the individual wear a 'fixed distinctive sign'. The requirement is generally met through the wearing of uniforms. There is no basis for deviating from this general requirement for those engaged in cyber operations. Some members of the International Group of Experts suggested that individuals engaged in cyber operations, regardless of circumstances such as distance from the area of operations or clear separation from the civilian population, must always comply with this requirement to enjoy combatant status.

So if you're ever tempted to engage in a little patriotic hacking into enemy computers, please don't forget to put on your uniform first...

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Filed Under: cyberwar, hacking, hactivism, nato, rules, uniform