No Immunity For Cops Who Sent A SWAT Team To A 68-Year-Old Woman's House For Threats Delivered Over Open WiFi Connection

from the probable-cause-=-'internet-threats-plus-an-internet-connection...-somewhere& dept

Earlier this year, we covered the story of Louise Milan, a 68-year-old grandmother whose house was raided by a SWAT team (accompanied by a news crew) searching for someone who had made alleged threats against police officers over the internet. Part of the probable cause submitted for the warrant was Milan's IP address. But the police made no attempt to verify whether any resident of Milan's house made the threats and ignored the fact that the IP address was linked to an open WiFi connection.

While the presiding judge did take issue with the tactics deployed by the SWAT team (which included turning a regular warrant into a no-knock warrant by only giving Milan a few seconds to respond to their knock before battering down the door and hurling flashbang grenades into the house), he didn't have much to say about the department's bogus "an IP address is a person" justification for the raid. This was concerning because the police verified the IP address by wardriving. By doing so, they also could have confirmed the WiFi connection was open and that the threats could have been made by anyone accessing that connection.

The judge, however, refused to grant the defendants summary judgment on the excessive force claims or immunity. This decision was appealed by the police department, which still insists it should be granted qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has a lot to say about the police officers' actions during this raid and the events leading up to it, none of it good.

First, it points out that the police officers could have performed their due diligence on the IP address before deciding to carry out a raid, but chose not to.

The defendants say they didn’t know that Mrs. Milan’s network was unsecured and therefore accessible by someone outside the house who could use the unsecured network to send the threatening messages. Although the police had discovered that there was an unsecured network near the house, they hadn’t bothered to find out whose network it was, as they could easily have done, precisely because it was unsecured and therefore accessible. Had they done that they would have known that it was Mrs. Milan’s network and, since it was unsecured, that it might have been used (without her knowledge) by someone outside her home to send the threatening messages. The failure to discover that the network was Mrs. Milan’s was a failure of responsible police practice.

The court notes that the officers' irresponsibility didn't end there. They also ignored the fact that a man who had made threats against officers in the past (Derrick Murray) was spotted sitting on a porch two houses away from Milan's by officers prior to the raid. (And, indeed, Murray watched the raid unfold from this same porch.) They also ignored the fact that none of the three other people they suspected of making the threats (former residents of the house/distant relations of Milan) had been observed entering or exiting the house. Instead, they took the IP address and the info obtained from the service provider and went after Milan. And, despite having no evidence someone dangerous might be in Milan's house, deployed a SWAT team.

So: a house occupied by an elderly woman and her two daughters; no evidence that any criminals would be present during the search although the possibility could not be excluded entirely; no effort to neutralize suspect Murray during the search, as by posting police to watch his house and make sure he didn’t rush over to Mrs. Milan’s house when the search began. But despite their insouciance about Murray and the perfunctory character of their investigation before the search, the police decided to search the Milan house—and in a violent manner.

The "violent manner" is described in greater detail in the opinion. The court grants itself a short tangent during its recounting of the incident to criticize the lingo cops deploy to downplay the violence of their methods and weaponry.

A search warrant was applied for and obtained, and the search was conducted by an eleven-man SWAT team accompanied by a news team. The members of the SWAT team rushed to the front door of the house, knocked, and without allowing a reasonable time—more than a few seconds—for a response (though they hadn’t gotten a “no knock” warrant) broke open the front door and a nearby window, and through these openings hurled two “flash bang” grenades. These are explosive devices, similar to but a good deal less lethal than military hand grenades, that are intended to stun and disorient persons, thus rendering them harmless, by emitting blinding flashes of light and deafening sounds. They can kill if they land on a person, especially a child. The police call them “distraction devices,” an absurd euphemism; we called them “bombs” in Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2000).

Then the court gets to the most absurd part of the raid -- considering the danger the police were attempting to neutralize by assaulting both Milan and her house.

That no men were found in the house during the raid confirmed the police in their belief that Murray was responsible for the threats. It took them only a day to discover that it was indeed he who was responsible—he had used Mrs. Milan’s open network to threaten the police. But rather than give him the SWAT-team treatment, the police politely requested that he come to police headquarters, which he did, where he was arrested without incident. The police department’s kid-gloves treatment of Murray is in startling contrast to their flashbang assault on Mrs. Milan’s home.

On top of that, even when it was evident there was no danger and none of the suspects were present, the SWAT team refused to dial back its aggressive tactics.

The handcuffing of the daughter, looking indeed much younger than her 18 years, is shown on the helmet video along with the rest of the search, and she is so small, frail, utterly harmless looking, and completely unresisting that the sight of her being led away in handcuffs is disturbing. All that the SWAT officer had to do was take her by the hand and lead her out of the house, which was rapidly filling with smoke from the flash bangs; there was no conceivable reason to handcuff her.

Everything about the raid bothers the Seventh Circuit Court. The lack of actual investigative work. The over-the-top tactics. The fact that a unit deploying flashbang grenades couldn't even be bothered to ensure any more damage than "necessary" wasn't done.

Precipitate use of flash bangs to launch a search has troubled us before, leading us to declare that “the use of a flash bang grenade is reasonable only when there is a dangerous suspect and a dangerous entry point for the police, when the police have checked to see if innocent individuals are around before deploying the device, when the police have visually inspected the area where the device will be used and when the police carry a fire extinguisher.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, supra, 600 F.3d at 784–85. The police in this case flunked the test just quoted. True, they’d brought a fire extinguisher with them—but, as if in tribute to Mack Sennett’s Keystone Kops, they left it in their armored SWAT vehicle.

The court notes that reasonable mistakes made by officers do not nullify qualified immunity, even when the mistakes seem less reasonable by the application of hindsight. But there was nothing reasonable about this entire debacle.

We cannot understand the failure of the police, before flash banging the house, to conduct a more extensive investigation of the actual suspects: Murray, living two doors away from the Milan home and thus with ready access to Mrs. Milan’s open network, and the male Milans. The police neglect of Murray is almost incomprehensible. His past made him a prime suspect. A day of investigating him would have nailed him, as we know because a day of investigating—the day after the violent search of the home—did nail him.

More to the point, the lack of even minimal investigative efforts precludes the department from claiming these "mistakes" were "reasonable."

[T]o repeat for emphasis, the police acted unreasonably and precipitately in flash banging the house without a minimally responsible investigation of the threats. The open network expanded the number of possible threateners and just one extra day of surveillance, coupled with a brief investigation of Murray and the three male Milans, should have been sufficient to reassure the police that there were no dangerous men lurking in the house.

In other words, had the police officers actually performed any sort of police work, Milan's house would have been left unmolested/un-flashbanged and she wouldn't be suing the department for civil rights violations. This lawsuit could have been avoided entirely and the police were obviously capable of taking down a much more dangerous target without extra drama and explosives. But it had a news crew in tow -- one it was apparently "repaying" for the tips about the social media threats. And once it had eyes on it, it couldn't help but deploy its ridiculous "shock and awe" tactics... to take down a 68-year-old grandmother and her "small, frail" daughter.

Filed Under: derrick murray, louise milan, open wifi, police, raid, swat, wifi

Cablevision Follows Comcast Down The Compulsory WiFi Hotspot Rabbit Hole

from the hot-damn dept

Less than a year ago, Comcast was sued over its WiFi hotspot program, which essentially turned residential customers into hotspots for other Comcast customers or hotspot subscribers. Comcast used this to make a great deal of money off of its own residential customers. The problem was that Comcast didn't see the need to have customers opt-in to this program and was perfectly happy using customers' electricity and, in some cases, bandwidth to power the service. That and the fact that the opt-out settings on the router controls were given to bouts of amnesia made the company look pretty crappy, but, hey, you know, Comcast.

Well, now it appears that Cablevision will find itself fighting in court over the exact same thing. Paul Jensen, a Cablevision customer, has sued the company on grounds that it violated the CFAA, gained unjust enrichment, and trespassed.

Consequently, unsuspecting customers who used Cablevision as their internet service provider now had "outsiders" piggybacking off their home Wi-Fi networks once individuals were within the range of the signal emanating from their home. Jensen contends that Cablevision never asked for his consent to use his home network to create a Wi-Fi hotspot. Jensen also points out that Cablevision's customer contract never mentions the existence of the secondary network they are providing to the public when they leased a router to him.

Not only did Cablevision act without his authorization, Jenson further asserts the company's actions have compromised his internet speed, put him at greater security risk and increased his electricity costs.

Why any company thought it could get away with something like this without legal blowback is completely beyond me, but why Cablevision thought it could skate after Comcast already faced legal action is a complete mystery. Like many other ISPs, Cablevision makes good money in renting routers and modems to customers. (Update: as our always helpful and informative comment section has pointed out, Cablevision supplies their smart router for the hotspot service free to ISP customers, though that doesn't change the rest of the post). This sort of news should serve to do nothing other than compel anyone who wishes to remain a Cablevision customer to buy their own router and modem. All because Cablevision couldn't be bothered to properly inform customers of the plan and give them an option to opt-out?

Oh, and as for that opt-out ability:

This increased traffic also heightens the residential customer's security risk since strangers are connecting to the internet through the same wireless router, Jensen says. He says when he called Cablevision to request that they remedy the situation, he was told that the wireless router he paid Cablevision to use could not have the Optimum Wi-Fi Hotspot feature turned off.

"Cablevision configures the routers it leases to consumers so that the Optimum Wi-Fi Hotspot cannot be disabled. Thus, consumers wishing to opt out of broadcasting a secondary Wi-Fi network from their homes are left with no recourse other than to buy an entirely new wireless router, costing anywhere from $50 to $200." the complaint says.

Charging Giving customers for equipment that can't opt-out of a service that only enriches the seller, not the customer? That sounds more like a pyramid scheme than an ISP to me.

Filed Under: compulsory, hotspot, routers, wifi
Companies: cablevision, comcast

Kenya's Ingenious Solution To Cybercrime: Register Every Wi-Fi User And Device With The Government

from the criminal-masterminds dept

Good news! Kenya has developed an ingenious, foolproof plan to put an end to the menace of cybercrime as we know it: they'll soon be requiring that all Wi-Fi users register with the government before going online. Since most of us realize that hacking or tricking Wi-Fi authentication systems is impossible, and, as we all know, criminals aren't capable of stealing other peoples' Wi-Fi credentials, Kenya will be at the very forefront of landing a killing blow on internet-based crime as we know it for decades to come. It's simply amazing that someone didn't come up with this idea sooner.

The new head of Kenya's Communications Authority, Francis Wangusi, last week stated in a speech that Kenya has taken over chairmanship of Association of Regulators of Information and Communications for Eastern and Southern Africa (ARICEA), a body that fights cybercrime within member nations. A new mandate of the group will require that every single Wi-Fi device in each and every member nation be registered with KENIC for the good of internet users everywhere:

"He added that Kenyans will also be required to register their mobile devices with Kenya Network Information Centre (KENIC) in new rules aimed at fighting cyber- crime. "We will license KENIC to register device owners using their national identity cards and telephone numbers, the identity of a device will be known when it connects to Wi-fi," said Mr Wangusi at the ARICEA annual general meeting Tuesday in Nairobi. CA is also committed to conduct a detailed study on the depth of web hackings in the country. Wangusi said cyber-attacks are on the rise with the banking sector suffering most, followed by government officials."

Other reports seem to indicate the well-formed plan could just involve users having to plug in a passport or other ID number before being able to access the internet whatsoever:

"We are considering the idea of ensuring the Public Wi-Fi is not accessed without a log in. The logging in of the public domain will require one’s passport number, ID Number or telephone number," he said. "The unique number of a device is identified on the internet but we can’t identify who is owning it, if you don’t use the right identification numbers. That’s why we insist on logging in the Public Wi-Fi with personal credentials. This will help us in securing the cyber space, in case of cybercrimes,” he said."

Since MAC spoofing apparently doesn't exist in the alternate dimension I'm currently writing this story from, it should be relatively easy to get everybody voluntarily registered while constantly monitoring and thwarting any attempt to bypass the system. Similarly, since fighting the ambiguous menace known as "cybercrime" is never used as a pretense to expand government surveillance and brick-and-mortar oppression, Kenya will likely spearhead this bold new assault on internet skulduggery without any negative repercussions whatsoever for the public at large. Amazing!

Filed Under: cybersecurity, kenya, registration, wifi

FBI Investigating Chris Roberts For Hacking Flight WiFi, Taking Control Of Engines

from the how-is-this-possible? dept

I'll be honest: when I wrote about Chris Roberts being detained by the FBI for tweeting about hacking his flight's WiFi, I reacted with a great big eyeroll. On the one hand, security researchers like Roberts look for these vulnerabilities all the time and it's quite helpful when law enforcement and airlines learn about potential avenues for threats. On the other hand, Chris Roberts is quite obviously not Al Qaeda. The whole thing appeared to be a reaction to embarrassment that the vulnerability had been allowed to exist, rather than any belief that Roberts was in any way a threat.

But if Roberts is to be believed, he did something really stupid on previous flights: he used his WiFi hack to manipulate the plane's engines.

During two interviews with F.B.I. agents in February and March of this year, Roberts said he hacked the inflight entertainment systems of Boeing and Airbus aircraft, during flights, about 15 to 20 times between 2011 and 2014. In one instance, Roberts told the federal agents he hacked into an airplane’s thrust management computer and momentarily took control of an engine, according to an affidavit attached to the application for a search warrant.

“He stated that he successfully commanded the system he had accessed to issue the ‘CLB’ or climb command. He stated that he thereby caused one of the airplane engines to climb resulting in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane during one of these flights,” said the affidavit, signed by F.B.I. agent Mike Hurley.

If true, that would go way beyond identifying exploits, mentioning that you could drop the oxygen masks, or really anything else that deals with in-flight wireless hacks. If the affidavit is to be believed, Roberts dangerously manipulated the flight's equipment, potentially putting everyone aboard at risk. We have only the FBI's word for all of this, of course, but the feds are certainly behaving as though Roberts both said all of this and that he's not simply making fictional claims.

Roberts, who has been interviewed at least three times by the F.B.I. this year, is under investigation for allegedly hacking into the electronic entertainment systems of airplanes, according to an application for a search warrant to probe seized electronic equipment. The document shows F.B.I. agents investigating Roberts believe he has the ability to do what he claims: take over flight control systems by hacking the inflight entertainment computer.

“We believe Roberts had the ability and the willingness to use the equipment then with him to access or attempt to access the (inflight entertainment system) and possibly the flight control systems on any aircraft equipped with an (inflight entertainment system) and it would endanger the public safety to allow him to leave the Syracuse airport that evening with that equipment,” sates the warrant application.

Roberts, for his part, has at least suggested to a Wired reporter that the FBI is twisting his words:

“That paragraph that’s in there is one paragraph out of a lot of discussions, so there is context that is obviously missing which obviously I can’t say anything about,” he said. “It would appear from what I’ve seen that the federal guys took one paragraph out of a lot of discussions and a lot of meetings and notes and just chose that one as opposed to plenty of others.”

That still doesn't say he didn't do it, though.

As with too many of these stories, the end result is that we have absolutely nobody to root for. To be fair, Roberts has been warning the airlines and the feds about these exploits for years, without any of it generating much attention. His purported stunt has suddenly brought a little light to what is obviously an untenable security risk, which doesn't in any way excuse manipulating an engine mid-flight. That, plainly, is insane, and I don't think it can be argued that it's an action that deserves punishment. On the other hand, Roberts still isn't Al Qaeda and the end result of all of this may be that planes are safer. Intentions matter, after all.

As for the federal government and the airlines: are you kidding me? You're telling me that not only was all of this possible, which is crazy at the outset, but they had been warned about it and had done nothing? Crazy as it sounds, everyone should be thanking the universe that Chris Roberts was the one manning the keyboard on these flights instead of someone with more nefarious intentions. The feds and the airlines should have simply hired Roberts to battle these vulnerabilities rather than letting it get to this point. Instead, we learn this way that it may indeed be possible to get control of a flight through a plane's WiFi. And we learn that law enforcement and the airline's chief strategy to deal with that fact was to pretend it didn't exist.

Filed Under: chris roberts, fbi, flights, hacking, wifi

Outnumbered And Outgunned, Marriott Sort Of Backs Off Stupid Plan To Ban Guest Device Wi-Fi

from the know-when-to-fold-'em dept

Back in October we noted how the FCC had fined Marriott $600,000 for using deauth man in the middle attacks to prevent customers from using tethered modems or mobile hotspots at the company's Gaylord Opryland Hotel and Convention Center in Nashville. Marriott's ingenious plan involved blocking visitors and convention attendees from using their own cellular connections so they'd be forced to use Marriott's historically abysmal and incredibly expensive wireless services (in some cases running up to $1,000 per device).

When pressed by the FCC, Marriott pretended this was all to protect the safety and security of their customers. The company also tried to claim that what it was doing was technically legal under the anti-jamming provisions of section 333 of the Communications Act, since the deauth attacks being used (which confuse devices into thinking they're connecting to bogus, friendly routers) weren't technically jamming cellular signals. The FCC didn't agree, and neither did industry giants like Microsoft, Google, AT&T and Verizon, who collectively filed opposition documents with the FCC arguing that Marriott was clearly violating the law.

After carefully surveying a battlefield scattered with millions of pissed off consumers, annoyed regulators, and angry, bottomless-pocketed technology giants, Marriott has apparently concluded that maybe its shallow ploy to make an extra buck isn't worth fighting over. In a statement posted to the company's website, Marriott states it's going to stop acting like a nitwit, maybe:

"Marriott International listens to its customers, and we will not block guests from using their personal Wi-Fi devices at any of our managed hotels. Marriott remains committed to protecting the security of Wi-Fi access in meeting and conference areas at our hotels. We will continue to look to the FCC to clarify appropriate security measures network operators can take to protect customer data, and will continue to work with the industry and others to find appropriate market solutions that do not involve the blocking of Wi-Fi devices."

You'll notice the selectively-worded statement doesn't completely put the issue to rest, and clings fast to the argument that Marriott is just really concerned about visitor security, suggesting this may not be the last we hear of this.

Filed Under: blocks, fcc, hotels, wifi
Companies: marriott

Judge Not Too Concerned That 68-Year-Old Woman's House Was Raided Because Someone Used Her Open WiFi To Post A Threat

from the an-IP-address-isn't-a-person dept

We've written before about faulty legal activities based on nothing stronger than an IP address. An IP address is not a person, but many entities have decided it's "close enough." Fortunately, the judicial system has (occasionally) stepped in to correct this assumption, usually in the context of copyright infringement lawsuits.

There are those in the law enforcement arena that know an IP address can't be used as an identifier. Careless statements get made about the "danger" of open WiFi connections, or it's suggested that accessing open networks should be illegal. This doesn't have much to do with keeping citizens safe, but it does have everything to do with easing law enforcement's investigative workload.

A lawsuit filed against the Evansville, Indiana police department is being allowed to move forward. [pdf link] The suit centers on the raid of a 68-year-old woman's house -- a raid predicated on an IP address related to an unprotected WiFi connection.

In June of 2012, threats against the police department were posted to Topix.com.

The following posts were discovered under the heading “EPD leak!!! All officers addresses are being passed around Evansville”:

“Me n my boys need them copys asap.need to pay a few a visit.”

“[Chief] Bolin lives behind parkside”

“Lol at all da cops commenting,f#+k the police.you mfs need to b taught a lesson,always harassing n violating mfs rights. 4th of July a cops house gonna got hit.dont care about your kids or btchs lives.I dnt even care about my own life.I got my reasons…times ticking.?”

“Cops be aware.Note:I am proud of my county,but I hate police of any kind..I have explosives.:) made in America.Evansville will feel my pain.guess who’s in the river.”

The police -- possibly tipped off by a news reporter (there were also unverified claims about the FBI contacting the EPD) -- began an investigation. The EPD subpoenaed Topix and the local cable provider to discover the user's information. The information traced back to 68-year-old Louise Milan's house. Information was verified by police wardriving, confirming that there was an open WiFi connection in the vicinity of Milan's residence.

Also discovered during the initial surveillance was known gang member Derrick Murray, who was two houses down sitting on his mother's porch.

A search warrant for the Milan residence was obtained, but notably did not include mention of either Derrick Murray or the unsecured wireless network. Instead, the warrant request asserted that the device from which the threats had been posted was actually in Milan's home.

The request also stated that “in order for a particular electronic device to utilize a particular IP address, . . . [it] requires the electronic device to be IN the residence of 616 E. Powell Avenue to access the internet provided . . . to the residence.”

Further investigation uncovered the criminal activities of Milan's stepson, Anthony Milan and HIS son, Anthony Milan, Jr. This was used by the EPD -- despite neither of these Milans having resided at Louise Milan's residence for over four years -- to tie Milan's home in with the online threats.

Using this information -- much of it faulty or circumstantial -- the EPD determined that the only "safe" way to approach the Milan residence was a SWAT raid. This plan moved ahead despite statements made indicating the EPD knew it was raiding the wrong person's house.

This decision was made, and ultimately carried out, despite the fact that Murray—and not Milan or her relatives—was identified during the “pre-raid briefing” as likely being “ultimately responsible” for the threats.

Helmet cam video of the raid shows how it went down. It was not a "no-knock" warrant, but the "knock" delivered by the SWAT team had very little to do with announcing its presence and everything to do with giving itself permission to smash through the front door and hurl flashbangs into the house.


Louise Milan and her 18-year-old granddaughter were cuffed and led from the house at gunpoint. Their computer was seized. Two days later, the police raided Derrick Murray's residence and recovered the device used to post the threats to Topix. Notably, Murray watched the raid of Milan's house go down from the comfort of his mother's porch.

Shortly thereafter, Milan filed suit against the police department and the city of Evansville, claiming her rights were violated by the SWAT team raid. [pdf link]

Judge William T. Lawrence addresses each of Milan's complaints and, unfortunately, dismisses most of them. For Milan's claim of unreasonable search and seizure, Lawrence states:

When Detective Brown made this statement, however, he knew that an unsecured Wi-Fi network in a residence may be accessed from outside the home. The Court is troubled by Detective Brown’s statement. Even so, the Court finds that his statement did not render the search warrant invalid. Even if Detective Brown had stated that Milan’s router could be accessed from outside the home, the warrant would still be supported by probable cause. The threats were made using Milan’s IP address; “though it was possible that the transmissions originated outside of the residence to which the IP address was assigned, it remained likely that the source of the transmissions was inside that residence.”

The dismissal of the false arrest claims follows in line with Judge Lawrence's determination that the search warrant was valid, despite Detective Brown's false assertions. If the search warrant was valid, the detainment was valid. That Milan was only detained for 20 minutes also factored into this decision.

But when it comes to Milan's accusation of unreasonable force, Judge Lawrence finds enough evidence to allow the lawsuit to proceed.

Officers are allowed to use tactics and force they deem necessary to control a potentially dangerous situation. Law enforcement agencies are granted a lot of leeway by the courts when it comes to raids like these. But Judge Lawrence finds the EPD's assertion that the methods used were necessary because of the potential danger short on evidence of actual danger.

He points again to the the fact that the pre-raid briefing made it clear that Derrick Murray -- not anyone in the Milan residence -- was the most likely suspect. The fact that the posted threats declared July 4th (still two weeks away at the time of raid) to be the day the acts would be carried out also indicated that there was minimal danger in approaching the Milan residence.

Furthermore, the police chief invited a news crew to be on hand for the raid (as "repayment" for the threat tip) -- again suggesting the danger level was rather low. Coupled with the fact that the SWAT team broke through the glass door and threw (rather than carefully placed) distraction devices into the home within seconds of arrival brings Judge Lawrence to the following conclusion.

It is questionable whether the officers had sufficient time to look inside to ensure that no one would be injured by the devices. It is also undisputed that the officers were not carrying a fire extinguisher during the search. These facts lead the Court to conclude that there are questions of fact regarding whether the Defendants’ actions were unreasonable and excessive. Thus, summary judgment on this issue is not appropriate. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment as to this claim.

Then Judge Lawrence goes further, declaring that the excesses of the EDP's use of force are enough to strip it of qualified immunity.

As detailed above, the decision to use the SWAT team and the distraction devices was made based solely on the nature of the threats and the small possibility that Milan, Sr., Milan, Jr., or Marc were responsible for the threats and would be found inside Milan’s home—that is it. The officers, however, did not see any of those men enter or leave Milan’s residence during their period of surveillance. Additionally, the officers suspected that Milan’s WAP was unsecured and that Murray was “ultimately responsible” for the threats long before they executed the search warrant at Milan’s home. Thus, there was little—if any—evidence that they would encounter a violent person. As discussed above, there was also no emergency situation (as the threat was for July 4), the officers did not carry a fire extinguisher, and the videos arguably indicate that the officers did not have sufficient time to look inside the residence for individuals who might be harmed before tossing (rather than placing) the distraction devices into Milan’s home. Lastly, there did not appear to be a dangerous point of entry. It was a clear day, and the front door (but not the storm door) was open when the SWAT team arrived.

For these same reasons, the Court also concludes that the EPD’s use of force “so clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in the circumstances that it cannot be said to lie near the ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force’ along which qualified immunity shields officers from liability for their snap judgments, if those judgments prove to be wrong upon further reflection.” Id. at 786. These were not snap judgments; they were methodical and deliberate decisions, which were based on limited facts and an incomplete investigation. A reasonable officer would know that the EPD’s actions were constitutionally excessive.

While Judge Lawrence's decision to overlook Detective Brown's portrayal of an open WiFi network as a positive indicator of a device's location is unfortunate, his refusal to grant summary judgement against claims of excessive force and his stripping of the principals' qualified immunity somewhat mitigates this. This entire debacle was based on a purposefully wrong assertion, but the Evansville PD has been spared having to answer directly for this misrepresentation.

Filed Under: evansville, indiana, open wifi, police, swat team, wifi