Brazilian President Possibly Canceling US Visit, $4 Billion Fighter Jet Order Over NSA's Snooping

from the the-NSA:-taking-down-the-country-from-the-inside dept

The fallout from the leaked NSA documents is apparently neverending. Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, has canceled her advance team's trip to Washington, DC. A high-ranking official stated the president was "furious" after information surfaced about the NSA's actions via a report by Globo TV.

The Globo report that aired Sunday was based on NSA documents leaked by Edward Snowden to U.S. journalist Glenn Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro and worked with the network on the story. Most of Greenwald’s stories on the NSA program have been published in Britain’s Guardian newspaper.

The report said the U.S. agency mapped out the aides with whom Rousseff communicated and tracked patterns of how those aides communicated with one another and also third parties, according to a June 2012 NSA document. Greenwald said the document, while not containing excerpts of Rousseff communications, made it clear that U.S. officials were reading her emails and text messages.

Rousseff had been extended a formal invitation by the administration to a "full state dinner," the only such invitation handed out this year, but it appears the Brazilian president is unwilling to entertain the offer, thanks to the administration's handling of the spying allegations.

[T]he official, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the episode, said Rousseff feels "patronized" by the U.S. response so far to the Globo report.

While it is common for state intelligence agencies to spy on other nations, the unwritten rule has always been, "don't get caught." Thanks to Snowden's leaks, the NSA has broken this rule, albeit more out of internal carelessness that led to the documents' escape, rather than through the carelessness of active agents.

The end result, however, is the same: another chilled international relationship and another one that the administration seems uninterested in rekindling. Rather than mend these fences, the administration seems to be putting more of its energy into playing defense.

But there's more on the line than some national embarrassment. Once again, allegations of spying are hurting American businesses. Not only does it appear that Rousseff with stand up Obama at the state dinner, but it also looks like a $4 billion deal to purchase F-18 fighters might evaporate as well. This is in addition to other mutually-beneficial agreements revolving around biofuels and oil.

The administration may be playing it safe and attempting to downplay the NSA's activities, but that only seems to be adding to the damage. As noted above, Rousseff felt "patronized" by the US government's response to the allegations. Brazil's Communications Minister Paulo Bernardo's assessment of the written response provided by the administration is even harsher.

Bernardo... said Brazil had yet to receive any "reasonable" explanation from the United States.

"All of the explanations that have been given to us from the beginning of these episodes have proven to be false," Bernardo said. "I think it's indiscriminate spying that has nothing to do with national security ... It's espionage with a commercial, industrial aim."

And that's the crux of the problem with the administration's response to these leaks. Rather than address the fact that many people feel violated by the surveillance, it instead doles out talking points about targeting, oversight, legality and security, when not issuing denials that are swiftly proven false. There's very little attempt to discuss the what bothers people about the NSA's actions -- the "why." Justification for these programs is always delivered in meaningless buzzwords and assertions that the NSA's activities are all very tightly controlled are delivered in words that have been stripped of their meaning by high-ranking intelligence officials.

It's not just Brazil that feels "patronized" by this "don't worry about it -- it's for your own good and it's all legal" treatment. It's everyone. While it may be the accepted m.o. for national intelligence agencies to play spy vs. spy, it's quite another to find out you've been directly targeted, no matter what your position, especially if you head a country that isn't directly antagonistic to the United States.

Filed Under: brazil, dilma rousseff, fallout, nsa, nsa surveillance

Feds Beg NY Times, Pro Publica Not To Reveal That They've Inserted Backdoors Into Internet Encryption

from the too-fucking-bad dept

We already wrote about the latest reports coming out of the Snowden leaks, concerning how the NSA and GCHQ have effectively backdoored their way into breaking various encryption schemes by writing the standards themselves and recruiting internal spies within companies to covertly inject backdoors. The reporting on these documents was done jointly by The Guardian, the NY Times and Pro Publica. However, the NY Times coverage has one interesting tidbit not in the Guardian:

Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read. The news organizations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the article because of the value of a public debate about government actions that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of Americans and others.

Pro Publica, for its part, put up a thorough and detailed explanation for why it chose to publish the story, which is well worth reading:

The story, we believe, is an important one. It shows that the expectations of millions of Internet users regarding the privacy of their electronic communications are mistaken. These expectations guide the practices of private individuals and businesses, most of them innocent of any wrongdoing. The potential for abuse of such extraordinary capabilities for surveillance, including for political purposes, is considerable. The government insists it has put in place checks and balances to limit misuses of this technology. But the question of whether they are effective is far from resolved and is an issue that can only be debated by the people and their elected representatives if the basic facts are revealed.

This is true in so many ways. As the NY Times report notes, there had been a public debate about all of this in the 90s, when there was the big fight over the Clipper Chip, an NSA-created form of encryption with backdoors. That fight ended with the NSA losing... and now it appears that they just ignored that and effectively spent the past few decades doing the same exact thing, but in secret. That deserves public exposure and discussion.

Pro Publica points out that this country is founded on a fundamental belief that you can't just "trust" the government, and yet the government is asking us to do exactly that here, as they prove time and time again not to be credible or worthy of trust.

There are those who, in good faith, believe that we should leave the balance between civil liberty and security entirely to our elected leaders, and to those they place in positions of executive responsibility. Again, we do not agree. The American system, as we understand it, is premised on the idea -- championed by such men as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison -- that government run amok poses the greatest potential threat to the people’s liberty, and that an informed citizenry is the necessary check on this threat. The sort of work ProPublica does -- watchdog journalism -- is a key element in helping the public play this role.

American history is replete with examples of the dangers of unchecked power operating in secret. Richard Nixon, for instance, was twice elected president of this country. He tried to subvert law enforcement, intelligence and other agencies for political purposes, and was more than willing to violate laws in the process. Such a person could come to power again. We need a system that can withstand such challenges. That system requires public knowledge of the power the government possesses. Today’s story is a step in that direction.

Kudos to all three publications for taking this step. It's unfortunate that they need to do this, but it's a sad statement on the way the US and UK governments have acted.

Update: The Guardian also mentions that intelligence officials asked them not to publish.

Filed Under: backdoors, encryption, journalism, nsa, nsa surveillance, surveillance
Companies: ny times, pro publica

NSA & GCHQ Covertly Took Over Security Standards, Recruited Telco Employees To Insert Backdoors

from the not-so-secure dept

And the latest report on the Ed Snowden leak documents has come out and it's yet another big one: the NSA and GCHQ have basically gotten backdoors into various key security offerings used online, in part by controlling the standards efforts, and in part by sometimes covertly introducing security vulnerabilities into various products. They haven't "cracked" encryption standards, but rather just found a different way in. The full report is worth reading, but a few key points are worth highlighting.

First, the NSA spends $250 million per year to "covertly" influence tech product designs. The report suggest two ways this is happening. First by infiltrating standards-bodies:

Independent security experts have long suspected that the NSA has been introducing weaknesses into security standards, a fact confirmed for the first time by another secret document. It shows the agency worked covertly to get its own version of a draft security standard issued by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology approved for worldwide use in 2006.

"Eventually, NSA became the sole editor," the document states.

That's disturbing enough, but it gets worse. While the Guardian report suggests that unnamed tech companies are "collaborating" in inserting these kinds of backdoors, that's not entirely clear, because later in the document, they suggest that the NSA is recruiting covert operatives within telco firms to insert vulnerabilities:

To help secure an insider advantage, GCHQ also established a Humint Operations Team (HOT). Humint, short for "human intelligence" refers to information gleaned directly from sources or undercover agents.

This GCHQ team was, according to an internal document, "responsible for identifying, recruiting and running covert agents in the global telecommunications industry."

"This enables GCHQ to tackle some of its most challenging targets," the report said. The efforts made by the NSA and GCHQ against encryption technologies may have negative consequences for all internet users, experts warn."

Did you get that? Rather than recruiting spies from, say, governments, the NSA and GCHQ are recruiting employees at telcos to help them suck up and access all your data.

All of this activity has apparently led to some major breakthroughs, allowing them to access plenty of data they didn't have access to previously. Just last week we'd written about major successes by the NSA having to do with encryption, and this report reveals more details:

"For the past decade, NSA has lead [sic] an aggressive, multi-pronged effort to break widely used internet encryption technologies," stated a 2010 GCHQ document. "Vast amounts of encrypted internet data which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable."

An internal agency memo noted that among British analysts shown a presentation on the NSA's progress: "Those not already briefed were gobsmacked!" The breakthrough, which was not described in detail in the documents, meant the intelligence agencies were able to monitor "large amounts" of data flowing through the world's fibre-optic cables and break its encryption, despite assurances from internet company executives that this data was beyond the reach of government.

Once again, we're seeing rather extreme behavior on the part of the NSA and GCHQ as they try to basically be able to dig into every possible communication.

Filed Under: backdoors, encryption, gchq, nsa, nsa surveillance, standards, surveillance

The NSA Needs To Get In Front Of The Leaks: Stop Lying And Open Up

from the only-way-to-regain-trust dept

Bruce Schneier has yet another interesting article over at The Atlantic, in which he notes that the only real way for the NSA to regain trust is to get in front of the coming leaks by finally opening up. He makes a compelling case. First off, every time the NSA has tried to defend various leaks, its defenses have been shown to be lies or, at the very least, misleading, just days later. This is, in large part, because it still doesn't seem to have any idea what Snowden took. And in its usual fashion, it seems to hope that if it just keeps lying, or redefining words, that it will be able to get away with keeping stuff hidden. But that's clearly not working, and the public has pretty much lost all trust. The only real way to deal with that is to finally be honest for once. That doesn't mean making everything public, but having someone who can look through everything and see what's really going on.

It's time to start cleaning up this mess. We need a special prosecutor, one not tied to the military, the corporations complicit in these programs, or the current political leadership, whether Democrat or Republican. This prosecutor needs free rein to go through the NSA's files and discover the full extent of what the agency is doing, as well as enough technical staff who have the capability to understand it. He needs the power to subpoena government officials and take their sworn testimony. He needs the ability to bring criminal indictments where appropriate. And, of course, he needs the requisite security clearance to see it all.

We also need something like South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where both government and corporate employees can come forward and tell their stories about NSA eavesdropping without fear of reprisal.

Now, obviously, some will claim that there's so much the NSA does that needs to be kept secret -- and, that's true. Except for one little tidbit: Ed Snowden already walked out the door with much of this stuff and gave it to reporters. Meaning that most of it isn't likely to be kept secret very long. And that's why this is the only reasonable course of action, even if it goes against the NSA's general DNA.

Yes, this will overturn the paradigm of keeping everything the NSA does secret, but Snowden and the reporters he's shared documents with have already done that. The secrets are going to come out, and the journalists doing the outing are not going to be sympathetic to the NSA. If the agency were smart, it'd realize that the best thing it could do would be to get ahead of the leaks.

The result needs to be a public report about the NSA's abuses, detailed enough that public watchdog groups can be convinced that everything is known. Only then can our country go about cleaning up the mess: shutting down programs, reforming the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act system, and reforming surveillance law to make it absolutely clear that even the NSA cannot eavesdrop on Americans without a warrant.

In many ways, this is like the difference between real security and security by obscurity. If the NSA is confident in what it's doing and why it's necessary, it should be able to come out and show what's really happening, and the public can take an educated position on whether or not it's appropriate.

Filed Under: bruce schneier, ed snowden, investigation, lies, nsa, nsa surveillance, secrecy, transparency

Author Of Patriot Act As Well As Members Of Church Commission Tell Court NSA Has Gone Too Far

from the wow dept

Here's something I'd bet you never thought you'd see: the EFF teaming up with the author of the Patriot Act, Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, to tell a court that the NSA is violating the Patriot Act. This is in the ACLU's lawsuit over the NSA's collection of metadata on all phone calls, which the DOJ is desperately trying to get out of. Here, Jim Sensenbrenner, with help from the EFF, has filed an amicus brief with the court, noting that the Patriot Act -- which the DOJ and NSA are relying on to claim the program is legal -- was never intended to allow this kind of activity. In fact, it was written to prevent this kind of activity.

The filing notes that Sensenbrenner originally received a draft of the Patriot Act from the DOJ five days after September 11, 2001, and found that it gave the government way too much power, so he redrafted the legislation specifically to prevent widespread abuses of investigative powers.

The parties can argue over the dictionary and legal definitions of the words “relevance” and “an.” But regardless of how those words are defined, one thing is clear: amicus, and the other Members of Congress who enacted Section 215, did not intend to authorize the program at issue in this lawsuit or any program of a comparable scope.

Amicus does not dispute that “relevance” is customarily given a broad meaning, and that he and his colleagues in Congress were aware of this broad meaning when they enacted and reauthorized Section 215. Nor does amicus dispute that Section 215 was intended to create a “sufficiently flexible” standard. See Defs’ Mot. to Dismiss at 24. But there is no suggestion in any legal precedent or in any statements in the legislative history that the relevance standard could justify the ongoing collection of the records of every telephone call made to or by every person on American soil, the vast majority of which Defendants concede will not be related even remotely to any terrorist activities.

To the contrary, amicus understood that “relevance” was commonly construed by the Supreme Court as a limiting factor that specifically prevented the bulk collection of records, even on a much smaller scale, on the belief that investigators might find the information useful at some point in the future.

Sensenbrenner's is not the only interesting amicus brief. A diverse group of interested parties have filed their own briefs as well -- including the NRA, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the PEN American Center. But another really interesting one was filed by former members of the Church Committee, the famous committee set up in 1975 to investigate and rein in the intelligence community after it became clear that they were abusing their powers. In this case, the filing comes from Gary Hart and Walter Mondale, two members of the Church Committee who may also be remembered for later (disastrous) attempts to run for President. This brief also involves a number of well-respected law professors who have spent a lot of time on related issues.

The full brief is well worth reading, giving the history of the Church Committee, and the FISA law which followed, and how it was designed to restrict the practices of the intelligence community and stop abuses such as widespread spying on the American public.

The government’s interpretation of “relevant” also contradicts Congress’ aim in enacting FISA. As discussed above, Congress designed the statute to be used in specific cases of foreign intelligence gathering. By limiting the targets of electronic surveillance, requiring probable cause, disallowing investigations solely on the basis of otherwise protected first amendment activities, and insisting on minimization procedures, Congress sought to restrict agencies’ ability to violate U.S. citizens’ privacy. The business records provision built on this approach, adopting the same definitions that prevailed in other portions of the statute, and requiring that agencies obtain orders to collect information on individuals believed to be foreign powers or agents of a foreign power. Congress later deliberately inserted “relevant” into the statute to ensure the continued specificity of targeted investigations.

In addition, Congress empowered the FISC to consider each instance of placing an electronic wiretap. The NSA’s program, in contrast, delegates such oversight to the executive, leaving all further inquiries of the databases to the agency involved. Once the NSA collects the telephony metadata, it is the NSA (and not the FISC) that decides which queries to use, and which individuals to target within the database.

This change means that the FISC is not performing its most basic function: protecting U.S. persons from undue incursions into their privacy. Instead, it leaves the determination of whom to target to the agency’s discretion.

When you basically have the people who were responsible for the various laws that the NSA is now relying on arguing in court that the NSA is clearly going beyond the intent of the laws, it seems rather clear that the NSA's case is on very thin ice.

Filed Under: church committee, gary hart, james clapper, jim sensenbrenner, nsa, nsa surveillance, patriot act, section 215, walter mondale
Companies: aclu

Obama: Checks & Balances Work Great To Prevent Abuse By NSA... But, Perhaps We Could Fix Things

from the say-what-now dept

It appears that, for the first time, President Obama has, ever so slightly, conceded that perhaps laws need to be tightened up to prevent abuses by the NSA. Of course, that came immediately after he insisted (falsely) that the current checks and balances were working and that the NSA isn't spying on Americans. This is a flat out lie from the President, and people should call him on it. He's lying.

"What I can say with confidence is that when it comes to our domestic operation, the concerns that people have back home in the United States of America, that we do not surveil the American people or persons within the United States, that there are a lot of checks and balances in place designed to avoid a surveillance state," Obama said. "There have been times where the procedures, because these are human endeavors, have not worked the way they should and we had to tighten them up. And I think there are legitimate questions that have been raised about the fact that as technology advances and capabilities grow, it may be that the laws that are currently in place are not sufficient to guard against the dangers of us being able to track so much."

Once again, that first part -- the part he says "with confidence" -- is a lie. We've already seen plenty of evidence that while the NSA insists that it doesn't surveil people within the US, it appears to do so regularly. Of course, since it classifies these as "incidental," it doesn't think they count, but they do. No, it may not be watching every single thing that US citizens do, but US citizens' data are clearly captured and analyzed quite frequently.

That said, the second part of that statement is actually a tiny step forward, in that it's President Obama actually signalling -- for the first time -- that the program has been abused and that new rules are possible. Many people will complain that it's such a minor statement (and coming right after a flat out lie, not particularly trustworthy), but it is more or less a signal that the President is likely resolved to agree to changes in how the NSA operates. Now the fight will be over what kinds of changes. The administration will seek to minimize those changes, but just the admission that changes need to happen is at least a baby step in the right direction.

Filed Under: barack obama, checks and balances, lies, nsa, nsa surveillance, oversight, us persons

White House CIO Asked About NSA Data Collection, Explains How Metadata Can Reveal A Lot

from the time-to-get-some-press-training dept

Over the entire course of the Obama administration's terms in office, there's been something of a conflict. While there's been a ridiculous amount of secrecy -- from NSA spying scandals, to refusals to respond to FOIA requests -- at the same time, President Obama also set up a federal CTO and federal CIO position, each of which have had two occupants who seem very, very focused on increasing openness and transparency in government (and who really do seem sincere). Over the past few years, they've put together a variety of projects trying to help provide more open data as it relates to the government (though, it appears they've run into the expected frustrations of dealing with one of the largest, if not the largest, bureaucracies in the world).

But given the conflicting messages -- openness over here, extreme secrecy over there -- it was inevitable that someone would be asked a question about this. Fast Company has an interview with the current federal CIO, Steve Van Roekel, where he's asked about the NSA's surveillance and the "conflict" between openness and privacy. Van Roekel seems to go out of his way to not actually say anything about the NSA, while at the same time (we assume) inadvertently pointing out that tiny bits of metadata, when combined with other tiny bits of metadata can reveal a ton of information about someone -- something that defenders of the "just metadata" regime have been trying to pretend isn't true:

I think this notion of the U.S. government treating data as an asset that’s open to everyone is interesting. I’d be remiss if I didn’t mention what’s happening with the NSA controversy--it seems like you have to walk a fine line between being open while also protecting citizens’ privacy.

One of the important parts of formulating the digital strategy and open data policy was to be very clear to people on two fronts. One was that with government data, you need to have a process by which we are not releasing any data that is confidential, that violates any citizens’ or Americans’ privacy, or has any national security implications.

The second part is examining something called the mosaic effect. That means if I released some data independently, there is high likelihood that that data released doesn’t have any private or publicly identifiable information in it. But if I release that data along with another piece of data, and overlay those two sources, then I could garner some identifiable information. For example, if I have a report on geographically dispersed diseases in this relatively unpopulated state, like North Dakota, then release another piece of data that details who lives in certain census blocks, you could suddenly tell who has that disease. That’d break personally identifiable information guidelines. So we’ve asked agencies to set up governance and be very diligent on issues related to privacy, confidentiality, or national security.

How have the recent NSA leaks affected that strategy? Have you tweaked anything in your approach?

Our conversation today isn’t about the NSA, but I can say that our diligence hasn’t waned even before any of this related to protecting confidentiality. The mission here--the mission of government--is how do we best serve the American people, and make sure they are safe, secure, and getting benefits from the services the government provides. That requires a lot of good governance, good security, good cyber-security, and really smart thinking about how we release data--making sure we don’t release any personally identifiable information or anything that would lose the trust of the American citizen.

Note the bolded part of the first answer above. That's the very point that critics of the fact that the government has been collecting so much metadata have been pointing out -- but it's a point that the federal government, including Van Roekel's boss, have been actively denying for months. They keep insisting that "just metadata" doesn't violate anyone's privacy. Yet here is Van Roekel, who understands this stuff, straight up admitting what plenty of people have realized: metadata can reveal an awful lot, especially when you have a few different collections of metadata that you can overlay with one another.

Filed Under: cto, metadata, nsa surveillance, steve van roekel, white house

Lost An Email? Just Call The NSA!

from the backup-and-disaster-recovery-for-idiots dept

Throughout all the reporting on the NSA's massive surveillance programs, both international and domestic, you'll occasionally hear an increasingly common response: let's just all troll the hell out of them. The idea, of course, is that the NSA's collection of everything ever simply sets up a massive problem of extrapolating the number and size of haystacks in which they must find the terrorism needle. Anyone pissed off about how the American government is treating them via spying on their activities might suggest that they surreptitiously insert a bunch of likely flagged words into normal communications just to make things a bit tougher on the agency. And, despite the fact that these suggestions are usually made half-seriously, often accompanied by nervous laughter and a quick review of surroundings to ensure no black vans are present, the NSA has acknowledged the problem and has said it is prepared for the trolls. This is in response to entire websites devoted to online antics and shenanigans, all designed to make the job of the NSA just a tad bit more difficult.

But not all such antics need take place online, as evidenced by my new personal hero, a man in Holland who called the NSA to retrieve and an email he said he'd accidentally deleted. This is what brilliance looks like. The logic is as flawless as the hapless NSA receptionist is flummoxed. In case you can't see the embedded video, this wonderful man called the NSA's general number and claimed he accidentally deleted a Gmail email and that his local computer repair tech had suggested calling the federal agency, since they obviously have a copy. What follows is a lengthy conversation with a woman, who is likely just trying to do her job, that should probably be up for some kind of comedy award.

But take note, people: this doesn't work. While the NSA certainly may have your email, but they won't serve as your backup provider. Which is just as well, since that'd take a significant revenue stream away from me, personally. Thanks for not intruding everywhere, NSA.

Filed Under: backup, email, nsa, nsa surveillance, pranks

Feds Waged Hundreds Of Cyberattacks On Other Countries; Spent $25 Million Buying Vulnerabilities

from the we-are-the-cybersecurity-threat dept

It's pretty typical for companies and governments hoping to "bury" important bad news to release it late on a Friday evening, hoping to miss the news cycle. If you're extra lucky, that Friday happens to come right before a long weekend, such as Labor Day. But, for the life of me, I can't figure out why a major news publication, like the Washington Post would break a big story on a Friday night before Labor Day weekend, pretty much guaranteeing that it doesn't get very much attention at all. Very bizarre -- but we figured we'd try to bring this story to you guys on Tuesday, back after the week is underway so the story doesn't get lost. The details: as suspected, the US is actually one of the leading proponents of offensive cyberattacks. This isn't a huge surprise, since they've more or less admitted to having "broad powers" but there have been questions both about the rules of engagement and just how often the US uses these capabilities.

Wonder no more. The Washington Post's Barton Gellman has the story from the black budget, showing 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, a number that likely went up quite a bit in 2012 (and again in 2013). For all the hype about "cybersecurity" threats from abroad, it still looks like the biggest cybersecurity threat out there is our own government. And, yes, everyone already knows about Stuxnet, and it sounds like most of these offensive efforts aren't nearly as ambitious, but there's still a lot going on.

Separately, the story confirms earlier reports that the US government is a huge purchaser of exploits from various hackers, choosing to exploit them, rather than use them to help protect our systems. For 2013, the feds budgeted $25.1 million for the "additional covert purchases of software vulnerabilities." But, that's really on a fraction of the number of exploits. The report notes that most vulnerabilities the NSA uses actually are designed at home.

Also those few hundred attacks appear to downplay the capabilities of the NSA (and the CIA) should they want to do more, because it sounds like they've hacked into a variety of networks and have zombie machines at the ready:

By the end of this year, GENIE is projected to control at least 85,000 implants in strategically chosen machines around the world. That is quadruple the number — 21,252 — available in 2008, according to the U.S. intelligence budget.

The NSA appears to be planning a rapid expansion of those numbers, which were limited until recently by the need for human operators to take remote control of compromised machines. Even with a staff of 1,870 people, GENIE made full use of only 8,448 of the 68,975 machines with active implants in 2011.

For GENIE’s next phase, according to an authoritative reference document, the NSA has brought online an automated system, code-named TURBINE, that is capable of managing “potentially millions of implants” for intelligence gathering “and active attack.”

While the fact that the NSA is doing all of this isn't a huge surprise and merely confirms earlier reports, the actual scale of the operations is certainly quite eye-opening.

Filed Under: black budget, cyberattacks, ed snowden, genie, nsa, nsa surveillance, offensive attacks, stuxnet, surveillance

Former NSA Boss: Mass Surveillance Is Very Important, But Perhaps NSA Should Stop Lying About It

from the baby-steps dept

The Guardian has an interesting interview with former NSA boss Bobby Ray Inman, who argues in favor of broad NSA surveillance efforts, but does feel that perhaps the federal government should, you know, stop lying about it:

In an extensive interview, Inman, a legendary NSA director, strongly defended the agency's bulk surveillance of phone records and internet communications, and criticized members of Congress who want to restrict it as ignorant of the way the programs operate.

But he also warned that intelligence officials have an obligation to tell the truth about surveillance in their public statements.

Well, as they say: baby steps, right? Yes, let's start by telling the truth, and then perhaps we can have an honest and open debate about what's going on.

Of course, some of Inman's claims just come across as silly:

"I would urge that if you're going to do that, [you have to] look at privacy issues in the private sector, not just the government. I personally find it offensive that it's fine for X corporation to have everything on you but not the government to know. That's a basic don't-trust-your-government argument, which I think erodes democracy."

There are some pretty big differences. When you share information with a corporation, that's your choice, not the government's -- and it often involves an exchange of values. You provide some attention, information or data, and they give you information or something else of value in response. It's an exchange. A voluntary one. When the government swoops in and just collects all that data it's quite different.

Oh yeah, also, there's this: the companies don't have a police force and an army with guns, nor prisons in which to lock you up. The government does. That kind of makes a big difference.

As for "don't trust your government," well, it would be a hell of a lot easier if the government actually deserved our trust. Yes, it erodes democracy when we can't trust our government, but there's a reason we can't trust our government, and it's not because "X corporation" doesn't want to share its users' information with the government.

Inman also insists that Congress has the ability to understand what's going on with the NSA, totally ignoring the fact that House Intelligence Committee boss specifically has blocked access to information from those who requested it and, much worse, chose to withhold pertinent information from Congress prior to a vote on re-approving the FISA Amendments Act, despite the strong urging from the White House that the information be widely shared with elected officials. Inman pretends none of that happened:

Inman criticized legislative skeptics of the bulk surveillance – who came close in the House of Representatives in July to ending NSA's bulk collection of American phone records – as intentionally and self-servingly ignorant.

"The current process would allow the doubters within the government, those who are members of Congress, to know what's what. They don't want to spend the time," Inman said.

While Inman said he had "enormous admiration for Dianne Feinstein and Mike Rogers," the intelligence committee leaders in the Senate and House, both of whom strongly support the bulk surveillance, he said he had "no sympathy for any member of Congress who says they're uninformed or didn't understand.

He has no sympathy even when information was deliberately withheld from them? And when they did seek it out they were denied? Really?

All in all the interview is pretty weak, but at least he's willing to admit that lying to Congress is a mistake.

Filed Under: bobby ray inman, ed snowden, lying, nsa, nsa surveillance