Justice Department Admits It Lied To Appeals Court Concerning Companies' Ability To Talk About National Security Letters

from the because-the-truth-looks-bad dept

Back in October, we wrote about the appeal on the legality of National Security Letters (NSLs), which are secretive filings from law enforcement demanding information with a perpetual gag order. In 2013, a district court had declared that NSLs were unconstitutional, but stayed that decision pending appeal. While the appeals court judges seemed skeptical, it still wasn't clear how they would rule. So it's interesting to see that the Justice Department has just admitted that it misled the court on some rather important points during the oral arguments.

In particular, with regards to the First Amendment question, the DOJ had insisted that companies could discuss the "quality" of the NSLs it had received, explaining it this way:

There is a category that the deputy attorney general provided that recipients can make disclosures and there is a category of 0-249 so recipients can disclose that. They’re allowed to disclose within these bands. And they can fully participate in the public debate, they can say as we have disclosed we’re in that band 0-249 and it can say the very things that [EFF Senior Staff Attorney Kurt Opsahl] said they can’t. They can say and we think the government is asking for too much in many of the NSLs we received and we want to talk to our fellow recipients and see if they too have felt that there’s too much and we think Congress ought to do something about that. They can do all of that. There’s nothing that says that they can’t comment, they’re allowed to make specific comments about quantity, there’s absolutely no ban on them commenting on the quality of those they’ve received.

Except that's not true, and it was clearly not true at the time. The EFF asked the DOJ to explain this statement in light of other statements that completely contradicted that claim, and suddenly the DOJ realized that it had been lying to the court on a rather important point. So it has now retracted those comments, claiming they were an "inadvertent misstatement."

In the course of discussing disclosures described in this letter, approximately 49 minutes into the Court's recording of the argument, government counsel indicated that if a company discloses that it is in one of these two bands starting with zero, it could publicly discuss the fact that it had received one or more NSLs and could discuss the quality of the specific NSL(s) that it had received.

That suggestion was mistaken. The district court correctly noted that “the NSL nondisclosure provisions . . . apply, without distinction, to both the content of the NSLs and to the very fact of having received one." .... The fact that a company may disclose that it has received 0 - 249 national security processes or 0 - 999 NSLs in a given period does not, by itself, allow that company to disclose that it has actually received one or more NSLs; the lower end of these bands was set at 0, rather than 1, in order to avoid such disclosures.

That last point is pretty interesting and probably explains why the Apple warrant canary changed. It wasn't about NSLs, but Patriot Act Section 215 requests (bulk records requests), but those fall into the "national security processes" list. So, it certainly sounds like Apple may have "violated" that agreement by originally saying it had received none, and once alerted to this fact, adjusted its language.

But, that's kind of crazy, and reveals just how problematic this setup is. Basically, the DOJ seems to be arguing that even if you haven't received any such requests, you can't say so, because you can only say within the 0 to 249 category. Thus, the DOJ appears to believe that all companies are bound by a gag order that they never received. Now that creates a rather serious First Amendment issue...

Filed Under: 9th circuit, doj, first amendment, free speech, gag order, lies, national security letters, nsls
Companies: eff

When Can The FBI Use National Security Letters To Go After Journalists? Why, That's Classified!

from the because-of-course-it-is dept

Two weeks ago, the DOJ Inspector General released a report on the FBI's use of National Security Letters (NSLs)—the controversial (and unconstitutional) surveillance instruments used to gather personal information of Americans without any prior oversight from a judge. In a little-noticed passage buried in the report, the IG describes how NSLs have been used on journalists in the past, and indicates that the FBI can currently circumvent the Justice Department's media guidelines to do so in the future.

When and precisely how can they do so? Well, apparently that's classified.

First, some background: In July, after a torrent of criticism that the Justice Department (DOJ) was targeting reporters in the wake of the Associated Press and Fox News scandals, Attorney General Eric Holder issued new guidelines for DOJ that tightened the rules for when they could secretly obtain records from reporters. Notably, the guidelines excluded National Security Letters.

This is critical because past IG reports, as well as the new one, have harshly criticized the FBI for circumventing the old media guidelines and using NSLs to gain access to reporters' records on at least three occasions. Earlier this year Pulitzer Prize winner Barton Gellman revealed his telephone records had once been targeted by an NSL.

As the New York Times reported when the new guidelines were issued in July:

There is no change to how the F.B.I. may obtain reporters' calling records via "national security letters," which are exempt from the regular guidelines. A Justice spokesman said the device is "subject to an extensive oversight regime."

What is the "extensive oversight regime"? The IG report discusses it, but the FBI has brazenly redacted the whole thing. From page 178 of the new report:

The above passage is referencing the FBI's response to the IG's criticism of a leak investigation in which a journalist's telephone records were accessed with an NSL. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 refers to the media guidelines. Reading between the redactions, it seems that Attorney General approval may required in some classified circumstances but not in others. The FBI thinks those circumstances should be secret.

Worse, it seems the FBI has so far ignored another IG recommendation regarding the use of NSLs against reporters. From page 192 of the report:

Unfortunately, the redactions in this section make it nearly unintelligible, but it's clear from the reference to the DOJ's media guidelines in the second paragraph that they are writing about leak investigations and journalists.

It should be noted from the very first footnote of the 196-page report that the IG strongly objected to many of the redactions within the report, including both information that was made public in previous reports and information they "believe is important to the public's understanding of the FBI's compliance with NSL requirements."

And that's the crux of the issue: how can the public be expected to have confidence in a so-called "extensive oversight regime", without any transparency or inkling of what it is? All too often the government has expected us to trust that such authorities are not being abused, while their own investigations continually uncover problems with compliance.

Beyond the fact that the whole NSL statute was ruled unconstitutional last year (the ruling is on hold pending appeal), journalists—at the bare minimum—deserve to know when the FBI thinks it can secretly conduct surveillance on them without court approval. As the IG states, this has significant First Amendment implications and it's a travesty that the FBI continues to keep their policies for spying on the press a secret.

Reposted from Freedom of the Press Foundation

Filed Under: classified, doj, fbi, journalists, national security letters, nsls

FBI Drops Another Questionable NSL After Microsoft Challenges It In Court

from the fighting-back dept

Microsoft has announced that its challenge against a National Security Letter (NSL) has finally been unsealed after the FBI dropped the request. If you're not familiar with them, the NSL is a process by which the FBI can basically demand a company hand over just about anything, by claiming its a matter of national security. As we've discussed, National Security Letters -- which come with built in gag orders -- are very rarely challenged. Two years ago, we noted that despite 50,000 NSLs, many of them later determined to be abusive, there had been only four challenges and the FBI simply dropped the requests on two of them.

Since then, it seems clear that there has been an uptick in companies challenging though they're still hidden by the gag orders. Microsoft specifically challenged that gag order, leading the FBI to withdraw its letter. But, that also means that the FBI doesn't get in any trouble at all for abusing the NSL process and fishing for information. Already, one court has found those letters unconstitutional, but that decision has been stayed while it goes through the lengthy appeals process. In the meantime, the FBI gets to keep fishing. It's good to see Microsoft challenging them, but this story could just as easily be "FBI gets away with yet another fishing expedition."

Filed Under: challenge, doj, fbi, national security letter, nsl, nsls
Companies: microsoft

Government Forces Free Press Advocacy Group To File Its Amicus Brief In NSL Case Under Seal

from the now-they're-OUR-secrets dept

Throw the words "national security" around frequently enough and you might start to believe it actually means something. The EFF's battle against the government's use of National Security Letters (NSLs) is being fought mostly under seal (the EFF can't even reveal whom its clients are). To be sure, there is sensitive material being discussed, but the government's paranoia has extended so far as to seal documents written by entities with no access to classified or sensitive material. (h/t to Trevor Timm)

The Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press (RCFP) recently filed an amicus brief in this case on the EFF's behalf, arguing that the non-disclosure demands of NSLs are a form of prior restraint, something that is clearly unconstitutional. It also notes the chilling effect this has had on journalism.

The information at issue is not just important for its own sake, but because, as recent reports have shown, fear of government surveillance has deterred confidential sources from speaking to journalists about a wide range of topics. The brief emphasizes that more knowledge about the NSL program can give sources and reporters confidence that their communications are confidential.

The government's desire for secrecy extends even further than the NSLs' gag orders. This secrecy has now spilled over into what would normally be the public's domain.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s challenge involves three cases, all of which are under seal. The Reporters Committee was required to file its briefs under seal, but submitted a motion to the Ninth Circuit asking it to unseal its brief.

Whatever the government's stated reasons for requiring the brief to be filed under seal, it's clearly wrong.

“The Court cannot constitutionally seal this brief,” the Reporters Committee wrote in the motion. “Amici have had no access to confidential materials in the case; the brief only includes information that is already public; and there are clear public policy reasons for requiring that the materials be open.”

The government doesn't know when to quit. It's sealed brief requirement makes about as much sense as government agencies' initial reactions to the first few leaked NSA documents -- instructing their employees to not look at publicly-available information because the documents were supposedly still "classified." As if that designation made any sense under the circumstances.

This is the same sort of reasoning: NSLs are super-secret and therefore, anything related to these should be withheld from the public, even if the brief contains nothing more than publicly-available information.

Filed Under: amicus, classified, doj, nsls, secrecy
Companies: eff, rcfp

Feds Reach Settlement With Internet Companies Allowing Them To Report Not Nearly Enough Details On Surveillance Efforts

from the too-bad dept

It appears that the lawsuit that a bunch of big internet companies had filed against the NSA in an attempt to reveal just how often they get FISA court information requests and how many of their users are impacted is now over, as the government has reached a settlement with the companies, allowing them slightly more leeway in sharing information, but in a very limiting way.

Not too long ago, the government had started allowing companies to reveal, for the first time, how many national security letter (NSL) requests they get, but said they had to reveal that number in ranges of 1,000 starting with 0 to 999. However, they did not allow any such reporting on FISA Court (FISC) orders, which covered things like the now infamous PRISM program under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. It appears that the settlement more or less follows the outline of what the government allowed with NSLs. Companies are given two options. One is to basically report FISC requests like NSL requests, in bands of 1,000, and to similarly report "number of customer accounts affected" for NSLs, "FISA orders for content," "number of customer selectors targeted under FISA content orders," "FISA orders for non-content," and "number of customer selectors targeted under FISA non-content orders." All of those can be revealed separately, but always in bands of 1,000, starting with 0 to 999.

Alternatively, if companies are willing to lump these various programs together, they are allowed somewhat more granularity. So, if they lump together NSLs and FISA orders into a single number, they can reveal the details in bands of 250, starting with 0 to 249. Similarly, they can list the lumped together "customer selectors targeted" under combined NSLs and FISA orders in bands of 250.

This is a step forward, but it's not nearly far enough. As Kevin Bankston notes:

"Asking the public and policymakers to try to judge the appropriateness of the government’s surveillance practices based on a single, combined, rounded number is like asking a doctor to diagnose a patient’s shadow: only the grossest and most obvious problem, if even that, will be ever be evident."

Among the problems here, are that while they can reveal the number of customer accounts impacted for NSLs, that's not what they can do with FISC orders. Instead, they can only reveal "customer selectors targeted." That can be very different. You can imagine a "customer selector" that impacts many, many user accounts. And that's what many people are worried about -- and with this agreement, we won't actually know.

Furthermore, the agreement has a ridiculous clause that says if a FISA court order covers a "new capability" (i.e., getting access to a service that previously was not being tapped by the NSA/FBI), the companies cannot share that information for two years. The thinking here is rather obvious. Say, for example, a company launches a new voice communications service, like Skype -- and then gets hit with a FISA court order demanding that the NSA be able to listen in. The companies would be blocked from revealing that for two years. Clearly, the idea is to keep people from knowing how quickly the NSA is able to tap into any new form of communication, but that also opens up plenty of opportunities for the NSA to abuse its powers.

There is still some indication that Congress may require greater transparency here. I can understand why the tech companies agreed to settle, but it's a bit disappointing that they threw in the towel so quickly.

Apple has already updated its transparency report to note 0 - 249 "national security orders" and 0 - 249 "total accounts affected." Since they're doing ranges of 250, they're clearly lumping together both national security letters and FISC orders as "national security orders" though that's a bit confusing. Also, I don't think Apple is actually allowed to say "total accounts affected" from the terms of the agreement. When it comes to FISC orders, they can only list "customer selectors targeted," and saying "accounts affected" would suggest more information than the agreement appears to allow. Still, the obvious suggestion is that the government isn't requesting that much information directly from Apple, though other reports suggest it gets plenty of information, not directly via Apple, but by hacking their way into iOS devices....

Filed Under: doj, fisa orders, fisc, internet companies, national security letters, nsls, transparency, transparency report
Companies: apple, facebook, google, linkedin, microsoft, yahoo

Obama Plans Cosmetic Changes To NSA: Embraces 'The Spirit Of Reform' But Not The Substance

from the as-expected dept

The expectation all along was that the President's intelligence task force was likely to recommend cosmetic changes while leaving the worst abuses in place. And, in fact, many of us were quite surprised to see the panel's actual recommendations had more teeth than expected (though, certainly did not go nearly far enough). It was pretty quickly suggested that President Obama wouldn't support the most significant changes, and now that he's set to announce his plan on Friday, it's already leaked out that he's going to support very minimal reforms that leave the problematic spying programs of the NSA effectively in place as is.

Mr. Obama plans to increase limits on access to bulk telephone data, call for privacy safeguards for foreigners and propose the creation of a public advocate to represent privacy concerns at a secret intelligence court. But he will not endorse leaving bulk data in the custody of telecommunications firms, nor will he require court permission for all so-called national security letters seeking business records.

As the NY Times says, he's taking the political way out, making sure not to upset the surveillance hawks:

The emerging approach, described by current and former government officials who insisted on anonymity in advance of Mr. Obama’s widely anticipated speech, suggested a president trying to straddle a difficult line in hopes of placating foreign leaders and advocates of civil liberties without a backlash from national security agencies. The result seems to be a speech that leaves in place many current programs, but embraces the spirit of reform and keeps the door open to changes later.

Yeah, but embracing "the spirit of reform" is not actually doing any reform. It's a bullshit approach guaranteed not to win anyone's approval, which seems to be the way the president often operates. Say you're going to do something, then offer a weakly compromised version of the plan and pretend you've actually done something big. It's not leadership, it's "let's talk big, and do little."

As the NY Times says, this "largely codifies existing practices."

Basically, this whole charade simply dumps the whole thing back into Congress's hands to try to push through real reform -- meaning that rather than letting President Obama decide what to do, we need to get things like the USA Freedom Act passed as a starting point, followed by more significant surveillance freforms.

Filed Under: barack obama, national security letters, nsa, nsls, reform, section 215, surveillance

James Clapper Says Feds Will Start Releasing Some FISA And NSL Metadata, But Not The Kind That Matters

from the it's-just-metadata... dept

We were just mocking the government's position that it cannot reveal the "metadata" on the numbers of FISA orders (and the number of people impacted) when those same people insist that we shouldn't worry about many NSA surveillance programs since they're "just metadata." And, now, the Director of National Intelligence has said that it will begin releasing some metadata on some key programs that had been secret before:

Specifically, for each of the following categories of national security authorities, the IC will release the total number of orders issued during the prior twelve-month period, and the number of targets affected by these orders:

• FISA orders based on probable cause ( Titles I and III of FISA, and sections 703 and 704).
• Section 702 of FISA
• FISA Business Records (Title V of FISA).
• FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace ( Title IV of FISA)
• National Security Letters issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. &sec; 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. &sec;&sec; 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. &sec; 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. &sec; 2709.

Our ability to discuss these activities is limited by our need to protect intelligence sources and methods.

For what it's worth this is a step forward -- and something the government should have done ages ago, but perhaps not nearly as big as Clapper would like everyone to believe. Note that they only say they'll reveal the number of "targets" rather than people impacted. Given that each person "targeted" may lead to scooping up records on many, many others, this seems fairly weak. Remember, for a "target" they can scoop up all kinds of records, and then go three hops deep. So, one target could impact thousands or possibly hundreds of thousands (or even millions) of people. This is a baby step forward, but it still seems designed to mislead.

Filed Under: 702, fisa, fisa amendments act, intelligence community, james clapper, metadata, national security letters, nsls

Government's Redaction Fail Causes Exceptionally Grave Damage To Nation's Security

from the excellent-work,-except-for-that-one-thing dept

As we are all painfully aware, discussing even the most minute detail of the NSA's data harvesting programs will cause "exceptionally grave damage to national security." This is why the average citizen receives nothing but an overly-long mock apology from the agency instead of the documents they've requested -- even when requesting their own data from the NSA.

Tech companies that have been forced to comply with the NSA's requests are given the same strangulated song-and-dance. These companies feel their customers would be better served if they were informed how much of their data is going to the NSA and how often. But even discussing the collection efforts using aggregate data is considered to a threat to national security.

While the arguments seem completely ridiculous, the courts have sided with the government and prevented these companies from discussing demands for data. So much for the debate.

Fortunately for us, the government is imperfect. A recently released document posted by the Southern New York District Court is the model of redaction, blanking out every mention of the company's name (along with some entire paragraphs). Perfect... except for one sentence on page 8 of the filing.

On June 6, 2013, the public's already healthy interest in Google's receipt of, and response to, national security legal process skyrocketed.

Oh, dear.

I don't want to alarm anyone, but it appears our future will be filled with explosive devices, hijacked planes and compromised infrastructure, all thanks to this screwup. The "alerted" terrorists will be quickly shifting from Gmail and GPlus to lesser-known services like Hotlook (or whatever Microsoft's email service is called now) and Friendster. If you don't believe me, just ask the people entrusted with securing this nation of ours.

In a June 5 letter to the court, the government argues that divulging the company’s name “would alert current and potential adversaries and targets,” possibly leading them to “change tactics and stop using the provider’s services altogether.”

That's only one small part of the problem. The other problem with allowing an almost-unnamed tech company to discuss its dealings with surveillance agencies is the age-old "no exceptions" policy, one usually deployed at refund desks: "If I make an exception for you, then everyone is going to want the same thing."

The government also argues that, if the court were to allow the company to acknowledge receipt of the national security letters, it would set a bad precedent and lead to many other companies being allowed to discuss NSLs.

The government is Wal-Mart, unsurprisingly.

Despite the fact that the company referred to is clearly "Google," no one at Google is allowed to discuss this document or anything else along these lines, something Google's legal teams points out is absurd in this very filing.

Since June 6, nearly every major Western publication has run stories (most of them inaccurate) regarding [a certain search giant's] receipt of and compliance with national security process. Whereas the government's request to redact [online behemoth's] identity may have made sense on June 5, maintaining the redaction now serves only to protect a secret that everyone already knows.

Not only is the company formerly known as [redacted] not discussing this inadvertent bit of transparency, but neither is the FBI or the court where it was filed. Only the firm's lawyer of record has broken the silence, and that only to "neither confirm nor deny" the veracity of the document.

If we've learned nothing else from this experience, it's that the world is a slightly less safer place than it was last Friday before this document was made public -- especially for whoever handled the redaction process.

Filed Under: doj, national security, national security letters, nsls, redactions
Companies: google

Court Orders Google To Comply With National Security Letters, But Suggests It Might Want To Ask Again

from the mother-may-i dept

You may recall that back in April it was revealed that Google was fighting back against complying with a series of National Security Letters (NSLs), the notorious tool of law enforcement to snoop on people secretly, which has been abused widely. Google's decision to push back on these NSLs came following a ruling by the same judge, Susan Illston, who had ruled NSLs unconstitutional. Given that ruling, it appeared that Google hoped to get the judge to say that it didn't need to comply with 19 NSLs it had received.

Instead, Judge Illston has told Google it must comply -- following secret affidavits from FBI officials. However, it appears that Judge Illston may think that Google just asked in the wrong way, and might be more willing to kill the NSLs if Google presented more specifics about the NSLs in question, rather than asking to broadly ignore NSLs in general:

It wasn't a complete win for the Justice Department, however: Illston all but invited Google to try again, stressing that the company has only raised broad arguments, not ones "specific to the 19 NSLs at issue." She also reserved judgment on two of the 19 NSLs, saying she wanted the government to "provide further information" prior to making a decision.

Given that, I would imagine this is nowhere near over.

Filed Under: compliance, constitutional, doj, fbi, national security letters, nsls, privacy
Companies: google

DOJ's History Of Ignoring The Rules When Getting Phone Records Of Journalists

from the not-the-first-time dept

There was, of course, plenty of talk about the DOJ getting two months of phone records concerning calls involving some reporters. Since the original story came out, reporters have quickly deduced what the government was after: they were trying to figure out who leaked information about the CIA stopping a plane bombing plot, because the "would be bomber" was actually working for the US, and revealing the news apparently ended the work early. The DOJ going batshit insane over a leak to the press is, unfortunately, par for the course for the Obama administration, which has been ridiculously aggressive (to an unprecedented level) in going after anyone who leaks to the press.

And while some are still trying to argue that this is a non-story, what may be more important is pointing out what a complete bullshit response the DOJ gave to this whole thing:

Despite the seizure of the phone records, a Justice Department spokesman said the agency valued freedom of the press and was “always careful and deliberative in seeking to strike the right balance between the public interest in the free flow of information and the public interest in the fair and effective administration of our criminal laws.”

The "right balance"? Well, let's take a look about how "always careful and deliberative" the DOJ is on these kinds of things. Julian Sanchez helpfully points us to the infamous 2010 report from the DOJ's Inspector General detailing how the FBI regularly abused "exigent letters" (pdf) -- better known as National Security Letters or NSLs -- to get phone records. This report got plenty of attention at the time, but if you don't recall all 300 pages of it, there's a discussion about getting info from reporters' call logs starting on page 89 (of the official pagination, which falls on page 102 of the pdf) detailing heavily redacted examples of getting reporters' phone records without getting the proper authorization or approvals. What is striking is the extremely cavalier attitude law enforcement seems to have about this. Here is just one example of the DOJ's "always careful and deliberative process" when "seeking to strike the right balance" in getting access to reporters' phone records. This case was an investigation into a leak that appeared in articles in the NY Times and the Washington Post. The full story is much longer, but here are the key points:

On November 5, [redacted], the case agent sent an e-mail asking another Special Agent in the [redacted] Field Office to inquire, in the other agent's capacity as his squad's liaison to the CAU, whether the on-site communications service providers could obtain telephone toll records of U.S. persons making [redacted] calls [redacted]. The case agent's November 5 e-mail listed 12 [redacted] telephone numbers, 8 of which were identified in the e-mail as belonging to Washington Post reporters [redacted] and Washington Post researcher [redacted] and New York Times reporters [redacted] The email identified a 7-month period -- a few months before and a few months after the published articles -- as the time period of interest for the leak investigation.

[....] However, in absence of any request from the case agent or anyone in the FBI, the CAU SSA issued an exigent letter dated December 17, [redacted], to Company A for telephone records of the reporters and others listed in the case agent's November 5, [redacted], e-mail. We determined that the SSA did this without further discussion with the case agent or the Special Agent who had asked only whether such records could be obtained through on-site providers, not that the records should be obtained.

The CAU SSA's exigent letter sought records on nine telephone numbers, seven of which were identified in the e-mail exchanges described above as belonging to Washington Post and New York Times reporters or their news organizations' bureaus in [redacted].....

The exigent letter did not specify the 7-month interval noted in the case agent's November 5 e-mail, or contain any date restrictions. The exigent letter also stated that the request was made "due to exigent circumstances" and that "subpoenas requesting this information have been submitted to the U.S. Attorney's office who will process and serve them formally on [Company A] as expeditiously as possible." However, this statement was not accurate. A subpoena request had not been sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office at the time the exigent letter was served, or at any time thereafter.

That's the "always careful and deliberative process"? Hmm. Later in the report, they note that even when the agent only had asked about (and never actually sought) 7 months of records, thanks to the NSL, they got months and months of records, nearly none of which was actually in the 7 month period the agent was interested in. All total, they were sent 1,627 telephone call records, and only three calls were from that 7 month period. Oh, and once they got those records, they were uploaded into a database, where they were searchable by other FBI staff and other government personnel as well.

The report notes a few other examples of agents getting access to reporter phone information without the proper authorization as well.

Of course, once this came out the FBI and DOJ insisted that this was no big deal. But, in a coincidence of timing, just before this whole story broke, the FBI was in court, seeking to keep secret the memo that gave the "legal basis" for its past use of NSLs to access phone records. While the DOJ insists that it's not using these processes any more, it still thinks it should keep the legal basis for why it issued those letters a complete secret. They claim, ridiculously, that this would "chill deliberative discussions within the Executive Branch." But people aren't asking for deliberative discussions, just the very specific claimed legal basis for issuing such letters. And, of course, the DOJ would prefer not to say.

Given all of this, is it any wonder that people suspect the DOJ of being up to no good?

Filed Under: doj, eric holder, exigent letters, fbi, nsls, phone records, privacy, regulations, reporters, rules