New North American Trade Deal Keeps Useful (But Limited) Liability Protections, Dumps Bad Biologics Data Protection

from the not-bad dept

When the NAFTA replacement "USMCA" agreement was first announced last year, we noted that it included a mix of good and bad ideas. The key good idea was that the USMCA contained a bit of language establishing a requirement for strong intermediary liability protections, similar to (but not exactly the same as) Section 230's protections in the US. Among the really bad ideas was expanding the data protection term for biologics -- which, we've noted, is really dangerous for basic science and innovation for new drugs -- but was supported by big pharmaceuticals to increase their monopoly power and ability to extract monopoly rents.

So it seems like good news that the latest version of the agreement keeps the intermediary liability protections and drops the biologics piece, which has the big pharma companies screaming angrily.

The intermediary liability protections for tech also have lots of people complaining -- including from both parties, but it's all ridiculous. First of all, most of the people freaking out about this are the very same people who originally loved the idea of sneaking ideas like longer copyright terms and anti-circumvention provisions into trade deals, and are now mad that internet companies are realizing that other ideas, that are better for the internet and free speech, can be put into those deals as well.

Perhaps more importantly -- as you hear more people whining about the inclusion of intermediary liability protections in USMCA -- is that these protections aren't even that strong, and Canada is already talking about ways to put more liability on internet services, despite what it's about to agree to in the USMCA. In other words, while it's good to see this language in the agreement, which will, at the margins, help keep the internet more open for free speech, the actual impact of this provision may be limited by creative efforts to write around the agreement -- and now just becomes a stick for those pushing the whole "techlash" narrative to beat against a wall.

Filed Under: biologics, canada, free trade, intermediary liability, mexico, nafta, nancy pelosi, section 230, trade, us, usmca, ustr

EU Tells US: Ban Strong Encryption, And Privacy Shield Data Sharing Agreement Could Be At Risk

from the question-of-adequacy dept

As a recent post underlines, law enforcement agencies around the world are still trying to argue that things are "going dark", and that strong encryption is bad and should be made illegal. Techdirt and many others have pointed out what an extremely stupid idea this would be. Here's a further reason why the US shouldn't ban strong encryption: it might lead to the EU making data transfers across the Atlantic much harder. The possibility has emerged thanks to some formal questions to the European Commission (pdf) submitted by a Member of the European Parliament, Moritz Körner. They include the following:

According to the news website Politico, the US government is considering a ban on encryption.

1. Would the Commission consider a similar ban in the EU to be useful?

2. Would a ban on encryption in the USA render data transfers to the US illegal in light of the requirement of the EU GDPR for built-in data protection?

The answers from the European Commission have now been published (pdf). The first response is as follows:

Encryption is one of the means of protecting confidentiality as well as privacy and is widely recognised as an essential tool for security and trust in open networks. No ban on encryption is being considered.

That's good, but:

At the same time, the use of encryption should be without prejudice to the powers of competent authorities to protect important public interests in accordance with the procedures, conditions and safeguards set forth by law. In particular, access to communications data by national authorities may be justified in individual cases by the objective of preventing or investigating criminal offences, as long as such measures are necessary, proportionate and respect due process rights.

The boilerplate caveat doesn't say how the EU aims to provide lawful access to communications data when strong encryption is employed, and so doesn't really illuminate EU policy here. By contrast, the response to the second question about the impact a US ban on strong encryption might have does provide new information:

Should the U.S. enact new legislation in this area, the Commission will carefully assess its impact on the adequacy finding for the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, a framework which the Commission has found to provide a level of data protection that is essentially equivalent to the level of the protection in EU, thus allowing for the transfer of personal data from the EU to participating companies in the U.S. without any further restrictions.

Privacy Shield governs the flow of EU citizens' personal data to the US -- something of vital importance to US Internet companies, and many others. Because of the GDPR's requirements, that flow can only take place if the European Commission issues an "adequacy decision" -- essentially confirming that a country outside the EU offers a sufficient level of data protection. Without adequacy, US companies would be forced to take additional, more onerous measures to guarantee that EU personal data was protected to the level required by the GDPR.

The European Commission's reply indicates that adequacy could be at risk if the US were to ban strong encryption. That's surprising, because the Commission has generally tried to ignore criticisms -- from the European Parliament, for example -- about the level of data protection in the US. This may just be a little saber-rattling on the Commission's part. But it's a useful hint that a US ban would not just be bad for the Internet, but could also turn out to be bad for the US.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter, Diaspora, or Mastodon.

Filed Under: encryption, eu, privacy, privacy shield, us

Adobe Announces Plan To Essentially Steal Money From Venezuelans Because It 'Has To' Due To US Sanctions

from the closing-up-(photo)shop dept

Update: After this story was written, but before it got published, Adobe backtracked and agreed that it would, in fact, return the money. However, users are still out of luck going forward.

Adobe has long had a history of questionable behavior, when it comes to the rights of its customers, and how the public is informed on all things Adobe. With the constant hammering on the concept that software it sells is licensed rather than purchased, not to mention with the move to more SaaS and cloud-based software, the company is, frankly, one of the pack leaders in consumers not actually owning what they bought.

But what's happening in Venezuela is something completely different. Adobe will be disabling its services entirely in that country, announcing that it was giving customers there roughly a month to download any content stored in the cloud. After that, poof, no more official Adobe access in Venezuela. That includes access for SaaS services that were prepaid. For such prepaid services, Adobe has also announced that zero refunds will be provided.

Why is this happening? According to Adobe, it's to comply with Trump's Executive Order 13884.

In the document, Adobe explains: “The U.S. Government issued Executive Order 13884, the practical effect of which is to prohibit almost all transactions and services between U.S. companies, entities, and individuals in Venezuela. To remain compliant with this order, Adobe is deactivating all accounts in Venezuela.”

To make matters worse, customers won’t be able to receive refunds for any purchases or outstanding subscriptions, as Adobe says that the executive order calls for “the cessation of all activity with the entities including no sales, service, support, refunds, credits, etc.”

As the Verge post points out, if you're shrugging at the idea that the average Venezuelan citizen just got bilked out of money or software for which they paid, private citizens aren't the only ones who will be affected by this. NGOs and news outfits will likewise be impacted by the move and those are some of the organizations attempting to affect change in Venezuela.

If nothing else, this should highlight just how risky engaging in SaaS-style tech service has become. It's one thing to pay your money and not actually own what you've bought. It's quite another to pay that money, not own what you bought, and not get your money back when you don't even get that thing you don't own at all -- because of international politics.

Filed Under: cloud software, ownership, saas, sanctions, us, venezuela
Companies: adobe

No, The New Agreement To Share Data Between US And UK Law Enforcement Does Not Require Encryption Backdoors

from the sounds-messed-up-but-hardly-changes-anything dept

It's no secret many in the UK government want backdoored encryption. The UK wing of the Five Eyes surveillance conglomerate says the only thing that should be "absolute" is the government's access to communications. The long-gestating "Snooper's Charter" frequently contained language mandating "lawful access," the government's preferred nomenclature for encryption backdoors. And officials have, at various times, made unsupported statements about how no one really needs encryption, so maybe companies should just stop offering it.

What the UK government has in the works now won't mandate backdoors, but it appears to be a way to get its foot in the (back)door with the assistance of the US government. An agreement between the UK and the US -- possibly an offshoot of the Cloud Act -- would mandate the sharing of encrypted communications with UK law enforcement, as Bloomberg reports.

Social media platforms based in the U.S. including Facebook and WhatsApp will be forced to share users’ encrypted messages with British police under a new treaty between the two countries, according to a person familiar with the matter.

The accord, which is set to be signed by next month, will compel social media firms to share information to support investigations into individuals suspected of serious criminal offenses including terrorism and pedophilia, the person said.

The reporting here is borderline atrocious. The article insinuates that this agreement will force Facebook and WhatsApp to turn over decrypted communications or install a backdoor. It won't. The platforms may be compelled to turn over encrypted messages but all UK law enforcement will get is encrypted messages. The reporting here makes it appear as though social media platforms are being compelled to provide plaintext. They aren't.

Sharing information is fine. Social media companies have plenty of information. What they don't have is access to users' encrypted communications, at least in most cases. Signing an accord won't change that. There might be increased sharing of encrypted communications but it doesn't appear this agreement actually requires companies to decrypt communications or create backdoors.

Facebook has already issued a statement saying it opposes any plan that would require the creation of backdoors. It points out the Cloud Act does not mandate backdoors. While it does give the US government permission to engage in extraterritorial searches of US companies' data stores located overseas, it does not demand companies decrypt data or communications for it.

The other factor pointing in the direction of the UK law enforcement beneficiaries ending up with useless garbage is the Cloud Act itself. UK tech lawyer Graham Smith points out the Cloud Act requires agreements like these to be "encryption neutral," meaning neither side can mandate backdoors. Consequently, UK and US government agencies will get what they get when utilizing this new agreement. This means in some cases demands for data and communications will produce incomprehensible text, rather than anything useful.

That said, the UK government dream of encryption backdoors hasn't died. The Bloomberg article quotes UK Home Secretary Priti Patel, who has previously claimed encryption "empowers criminals." This is pretty much the same thing her predecessor, Amber Rudd, said. The less-than-implicit suggestion is that companies providing encrypted communications to users are siding with criminals, rather than the forces of law and order. Any perceived benefits of secure communications apparently pale in comparison to the government's "right" to access the content of communications.

This new accord likely won't (and probably can't) mandate backdoors -- no matter how the Bloomberg article skews it. But an international partnership created solely for the purpose of accessing communications and data applies a lot more pressure than parallel efforts from both sides of the pond.

Filed Under: cloud act, data sharing, encryption, law enforcement, priti patel, uk, us
Companies: bloomberg, whatsapp

US Court Says Fair Use Nullifies French Rightholder's Attempt To Extract $2.25 Million From A California Art Scholar

from the how's-all-that-litigating-going-for-you? dept

Almost twenty-three years after a US art editor was first sued by a French company for alleged copyright infringement, a US court has told the French rightholders going after him that copyright does not work that way… at least not here in the United States. (via Courthouse News)

Photos of Pablo Picasso's artwork were taken by one of his personal friends, Christian Zervos, over the course of four decades. The rights to these 16,000 photos were obtained by Yves Sicre de Fontbrune in 1979. Several of these photos were included in books created by American art editor Alan Wofsy. Wofsy made the mistake of trying to sell these books in Paris, which resulted in the rightsholder suing him in 1996.

That lawsuit was rejected, but the Paris Court of Appeals said otherwise in 2001. It concluded that copyright infringement had occurred and that Wofsy could be held liable for $1,700 per future infringement. More than a decade later, de Fontbrune went back to the court with new claims after finding a copy of one of Wofsy's book in a French bookstore. As the federal court notes in its recitation of the facts, this 2011 legal action was a bit sketchy.

Plaintiffs asserted that, in violation of the 2001 Judgment, Defendants had continued to publish The Picasso Project. Id. at 3. The summons and complaint for the Astreinte Proceeding stated that the purchased copy contained many hundreds of Plaintiffs’ photographs, and later that the “rights to [the photographs] are the property of [Plaintiffs].” Id. at 3-4. The summons and complaint also stated that the proceedings were “for the settlement of the non-compliance penalty” of the 2001 Judgment. Id. at 4. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs ever informed the [the French court] that they no longer owned the copyrights underlying the astreinte [civil penalty]. Dkt. 70-1 at 15 (Fact 30).

So, de Fontbrune was trying to backdate the infringement to collect fines linked to copyrights it no longer owned. In addition, Wofsy was not properly served with the lawsuit, resulting in de Fontbrune moving on unopposed. After being ordered to properly serve Wofsy, another attempt was made. Wofsy apparently received this notice, but did not show up to defend himself. With the proceedings being held in Paris and Wofsy residing in San Francisco, this no-show was perhaps to be expected.

Since Wofsy wasn't there to defend himself, the French court found in favor of de Fontbrune and the IP it no longer owned. In 2012, it awarded a $2.25 million judgment to the former rightsholders, concluding that Wofsy's publication of these photos violated the 2001 ruling by the Paris Court of Appeals.

After a long discussion of French court proceedings and whether or not this decision can even be reviewed by a US federal court, the California court comes to the conclusion that it can make a ruling on the enforceability of the order issued by the Paris Appeals Court 18 years ago. And that doesn't work out well for de Fontbrune. The enforceability of foreign judgments is subject to the Recognition Act, which says these must align themselves with US laws and policies to be enforceable.

In this case, the 2001 judgment fails. Here in the United States, fair use is a thing. Because of that, the California court [PDF] says Wofsy's use of some of the 16,000 photographs is protected, which means de Fontbrune can't collect $2.25 million for infringement that didn't actually occur -- at least not under US law.

[D]efendants contend that the purpose and character of their use of the photographs should qualify as fair use. While conceding that The Picasso Project is a commercial venture, Defendants point out that their books are reference works intended for libraries, academic institutions, art collectors and auction houses, and such institutions find it an attractive reference due to its price point. Dkt. No. 70-1 at 16, 19 (Facts 33, 42). The Picasso Project also includes information about the photographed works, such as their titles, literary references, provenance, current ownership and sales information, that is generally not included in the Zervos Catalogue. Dkt. No. 70-1 at 18 (Fact 39). Plaintiffs do not contest these facts. Id. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ copying has a commercial purpose, which weighs against fair use. However, the mere commercial nature of a work does not create a presumption against fair use; such a presumption “would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities are generally conducted for profit in this country.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (citation and quotations omitted). Because Plaintiffs do not dispute that The Picasso Project is intended for libraries, academic institutions, art collectors, and auction houses, it falls within the exemplary uses named in the preamble of § 107 of the Copyright Act.

The court also points out the two publications in dispute -- the 16,000-photo Zervos Catalogue and Wofsy's "The Picasso Project" -- are not competitive products. The reproduction of photos from the Zervos Catalogue does not replace the Catalogue, nor does it even come close to diminishing its market value.

Plaintiffs argue that they are competing products, but they provide no factual basis for this position. The Picasso Project can be purchased by individual volumes for about $150 per volume. Mot. Wofsy Decl. ¶ 38. When sold as a collection of all 28 volumes, it retails for either $2,780, $3,400, or $3,780. Id.; Reply Mooney Decl. (Dkt. No. 71-1) ¶ 3 & Attachment. By contrast, the original Zervos Catalogue is only available on the second-hand market, and a 2013 reprint is only available as a complete set of all of its volumes and sells for $20,000. Dkt. No. 70- 1 at 17 (Facts 36, 37). Plaintiffs do not dispute that The Picasso Project is intended for libraries, academic institutions, art collectors, and auction houses, whereas the Zervos Catalogue has a niche market due to its historic nature and high price. Dkt. No. 70-1 at 16, 18-19 (Facts 33, 41). Given their disparate markets and wildly different price points, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Zervos Catalogue and The Picasso Project compete.

Since three of the four factors weigh heavily in favor of Wofsy and his Picasso Project, the 2012 judgment de Fontbrune secured in France cannot be enforced in the United States.

[T]he court finds that the Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ photographs qualifies as fair use. The 2012 Judgment is, therefore at odds to the U.S. public policy promoting criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research. Defendants have carried their burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the 2012 Judgment is repugnant to U.S. public policy.

Having reached this conclusion, the court will not recognize the 2012 Judgment.

And away goes a $2.25 million judgment that may have been awarded to de Fontbrune for works it had already sold the rights to. Fair use prevails and de Fontbrune will have to figure out some other form of rent-seeking if it wants to continue profiting from photos someone else took.

Filed Under: alan wofsy, christian zervos, copyright, fair use, france, jurisdiction, pablo picasso, us, yves sicre de fontbrune

Sony, Microsoft, Nintendo Say Trump Tariffs Will Make Game Consoles Hugely More Expensive

from the Big-Old-Derp dept

If you hadn't noticed by now, Trump's efforts to use tariffs to somehow magically improve the country's standing in the world aren't based on much in the way of sound logic or economic theory. And companies who've been forced to reconfigure and relocate their entire supply chains (to countries like Taiwan) to avoid massive penalties are likely to just pass those costs on to American consumers, something said consumers haven't really fully grokked yet. Countless CEOs think the entire gambit is immeasurably stupid, but have been hesitant to be too pointed in their criticism for fear of upsetting administration regulators.

As the actual bill comes due however, consumers are likely to wake up from their slumber. Maybe.

Case in point: Microsoft, Sony, and Nintendo this week fired off a letter to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, warning the Trump administration's plan to bump Chinese tariffs from 10 to 25 percent will have a profoundly-negative impact on the game industry. With 96 percent of game consoles made in China last year, the act of reconfiguring their entire supply chains will have a massive impact on the sector's bottom line and the numerous connecting companies that tendril out from the big three gaming giants.

The letter itself is abundantly clear that it's not these companies that are going to eat these costs, but the American consumer. In fact, the full letter (pdf) leans heavily on data suggesting that the 25 percent hike on game consoles will result in US consumers paying $840 million more on the game hardware than they might have anyway:

"A price increase of 25% will likely put a new video game console out of reach for many American families who we expect to be in the market for a console this holiday season. For those purchases that do go forward despite tariffs, consumers would pay $840 million more than they otherwise would have, according to a recent study prepared for the Consumer Technology Association by the independent economic group, Trade Partnership. That study also noted that “[e]ven after accounting for new tariff revenue, the result is a net $350 million loss for the U.S. economy for each year the tariffs remain in effect, with the burden carried by U.S. consumers."

Hey, neat.

Presumably, Trump believes that these threats will ingeniously force China's hands in trade negotiations, though it's not really clear that's actually happening. What's happening instead is a slow accumulation of collateral damage, as countless US companies (like Apple) face new penalties that will slowly chip away at the US economy before it forces China's hand. It will be curious to see what happens when American consumers realize they're the ones footing the bill as we wait for the final outcome of a unilateral US trade gambit that was never likely to actually work.

Filed Under: china, donald trump, gaming consoles, playstation, tariffs, trade war, us, ustr, xbox
Companies: microsoft, nintendo, sony

Don't Shoot The Message Board: A Data Driven Look At The Impact Of Section 230 On Innovation And The Economy

from the these-things-matter dept

Read our new report on intermediary liability »

We've obviously been talking a lot about Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act over the past few years -- and it is often credited as being the most important law for the internet. Jeff Kosseff's recent book calls it "the 26 words that created the internet," while David Post once declared that Section 230 probably "created a trillion dollars or so of value." We've talked a lot about how the real benefits of Section 230 are not to the internet companies themselves, but to the public's free speech rights, but over the last few years it's bugged me that there wasn't a better attempt to measure the actual economic impact of Section 230 and other intermediary liability regimes.

Today, in partnership with NetChoice, we're launching our new report: Don't Shoot the Message Board, that attempts to explore what the data shows concerning the economic benefits of Section 230. We chose the name because it's perfectly fitting. Section 230 was, literally, written and pushed by (then) Reps. Chris Cox and Ron Wyden in response to the awful ruling in the Stratton Oakmont case, which suggested that any company hosting a message board could be found liable for any of the content on that message board. Similarly, the common phrase is "don't shoot the messenger," which is very much about not blaming the party merely delivering the message, as opposed to creating or causing the message. Putting liability on intermediaries is very much about blaming the messenger for actions of someone else.

To provide some actual data for this debate, the report first compares a few different intermediary liability regimes to see what we can parse out. It starts with looking at the US vs. the EU. In the US, we have CDA 230 for most platforms, and DMCA 512 for copyright-related platforms. In the EU, they have the E-Commerce Directive (and soon they'll have the implementations of the Copyright Directive, but this report looks at the state of things before that). In many ways the intermediary liability in the E-Commerce Directive is much more similar to the DMCA in the US than CDA 230. Using a variety of datasets and comparison points, we found that CDA 230 appears to have resulted in significantly higher investment in US internet companies who rely on CDA 230. Our data suggests CDA 230 alone is probably responsible for two to three times more investment in the US than the EU. It also drove much higher levels of investment as companies in our sample were five times as likely to raise over $10 million in the US and nearly ten times as likely to raise over $100 million than their counterparts in the EU.

Tellingly, when comparing copyright-focused platforms, where the liability standards are similar (or, at least were similar, prior to the Copyright Directive), we found EU companies did much better compared to their American counterparts. In other words, it appears that different choices for liability regimes can have a major impact on the types of investment and how much is invested. One reason why many of the big music platforms may have come out of the EU, rather than the US, is that the US's decisions on intermediary liability no longer gave the US an advantage for those kinds of platforms. In short: the decision to offer fewer liability protections in the US drove those investment dollars elsewhere.

The paper also compares the DMCA and the CDA in the US alone, to see if there's a major difference in spurring investment -- and we found clear evidence that having these two different regimes resulted in much more investment focused on platforms that rely on CDA 230 (social media, communications platforms) as compared to content based platforms where the DMCA is of greater importance. There is obviously overlap, as many platforms rely on both laws, but when breaking out music companies vs. cloud computing, cloud storage, e-commerce and social media companies, we found over and over again that the latter received more investment, were more successful in the long run, more likely to have a successful exit and less likely to shut down. In other words, having the strong protections of CDA 230 seemed to help lead to more successful companies, and thus, more innovation.

To back up these findings, we looked at a variety of countries where a major change -- either from a key court ruling or changes in the law -- created a sudden shift in intermediary liability protections, and then did a before-and-after analysis of the impact on investment and startups in those markets. Once again, the findings were more or less what we expected. When a country strengthened the protections for intermediaries, investment went up, the number of startups increased and there was greater innovation. When a country removed or weakened such protections, investment dropped. Noticeably.

I should note that there were some exceptions to this rule -- and that happened mostly where there wasn't an existing strong startup ecosystem (such as Argentina). There, when intermediary liability laws were strengthened, there was little evidence of a sudden influx of investment. So, that suggests that strong intermediary liability protections are important, but not the only important thing, in driving greater innovation and investment.

As we note in the paper, this is not meant to be the definitive look at these issues. There are many, many different factors and variables that play into the startup and innovation ecosystems. However, there was so little data on the direct impact of things like Section 230 that we thought it would be helpful in furthering the debate to at least have some data-driven research into the impact.

At a time when politicians around the globe are suddenly increasingly interested in weakening intermediary liability protections, they should at least consider what that might do to investment, innovation and jobs. Our new report suggests weakening such protections may very well be "shooting the message board."

Filed Under: cda 230, data, dmca 512, don't shoot the message board, e-commerce directive, eu, innovation, intermediary liability, investment, section 230, studies, us

UK, American Breweries Show How The Craft Beer Industry Should Be Handling Trademark Issues

from the how-it's-done dept

Any brief review of the posts we've done here on the craft beer industry's recent heel-turn on all things trademark would give you the impression that there are few good guys any longer and all potential trademark disputes become disputes dialed to eleven in every case. The industry, which has exploded in last twenty years or so, initially developed a tradition for cooperation and congeniality. This was largely to do with the craft industry being heavy on very small startup breweries coupled with the tradition for creative names of brews and artistically inspired label designs. The end result was breweries that quite often swept aside what would be trademark disputes in other industries in favor of camaraderie.

That tradition has unfortunately largely disappeared over the past decade. In its place is what's become the steady corporatization of the craft beer industry, which has dragged expensive legal teams into the ranks. Those legal teams too often treat trademark concerns differently than the old guard did, opting for protectionism and aggression rather than cooperation.

But the old ways are not entirely gone, as demonstrated by UK and American brewery teams that chose instead to work with rather than against one another.

The Loose Cannon Brewery of Abingdon, UK has recently established trademark agreement with Heavy Seas Beer of Baltimore, Maryland as Heavy Seas moves towards selling their beers in the UK and Europe.

Heavy Seas’ flagship brand, Loose Cannon IPA, was potentially going to create confusion with the Loose Cannon Brewery. Happily, the Trademark ownership and use issue has now been fully resolved with Loose Cannon taking over the ownership of the UK trade mark and subsequently granting a license for use to Heavy Seas Beer in the UK. Heavy Seas has granted a mirror license to the Loose Cannon Brewery for the use of the Trademark in the EU.

It's sad how unique this sort of thing has become. Two breweries, between which there was a sensible concern about confusion over trademark rights and branding names, opted to cross-license to one another so that each entity's products could be sold in each market. In addition to demonstrating a congenial approach, it also strikes me that a move like this demonstrates the confidence each brewery has in its own products. This kind of permissive attitude towards what is ostensibly going to be some level of competition only happens when each side is confident that its own fans' love of each beer will keep any real confusion at bay.

Not satisfied with just being cool about all of this, however, the two breweries went a step further to solidify the positive relationship by collaborating on brews as well.

To mark what has been a successful outcome, the two brewers will produce a collaboration brew in 2019 at the Loose Cannon Brewery in Abingdon to introduce Heavy Seas beers to the UK market.

But this needs to be more than a mere feel-good story. It should serve as a template for other craft breweries as to how to interact and resolve potential trademark issues between peers. The craft industry is simply better for outcomes such as these.

And that should be good for everyone.

Filed Under: cooperation, craft beer, eu, licensing, loose cannon, trademark, uk, us
Companies: heavy seas beer, loose cannon brewery

Google Joins The Evidence-Optional Assault On Huawei

from the intercontinental-blackballing dept

So we've noted several times now how the US efforts to blacklist Huawei from global telecom markets haven't much in the way of, oh, supporting evidence. The Trump administration and FCC have taken all manner of actions to try and blackball the company, from pressuring U.S. carriers to drop plans to sell Huawei phones to the FCC's decision to ban companies from using Huawei gear if they want to receive federal subsidies.

The underlying justification for these moves has centered on the idea that Huawei operates as a surveillance extension of the Chinese government, something that still hasn't been proven despite a decade's worth of claims to this effect, and an eighteen month investigation by the White House.

That's not to say the Chinese government is an innocent little daisy. Nor is it meant to suggest that it's impossible that Huawei spies on Americans. But the lack of any actual public evidence of spying remains troubling all the same, given that if the shoe were on the other foot, there'd be no shortage of face-fanning consternation on the part of American politicians and industry.

Enter Google, which this week decided that it'd be joining the evidence-optional festivities by announcing it would be severing Huawei's Android license. The move forces Huawei to rely on the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), cutting it off from critical Google apps and services. The move, as Reuters notes, could prove devastating for one of the nation's biggest smartphone manufacturers:

"The suspension could hobble Huawei’s smartphone business outside China as the tech giant will immediately lose access to updates to Google’s Android operating system. Future versions of Huawei smartphones that run on Android will also lose access to popular services, including the Google Play Store and Gmail and YouTube apps."

As some were quick to note, the move may actually prove to be counterproductive, given the negative impact it could have on deploying timely security updates:

For its part, Google stated it was simply complying with the US Commerce Department’s decision to place Huawei on the “Entity List," a move that was justified as essential to ensuring network security. But the company largely ignored any criticism that such a move might actually undermine end-user security. And in the press, it's almost bizarre how few reporters have noticed that public evidence of spying allegations is nonexistent:

It's perfectly fine if your gut tells you Huawei is a surveillance proxy for the Chinese government, but that's not the same as evidence. Also lost in this conversation is the fact that companies like Cisco have a long history of trying to gin up lawmaker hysteria on this subject for competitive advantage, or that this blackballing effort just mysteriously materialized at the same time US gear makers were worried about competing with cheaper Chinese gear as they rush to secure international fifth-generation (5G) network contracts.

Again, perhaps Huawei really is a spy and the last decade of similar hand-wringing is perfectly justified. But if that's the case, it shouldn't be hard to provide some public evidence supporting that allegation. And while some of the concern about Huawei may very well be driven by legitimate national security concerns, another significant chunk of these efforts is pretty clearly driven by good old vanilla protectionism. To ensure US policy is being driven more by the former than the latter, it might be a good idea if the press stopped playing parrot and demanded a little more in the way of actual proof.

Filed Under: android, china, donald trump, entity list, protectionism, security, us, white house
Companies: google, huawei