How Attorney General Barr's War On Encryption Will Harm Our Military

from the stop-it-guys dept

We've highlighted in the past that there are large parts of the federal government that recognize that strong encryption is actually very, very important for national security, and that the framing by Attorney General William Barr, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and even President Trump -- that there need to be back doors to encryption for "security" reasons -- is utter nonsense. The intelligence community has long recognized the importance of strong encryption. Even many people within the FBI think their bosses' position on this issue is bonkers. Late last year, we were pleasantly surprised to see the Defense Department step up as well, with a letter to Congress talking about just how important encryption is for national security.

Over at Cyberscoop, former National Security Council cybersecurity expert Ari Schwartz has a nice article explaining just how important encryption is to protecting the military. It won't tread any new ground for anyone who understands the basics here, but it's nice to see more and more people highlighting this.

Last month, a brigade of U.S. soldiers deployed to the Middle East received instructions from their superiors to use two commercial encrypted messaging applications, Signal and Wickr, on their government issued cell phones. These leadership cues trickled down from the Department of Defense’s (DoD) position that strong encryption is critical to national security. While U.S. Attorney General William Barr continues to push for a broad mandate for backdoors for law enforcement, those on the front lines of protecting America have notably decided on a different approach. Simply put, weakening encryption means putting our military service members at risk.

The key point -- and one that many of us have made for years is that the framing by Wray/Barr (and, for what it's worth, James Comey before them) is that there's some sort of conflict here between "security" and "privacy." But that's always been bullshit. The issue has always been between having both security and privacy vs. giving law enforcement easier access to data and information they can almost always get elsewhere with a little more effort. In short, it's a debate between having security and privacy widely available against a bit of convenience for law enforcement. As such, this should be no debate at all.

Let’s stop wasting time suggesting that we need universal solutions that may solve law enforcement’s short-term needs, but then put consumers and our military at risk.

Somehow, I don't think the time wasting is going to go away any time soon, unfortunately.

Filed Under: dod, doj, encryption, going dark, military, national security, william barr

Is William Barr's Latest Attack On Section 230 Simply An Effort To Harm Tech Companies For Blocking His Desire To Kill Encryption?

from the this-makes-no-sense dept

Last month, we noted that Attorney General William Barr was making a bizarre attack on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, claiming that the DOJ was "studying Section 230 and its scope" and arguing -- without evidence -- that 230 might be contributing to "unlawful behavior" online. As we noted at the time, Section 230 explicitly exempts federal criminal charges from what it applies to, meaning that it literally cannot interfere with any DOJ prosecution. So it's truly bizarre to see the DOJ concerned about the issue.

But Barr has continued to push forward with this anti-230 kick, and is going to host a "workshop" about 230 in a few weeks.

The U.S. Justice Department is hosting a workshop next month seeking “a wide diversity of viewpoints” on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, the federal statute that, with few exceptions, protections major internet companies and private website owners from liability when it comes to the posts and comments generated by users.

While the DOJ claims that this workshop will have that "diversity of viewpoints," as we've seen in other contexts with the DOJ, that this is rarely the actual case. It may offer up a sacrificial lamb in support of 230, but it is likely to stack the deck against 230. This is the same thing that the DOJ has done, repeatedly, with regard to the encryption debate and questions around "going dark." Indeed, we've noted before the similarities between the government's efforts to attack encryption and the playbook that was used to attack Section 230 in 2018. In fact, we've heard that the very same former Hollywood lobbyist is a key player in both efforts.

Given the similarities in the playbook, and the fact that the DOJ is not hindered at all by 230, it makes you wonder if Barr and the DOJ are playing this anti-230 card simply as a method of punishing the internet industry for opposing his desire to gut encryption? The whole thing seems to be little more than an abuse of DOJ power to intimidate and threaten an entire industry for daring to support online security and free speech online against a government which would prefer neither thing be enabled.

Filed Under: cda 230, doj, encryption, section 230, william barr

Attorney General Barr's Anti-Encryption Efforts Aren't Supported By Many FBI Officials

from the going-to-war-with-the-one-many-army-you-have dept

When Attorney General William Barr speaks, he represents the DOJ and all the agencies it oversees. The problem is that Bill Barr's recent anti-encryption agitating doesn't reflect the views of the people he oversees. While Barr is trying to turn the public against Apple by suggesting it protects terrorists and murderers, FBI employees are worried his words and actions will harm them more than help them.

The Wall Street Journal spoke to people in the FBI and DOJ who aren't convinced Barr's doing the right thing by taking a hardline stance on encryption. [Non-paywalled version here.]

Some senior FBI officials say privately they are worried that Mr. Barr’s sharp tone could undermine relationships with technology companies they have worked hard to develop, people familiar with the matter said.

The bureau relies on close partnerships with tech firms in a range of investigations, with companies complying with legal requests for data and troubleshooting technical obstacles that agents may struggle with, current and former officials said.

Pushing Apple is unproductive. It damages relationships while gaining absolutely nothing for the DOJ and FBI. Apple has already given the FBI all the information it can pull from the Pensacola shooters' accounts. Breaking encryption simply isn't an option -- not when it leads directly to reduced security for the rest of Apple's customers.

Many in the FBI realize this. Barr just doesn't seem to care. If Barr continues to push his anti-encryption agenda, he not only risks reducing cooperation from tech companies but also the trust of the people who work for him. Barr says Apple's not doing enough to help investigations. Internally, the FBI disagrees.

Some FBI officials were stunned by Mr. Barr’s rebuke of Apple, the people familiar with the matter said, and believe the Pensacola case is the wrong one to press in the encryption fight, in part because they believed Apple had already provided ample assistance to the probe.

Barr's ultimate goal may be another courtroom showdown. Others in the FBI would prefer precedent to outside help from phone-cracking companies. Barr has aligned himself with those officials. But the ones pushing for precedent seem unaware of how much collateral damage the FBI itself might suffer if things don't work out the way Barr wants them to.

[Former DHS Secretary Michael] Chertoff said a court ruling against the Justice Department could limit access to widely available forensic tools that allow investigators to get into phones in some situations, for instance. “It’s not clear to me why this fight is advantageous to anybody,” he said.

Barr and those like them so firmly believe they're in the right, they're seemingly incapable of considering the negative consequences of their actions. Precedent that safeguards people's phones against encryption-breaking efforts works against the government, restricting its access to outside assistance. But even if the FBI gets the precedent it wants, the nation as a whole will be less secure because encryption will be compromised severely and permanently. Barr and his anti-encryption buddies are willing to sacrifice everyone else's security for their own ends. That's not just selfish. It's also dangerous.

Filed Under: doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, william barr
Companies: apple

The FBI Can Get Into The Latest IPhones, So Why Is It Asking Apple To Break Encryption On Older Models?

from the reminder:-the-FBI-still-hasn't-updated-its-locked-device-count dept

The FBI has asked Apple to break the encryption on devices owned by the Pensacola Naval Base shooter. It hasn't made this request officially -- there's no court order being sought to compel Apple's assistance -- but it's asking nonetheless.

Attorney General Bill Barr put a little more muscle behind the FBI's informal request. His statement insinuated that Apple was making the country less safe by refusing to break encryption. He also stated that time was of the essence in cases like this and Apple's general unhelpfulness wasn't acceptable.

Apple fired back by again stating it would not break phone encryption for the US government. It also pointed out the FBI did not inform of it a second locked device until a month after the shooting. If the government was concerned about time slipping away, it did not act with alacrity during this latest investigation.

Donald Trump followed Bill Barr's lead, attacking Apple via Twitter with a particularly stupid tweet that suggests the president is still all about quid pro quo.

The administration is trying to turn public opinion against Apple. This will make it easier to push anti-encryption laws and policies. But the FBI doesn't seem to need Apple to break encryption for it. It has options it's apparently decided not to use in this case.

As we've noted earlier, a handful of tech companies offer devices that break or bypass encryption to pull data and communications from locked phones. Yes, it's still an arms race, with companies like Apple patching the flaws these tools exploit, but there's plenty of money to be made cracking open devices for government agencies.

The FBI isn't interested in these tools, except when it's convenient for the agency. Legal precedent compelling phone manufacturers to break encryption is infinitely more useful to the FBI. So, it chooses to ignore these options when it thinks it has a compelling case for encryption backdoors. That's what appears to be happening here.

Thomas Brewster of Forbes says the FBI has used third-party hacking tools to access the contents of Apple's latest iPhone.

Last year, FBI investigators in Ohio used a hacking device called a GrayKey to draw data from the latest Apple model, the iPhone 11 Pro Max. The phone belonged to Baris Ali Koch, who was accused of helping his convicted brother flee the country by providing him with his own ID documents and lying to the police.

If the FBI can get into the newest devices, why does it need Apple to break encryption on the shooters' phones, which are much older?

Given the models in the Pensacola shooting case are iPhones 5 and 7, it’s unclear why a GrayKey hasn’t proven useful in that investigation. Forbes has previously revealed a GrayKey brochure that showed it worked on older devices, too.

It's a question the DOJ probably doesn't want to answer. It will have to, though. Senator Ron Wyden has already asked the DOJ to explain its actions in this case.

The most obvious answer is this: this case pushes all the buttons the administration wants pressed. It involves the shooting of US military members by a foreigner. The San Bernardino shooting was pretty much the same thing: the shooting of government employees by foreigners. These are the only two cases where the FBI has gone public about its desire to force Apple to undermine its own encryption. For everything else, there are third-party hacking tools that actually give the FBI the evidence it wants without undermining the security of millions of iPhone users.

The FBI will only push for precedent when it thinks it has the public's support. It failed to read the room during the San Bernardino case. It hasn't gotten any better at gauging public opinion since then. Even with Barr and Trump going on the attack, the public's mood hasn't shifted. Compelled encryption-breaking makes everyone less secure, not just the targets of investigations. Trying to parlay dead people's phones into court precedent is not a good look for the agency. But the agency -- and the administration running it -- don't particularly care what the public wants or is best for it.

Filed Under: chris wray, doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, graykey, pensacola, technology, william barr

Dear Reuters: This Is NOT How You Report On Dishonest, Disingenuous Talking Points From US Officials Regarding Encryption

from the come-on-guys dept

Attorney General William Barr and his DOJ and FBI have really ramped up their bullshit campaign against the public being able to use encryption. President Trump himself weighed in himself with some ignorant statements, suggesting that Apple owes him some sort of quid pro quo, because his policies may have helped them on trade:

We are helping Apple all of the time on TRADE and so many other issues, and yet they refuse to unlock phones used by killers, drug dealers and other violent criminal elements. They will have to step up to the plate and help our great Country, NOW!

This is dumb and wrong for many, many reasons. First of all, no matter what the US government has done on an unrelated issue, that doesn't mean that Apple should do something on a totally different issue. Second, the issue is not Apple "refusing to unlock phones used by killers, drug dealers and other violent criminal elements." It's Apple offering encryption that protects all of us. It is not possible for Apple to "unlock" the phones of criminals without doing so for everyone else as well, putting everyone's information at tremendous risk. And, for very little benefit, seeing as there are multiple private companies who have figure out how to crack iPhone encryption and which the DOJ and other law enforcement agencies are already using.

Indeed, outside of the President and the DOJ, other parts of the federal government have come down against having Apple break encryption, including the intelligence community and the Defense Department who recently told Congress how important general purpose consumer encryption is in protecting national security.

But, because only the other side of the debate seems to get any attention, and because Trump toady's feel the need to kiss up to the President, now we have Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, also repeating nonsense about Apple and encryption:

“I understand the president’s view, and it is absolutely critical for our technology companies to cooperate with law enforcement,” Mnuchin told CNBC in an interview.

Mnuchin later told reporters at the White House that he had not discussed the issue with Apple and did not know the specifics at hand. “I know Apple has cooperated in the past on law enforcement issues, and I expect they would continue ... to cooperate.”

Damn straight he doesn't "understand the specifics at hand." Still, political grifters spewing nonsense is nothing new. What frustrates me is how Reuters framed this story. Its headline blared: "Mnuchin urges Apple, other technology companies to work with U.S. law enforcement"

That's really bad framing, because it suggests to basically everyone (totally incorrectly) that the issue here is that Apple and other tech companies are somehow not "working with U.S. law enforcement." Except they are. Where possible and where reasonable and allowed by law. The issue at play when it comes to encryption literally has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not tech companies should or should not "work with" law enforcement, but rather whether they should put all of our security at risk, in order to make it marginally easier in a few limited cases for law enforcement to get into phones it probably already has access to through other means.

When framed that way, it's obviously dumb. But anyone reading Reuters' coverage of the issue won't get that. They'll think that Apple is somehow taking some sort of stand against US law enforcement. This is what Trump, Barr, and apparently Mnuchin, would like people to think, but it's not true, and it's fundamentally bad journalism for Reuters to frame it that way.

Filed Under: doj, donald trump, encryption, going dark, law enforcement, security, steve mnuchin, william barr
Companies: apple, reuters

Bill Barr: Apple Is Holding Up This Investigation. Apple: You Waited A Month To Tell Us You Needed More Help

from the STFU-and-GTFO-Bill dept

Last week, the DOJ's counsel sent a letter to Apple asking for its assistance cracking open two phones recovered from the shooter at the Pensacola Naval Air Base. Apple replied it had already provided assistance by giving the FBI everything it could recover from the shooter's Apple accounts. The company also made it clear it would not attempt to break the encryption on the phones.

This sounded like a warning shot from the DOJ -- one issued before the commencement of litigation. No formal request for assistance has been made in court yet, but the head of the DOJ has decided to apply additional pressure. Attorney General William Barr's view appears to be that if the FBI has a warrant, Apple has to let it come in. Otherwise, bad things will happen. He also accused Apple of not being helpful enough.

“This situation perfectly illustrates why it is critical that the public be able to get access to digital evidence,” Mr. Barr said, calling on technology companies to find a solution and complaining that Apple had provided no “substantive assistance.”

Going beyond that, Barr said lives are on the line and tech companies unwilling to punch holes in the encryption they use to protect their customers are just adding to the body count.

“We don’t want to get into a world where we have to spend months and even years exhausting efforts when lives are in the balance,” he said. “We should be able to get in when we have a warrant that establishes that criminal activity is underway.”

When time is of the essence, the FBI is only weeks away.

We responded to each request promptly, often within hours, sharing information with FBI offices in Jacksonville, Pensacola and New York. The queries resulted in many gigabytes of information that we turned over to investigators. In every instance, we responded with all of the information that we had.

The FBI only notified us on January 6th that they needed additional assistance — a month after the attack occurred. Only then did we learn about the existence of a second iPhone associated with the investigation and the FBI's inability to access either iPhone. It was not until January 8th that we received a subpoena for information related to the second iPhone, which we responded to within hours. Early outreach is critical to accessing information and finding additional options.

That's from Apple's statement on the matter, as reported by Scott Lucas for Buzzfeed. AG Barr is complaining about months and years, and it's the FBI that waited until a month after the shooting to even inform Apple there was a second iPhone involved.

It could be the DOJ knew Apple would reject its advances. It could also be the FBI was exploring other options during the last 30 days. Even if this is the case, it's completely disingenuous for Bill Barr to give the impression Apple has been uncooperative and is holding up this investigation. Apple helped immediately and turned over "many gigabytes" of data and communications to the FBI.

Just because the feds can't unlock the phones does not mean Apple isn't helping. It just won't do the one thing the FBI wants it to do: weaken a security measure that keeps millions of iPhone users, who've never committed a crime, safe. Apple's statement drives this point home.

We have always maintained there is no such thing as a backdoor just for the good guys. Backdoors can also be exploited by those who threaten our national security and the data security of our customers. Today, law enforcement has access to more data than ever before in history, so Americans do not have to choose between weakening encryption and solving investigations. We feel strongly encryption is vital to protecting our country and our users' data.

If Barr is serious about the safety and security of the nation he's sworn to protect, he'll leave encryption the fuck alone. But Barr isn't serious about this. He wants the DOJ to get what he wants, no matter how much collateral damage it causes. Sacrificing security for minimal gains in law enforcement efficiency is the name of the game. Unfortunately, it's a game we all lose if the DOJ gets its way.

Filed Under: doj, emergency, encryption, going dark, iphones, terrorism, william barr
Companies: apple

Attorney General William Barr Says Apple Isn't Doing Enough To Let The DOJ Check Out A Dead Man's Phones

from the give-it-a-rest,-Bill dept

The DOJ has asked somewhat politely for Apple to break the encryption on some iPhones. Last time, the request wasn't so polite. It involved a legal battle that only ended when a third-party cracked the San Bernardino's iPhone for the FBI. Nothing of interest was recovered from that phone.

Another shooting and another dead shooter has brought Apple and the DOJ together again. The DOJ's counsel sent a letter to Apple asking it to break into two phones recovered from the shooter. Apple stated it had already given the DOJ all the information it could recover without actually cracking the devices. This isn't good enough for the DOJ, which believes the possession of a warrant should trump any concerns about creating encryption backdoors.

There's been no demand made in court… yet. But Attorney General Bill Barr -- whose antipathy towards encryption has been stated multiple times -- is trying to apply a little more extrajudicial pressure.

Attorney General William P. Barr declared on Monday that a deadly shooting last month at a naval air station in Pensacola, Fla., was an act of terrorism, and he asked Apple in an unusually high-profile request to provide access to two phones used by the gunman.

[...]

“This situation perfectly illustrates why it is critical that the public be able to get access to digital evidence,” Mr. Barr said, calling on technology companies to find a solution and complaining that Apple had provided no “substantive assistance.”

It actually illustrates nothing of the sort. "Substantive evidence" is unlikely to be found on the shooter's phones. While the DOJ has pointed to evidence the shooter was "radicalized" on social media, it can only speculate about what evidence can be recovered from the phones, one of which partially destroyed by a deputy's bullet during the shootout with the gunman.

The DOJ's assertions undercut Bill Barr's claims that Apple has provided "no substantive assistance." Barr said that the evidence the DOJ already has shows the "shooter was motivated by jihadist ideology." This is based on social media messages and other content recovered by the DOJ, some of it likely from Apple itself.

There's not much of a case to be built against a dead man. And there's probably some value in mining contacts and text messages, but it's dubious to claim the evidence that might reside on the locked devices will be a game changer for the FBI or result in new leads that could prevent future shootings.

Nevertheless, the Attorney General insists Apple is preventing law enforcement from doing its job. According to Barr, a warrant is all anyone should need to see to start cracking open cellphones for the FBI.

Mr. Barr indicated that he is ready for a sharp fight. “We don’t want to get into a world where we have to spend months and even years exhausting efforts when lives are in the balance,” he said. “We should be able to get in when we have a warrant that establishes that criminal activity is underway.”

This is the leverage. Any tragedy with an iPhone in the mix is fodder for the DOJ's anti-encryption efforts. Third-party services can help the FBI achieve what Barr says it wants to achieve: speedy recovery of evidence from locked devices. But Barr and the agencies he represents only want outside help from the courts -- precedent that will make all cellphone users less safe in the name of securing the nation.

Filed Under: doj, encryption, fbi, going dark, iphones, terrorism, william barr
Companies: apple

DOJ Headed By William Barr Asked To Explain Warrantless Bulk Data Collection William Barr Authorized 27 Years Ago When He Was The Head Of The DOJ

from the DOJ's-timeline-has-become-a-flat-circle dept

More than a quarter-century ago, then-Attorney General William Barr gave the DEA something it shouldn't have had and something it certainly hadn't earned. The War on Drugs was a forever war and it demanded an expansion of the government's powers. AG Barr OK'ed it: the warrantless bulk collection of multiple third party records, including call records, banking information, and the tracking of purchases.

Twenty-seven years after the fact, the DOJ's Inspector General released its review of these programs, finding they had been crafted and deployed with no underlying legal basis. Some of these programs are defunct. Others have been codified into quasi-legitimacy by War on Terror-related government power expansions.

Twenty-seven years later, William Barr is Attorney General once again. And he's likely just as interested in expanding law enforcement surveillance programs (without worrying too much about how legal they are) as he was three decades ago. He has shown no love for the public nor their rights since he took office, making it crystal clear that neither the administration he works for nor the law enforcement agencies he oversees should be questioned by other branches of the government, much less the public they're supposed to be serving.

More questions are on the way, though. Senator Ron Wyden and Senator Pat Leahy want some answers from the DOJ about Barr's past legal misadventures and what he's doing now to address the findings of the long-delayed Inspector General's report.

“Mr. Barr’s authorization of this sweeping surveillance program without requiring, at minimum, an appropriate legal analysis, was not consistent with his oath to support and defend the Constitution and it likely amounted to professional misconduct,” Wyden and Leahy wrote. “Attorney General Barr knew, or should have known, that neither statutory law nor federal case law permitted the DEA to sweep up, in bulk, billions of records of Americans’ telephone communications. We write to ask that you open an investigation into the authorization of this recently-disclosed illegal, bulk surveillance program that collected billions of records of Americans’ telephone calls without conducting any legal analysis of the program.”

The program Barr authorized ran for more than 20 years, finally being mothballed in 2013 following the Snowden leak exposing the NSA's bulk phone records collection. The collection continued past that point, but was modified significantly, at least according to the DOJ's public statements. The Senators want specifics. Their letter [PDF] asks for details about the long-running program Barr summoned into existence for President Bush the First.

1. During the two decades in which the DEA operated Program A, did any telecommunications companies ever raise questions about its legality, refuse to comply with a DEA subpoena for bulk data, or seek judicial review?

2. According to the OIG report, the DEA transitioned in 2013 from collecting bulk records under Program A to requesting records about specific targets. What legal analysis, if any, did DOJ and DEA engage in before beginning this reconfigured surveillance program? If no legal analysis was conducted, why not?

3. Under target-specific data collection operations, DEA officials must now provide "reasonable articulable suspicion" that the target is involved in drug activity.

a. What safeguards are in place to ensure the target is actually involved in drug activity?

b. What constitutes involvement in drug activity?

c. If someone is targeted under this program, and it is later revealed there was no nexus to drug activity, what happens to the data that the DEA collected, and is the person ever notified that data about them was obtained by the government?

d. What actions will be taken to ensure this program will not be abused in a similar manner to the programs discussed in the OIG report?

The Senators also want to know what the DOJ is doing to prevent this sort of thing from happening again. They're also asking the DOJ if it's following through with the recommended overhaul of its parallel construction practices as well as the internal legal process authorizing new bulk records collection programs.

Considering Barr's running the place again, it seems unlikely answers are forthcoming, and -- if and when answers do eventually arrive -- they will be forthcoming. The new AG has made it clear the administration doesn't need to answer to anyone, not even other branches of the government that are supposed to ensure one branch doesn't grab too much power for itself.

The DOJ doesn't like talking about its screw-ups or its secrets or its ridiculous belief that Drug Wars are good and easy to win. AG Barr's position at the head of the department only buttresses these positions. I wish Wyden and Leahy all the luck in the world, but something tells me the clock will run out on this administration before the DOJ's willing to talk about a twenty-seven-year-old, potentially illegal surveillance program.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, bulk data collection, dea, doj, surveillance, warrantless surveillance, william barr

Attorney General To Law Enforcement Critics: Good Luck Getting A Cop When You Need One

from the pulling-the-veil-off-the-threats dept

Attorney General Barr to America: Fuck you, you ungrateful bastards. You're on your own.

Attorney General Bill Barr suggested in a speech Tuesday night that continued police protection for certain “communities” in the United States could ultimately depend on those communities showing more “respect and support” for law enforcement.

More specifically, vis-a-vis the general public being invited to go fuck itself:

“I think today, American people have to focus on something else, which is the sacrifice and the service that is given by our law enforcement officers,” Barr told the crowd. “And they have to start showing, more than they do, the respect and support that law enforcement deserves―and if communities don’t give that support and respect, they might find themselves without the police protection they need.”

There are a few ways to read the AG's comments. We're welcome to any one of them because neither the AG nor the DOJ has offered any clarifying comments on Barr's comments, which read like a veiled threat to communities that don't show the proper amount of respect.

The very most charitable way to read this statement by Barr still does no favors to cops. Elliot Hannon of Slate suggests it might link back to comments Bill Barr has made about America's least popular war.

A more benign interpretation of Barr’s comments is: If police are vilified, it is harder to get people to do police work, which, in turn, could make it difficult―or even impossible―to perform the vital functions of law enforcement anywhere. Hence, communities could end up with inadequate policing services. Barr’s reference during his speech―and in previous remarks―to how soldiers were treated returning home from the Vietnam War suggests this reading. “In the Vietnam era, our country learned a lesson. I remember that our brave troops who served in that conflict weren’t treated very well in many cases when they came home, and sometimes they bore the brunt of people who were opposed to the war,” he said. “The respect and gratitude owed to them was not given. And it took decades for the American people finally to realize that.”

Even if we are to assume this "benign" interpretation is more aligned with Barr's meaning than the less charitable (but possibly more accurate) interpretations we'll soon be delving into, this is Barr equating domestic law enforcement officers with soldiers returning from a war. It's an interpretation that buys into the self-delusion so common to law enforcement today. Rather than recognize they're public servants there to protect and serve the public, they've decided they're soldiers in a war zone surrounded by enemies. This should be an awkward position. Somehow it isn't. The people cops consider enemies are the same ones making sure their paychecks clear.

That's the most charitable reading: that cops are vets of the New Vietnam -- persecuted by the uncomprehending masses who churlishly refuse to be grateful for all the freedom secured by law enforcement blood.

Here are the more awful alternatives, in descending order of awfulness.

Option 1: Barr is suggesting cops will engage in "work slowdown" if they're not properly appreciated for the work they do. As community pressure to improve relations increases, cops will respond by doing less enforcement. If the line between regular cop business and the sort of shit that might result in discipline is no longer afforded the level of ambiguity cops have become accustomed to, they'll walk away from anything that might reflect badly on them should they choose to intervene in the manner they've become accustomed to.

This translation of Barr's remarks makes cops look like criminals of opportunity. (And they make Barr look like a union boss.) When the going gets tough, the self-appointed toughs get slacking. When public opinion and a lack of oversight favors applications of excessive force and routine rights violations, cops are willing to work. When they don't, cops won't.

The worst interpretation of Barr's comments is this: cops are a criminal organization running a protection racket. If citizens aren't willing to cough up enough respect, cops will no longer act as protectors. It's pretty close to the interpretation directly above this. The difference, though, is this: the relationship between cops and the people they're supposed to serve is not one of mutual respect. It's a one way street "guarded" by extortionists.

This may be what Barr is implying. It's not surprising he won't own up to it if it is. These comments were given to law enforcement members gathered to receive service awards. The choir got what it came for: an affirmation of their elevation above the people they serve, no matter which interpretation of Barr's comments you select.

This is dangerous stuff. This isn't just Barr big-upping his fellow cops. This is Barr telling cops they're more equal than the people who employ them. This is Barr saying cops are heroes even when so many are undeserving of this title. This is ugly and it's going to make what's already a problem even worse. Law enforcement officers have spent decades cultivating an "us vs. them" attitude that has nothing to do with cops and robbers, and everything to do with separating themselves further from anyone who could hold them accountable for their actions. Barr has affirmed their "rightness" and he's demonstrated he'll back the blue, no matter how much damage it does to the communities these officers serve.

Filed Under: doj, police, respect, william barr