DOJ Inspector General: ATF, FBI's Drones Worthless, Expensive And Completely Mismanaged

from the so-lousy-they-can't-even-violate-your-privacy dept

The DOJ's most infamous drone deployments involve justifications for extrajudicial killings. But its agencies also have fleets of (nonlethal) drones, something these agencies tend to avoid discussing until sued into doing so.

The Office of the Inspector General has taken another look at the drones deployed by DOJ agencies and found that, while plenty of money has been spent acquiring and maintaining drones/operators, very little deployment is actually occurring.

Our September 2013 interim report found that between 2004 and 2013, the FBI spent approximately $3 million to acquire small UAS it deployed to support its investigations. As of August 2014, the FBI had acquired 34 UAS vehicles and associated control stations, of which it considered 17 vehicles and a smaller number of control stations to be operational.

$3 million spent on drones, with only half currently considered "operational." In eight years (2006-2014), the drones have only been deployed to assist in 13 investigations, with nine of those occurring in the last four years. This may be good news for those concerned about extensive domestic surveillance, but it's not good news for those interested in how their tax dollars are being spent.

The FBI may have the desire for more unchecked surveillance and the drones needed to do the job, but it apparently lacks the manpower…

During the time of our review, the FBI maintained its UAS at one location in the United States and had only one team composed of two pilots on staff who were adequately trained to operate its UAS.

...or Fourth Amendment concerns…

The FBI told us that that it determined it did not need to obtain search warrants for any of its UAS operations.

That's the nice thing about making your own in-house "determinations": they'll rarely be challenged.

As for the half-functional 34-drone fleet "manned" by the FBI's two pilots, it couldn't be more unlike the agency's earlier assertions.

This approach differs from the decentralized deployment approach that FBI officials told us they employ for the FBI’s manned aircraft.

If you're wondering where more of your tax dollars are being misspent, it's right there in the following paragraphs. Because the FBI has only two drone pilots, these operators are driven or flown to locations where the drones are needed, sometimes arriving more than a day after the request for assistance was made. The FBI, despite being a national law enforcement agency, houses both its pilots and its drones at the same location.

Considering the FBI claims the drones have been used in potentially life-threatening situations (search-and-rescue efforts, suspected kidnappings), spending a day shipping drones and pilots where needed seems like the sort of thing that would result in unnecessary deaths/injuries. In response, the OIG has asked the FBI to handle its drone fleet less stupidly.

The ATF also has a few drones of its own. (The US Marshals Service and DEA were queried by the OIG, but both claimed to have no drones in their possession, which is true, but misleading. [More on that below.]) And, like the FBI, the drones are expensive, underutilized and, far too often, not worth the money that's been spent on them.

One UAS program manager told us ATF found that one of its smaller UAS models, which cost nearly $90,000, was too difficult to use reliably in operations. Furthermore, the TOB discovered that a gas-powered UAS model, which cost approximately $315,000 and was specified to fly for up to 2 hours, was never operable due to multiple technical defects.

The lack of functioning flying eyeballs resulted in the Special Operations Division shutting down the ATF's drone fleet in June 2014. Those drones were transferred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service "at no cost" -- a fair price for non-functioning drones. With its drones and drone program dead, the ATF did the logical thing: bought more drones.

Less than a week after ATF’s Special Operations Division suspended its UAS program, ATF’s National Response Team (NRT) purchased five small, commercially available UAS at a total cost of about $15,000.

These new drones were deployed exactly once. At that point, the ATF determined it would need to permission from the FAA before deploying its drones in the future. With that, the ATF's drone program returned to its briefly interrupted hibernation.

For those agencies claiming they have no drones (US Marshals Service, DEA), that's only true if limited to direct ownership. Every major DOJ agency has availed itself to the DHS's fleet of drones, a majority of which belong to the CBP.

Specifically, four DOJ law enforcement components – the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS – have received UAS support from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates a fleet of Predator-B UAS. In response to our request, the CBP provided to us evidence indicating it operated UAS at least 95 times on missions that involved DOJ components in some way. Of these flights, the CBP identified that DEA was involved in 73, the FBI in 13, ATF in 4, the USMS in 3, and 2 for multiple DOJ components.

So, when the DEA says it has no drones, it's technically correct. But the drones it doesn't own have flown more times than the 34 drones the FBI actually owns. The CBP's drone fleet seems to have enough drones for everyone, and this division of labor (so to speak) allows the DEA and other DOJ agencies to minimize their drone paper trails. But more drones doesn't mean useful drones. The CBP's drone fleet may perform well in other agencies' hands, but it's next to useless when deployed by Customs itself.

While the investigation generally points to limited drone usage -- which is a good thing -- the discovery that the DOJ's drone fleets are expensive, mismanaged and almost completely worthless isn't.

Filed Under: atf, doj, drones, fbi, inspector general

State Dept. Employees Only Retained .01 Percent Of Emails As FOIA-Able 'Official Records'

from the lol-'accountability' dept

With uncanny timeliness, the State Department's Office of the Inspector General has released a report on the State Department's email retention -- or lack thereof. Not covered in the report is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's email retention -- or lack thereof. High-ranking State Department officials use a different email system (when not using personal accounts) that isn't covered in this report.

Unfortunately, the lower-level officials and rank-and-file are abysmal at retaining emails subject to open records requests. In fact, they're so far under abysmal as to not even register on the Excellent-to-How-do-these-people-still-have-jobs? scale.

First, we have this:

A 2009 upgrade in the Department of State’s system facilitated the preservation of emails as official records.

Then we have this:

In 2011, employees created 61,156 record emails out of more than a billion emails sent.

Then… we have this:

Employees created 41,749 record emails in 2013.

Assuming around a billion emails for both the years quoted, State Department employees have managed to retain only .01% of emails created as FOIA-able "official records." Some of this is due to the lack of training or guidance on their responsibilities as public officials. But most of it is likely due to this, which is also related to the ongoing lack of training or guidance.

Some employees do not create record emails because they do not want to make the email available in searches or fear that this availability would inhibit debate about pending decisions.

"Inhibit debate." What a bunch of cowards. So scared of the American public that they shirk their responsibilities to the people who put roofs over their heads, gas in their cars and pension checks in their mailboxes. It's no surprise they haven't received the necessary training and guidance. Everyone from the Secretary of State on down suffers from the same fear of accountability. If they're not retaining records at the top level, those middle-managing aren't going to feel too compelled to make sure every employee takes care to retain emails as official records. "Lead by example," as the saying goes, and the example is… Hillary Clinton, etc.

The OIG discovered that, while every State Dept. office was pretty terrible about following retention rules, some were much worse than others.

The OIG team’s review of the Department’s records on record email use by missions and bureaus shows great variations (see Appendices C and D). For example, Embassy Singapore created 1,047 record emails in 2013; Embassy Islamabad created 121; and Embassy Beijing, only 47. Consulate General Lagos created 4,922 record emails, the most of any post in 2013.

The Department’s bureaus also vary widely in their use of record email. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs created 736 record emails in 2013; the Bureau of International Organizations, 311; the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 26; and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, only 22. IRM created 1,630 record emails, more than any other bureau in 2013.

Some bureaus increased usage when the OIG informed them that email retention could also work to their advantage. Not all paper trails are damning. Some are exculpatory. Certainly there are more of the former than the latter, hence the State Department's general reluctance to keep any more than .01% of its emails in any given year.

The OIG also noted that there is no centralized oversight of this system. Unsurprising, considering no one seems to want the job. Even when given a system that makes retention easy, the State Dept's staff -- from top to bottom -- has gone out of its way to avoid doing that very thing.

The OIG suggests further training, but that's not going to make much of a dent in the ingrained culture of secrecy common to many government agencies. It also suggests a handful of other bureaucratic fixes, many of which will likely be listed as "in the works" or "unstarted" when the next OIG report rolls around.

As for the report itself, it's quite possible this would never had been made public if not for recent events. It's marked "Sensitive but Unclassified" and carries this since-stricken warning in the opening pages.

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies of organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.

In other words, the secretive agency's internal report about its transparency-thwarting was supposed to remain a secret. The OIG blows the lid off the agency's willing failure to retain email records, and the State Department -- with the OIG's tacit approval -- elects to keep constituents from learning how its government is actively working to keep them separated from records they have every right to demand.

Filed Under: email, foia, inspector general, records, retain, state department, transparency

DOJ Inspector General Tells Congress That FBI Isn't Letting His Office Do Its Job... Again

from the Fight-Block-Impede dept

The FBI is still actively thwarting its oversight. Last fall, DOJ Inspector General Michael Horowitz informed the House Judiciary Committee that the FBI was routinely denying his office documents it needed to perform investigations. The withheld documents included everything from electronic surveillance information to organizational charts. Not only did the FBI refuse to hand over requested documents, but it also stonewalled OIG investigations for so long that "officials under review [had] retired or left the agencies before the report [was] complete."

Nearly six months later, the situation remains unchanged. Horowitz is again informing the House Judiciary Committee that the FBI is still less than interested in assisting his office. The same stonewalling tactics and withholding of information continues, preventing the IG from fully examining the DEA's use of administrative subpoenas.

The unfulfilled information request that causes the OIG to make this report was sent to the FBI on November 20,2014. Since that time, the FBI has made a partial production in this matter, and there have been multiple discussions between the OIG and the FBI about this request, resulting in the OIG setting a final deadline for production of all material of February 13,2015.

Both words in the phrase "final deadline" were quickly rendered meaningless by the FBI.

On February 12, 2015, the FBI informed the OIG that it would not be able to produce the remaining records by the deadline.

The FBI's fluid definition of "final deadline" apparently includes a shrugged "We don't really know when -- or if -- these documents will be produced."

The FBI gave an estimate of 1-2 weeks to complete the production but did not commit to do so by a date certain.

The FBI claims it still needs to review the requested document list to ensure nothing that's being asked for falls into its multitudinous exceptions -- like information related to grand juries, Title III electronic surveillance and, oddly, the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Horowitz's letter points out two things, the latter of which may prompt more immediate action than the first.

In the first place, the exceptions raised by the FBI do not apply to OIG investigations. Secondly, the (apparently continual) stonewalling of OIG investigations is, at best, a misuse of taxpayer funds.

Section 218 of the Appropriations Act does not permit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Justice to deny the OIG access to records in the custody of the Department unless in accordance with an express limitation of Section 6(a) of the IG Act. The IG Act, Section 6(a), does not expressly or otherwise limit the OIG's access to the categories of information the FBI maintains it must review before providing records to the OIG. For this reason, we are reporting this matter to the Appropriations Committees in conformity with Section 218.

We'll see if the the FBI suddenly becomes a bit more helpful now that Horowitz has made a move for its wallet. But once again, this sort of activity completely undermines the arguments of those defending these agencies by pointing to the "rigorous oversight" supposedly keeping domestic surveillance in check and abuses of power to a minimum.

Filed Under: congress, doj, fbi, inspector general

Redactions To Report On TSA's Internal Security Failures Prompts Angry Response From Inspector General

from the do-what-thou-wilt,-or-mostly-don't;-that-is-the-whole-of-the-policy dept

The DHS's Inspector General has finally released a report [pdf link] on the agency's control of TSA information systems at JFK International Airport. It's been delayed several times, mainly because of (now former) TSA head John Pistole's refusal to communicate with the Inspector General's office.

This report -- which has a release date of January 16, 2015 -- was actually completed on July 22, 2014. It was turned over to the TSA's CIO for a review, which should have been concluded within 30 days. The DHS Chief of Staff asked for additional time after failing to meet this deadline. The Inspector General granted another 30 days, making the new deadline September 17.

This revised due date came and went without a response from the TSA. On October 20th, the TSA finally produced its approved version of the IG's report, but not without several redactions of supposed SSI (Sensitive Security Information). The IG formally challenged the redactions in a November memo to John Pistole. Pistole never responded. Another memo was issued in December, which was also ignored by the TSA chief.

Finally, five months after its sensitive information review, the report was returned to the IG's office. All of the challenged redactions remained.

The IG's letter, which opens up the report, expresses his displeasure at the TSA's stalling tactics and secrecy.

I am disappointed in both the substance of the decision as well as its lack of timeliness. In 2006, Congress, concerned about delays in appeals of this nature, directed the Department to revise DHS Management Directive 11056.1 to require TSA to require timely SSI reviews. Given the clear requirement for timely SSI reviews in response to requests from the public, we hoped that TSA would approach an SSI appeal from the Inspector General with similar diligence, especially because TSA was aware of our deadlines.

Now, to meet our reporting requirement, we are compelled to publish a redacted report with SSI markings and will again ask the head of TSA to overrule the SSI program office's decision.

I believe that this report should be released in its entirety in the public domain. I challenged TSA's determination because this type of information has been disclosed in other reports without objection from TSA, and because the language marked SSI reveals generic, non-specific vulnerabilities that are common to virtually all systems and would not be detrimental to transportation security. My auditors, who are experts in computer security, have assured me that the redacted information would not compromise transportation security. Our ability to issue reports that are transparent, without unduly restricting information, is key to accomplishing our mission.

So, here we have a clear case of the TSA thwarting its own oversight in order to withhold information from the public. These are the sorts of things the TSA doesn't want you to see.




The TSA believes that exposing this information (such as the locations of its unsecured areas) will create a security risk, but it doesn't explain how that would be any different from the state the areas were in when the OIG inspected them. Unless JFK's TSA staff haven't taken any steps, the issues pointed out in the report like exposing the location of these areas (and, I don't know, CLOSING AND LOCKING DOORS), shouldn't matter.

As for redacting the number of vulnerabilities found in the TSA's servers, the only plausible explanation is that every number in those blacked-out charts is higher than agency feels comfortable disclosing. Whether the number is 2 or 9 really doesn't matter. (In one total column, it's obviously a two-digit number.) It only takes one hole to compromise a system.

While the TSA managed to withhold some information, much of what's left untouched isn't exactly flattering. The TSA's "security theater" apparently extends to its internal operations. We know the TSA generally "catches" terrorists by allowing airborne passengers do all the heavy lifting. This same "work ethic" applies to securing its own systems. From the looks of what the IG found, TSA agents at JFK apparently believe internal security is someone else's job and even the most basic of controls haven't been implemented.

At JFK, TSA did not have visitor logs in any of its communication rooms to document the entry and exit of visitors to these rooms that contain sensitive IT equipment.

[...]

Fire protection, detection, and suppression controls were not present in many TSA communication rooms. Specifically, 14 of the 21 rooms inspected that contained sensitive equipment did not have fire extinguishers…

Compounding the issue of fire detection and mitigation, only 7 of 21 the rooms inspected contained smoke detectors. Smoke detectors alert the appropriate personnel of a potential fire and possible hazard.

[...]

Several TSA communication closets located in the JFK terminals contained storage items and cleaning supplies. For example, we found TSA equipment on top of an unlocked TSA telecommunication cabinet surrounded by a ladder, boxes, trash, and cleaning supplies. The ladder, boxes, and cleaning supplies are all harmful to IT equipment. Additionally, there was no sign in sheet, and non-TSA personnel used the room for equipment storage.

TSA did not have an operable uninterruptible power supply (UPS) in three communication cabinets…

A sensitive equipment cabinet located in a public area was unlocked and left open to run an extension cord to a nearby electrical outlet for power.

The door to the secure Explosive Detection Systems room, where TSA reviews x-ray images of luggage to determine if suspicious checked luggage requires additional inspection, was propped open to vent a portable air conditioning unit, violating physical security controls.

The IG makes several recommendations, most of which can be boiled down to four words: FOLLOW EXISTING DHS POLICIES.

Since this report contains inspections of every other DHS agency with operations at the JFK airport, similar faults were found for both CBP (Customs and Border Protection) and ICE (Immigrations and Customs Enforcement). However, one agency managed to pass inspection: the Secret Service.

USSS fully complied with DHS operational, technical, and management operational policies for its telecommunication room at JFK. We audited IT security controls of the USSS telecommunication room located at the JFK on-site building number 75. This location had a DHS OneNet connection and a network switch device. The telecommunications room was clean and well maintained. Visitor’s logs were also maintained. Humidity and temperature sensor readings were within DHS policy guidelines. Since, the JFK location did not have an on-site server, vulnerability scans were not applicable.

Say what you will about its inability to secure the White House, but the Secret Service -- which oversees travel of dignitaries and government officials on over 800 flights per year -- has its JFK operations locked down tight.

What we have detailed here is another security agency making an effort to thwart its oversight. The TSA managed to delay a critical report by 6 months and withhold supposedly "sensitive" information over the repeated protests of the Inspector General. In doing so, it has shown Americans who really holds the power in Washington -- and it isn't these agencies' internal and external oversight.

Filed Under: dhs, inspector general, redactions, tsa

Inspector General's Report Says Accusations NSA Listened In On Military Personnel's Phone Calls 'Baseless,' Hints At Other Misconduct

from the the-most-selective-transparency dept

The ACLU's FOIA lawsuit over documents related to the NSA's activities under Executive Order 12333 has knocked a few more pages out the agency's tightly-closed fist, most of which are related to its signals intelligence programs. Included in the released documents is an 89-page Inspector General's report on the investigation of accusations made back in 2009 by David Murfee Faulk, who alleged that NSA linguists were listening in on the phone calls of military personnel, journalists and aid workers and sharing those containing "pillow talk" with other analysts.

As for the accusations of NSA linguists and analysts listening in on phone calls of American citizens located overseas for purely prurient interests, the NSA's under-utilized Inspector General says there's no evidence this occurred. The report runs 89 pages, most of them completely withheld, but what little the NSA agreed to release indicates a lack of evidence to support David Faulk's accusations.

There are 68 pages withheld in full (and five pages that are "intentionally left blank"), so any nuance has been left on the redacting room floor, along with any other evidence of wrongdoing. A memo from the Inspector General's office hints at other impropriety unrelated to the linguist's accusations.

During the investigation of alleged improprieties at NSA Georgia (NSAG) in 2004 and 2005 and reported by a former NSA assignee in 2008, we identified some practices in [REDACTED] that are inconsistent with established NSA/CSS policies and procedures. For details concerning the investigation, see Report of Investigation Regarding Alleged Improprieties at NSA Georgia (Report of Investigation), IV-09-0003, August 14, 2009. These practices may increase the risk of mishandling U.S. persons information and, therefore, require your attention.

Well, we have that report but we can't actually read most of it. There's hardly anything left but the IG clearing the NSA of the specific misconduct alleged by two NSA linguists. The IG memo lists other non-compliance issues like the dissemination of raw US persons SIGINT, as well as violations of reporting procedures and retention guidelines, but the specifics of the IG's findings remain hidden. I would imagine a legal challenge to the massive redactions in the Inspector General's report will be forthcoming. There's more self-interest than security apparent in the NSA's very selective exposures, making this exculpatory information highly conspicuous in its inclusion.

Filed Under: abuse, eo 12333, executive order 12333, inspector general, nsa, pillow talk, surveillance, violations

DOJ Investigates Law Enforcement Agencies All Over The Nation But Can't Be Bothered To Police Itself

from the backyard-due-to-be-condemned-for-lack-of-upkeep dept

The Justice Department will be investigating the Ferguson PD in the wake of an unarmed citizen's shooting by Officer Darren Wilson. Already, news has surfaced that the police force has a history of discriminatory actions and a problem with deploying excessive force. But should we even trust the DOJ to do this? If the DOJ is going to police the nation's police, then it should be holding its own agencies and employees to the highest standards. But it doesn't. It doesn't even come close.

Documents obtained by McClatchy News Service [pdf link] reveal incident after incident of misconduct uncovered by the Office of the Inspector General. They range from the merely questionable to the wholly unacceptable, but one thread holds them all together: a nearly complete lack of accountability.

The records, which cover the period from January 2010 to March 2014, detail some 80 cases, only a few of which appear to have been previously made public.

The accused officials work for agencies that include the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

In at least 27 cases, the inspector general identified evidence of possible criminal wrongdoing but no one was prosecuted.

[...]

According to the most recent report by the office, the Justice Department’s inspector general received nearly 5,900 allegations of misconduct, opened 195 investigations and was involved in 32 arrests and 38 convictions from October through March.

Cases referred to the IG involved anything from inappropriate relationships to murder-for-hire. An assistant US attorney general was accused of withholding information about her husband's embezzlement from investigators. Another federal prosecutor recused herself from a case when it was revealed she had a "personal relationship" with the investigation's target. This same prosecutor also divulged sensitive information about the case to her husband -- who subsequently passed this information along to the target.

Gifts and paid trips were accepted by employees in violation of agency ethics policies. An FBI agent used his government-issued Blackberry to pursue relationships with 17 different women. Another FBI agent misused agency resources to participate in three extramarital affairs. An ATF official worked for Morgan Stanley while on paid leave from the agency. The DHS, ATF and FBI are all called out for engaging in retaliatory behavior against protected whistleblowers.

On and on it goes for 42 pages. Bureau of Prison personnel stole or misused government-purchased equipment. Ethical standards violated. Investigations interfered with. Abuse of position to get out of traffic tickets or obtain goods, services… even surveillance tapes from a private business.

In the end, though, only a few cases were recommended for prosecution. In many cases, the employees retired ahead of pending punishments. In others, employees received nothing more than "oral admonishments."

And then there's this complete bullshit:

Sometimes, alleged misconduct by prosecutors and investigators might be handled less aggressively because of concern that it would taint criminal cases, [former Dept. of Interior Inspector General Earl] Devaney said. At trial, defense attorneys are permitted to learn of serious misconduct of the agents and prosecutors involved in their cases.

There's that infamous criminal justice system again. In order to avoid "losses," government agencies are burying misconduct allegations or issuing "oral admonishments" to avoid leaving damning paper trails that might call the integrity of their prosecutors and investigators into question. To sum up: the government would rather prosecute a citizen than hold one of its own fully accountable.

When the DOJ starts looking into Ferguson, it had better hope the PD doesn't just hold up a mirror and dare it to meet its own gaze.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, inspector general, law enforcement

DOJ Inspector General Says FBI Actively Preventing Him From Doing His Job

from the no-accountability dept

Rogue agency? The FBI seems to fit the description:

The Justice Department's inspector general said Tuesday that his staff is routinely blocked from getting access to documents it needs for audits and reviews of the department and its law enforcement agencies…

In the last few years, the FBI has denied access to records that should be provided under federal law, including grand jury materials, an organizational chart and electronic surveillance information, [Inspector General Michael] Horowitz testified.

Yeah. Not even an organizational chart. The FBI, which can't seem to decide whether it likes law enforcement or counterterrorism better, won't even hand over that info. It's incredibly hard to investigate an agency that stonewalls its superiors with as much fervor as it does FOIA requesters.

As it stands now, the FBI routes the Inspector General through its legal counsel. Then a whole lot of nothing happens until the Attorney General's office gets involved and demands the release of information. This stonewalling goes on for years.

He said the refusal to grant routine requests stalls investigations, including a recent one on FBI material witnesses, such that officials who are under review have sometimes retired or left the agencies before the report is complete.

It's another one-way street of information by a government agency. FOIA requesters and the DOJ's Inspector General get nothing. The FBI gets everything it demands, via subpoenas, FISA court orders and National Security Letters. In addition, the FBI actively interjects itself into state-level FOI requests, ordering local law enforcement agencies to withhold information on cell tower spoofers and other "sensitive" equipment -- even going so far as to help them with parallel construction.

There's nothing defensible here. The Inspector General should be able to see whatever it asks for. Anything deemed sensitive can be redacted from the eventual report. But handling requests for information the way the FBI does insulates it from accountability -- an essential element of its "bargain" with the public. Everything it has -- from its power to its budget -- derives from the people. And in return, the people are getting nothing back, even those at the supposed top of the accountability chain.

The Attorney General needs to rein the agency in, rather than intercede only when asked to by the OIG. There's obviously a problem here but it appears those with the actual power to fix it are simply letting the agency slide. The FBI -- especially in its new counterterrorism capacity -- has too much power to be allowed this much leeway.

Filed Under: doj, fbi, inspector general, investigations

USPTO Tried To Hide Abuse And Fraud By Patent Examiners From Inspector General

from the part-II dept

So, we just wrote about the fact that there was apparently fairly widespread abuse and fraud by patent examiners, mostly those working from home, in lying about the hours they put in and getting paid for work they didn't do. However, what may be much more concerning was the fact that the USPTO tried to hide this from the Inspector General who was investigating this. As the Washington Post notes, an initial internal report detailed many more examples of fraud and abuse, which disappeared from the final report that was handed over.

But when it came time last summer for the patent office to turn over the findings to its outside watchdog, the most damaging revelations had disappeared. The report sent to Commerce Department Inspector General Todd Zinser concluded that it was impossible to know if the whistleblowers’ allegations of systemic abuses were true.

“What we hoped to see was an unfiltered response,” Zinser said.“That’s not what this was. It’s a lot less sensational. The true extent of the problem was not being conveyed to us.”

The original findings, by contrast, raise “fundamental issues” with the business model of the patent office, which oversees an essential function of U.S. commerce, said Zinser, who was provided a copy of the original by a patent official.

The white washing of the abuse seems particularly problematic, given that it paints a very different picture, where the problems aren't so pervasive, and that the problems don't go back to leadership (hmm...).

Both reports conclude that policies negotiated with the patent examiners’ union have left managers with few tools to monitor their staffs. Both acknowledge that supervisors have limited access to records that could prove suspected time fraud, resulting in negligible disciplinary action.

But the original one describes a culture of fraud that is overlooked by senior leaders, lax enforcement of the rules and the resulting frustration of many front-line supervisors. The version provided to the watchdog was far less conclusive, saying that managers who were interviewed held “inconsistent” views on whether examiners were gaming the system.

The USPTO is trying to frame this distinction as being that the first report was a "rough draft" and the latter was a more complete version, but it seems like the opposite. The first was pretty complete, and the second is... missing a bunch.

The fact that the USPTO tried to hide this abuse -- and the fact that it appears to be systemic -- also suggestions an operation that is not looking to fix the problems, but to brush them under the rug. It certainly does not inspire much confidence.

Filed Under: abuse, fraud, inspector general, uspto, whitewashing

Veterans Administration Inspector General Demands Whistleblower Documents Submitted To Government Watchdog Group

from the the-First-Amendment-is-no-match-for-our-subpoena-powers dept

The ongoing investigation on the Veterans Administration's ineptitude and abuse may soon be able to add exposed whistleblowers to its collateral damage. The VA's Inspector General has made the unprecedented move to subpoena documents turned over anonymously to independent, non-profit watchdog group Project On Government Oversight (POGO).

The Department of Veterans Affairs' in-house watchdog has demanded that the Project On Government Oversight turn over all information it has collected related to abuses and mismanagement at VA medical facilities, according to a subpoena delivered to POGO May 30.

The subpoena from the VA Office of Inspector General demands all records POGO has received from current or former VA employees, as well as any other individuals, including veterans. The subpoena asks for records related to "wait times, access to care, and/or patient scheduling issues at the Phoenix, Arizona VA Healthcare System and any other VA medical facility."

While on one hand, the information the IG is seeking is exactly the sort of data it needs to complete its investigation, the larger issue is the subpoena's potential to undermine the confidentiality promised to whistleblowers who submitted documents through POGO's VAOversight.org website. Nearly 700 people have turned over information to POGO's secure dropbox since the site's launch in early May. POGO advised submitters to take steps to maintain their anonymity when submitting (using TOR, not submitting docs from work phones, computers or fax machines, etc.) and all submissions were sent as encrypted messages.

Now, with a simple administrative subpoena -- one that isn't even signed by a judge -- all of this protection is being removed. Anyone who failed to take preventative measures, or might be traced back via other means, can now be exposed by the IG's efforts.

The current administration talks a lot about transparency and the importance of whistleblowers in keeping the government in line, but its actions have completely contradicted its spoken assurances. This administration has prosecuted more whistleblowers than all other administrations combined. Those who may be swept up by the IG's investigation include many who tried to alert the government of the VA's problems through proper channels, but turned to a third party when their grievances went unanswered.

POGO is fighting this subpoena and has sent a letter to the VA Inspector General apprising him of its non-compliance.

Our unwillingness to comply with the subpoena is consistent with our long history of protecting sources who come to our organization. POGO has consistently refused to turn over information and/or records about our sources, investigations, and practices when government agencies, Congress, and parties in civil and administrative cases made such requests, including requests made pursuant to a subpoena. POGO has always taken the position that the First Amendment protects POGO's right to protect the whistleblowers, sources, and insiders who come to us with information or assist in POGO’s investigations.

The letter further points out that there's little reason to believe that the Inspector General doesn't already have access to the sort of information its seeking.

The IG's office has provided no basis to suggest that the information possessed by POGO as a result of its investigation of the VA is not already available to the IG, including through the VA IG "hotline." Accordingly, the administrative subpoena is little more than an invasive fishing expedition.

The IG's subpoena also highlights a quick and dirty way to undermined protective measures. Peter Van Buren at Firedoglake points out that subpoenas like this make extra efforts like encryption completely worthless.

Edward Snowden, along with many others, has said that the best tool right now to defeat the NSA and other government spying is the use of encryption. It is possible that some forms of encryption are not breakable by the NSA. It is likely that breaking other forms of encryption is slow and/or expensive to do on a world wide web-scale. It is a race of course, between how many supercomputing algorithms the NSA can throw at the problem and the cleverness of the people creating new forms of better encryption.

If the government can access documents and information with a simple piece of paper– a subpoena– then all the encryption in the world is pointless.

This is part of the government's interpretation of the Third Party Doctrine, one that has made the Fourth Amendment almost completely useless.

DOJ has turned all that around. It claims now that under the Fourth Amendment, it can subpoena an Internet company such as Facebook and demand they look for and turn over all the records they have about Mr. Anderson. DOJ isn’t searching, per se– they are demanding Facebook do that for them, so no warrant is needed. Worse yet, DOJ believes it can subpoena multiple records, maybe all the records something like Facebook has, with one piece of paper. The same thing applies, DOJ claims, to email. If they came to someone’s home and demanded access to that person’s emails, it would require a specific search warrant. Instead, if DOJ issues a subpoena to say Google, they can potentially vacuum up every Gmail message ever sent.

So, while encryption may stymie the interception of communications, it doesn't do much good when the government arrives with a piece of paper asking for the unencrypted end result of these communications, especially one that is self-issued by the Inspector General with no additional legal scrutiny. POGO encrypted submissions but the IG's subpoena asks for everything its collected in unencrypted form ("fully legible and complete copies of the records"). The assurances given to anonymous whistleblowers by POGO are as meaningless as the assurances given to users of Lavabit's encrypted email service. The government doesn't mind much if you encrypt the "middle," because it can always just ask for stuff at either end.

Filed Under: administrative subpoena, inspector general, investigations, subpoena, va, veterans administration, watchdogs, whistleblowers
Companies: project on government oversight

Former DHS Watchdog, A Tyrant, Failure And Alleged Felon, 'Punished' With Transfer To Another Government Agency

from the ah,-the-famous-'lateral-demotion' dept

Good news, Americans! The former "top watchdog" for the Department of Homeland Security, Charles K. Edwards, was an incredibly perverse blend of crooked and spineless and yet we still managed to avoid being terrorized to death during his run as Inspector General (2011-2013). That's the resilience of the American public. Even while the agency was being bumblefucked into (even greater) uselessness, those who hate us for our way of life (which now includes drone strikes, neverending military 'interventions' and the constant watching of damn near everybody) were unable to find a way to maneuver around the "security" "provided" by the DHS.

How can you tell when an investigative report is especially damning? When you can't even make it through the table of contents without gasping out loud a few times. Get a load of this:

III. LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
A. Lack of Familiarity with OIG Work
B. Frequent Communications and Personal Relationships with Senior DHS Officials
C. Lack of Independent Legal Advice
D. Improper Alteration or Delay of Reports
1. “Secure Communities” Audit Report
2. “Advance Imaging Technology” Audit Report
3. “Acquisition Management” Audit Report
4. “Secret Service” Investigation and Inspection
5. “Ports of Entry” Audit Report
E. Tainted Audit Reports
F. Apparent Desire for a Permanent IG Position

IV. ABUSE OF AGENCY RESOURCES
A. Assistance with Pursuit of a Ph.D
B. Assistance with Employment at Capitol College
C. Assistance with Pursuit of a Permanent IG Position
D. Travel to Florida
E. Misuse of a Government Vehicle
F. Benefits for Ms. Edwards
1. Nepotism in Hiring
2. Telework from India
3. International Phone Calls
4. Staff Assistance for Ms. Edwards

V. OTHER ALLEGATIONS
A. Notice of Administrative Leave
B. Destruction of E-mails
C. Deletion or Closing of Hotline Complaints
D. Destruction of Phone Records
E. Retaliation
1. Administrative Leave
2. Poor Performance Review
F. Office Environment

Where do you even start? It's all terrible. Edwards apparently wined and dined with DHS leaders, giving them heads up on the findings of investigations. So, there's that, which undermines the oversight. From there, Edwards went to various administration higher-ups and allowed them to control the timing and wording of investigative reports, further subverting the oversight process he was tasked with.

Beyond the major subversion, there's tons of minor issues. Nepotism, misuse of department resources, Edwards using the department to pursue a doctorate and a permanent position as an IG… about the only thing not noted in here is supply closet raids.

Furthermore, it appears Edwards wasn't even qualified to do the job he absolutely failed to do over a three-year period.

Unlike most IGs, Mr. Edwards does not have experience conducting audits, investigations, or inspections, the three main types of work conducted in an Office of Inspector General.

For example, when interviewed by Subcommittee staff, Edwards was unable to articulate guidelines that govern briefing details of an ongoing investigation to DHS. Edwards stated, “I don’t know that offhand here. You will have to talk to the office – to the Assistant IG for Investigations.”

Not only was he a lousy employee, he was a terrible boss. When not setting up his wife with travel, phones, laptops and a position within the department, he mistreated the rest of his staff -- the same staffers he tasked with working on his Ph.D dissertation and documents related to his pursuit of both a position with Capitol College and a permanent IG nomination.

During the Subcommittee’s investigation, current and former OIG employees repeatedly reported that Mr. Edwards had created a hostile work environment. One official characterized the office as a “toxic, totally dysfunctional and oppressive” work environment characterized by low morale, paranoia, and fear. Another official described the atmosphere of the OIG as one of “[c]omplete terror,” such that “there were times that [they] couldn’t even get up out of bed, [they were] so emotionally scared, drained.”

Many employees told the Subcommittee they wanted a change in leadership. According to one official, the OIG staff “want to have a legitimate Inspector General in place to get us back on track.” Another called the office “the worst agency” and said that it has been “run into the ground” under Mr. Edwards’ leadership. Reasons include Mr. Edwards’ reluctance to “seek out advice or guidance from anybody with experience” and that the “people … he surrounds himself with … do not have the background or the experience to be useful to him.”

When faced with low morale, Edwards apparently did what other wholly ineffective leaders do when faced with friction: he retaliated. Staffers claim Edwards routinely placed dissenters on administrative leave or used periodic employee reviews to "get back" at them for their failure to kowtow.

Allegations (some unsubstantiated) that Edwards broke federal law by destroying emails and documents are also included in the report. There are also allegations that Edwards spied on interoffice communications. A former senior OIG official noted that "nearly all" the communications he received about Edwards' actions originated from personal email accounts or phones.

So, what's to become of Edwards, who completely undercut any sort of independent oversight of the nation's foremost security agency, along with possibly breaking a handful of federal laws? A whole lot of nothing.

Edwards, a 20-year federal career employee with expertise in computer engineering, resigned his office in December, three days before he was scheduled to appear at a Senate hearing to answer questions. DHS granted his request to be transferred into its office of science and technology, and the hearing was canceled.

Wonderful. Way to send a message, Chief. That will let the government's Inspector Generals know they'd better be right on that oversight thing OR ELSE [they'll be transferred to another government agency, no questions asked].

The DHS is a joke with no punchline. I'd say DHS head Jeh Johnson has his hands full whipping this disgrace back into some semblance of a respectable government body, but let's face it, it has never been credible during its decade-plus existence. Johnson's not going to turn this around. The department's focus is almost entirely on maintaining a credible terrorist threat in order to justify its $39 billion budget and 225,000 employees. That leaves precious little time or resources to clean house.

People like Edwards who can fill the position while minimizing embarrassing investigative reports are welcomed at the DHS. No one wants to be the guy (or girl) who truly outs the agency as a bloated wreck that does little to nothing in the way of keeping the Homeland secure. Pursuing truly independent oversight just means working your way out of a job.

Filed Under: charles edwards, dhs, homeland security, inspector general, management