Question: Will Dianne Feinstein Investigate Her Own Leak Of Classified Info? Will She Face Espionage Act Charges?

from the just-asking... dept

So, we just discussed how it appears that Dianne Feinstein accidentally confirmed what was widely suspected: that the NSA is tapping the internet backbone to get access to emails. This is interesting on many levels, not the least of which is that Feinstein herself has been famously harsh against any kind of leak, regularly arguing that the leaks themselves are more damaging than what the leaks may reveal about US government abuse. In the past, Feinstein has raged against leakers:

In a televised interview Wednesday, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein repeatedly vented her ire over leaks of classified information and she signaled that she favors a more aggressive crackdown on those who are passing national security secrets to the press.

"What we're seeing...is an Anschluss, an avalanche of leaks. And it's very, very disturbing. You know, it's dismayed our allies. It puts American lives in jeopardy. It puts our nation's security in jeopardy," Feinstein (D-Calif.) said on CNN's "Situation Room" program.

Similarly, she has argued that Ed Snowden is a "traitor" for revealing information, though unlike her, he didn't reveal this particular program (or at least it hasn't been reported on yet).

Meanwhile, the Senate's current rules on revealing classified information suggest that an investigation is warranted:

The Senate Office of Security and the House counterpart are charged with investigating or coordinating investigations of suspected security violations by employees. In addition, investigations by the House and Senate Ethics Committees of suspected breaches of security are authorized by each chamber’s rules, directly and indirectly. The Senate Ethics Committee, importantly, has the broad duty to “receive complaints and investigate allegations of improper conduct which may reflect upon the Senate, violations of law, violations of the Senate Code of Official Conduct, and violations of rules and regulations of the Senate.” The panel is also directed “to investigate any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information [from the Senate Intelligence Committee] by a Member, officer or employee of the Senate.”

If, for example, Senator Wyden had ever actually revealed the details of any classified program (as some had urged him to do), you can rest assured that such an investigation (along with a public tarring and feathering) would likely have occurred. It's also unlikely that he would be allowed to remain on the Intelligence Committee.

So, will Senator Feinstein call for an investigation into her own leak? Will she call herself a traitor? We'll see...

Filed Under: dianne feinstein, investigations, leaks, nsa surveillance, surveillance

NYPD Program Designated Entire Mosques As 'Terrorist Organizations' And Failed To Deliver Useful Data When It Mattered Most

from the an-ongoing,-audacious-failure dept

The NYPD's defenders claim that minorities will be the real victims if the stop and frisk program is neutered by court decisions and legislation. It's an odd claim considering minorities made up 88% of the unconstitutional stops, but that's the line of thinking up top.

I wonder how they'll spin this latest revelation. The NYPD carved itself exceptions to policies meant to limit First Amendment violations by declaring entire New York mosques as "terror groups."

The New York Police Department has secretly labeled entire mosques as terrorist organizations, a designation that allows police to use informants to record sermons and spy on imams, often without specific evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

Designating an entire mosque as a terrorism enterprise means that anyone who attends prayer services there is a potential subject of an investigation and fair game for surveillance.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD has opened at least a dozen "terrorism enterprise investigations" into mosques, according to interviews and confidential police documents. The TEI, as it is known, is a police tool intended to help investigate terrorist cells and the like.

Many TEIs stretch for years, allowing surveillance to continue even though the NYPD has never criminally charged a mosque or Islamic organization with operating as a terrorism enterprises.

How did the NYPD do this? By exploiting post-9/11 paranoia and leveraging the word "protection" in order to infringe on civil liberties. NY Magazine details how this went down in a very long and thorough writeup on the history of the NYPD's civil liberty-stomping Demographics Group. The first step in turning mosques into Constitution-free zones required a rewrite of rules referred to as the "Handschu guidelines."

"The guidelines stated that police could investigate constitutionally protected activities only when they had specific information that a crime was being committed or was imminent. Undercover officers could be used only when they were essential to a case, not as a way to keep tabs on groups that might be up to no good. Police were prohibited from building dossiers on people or keeping their names in files without specific evidence of crimes."

Over the years, constitutional protection has often been viewed as an impediment to investigative work. Just as the government pushed for warrantless wiretaps, location tracking and cell phone content searches, the NYPD pushed for uncontrolled access to anything it considered a hotspot for terrorists -- in this case, the city's many mosques. The bizarrely-named "Demographics Group" used the recent terrorist attacks in New York City as the justification for violating First Amendment protections.

[T]he activities that [CIA liaison Larry] Sanchez and [former senior CIA officer David] Cohen were proposing would not have been permitted under the Handschu guidelines. So, on September 12, 2002, Cohen filed a 23-page document in federal court asking a judge to throw out the guidelines and give his officers more leeway.

Cohen insisted that the world had changed since Al Qaeda attacked America, and the NYPD needed to change with it. “These changes were not envisioned when the Handschu guidelines were agreed upon,” he wrote, “and their continuation dangerously limits the ability of the NYPD to protect the people it is sworn to serve.”

Cohen painted a frightening picture of a nation—and a city—under siege from enemies within. “They escape detection by blending into American society. They may own homes, live in communities with families, belong to religious or social organizations, and attend educational institutions,” he wrote. “They typically display enormous patience, often waiting years until the components of their plans are perfectly aligned.”

He argued that America’s freedoms of movement, privacy, and association gave terrorists an advantage, one that left U.S. citizens painfully exposed. “The freedom of our society,” Cohen wrote, “has also made it possible for terrorist organizations to maintain U.S.-based activities.”

This 23-page document was, to put it lightly, bullshit. But it was a "masterpiece" of button-pushing, an exceedingly well-crafted bit of rhetoric that served as a justification blueprint for nearly every constitutionally-problematic NYPD program that followed. Cohen's combination of jargon and fearmongering won over Judge Charles Haight, who decided the "Handschu guidelines" were no longer applicable to today's terrorist-heavy world.

The new guidelines still contained one significant restriction: the department was forbidden from collecting or storing information related to First Amendment-protected activities (like worship and speech) unless it was "directly related" to criminal activity. This limitation obviously wasn't going to work for Sanchez and Cohen, so they did what the NSA has done -- expanded the definition of "related." Here's a quote by Sanchez that illustrates the type of spin deployed to loosen the restrictions.

“Part of our mission is to protect New York City citizens from becoming terrorists."

This is taken from a statement delivered to Congress. Unbelievably, no one questioned whether the NYPD should really be in the "business" of "protecting" New Yorkers from terrorist recruiting efforts. No one questioned the fact that widening the scope of its "mission" allowed the NYPD's mini-CIA to claim nearly everything and everyone in New York City was "related" to its investigations, thanks to nearly everyone being somehow susceptible to terrorist recruitment efforts. In fact, as NY Magazine points out, Congress "enthusiastically embraced" Cohen and Sanchez's views.

With anything and everything now "related" to the Demographic Group's investigations, the data poured in. And most of what was collected was completely useless. Well, "useless" if you believe the group was primarily there to catch terrorists. If you believe it was there to scoop up as much information as it could about mosque attendees and their non-mosque-related activities, then the program was firing on all cylinders.

About once a week, they filed reports on conversations they’d eavesdropped on. Nobody trained the rakers on what exactly qualified as suspicious, so they reported anything they heard. One Muslim man made it into files even though he praised President Bush’s State of the Union address and said people who criticized the U.S. government didn’t realize how good they had it. Two men of Pakistani ancestry were included for saying the nation’s policies had become increasingly anti-Muslim since 9/11. Muslims who criticized the CIA’s use of drones to launch missiles in Pakistan were documented.

The surveillance program grew, as unchecked programs tend to, expanding beyond even the loosely-defined targets.

Cohen and Sanchez’s efforts also reached beyond the Muslim community. Undercover officers traveled the country, keeping tabs on liberal protest groups like Time’s Up and the Friends of Brad Will. Police infiltrated demonstrations and collected information about antiwar groups and those that marched against police brutality.

So, now the Demographic Group was surveilling everyone the NYPD viewed with suspicion, including those who simply don't care to be brutalized by police officers. This program extended so far past its original point that even the FBI became concerned after Sanchez tried to sell it some of the Demographics Group's collected data, declaring the program was "targeting individuals and businesses without cause." Taking the files would have violated the FBI's rules.

Not only was the FBI concerned, but the CIA found the unit's work troublesome, especially as no one could point to any proven results of its activities.

Sitting with the NYPD, [senior CIA officer Margaret Henoch] felt a similar unease. She didn’t see how the Demographics reports could be used to draw conclusions. “I think this is a really impressive collection of what’s where, but I don’t understand how it helps you,” Henoch told the NYPD brass… She asked if there was some success story that summed up the program’s usefulness in its first two years. When she didn’t get an answer, she assumed that the NYPD was being coy with a potential rival. Even in the post-9/11 era, intelligence agencies often jealously guarded their secrets.

We've covered that exact lack of results here at Techdirt. Thousands of man-hours and millions of dollars spent, and the only success stories seem to involve questionable sting operations that set up unassuming chumps to take a fall on terrorism charges. The only outcome to date has been an impressive slate of civil liberties violations.

Even worse, despite years of wide collections, no one who ended up in a file was ever crossed off the list of potential terrorists. If the Demographic Group gathered anything on you, you were a suspect for life. The analogy Cohen used to sell the judge on the program -- "raking" through "coal" to look for "hotspots" -- turned out be a shovel that produced nothing more than bigger and bigger piles of coal.

Then came the most damning moment of all. The collection efforts failed when they mattered most.

In September 2009, the National Security Agency intercepted an e-mail from a taxi driver named Najibullah Zazi to an e-mail address linked to one of Al Qaeda’s most senior leaders. The message contained the line “the marriage is ready.”

Marriage and wedding were among Al Qaeda’s favorite code words for attacks, referring to the day that a suicide bomber met his brides, the maidens of the hereafter.

Trying to ascertain the scope of the plot, the NYPD searched the files of the Demographics Unit. Even though the rakers had canvassed Zazi’s neighborhood daily, and had even visited the travel agent where he bought his tickets between New York and Colorado, there was not a single piece of useful information.

Here's where the NYPD's mini-CIA meets the real CIA and its more secretive, more sinister big brother, the NSA. All of these agencies, handling rakes or pitchforks or whatever in order to comb through haystacks and piles of coal, collaborated to search for that one ember, that one needle -- and came up with nothing.

Harvesting massive amounts of data simply because you've carved yourself a loophole in the Constitution not only abuses the trust of American citizens, but it does so in exchange for "collections" that are 99.9-100% useless. The defenders continue to claim every bit of this extraneous information is somehow "relevant" or "related," but when it comes time to put it all to work, the dots fail to connect. See also: the Boston Bombing.

Kelly still believes this program is useful and violates no one's rights. Of course he feels this way. Citizens are merely data points or potential criminals or, very frequently, both. The only people he trusts are members of his police force. Everyone else is a name on a file, collected and observed simply because someone gave the NYPD the permission to do it.

Filed Under: investigations, mosques, nypd, privacy, profiling, terrorism

Federal Official Declares That Anyone Who Speaks Out Against Lie Detector Tests Should Be Criminally Investigated

from the insanity dept

The Obama administration's war on whistleblowers was already fairly crazy, what with its official designation of "leakers" as "aiding the enemy," but now apparently it's extending even further. Federal agents have now launched criminal investigations into some instructors who claim they can teach you to beat a lie detector test, all done under the mandate of the war against whistleblowers.

Federal agents have launched a criminal investigation of instructors who claim they can teach job applicants how to pass lie detector tests as part of the Obama administration’s unprecedented crackdown on security violators and leakers.

The criminal inquiry, which hasn’t been acknowledged publicly, is aimed at discouraging criminals and spies from infiltrating the U.S. government by using the polygraph-beating techniques, which are said to include controlled breathing, muscle tensing, tongue biting and mental arithmetic.

Methods for how to beat lie detector tests have been around for ages, and they are unreliable to begin with — so much so that many experts and groups have expressed doubt about polygraphs or disavowed them entirely. The National Research Council, the National Academy of Sciences, the Congress Office of Technology Assessment, the American Psychological Association, the Supreme Court — the list of doubters goes on and on, and any discussion of the question inevitably covers the ways people intentionally trick the test, to the point that these methods are practically common knowledge. Even Mythbusters has tested whether or not you can beat the polygraph, as has Penn & Teller: Bullshit! in an episode where they taught volunteers how to beat a test on camera. I wonder if these shows should now be investigated as well?

Either way, it seems like a huge stretch to claim that merely teaching potential methods for beating a lie detector should be considered a crime. At the very least, that seems to test the bounds of the First Amendment. One of the instructors targeted has already plead guilty, but to "obstructing an agency proceeding and wire fraud," while the feds are pushing for two years in jail for the other one. While some of the details are under seal, it appears that federal agents basically set up a "sting" operation, in which they induced the two people to teach them how to trick a polygraph, and in the process "admitted" to the instructors certain crimes that they were involved in. This sounds a like borderline entrapment. In fact, the report notes that the people who "sought out" the information from the two men who were investigated generally just wanted books or videos -- not the "one on one" lessons the feds set up.

The impact of all of this is creating serious chilling effects just on those who oppose the use of polygraphs in general:

Some opponents of polygraph testing, including a Wisconsin police chief, said they were concerned that the federal government also might be secretly investigating them, not for helping criminals to lie but for being critical of the government’s polygraph programs. In his speech to the American Association of Police Polygraphists, Schwartz said he thought that those who “protest the loudest and the longest” against polygraph testing “are the ones that I believe we need to focus our attention on.”

The "Schwartz" quoted there is John Schwartz, a Customs and Border Patrol official who is involved in the investigations. So, yeah, that's a federal government agent specifically claiming that he wants to focus his criminal investigatory power on those who speak out against polygraph testing. If I were to take a polygraph test right now it would note that I'm telling the truth when I say that sounds a hell of a lot like a police state, where federal agents publicly declare that they're going to use their criminal investigation powers to target people who oppose a program they support. Talk about chilling effects and a massive First Amendment violation.

To have a federal official, with investigatory power, whose already involved in existing investigations flat out say that he wants to target those who speak out, is incredible. That's not the way our government is supposed to work.

Filed Under: beat a lie detector, criminal investigations, federal employees, investigations, leakers, lie detectors, polygraphs

Unsealed Megaupload Seizure Warrants Reveal Use Of Flawed Logic... And An 'Undercover Computer'

from the did-it-wear-a-mustache dept

Last month, we wrote about how the EFF, representing Kyle Goodwin, had asked the US district court handling the Megaupload case to unseal the warrants for the seizures of Megauploads domains and servers. The court has now ordered the documents unsealed. To be honest, there isn't too much surprising in them. There are some huge leaps to assume that hosting a cloud service somehow makes you criminally liable for what people do on that service. In fact, part of it ridiculously argues that the "proof" of criminality is the fact that the DOJ had alerted Megaupload to some infringing files, and those files had not been taken down. However, as Megaupload's lawyer points out, the "alert" was in the form of asking for cooperation, which Megaupload granted, and not to "interfere" in the investigation. Taking down the videos would be interfering. Megaupload's lawyer, Ira Rothken explained to CNET:

"MegaUpload was served with a criminal search warrant for alleged third-party user conduct and was advised not to interfere with that criminal investigation or with the files -- as such disclosure, would jeopardize the ongoing investigation. To ask MegaUpload to cooperate and then use that cooperation against them, to us seems to be both unfair and misleading."

Most of the argument in the warrants is just repeating the already questionable claims in the indictment -- which is what you'd expect. They're also not all that different from previous domain seizure requests -- with a few notable exceptions. First, you'll notice that the special agent who conducted the investigation has all personal information redacted. Apparently the Justice Department would prefer that its agent not receive the ridicule that the agent who made myriad mistakes in earlier domain seizures received.

But what was really amusing was the description of the investigation, which apparently involved an "undercover computer."

Using an undercover computer, [redacted] observed how a visitor may view content hosted on Megaupload.com. For example, on November 20, 2011, [redacted] observed the copyrighted picture "Zack and Miri Make a Porno," which was released in 2008 by The Weinstein Company, on the website Megavideo.com.

I'm still trying to figure out just what an "undercover computer" is -- and where I can buy one. Also, seems kind of random to choose Zack and Miri as the sample file to download -- especially given the director/writer of that particular movie, Kevin Smith, has talked extensively about how he believes "piracy" actually helps him gain more fans. Yes, the film's copyright is held by The Weinstein Company -- whose owners appear to have a slightly less enlightened view of infringement -- but it still seems like an odd choice.

In addition to those oddities, there are some other claims within the filings that don't make much sense. They make the argument that seizure is necessary with claims that are, simply speaking, not true:

Neither a restraining order nor an injunction is sufficient to guarantee the availability of the Subject Domain Names for forfeiture. By seizing the Subject Domain Names and redirecting them to another website, the United States will prevent supporters of the Mega Conspiracy or third parties from redirecting the Subject Domain Names to servers elsewhere in the world, and thus using them to commit additional crimes. Furthermore, seizure of the Subject Domain Names will prevent visitors from continuing to access the websites located at the Subject Domain Names.

To put it simply: that makes no sense. Either a restraining order or an injunction would, in fact, prevent those other things from happening. Yes, Megaupload could have ignored the two, but then it would face additional charges for ignoring the court. Given that Megaupload had repeatedly engaged in various lawsuits against it in the US before, there was simply no evidence that Megaupload would directly ignore the court and, as such, face additional charges.

Finally, the documents also show the DOJ's request for these documents to be sealed. You can understand why they wanted the warrants sealed prior to the takedowns and arrests happening. But those all took place within a week of the seizures being approved by the judge. There was no reason to keep them under seal. Yet the DOJ claims that it "has considered alternatives less drastic than sealing, including, for example, the possibility of redactions, and has determined that none would suffice to protect this investigation." That is, of course, empirically and definitively false because we've now seen the unsealed and redacted document and they do nothing to endanger the investigation (other than, perhaps, revealing the weaknesses of the DOJ's arguments).

Filed Under: copyright, criminal copyright, forefeiture, investigations, seizure
Companies: megaupload

Senate Intelligence Committee A Lot More Interested In Punishing Whistleblowers Than In Investigating Why They're Blowing The Whistle

from the but-of-course... dept

A few weeks back, we noted how ridiculous it was that Senator Dianne Feinstein seemed a lot more upset that information about questionable US activities abroad was being leaked than she was about the fact that the US was involved in questionable activities abroad. And, now the Senate Intelligence Committee (of which Feinstein is the chair) has pushed out new rules targeting those who leak information to the press (what most of us call whistleblowing). The Secrecy News blog does a good job highlighting how this seems to be much more about sweeping bad activities under the rug and blaming whistleblowers, rather than actually stopping bad behavior by government:

In an earlier generation of intelligence oversight, leaks led to leak investigations in executive agencies, but they also prompted substantive oversight in Congress.  When Seymour Hersh and the New York Times famously reported on unlawful domestic surveillance in December 1974, the urgent question in Congress was not how did Hersh find out, or how similar disclosures could be prevented, but what to do about the alarming facts that had been disclosed.

In contrast, while pursuing leaks and leakers, today’s Senate Intelligence Committee has not held an open public hearing for six months. The Committee’s investigative report concerning CIA interrogation practices from ten years (and two presidential terms) ago has still not been issued.  Upon publication — perhaps this fall — it will essentially be a historical document.

Most fundamentally, the Committee’s new draft legislation errs by treating “classification” as a self-validating category — i.e., if it’s classified, it warrants protection by definition — rather than as the flawed administrative instrument that it is.

Effectively, the new rules would make it that much harder for anyone in the intelligence community to blow the whistle if they come across illegal activities by the government. It effectively treats all activity by the government as good and any "leak" as bad, even if it would serve to highlight massive government abuse. That's pretty scary. Not only will it create massive chilling effects for anyone seeking to stop illegal government behavior, but it will actually provide even more cover for the government to ignore the laws.

Filed Under: chilling effects, dianne feinstein, investigations, privacy, whistleblowers

Federal Agent Manufactured Case Against Guy... For The Purpose Of Spending More Time With His Mistress

from the damn dept

We've covered, repeatedly, the misdeeds of various law enforcement officials lately, but this latest story might be the most egregiously ridiculous case. Apparently EPA Agent Keith Phillips pushed heavily for a case against a guy named Hubert Vidrine, who was eventually charged with "knowingly storing hazardous waste materials without a permit." It later turned out that there were some serious problems with the case against Vidrine. First, he was storing oil, which was not considered hazardous waste, and second, there was no evidence that the storage was done "knowingly." Eventually, the feds realized the case was so weak that it dumped it. Vidrine fought back in court, claiming malicious prosecution, and the court hasn't just sided with him, but awarded him $1.7 million dollars for the malicious prosecution, detailing that Phillips provided false testimony and then "permeated the entire investigation with omissions, half-truths, overstatements, inflammatory language, misstatements, patent falsehoods, and tortured readings of regulations."

But where it gets insane is the reason behind all of this. It didn't even have anything to do with Vidrine at all. Apparently, Agent Phillips used the case as a way to spend more time with his mistress, who was also working on the case. Seriously:

One of the more distressing allegations made at trial, involved allegations of Agent Phillips’ sexual, extra-marital affair (and its subsequent “cover up”) with Agent Barnhill. The evidence strongly indicated Agent Phillips deliberately used his investigation and prosecution of Hubert Vidrine to foster, further, facilitate and cloak his extra-marital affair with Agent Barnhill, and perhaps, to exert improper influence over the manner in which she investigated and reported upon this case. Agent Barnhill candidly testified that she and Agent Phillips began a physical, sexual relationship while assigned to this matter, which lasted from approximately 1996 until January or February 2001. Agent Barnhill testified she and Agent Phillips were only physically intimate when working together on the Vidrine case — in other words, they did not meet to pursue their sexual relations on occasions when they were not working the case together. Thus, the case granted the opportunity for those rendez-vous, as well as providing justification for Agent Phillips wife.

During the investigation and prosecution, Agent Barnhill, who was single, lived in South Louisiana; Agent Phillips, who was married, lived in Dallas, Texas with his wife. Prior to and at trial, plaintiffs’ counsel consistently argued Agent Phillips used the Vidrine investigation as a cover, excuse and opportunity to facilitate his illicit affair with Agent Barnhill and to hide the affair from his wife. Plaintiffs consistently argued Keith Phillips manufactured a case, both in law and fact, against Hubert Vidrine, and carefully fed the AUSA and his supervisors only the information which would further that end and perpetuate the case, all to promote access to Agent Barnhill and perpetuate and conceal their illicit affair. Regrettably, the Court agrees with plaintiffs: this inappropriate and unprofessional behavior likely was, at least in part (if not in whole) a motivation for Agent Phillips’ continued pursuit of Hubert Vidrine, without probable cause, and certainly with a complete and total reckless disregard of Hubert Vidrine’s rights.

For all of this, Phillips was charged separately, leading to him recently pleading guilty to perjury and obstruction of justice. Obviously, this is an extreme case, and in no way representative. But the point that it brings up is that law enforcement has tremendous power, and if they choose to go after someone maliciously (or indirectly salaciously), they can make someone's life a living hell on their own whim. This is why we're so often concerned about making sure there's transparency and oversight -- and that those accused of things are able to effectively defend themselves.

Filed Under: epa, government, investigations, oversight

ABA Says RIAA File Sharing Watchers Shouldn't Need Private Investigators' Licenses

from the and-they're-probably-right dept

We've seen a few cases against the RIAA in which either state officials or defendants will point out that the RIAA's hired hands in tracking down file sharers -- companies like MediaSentry -- are violating state laws requiring private investigators' licenses for certain activities. Now, the American Bar Association (ABA) has put out a report suggesting that this is silly, and that states and judges shouldn't require such companies to have a PI's license. While I'm a bit surprised at myself, I actually agree with the ABA. As distasteful as the RIAA's legal strategy is, and as flimsy as the evidence is that these company's collect, going after them for not having a PI's license is focusing on a loophole, not the actual merits. And, honestly, most of these requirements for PI licenses are really just a way to create artificial scarcity in the PI business, not actually a way to ensure safety or quality. The RIAA's efforts to sue music fans have plenty of problems, but focusing on whether or not companies like MediaSentry need a PI license seems like a tangent that takes away from the bigger picture.

Filed Under: copyright, investigations, lawsuits, monitoring, private investigators license

Oregon Attorney General Fighting Back Against RIAA Lawsuits

from the messed-with-the-wrong-attorney-general dept

Over the summer, we wrote about a lawsuit someone had filed against the RIAA in Oregon, claiming that the RIAA's investigation tactics were illegal, since the firm it used to sniff out unauthorized users, MediaSentry, was not a licensed investigator in Oregon. This seemed like a relatively weak claim (or at least one focused on the letter of the law more than the spirit). However, it appears that argument has caught the attention of Oregon's Attorney General who already is unhappy with the RIAA. You may recall that earlier this month, the Attorney General stood up to the RIAA after it tried to get the University of Oregon to identify students. It was surprising to see the AG get involved in such an issue, but clearly, he believes the RIAA is going too far. The RIAA responded to his filing, opposing the motion, of course. And now the Attorney General has responded, not just about this particular issue, but slamming the RIAA on a number of fronts, suggesting that the RIAA may be in a bit more hot water than it believed. He repeats the argument that the RIAA's investigation techniques are illegal and then goes on to slam the evidence the RIAA has, how it's gathered, how it uses these cases to squeeze money out of unsophisticated people and many other points about these RIAA cases. The response then points out why this is an important matter for the Attorney General to take a stand on and how it would like to get some answers from the RIAA:

"Because Plaintiffs routinely obtain ex parte discovery in their John Doe infringement suits, as they themselves have pointed out, their factual assertions supporting their good cause argument are never challenged by an adverse party and their investigative methods remain free of scrutiny. They often settle their cases quickly before defendants obtain legal representation and begin to conduct discovery.... While the University is not a party to the case, Plaintiffs' subpoena affects the university's rights and obligations. Plaintiffs may be spying on students who use the University's computer system and may be accessing much more than IP addresses. The University seeks the Court's permission to serve the attached interrogatories on Plaintiffs and conduct telephonic depositions of the individuals who investigated the seventeen John Does named in this lawsuit to determine 1) what their investigative practices are and 2) whether they have any additional information with which to identify the John Does."

It looks like the RIAA may have messed with the wrong university in the wrong state.

Filed Under: copyright, investigations, lawsuits, oregon
Companies: mediasentry, riaa