Repeal All UK Terrorism Laws, Says UK Government Adviser On Terrorism Laws

from the outbreak-of-sanity dept

It's become a depressingly predictable spectacle over the years, as politicians, law enforcement officials and spy chiefs take turns to warn about the threat of "going dark", and to call for yet more tough new laws, regardless of the fact that they won't help. So it comes as something of shock to read that the UK government's own adviser on terrorism laws has just said the following in an interview:

The Government should consider abolishing all anti-terror laws as they are "unnecessary" in the fight against extremists, the barrister tasked with reviewing Britain’s terrorism legislation has said.

…

the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, argued potential jihadis can be stopped with existing "general" laws that are not always being used effectively to take threats off the streets.

As the Independent reported, the UK government's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Max Hill, went on:

"We should not legislate in haste, we should not use the mantra of 'something has to be done' as an excuse for creating new laws," he added. “We should make use of what we have."

Aside from the astonishingly sensible nature of Hill's comments, the interview is also worth reading for the insight it provides into the changing nature of terrorism, at least in Europe:

Mr Hill noted that some of the perpetrators of the four recent terror attacks to hit the UK were previously "operating at a low level of criminality", adding: "I think that people like that should be stopped wherever possible, indicted using whatever legislation, and brought to court."

This emerging "crime-terror nexus" is one reason why anti-terrorism laws are unnecessary. Instead, non-terrorism legislation could be used to tackle what Hill termed "precursor criminality" -- general criminal activity committed by individuals who could be stopped and prosecuted before they move into terrorism. Similarly, it would be possible to use laws against murder and making explosive devices to hand down sentences for terrorists, made harsher to reflect the seriousness of the crimes.

Even though Hill himself doubts that the UK's terrorism laws will be repealed any time soon, his views are still important. Taken in conjunction with the former head of GCHQ saying recently that end-to-end encryption shouldn't be weakened, they form a more rational counterpoint to the ill-informed calls for more laws and less crypto.

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Filed Under: extremism, max hill, terrorism, terrorism laws, uk

FBI Terrorism Sting Nets Paranoid Schizophrenic Previously Found Incompetent By A State Court

from the FBI-Darwinism dept

It looks like the FBI has secured another anti-terrorism "win." Once again, the agency controlled the terrorism sting from beginning to end, ensuring the suspect communicated with no one but confidential informants and undercover agents. And, once again, the FBI has utilized the sort of person who probably poses more harm to themselves than others.

The FBI has arrested an Oklahoma man on charges that he tried to detonate what he thought was a 1,000-pound bomb, acting out of a hatred for the U.S. government and an admiration for Oklahoma City bomber Timothy Mc­Veigh, according to court papers.

Jerry Drake Varnell was arrested shortly after an attempt early Saturday morning to detonate a fake bomb packed into what he believed was a stolen cargo van outside a bank in Oklahoma City, according to a criminal complaint filed in federal court. He was charged with attempted destruction of a building by means of an explosive.

This is taken from the FBI's statements and criminal complaint [PDF]. There's another side to the story -- some of which can be sussed out from the complaint itself. Varnell's family, however, has stepped up to offer their side of the story -- one that involves Varnell's paranoid schizophrenia, which goes unmentioned in the government's filings.

We as a family are extremely distraught about this situation with our son Jerry Drake Varnell, but what the public must understand is that he is a paranoid schizophrenic and is extremely susceptible to different types of ideology that normal people would deem immoral. Underneath his condition, he is a sweet-hearted person and we are extremely shocked that this event has happened. However, what truly has us flabbergasted is the fact that the FBI knew he was schizophrenic. The State of Oklahoma found him mentally incompetent and we, his parents have legal guardianship over him by the Court. These documents are sealed from the public, which is why no news media outlet has been able to obtain them. The FBI clearly knew that he was schizophrenic because they have gathered every ounce of information on him.

If true, this prosecution will make the FBI's counterterrorist operations look even worse. This isn't the first time the FBI has exploited the weakest of humans to rack up terrorist busts. This includes the prosecution of a man agents referred to as a "retarded fool" and the dumping of an 18-year-old with a 51 IQ into the lap of local prosecutors. Now we have the FBI steering a paranoid schizophrenic into a self-destructive path, utilizing a confidential informant who apparently made several misrepresentations during his work with the FBI.

The CI claimed to have seen a "bunker" at Varnell's home (where he lived with his parents because he is mentally unable to live on his own). The Varnells claim the "bunker" is nothing more than a partially-buried storage container, meant to be used as a storm shelter. Adding to its un-bunkerlike aspects are the fact that it locks from the outside and contains no food, water, or source of electricity.

From the criminal complaint, other facts emerge. Varnell lived with his parents and only had access to the full residence occasionally. Varnell talked about bombing US government buildings but was unable to secure a vehicle to house the explosives. (He told the undercover agent he might be able to "borrow" a vehicle from some relatives.) The affidavit says the undercover agent supplied everything needed to build the explosive device -- not a single element came from the alleged terrorist. The undercover agent also supplied the vehicle.

So, in the end, the FBI got its man: Jerry Drake Varnell, lifelong schizophrenic with the inability to obtain a vehicle, much less build his own bomb. Varnell talked a lot about sending a message to the government using violent means, but it's unclear how much he actually would have done if he hadn't been nudged towards self-destruction by an overly-helpful CI and FBI undercover agent.

According to the Varnells, this may never have gone this far if the FBI's informant had simply done what he'd been told. The Varnells claim Jerry Varnell's father kicked the CI off the property and told him he'd be arrested for trespassing if he came back. This was due to apparent drug abuse by the CI. And yet, the CI returned, presumably at the behest of the FBI, which was willing to overlook the CI's drug use if it could keep its terrorism sting on track.

Varnell's lawyer has asked for a hearing [PDF] to determine whether Varnell is competent to stand trial. Based on Varnell's long history of mental illness, it would seem apparent the man can't be expected to stand trial, much less carry out an attack on a federal building… at least not without a lot of outside help from the feds themselves.

Filed Under: fbi, terrorism

UK Home Secretary Doesn't Want Backdoors; She Just Wants Companies To Stop Offering Encryption Because No One Wants It

from the insanity-plea dept

UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd, perhaps now most famously known for not knowing the "necessary hashtags," is back to beating up on encryption because it (no citation provided) helps terrorists get away with terrorism. Her op-ed piece for The Telegraph begins as so many pleas to undermine encryption do: with the horrors perpetrated by terrorists. Only now, the parade of horrors tends to sound something like a "CSI: Cyber" exposition outtake.

Nearly every plot we uncover has a digital element to it. Go online and you will find your own “do-it-yourself” jihad at the click of a mouse. The tentacles of Daesh (Isil) recruiters in Syria reach back to the laptops in the bedrooms of boys – and increasingly girls – in our towns and cities up and down the country. The purveyors of far-Right extremism pump out their brand of hate across the globe, without ever leaving home.

The scale of what is happening cannot be downplayed. Before he mowed down the innocents on Westminster Bridge and stabbed Pc Keith Palmer, Khalid Masood is thought to have watched extremist videos. Daesh claim to have created 11,000 new social media accounts in May alone. Our analysis shows that three-quarters of Daesh propaganda stories are shared within the first three hours of release – an hour quicker than a year ago.

An hour quicker! In internet time, that's practically a millennium. It's tough to tell what Rudd's attempting to make of this technobabble. Is she suggesting future Masoods will act quicker because they'll be able to complete their viewing of extremist videos faster? If that's the case, maybe regulators need to step in and throttle broadband connections. The more the video buffers, the less likely it is someone will watch it… and the less likely it is someone will carry out an attack. The math(s) work out.

Unfortunately, this is not where the op-ed is heading. Sadly, Rudd is here to take a swing at encryption. But she takes a swing at it in prime passive-aggressive, Ike Turner-style, saying she loves it even as the blows rain home.

Encryption plays a fundamental role in protecting us all online. It is key to growing the digital economy, and delivering public services online.

I ain't mad at ya.

But, like many powerful technologies, encrypted services are used and abused by a small minority of people. The particular challenge is around so called “end-to-end” encryption, where even the service provider cannot see the content of a communication.

But you mess me up so much inside.

To be very clear – Government supports strong encryption and has no intention of banning end-to-end encryption. But the inability to gain access to encrypted data in specific and targeted instances – even with a warrant signed by a Secretary of State and a senior judge – is right now severely limiting our agencies’ ability to stop terrorist attacks and bring criminals to justice.

In a fun twist, Rudd doesn't call for harder nerding. (Note: Rudd is visiting Silicon Valley to meet with tech leaders, so it's safe to assume requests for harder nerding will be made, even if not directly in this op-ed.)

No, Rudd doesn't want the impossible: secure, backdoored encryption. Instead, she wants to know if tech companies will just take the encryption off one end of the end-to-end. Her bolstering argument? The public doesn't give a shit about encryption. It just wants easy-to-use communication tools.

Real people often prefer ease of use and a multitude of features to perfect, unbreakable security. So this is not about asking the companies to break encryption or create so called “back doors”. Who uses WhatsApp because it is end-to-end encrypted, rather than because it is an incredibly user-friendly and cheap way of staying in touch with friends and family? Companies are constantly making trade-offs between security and “usability”, and it is here where our experts believe opportunities may lie.

Having set up her straw app user, Rudd moves towards her conclusion… which is severely lacking in anything cohesive or coherent. The "opportunities" lie in persuading tech companies to provide users with less secure communications platforms. Should be an easy sale, especially if the average user doesn't care about security. But maybe the company does and doesn't want to give bad people an easy way to access the communications of others. Hence encryption. Hence end-to-end, so even if the provider is breached, there's still nothing to access.

What Rudd is looking for can't be called a trade-off. The government has nothing tech companies want. All they can offer is platitudes about fighting crime and national security. The government, meanwhile, wants tech companies to write software the way the government wants it, rather than how the company or its users want it. That's not a trade-off. That's a one-way street where every internet communication platform becomes a proxy government agency.

Rudd's idea is bad and she should feel bad. But I get the feeling that no matter how many tech experts she talks to, she's still going to believe her way is the right and best way.

Filed Under: amber rudd, backdoors, encryption, fud, terrorism, uk

May And Macron's Ridiculous Adventure In Censoring The Internet

from the these-are-bad-ideas,-marc dept

For some observers, struggling UK Prime Minister Theresa May and triumphant French President Emmanuel Macron may seem at somewhat opposite ends of the current political climate. But... apparently they agree on one really, really bad idea: that it's time to massively censor the internet and to blame tech companies if they don't censor enough. We've been explaining for many years why this is a bad idea, but apparently we need to do so again. First, the plan:

The prime minister and Emmanuel Macron will launch a joint campaign on Tuesday to tackle online radicalisation, a personal priority of the prime minister from her time as home secretary and a comfortable agenda for the pair to agree upon before Brexit negotiations begin next week.

In particular, the two say they intend to create a new legal liability for tech companies if they fail to remove inflammatory content, which could include penalties such as fines.

It's no surprise that May is pushing for this. She's been pushing to regulate the internet for quite some time, and it's a core part of her platform (which is a bit "weak and wobbly" as they say these days). But, Macron... well, he's been held up repeatedly as a "friend" to the tech industry, so this has to be seen as a bit of a surprise in the internet world. Of course, there were hints that he might not really be all that well versed in the way technology works when he appeared to support backdoors to encryption. This latest move just confirms an unfortunate ignorance about the technology/internet landscape.

Creating a new legal liability for companies that fail to remove inflammatory content is going to be a massive disaster in many, many ways. It will damage the internet economy in Europe. It will create massive harms to free speech. And, it won't do what they seem to think it will do: it won't stop terrorists from posting propaganda online.

First, a regime that fines companies for failing to remove "inflammatory content" will lead companies to censor broadly, out of fear that any borderline content they leave up may open them up to massive liability. This is exactly how the Great Firewall of China works. The Chinese government doesn't just say "censor bad stuff" it tells ISPs that they'll get fined if they allow bad stuff through. And thus, the ISPs over-censor to avoid leaving anything that might put them at risk online. And, when it comes to free speech, doing something "the way the Chinese do things" tends not to be the best idea.

Second, related to that, once they open up this can of worms, they may not be happy with how it turns out. It's great to say that you don't think "inflammatory content" should be allowed online, but who gets to define "inflammatory" makes a pretty big difference. As we've noted, you always want to design regulations as if the people you trust the least are in power. This is not to say that May or Macron themselves would do this, but would you put it past some politicians in power to argue that online content from political opponents is too "inflammatory" and thus must be removed? What about if the press reveals corruption? That could be considered "inflammatory" as well.

Third, one person's "inflammatory content" is another's "useful evidence." We see this all the time in other censorship cases. I've written before about how YouTube was pressured to take down inflammatory "terrorist videos" in the past, and ended up taking down the account of a human rights group documenting atrocities in Syria. It's easy to say "take down terrorist content!" but it's not always easy to recognize what's terrorist propaganda versus what's people documenting the horrors that the terrorists are committing.

Fourth, time and time again, we've seen the intelligence community come out and argue against this kind of censorship, noting that terrorists posting inflammatory content online is a really useful way to figure out what they're up to. Demanding that platforms take down these useful sources of open source intelligence will actually harm the intelligence community's ability to monitor and stop plans of attack.

Fifth, this move will almost certainly be used by autocratic and dictatorial regimes to justify their own widespread crackdown on free speech. And, sure, they might do that already, but removing the moral high ground can be deeply problematic in diplomatic situations. How can UK or French diplomats push for more freedom of expression in, say, China or Iran, if they're actively putting this in place back home. Sure, you can say that they're different, but the officials from those countries will argue it's the exact same thing: you're censoring the internet to "protect" people from "dangerous content." Well, they'll argue, that's the same thing that we do -- it's just that we have different threats we need to protect against.

Sixth, this will inevitably be bad for innovation and the economy in both countries. Time and time again, we've seen that leaving internet platforms free from liability for the actions of their users is what has helped those companies develop, provide useful services, employ lots of people and generally help create new economic opportunities. With this plan, sure, Google and Facebook can likely figure out some way to censor some content -- and can probably stand the risk of some liability. But pretty much every other smaller platform? Good luck. If I were running a platform company in either country, I'd be looking to move elsewhere, because the cost of complying and the risk of failing to take down content would simply be too much.

Seventh, and finally, it won't work. The "problem" is not that this content exists. The problem is that lots of people out there are susceptible to such content and are interested and/or swayed by it. That's a much more fundamental problem, and censoring such content doesn't do much good. Instead, it tends to only rally up those who were already susceptible to it. They see that the powers-that-be -- who they already don't trust -- find this content "too dangerous" and that draws them in even closer to it. And of course that content will find many other places to live online.

Censoring "bad" content always seems like an easy solution if you haven't actually thought through the issues. It's not a surprise that May hasn't -- but we had hopes that perhaps Macron wouldn't be swayed by the same weak arguments.

Filed Under: censorship, emmanuel macron, filtering, france, free speech, inflammatory content, intermediary liability, terrorism, terrorist content, theresa may, uk
Companies: facebook, google

The Importance Of Defending Section 230 Even When It's Hard

from the preventing-tough-cases-from-making-bad-law dept

The Copia Institute filed another amicus brief this week, this time in Fields v. Twitter. Fields v. Twitter is one of a flurry of cases being brought against Internet platforms alleging that they are liable for the harms caused by the terrorists using their sites. The facts in these cases are invariably awful: often people have been brutally killed and their loved ones are seeking redress for their loss. There is a natural, and perfectly reasonable, temptation to give them some sort of remedy from someone, but as we argued in our brief, that someone cannot be an internet platform.

There are several reasons for this, including some that have nothing to do with Section 230. For instance, even if Section 230 did not exist and platforms could be liable for the harms resulting from their users' use of their services, for them to be liable there would have to be a clear connection between the use of the platform and the harm. Otherwise, based on the general rules of tort law, there could be no liability. In this particular case, for instance, there is a fairly weak connection between ISIS members using Twitter and the specific terrorist act that killed the plaintiffs' family members.

But we left that point to Twitter to ably argue. Our brief focused exclusively on the fact that Section 230 should prevent a court from ever even reaching the tort law analysis. With Section 230, a platform should never find itself having to defend against liability for harm that may have resulted from how people used it. Our concern is that in several recent cases with their own terrible facts, the Ninth Circuit in particular has found itself willing to make exceptions to that rule. As much as we were supporting Twitter in this case, trying to help ensure the Ninth Circuit does not overturn the very good District Court decision that had correctly applied Section 230 to dismiss the case, we also had an eye to the long view of reversing this trend.

The problem is, like the First Amendment itself, speech protections only work as speech protections when they always work. When one can find exemptions here and there, all of a sudden none of these protections are effective and it chills the speech of those who were counting on them because no one can be sure whether or not the speech will ultimately be protected. In the case of Section 230, that chilling arises because if the platforms cannot be sure whether they will be protected from liability in their users' speech, then they will have to assume they are not. Suddenly they will have to make all the censoring choices with respect to their users' content that Section 230 was designed to prevent, just to avoid the specter of potentially crippling liability.

One of the points we emphasized in our brief was how such an outcome flouts what Congress intended when it passed Section 230. As we said then, and will say again as many times as we need to, the point of Section 230 is to encourage the most beneficial online speech and also minimize the worst speech. To see how this dual-purposed intent plays out we need to look at the statute as a whole, beyond the part of it that usually gets the most attention, at Subsection (c)(1), which is about how platforms are immune from liability manifest in their users' speech. There is also another equally important part of the statute, at Subsection (c)(2), that immunizes platforms from liability when they take steps to minimize harmful online content on their systems. This subsection rarely gets attention, but it's important not to overlook, especially as people look at the effect of the first subsection and worry that it might encourage too much "bad" speech. Congress anticipated this problem and built in a remedy as part of a balanced approach to encourage the most good speech and least bad speech. The problem with now holding online services liable for bad uses of their platforms is that it distorts this balance, and in distorting this balance undermines both these goals.

We used the cases of Barnes v. Yahoo and Doe 14 v. Internet Brands to illustrate this point. Both of these are cases where the Ninth Circuit did make exemptions and found Section 230 not to apply to certain negative uses of Internet platforms. For instance, in Barnes Section 230 was actually found to apply to part of the claim directly relating to the speech in question, which was a good result, but the lawsuit also included a promissory estoppel claim, and the Court decided that because it was not directly related to liability arising from content it could go forward. The problem here was that Yahoo had separately promised to take down certain content, and so the Court found it potentially liable for not having lived up to its promise. But as we pointed out, the effect of the Barnes case was that now platforms never promise to take content down. Even though Congress intended for Section 230 to help Internet platforms perform a hygiene function to help keep the Internet free of the worst content, by discouraging platforms from going the extra mile it has instead had the opposite effect from the one Congress intended. That's why courts should not continue to find reasons to limit Section 230's applicability. Even if they think they have good reason to find one, that very justification itself will be better advanced when Section 230's protection can be most robust.

We also pointed out that in terms of the other policy goal behind Section 230, to encourage more online speech, divining exemptions from Section 230's coverage would undermine that goal as well. In this case the plaintiffs want providers to have to deny terrorists the use of their platforms. As a separate amicus brief by the Internet Association explained, platforms actually want to keep terrorists off and go to great lengths to try to do so. But as the saying goes, "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In other words, deciding who to label a terrorist can often be a difficult thing to do, as well as an extremely political decision to make. It's certainly beyond the ken of an "intermediary" to determine -- especially a smaller, less capitalized, or potentially even individual one. (Have you ever had people comment on one of your Facebook posts? Congratulations! You are an intermediary, and Section 230 applies to you too.)

Even if the rule were that a platform had to check prospective users' names against a government list, there are significant constitutional concerns, particularly regarding the right to speak anonymously and the prohibition against prior restraint, that arise from having to make these sorts of registration denial decisions this way. There are also often significant constitutional problems with how these lists are made at all. As the amicus brief by EFF and CDT also argued, we can't create a system where the statutory protection platforms depend on to be able to foster online free speech is conditioned on coercing platforms to undermine it.

Filed Under: fields v. twitter, free speech, intermediary liability, material support for terrorism, platforms, section 230, tamara fields, terrorism
Companies: twitter

Theresa May's Plan To Regulate The Internet Won't Stop Terrorism; It Might Make Things Worse

from the counterproductive-not-counterterrorism dept

In the wake of Saturday's horrific attack on London—the third high-profile terrorist incident in the United Kingdom in the past three months—British policymakers were left scrambling for better ways to combat violent extremism. Prime Minister Theresa May called for new global efforts to "regulate cyberspace to prevent the spread of extremism and terrorist planning," charging that the internet cannot be allowed to be a "safe space" for terrorists.

While May's desire for a strong response is easy to understand, her call for more expansive internet regulation and censorship is wrongheaded and will make it harder to win the war against violent extremism.

May didn't specify the details of her proposal, but to many observers it was clear that she's asking for sweeping new powers to compel tech companies to help spy on citizens and censor online content. Unfortunately, this isn't simply a knee-jerk response to horrible circumstances, but reflects a longstanding ambition of May's Conservative Party to impose draconian controls on cyberspace.

As home secretary, May introduced and oversaw passage of the Investigatory Powers Act, legislation that civil-liberties advocates have called the worst surveillance bill of any western democracy. Following last month's attack in Manchester, May's government purportedly briefed newspapers of its intent to invoke the law to compel internet companies to "break their own security so that messages can be read by intelligence agencies." David Cameron, May's predecessor, argued for internet companies to be compelled to create backdoors in their software so that there would be no digital communications "we cannot read."

Even if the U.K. government got the expansive new powers it seems to want, there's no reason to think it would stop terrorism in its tracks. Researchers have found that suicide attacks are a social phenomenon involving support networks that radicalize the perpetrators. Most people in these networks aren't themselves terrorists. Allowing them to operate openly makes it easier both for moderating voices to intervene and for intelligence agencies to track. If the communities are forced underground and offline, they'll be harder to infiltrate and monitor.

Moreover, there's no way to create communications backdoors that only apply to bad guys. While committed terrorists could easily adapt to open source or analog means of communication in response to a government-mandated backdoor, law-abiding civilians would be exposed to new cybersecurity risks and have their economic and civil liberties compromised. Experience has shown that backdoors inevitably will be hacked, making everyone less safe. As the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee noted in its report on the topic, all of the proposed solutions to access encrypted information "come with significant trade-offs, and provide little guarantee of successfully addressing the issue."

The policy also would have serious consequences for the United Kingdom's global competitiveness. As the MIT report "Keys Under Doormats" notes, mandating architectures that allow access to encrypted communications "risks the real economic, geopolitical, and strategic benefits of an open and secure internet for law enforcement gains that are at best minor and tactical." One of the factors behind the West's dominance in technology and innovation is that its apps are not government-sanctioned, as they are in China or Russia. After all, what consumer would want to buy an app or device that had a built-in backdoor?

All this isn't to say that governments should stand back and do nothing to stop terrorist activity online. It's illegal almost everywhere in the world to provide material support to terrorist activities, not to mention the obvious crimes of murder and conspiracy. But terrorists don't have free reign in cyberspace. In addition to the United Kingdom's comparatively robust domestic snooping powers, the nation's Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) already coordinates flagging and removing unlawful terrorist-related content. Since its launch in 2010, it has worked with online service providers to remove a quarter million pieces of terrorist material.

There also are already international agreements to help authorities uncover and track people engaged in these activities and to exchange intelligence about them across borders. For instance, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) allow the cross-border flow of data about criminal matters between investigative bodies. While the current MLAT agreements can be slow and cumbersome, efforts are underway to create a new process and allow U.K. authorities to go directly to U.S.-based online service providers, upon meeting certain conditions.

The United Kingdom also is already a key part of the national security data-sharing arrangements between the "Five Eyes," under which intelligence from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, of course, the United States is shared almost in real time. While the details are classified, there is evidence that this intelligence sharing has prevented numerous attacks.

To her credit, May emphasized the importance of improving these sorts of international agreements in her speech about fighting terrorism. This is an area where we can and should make positive steps toward reform, increasing the capacity for intelligence sharing in real time and improving cooperation, while ensuring that the right checks and balances are in place.

Combating violent extremism online doesn't have to be a Pyrrhic victory for democratic societies. Certain risks are unavoidable, and no level of internet regulation will stop the most determined attackers. But there are real steps policymakers can take now to enhance our tools without sacrificing our security, liberty or global competitiveness in the process.

Zach Graves is tech policy director and Arthur Rizer is national security and justice policy director for the R Street Institut

Filed Under: censorship, encryption, internet, terrorism, theresa may, uk

Theresa May Blames The Internet For London Bridge Attack; Repeats Demands To Censor It

from the not-very-subtle dept

It's no secret that Theresa May is no fan of the internet and will use basically any excuse at all to push for greater censorship on the internet. Going back to the time when she was Home Secretary, she was already slamming the internet as being responsible for ISIS and promising to censor it. Since she's become Prime Minister it's only gotten worse. As part of her manifesto for the general election coming up later this week, a key part of her party's promise was to censor the internet. And May and her friends seem to leave no tragedy unexploited. With the attack in Manchester a couple weeks back, she used it as an excuse to push the plan to kill end-to-end encryption. And with this weekend's London Bridge attack, she immediately blamed the internet and promised more censorship:

"We cannot allow this ideology the safe space it needs to breed - yet that is precisely what the internet, and the big companies that provide internet-based services provide,” Ms May said.

“We need to work with allies democratic governments to reach international agreements to regulate cyberspace to prevent the spread of extremist and terrorism planning."

Of course, there's no indication that the internet had anything to do with the attack at all. Indeed, another news report claimed that one of the suspects had to ask a neighbor where he could rent the van that was later used in the attack, leading some to point out that if someone can't even Google that kind of info... the internet might not be to blame here:

Or this perfectly snarky response to blaming the internet for a real world stabbing attack:

In response to all of this nonsense, Charles Arthur has an excellent column at the Guardian pointing out that responding to all this by censoring the internet not only won't help, it will almost certainly make things worse.

The problem is this: things can be done, but they open a Pandora’s box. The British government could insist that the identities of people who search for certain terror-related words on Google or YouTube or Facebook be handed over. But then what’s to stop the Turkish government, or embassy, demanding the same about Kurdish people searching on “dangerous” topics? The home secretary, Amber Rudd, could insist that WhatsApp hand over the names and details of every communicant with a phone number. But then what happens in Iran or Saudi Arabia? What’s the calculus of our freedom against others’?

Similarly, May and Rudd and every home secretary back to Jack Straw keep being told that encryption (as used in WhatsApp particularly) can’t be repealed, because it’s mathematics, not material. People can write apps whose messages can’t be read in transit, only at the ends. Ban WhatsApp, and would-be terrorists will find another app, as will those struggling against dictators.

Blaming the internet for some angry individuals committing violent acts isn't just dumb and nonsensical, it's counterproductive and will almost certainly do more harm than good. It's a way for May and her colleagues to try to pin the blame on "something else" rather than to admit that they don't appear to have a real strategy or plan for almost anything. Blame goes a long way, but blaming a tool that people use basically everyday for all sorts of useful reasons, seems really short-sighted.

Filed Under: censorship, internet, london bridge, moral panic, terrorism, theresa may, uk

Former FCC Commissioner Uses Manchester Bombing As A Prop To Claim Net Neutrality Aids Terrorism

from the grotesqueries dept

Since the FCC's decision to begin gutting net neutrality earlier this month, broadband providers have been busy as hell trying to convince the public that gutting these essential consumer protections is just no big deal. We, of course, had that horrible Verizon video in which the company not only falsely claimed that net neutrality isn't being killed, but tried to pretend ISPs like Verizon didn't just spend a decade trying to kill it. Other ISPs like Comcast have penned similar "nothing to see here, guys" missives, in which they insist this whole thing is all some kind of big misunderstanding.

While these ISPs use polite, sensible-sounding public statements to insist that nothing's really changing and none of this will hurt consumers (that's false, if it needs repeating), their usual assortment of think tankers, astroturfers, lobbyists, consultants, hired economists and other "doller per holler" policy folks are under no such constraints, and have been busy taking an already hyperbolic debate to an entirely new level.

For example, just two days removed from the recent Manchester bombing, Forbes ran this abomination of an attempt at prose by former FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, who now works at the ISP-funded Hudson Institute. In none-too-subtle fashion, Furchtgott-Roth uses the Manchester attack to suggest that none of this bloodshed would have happened if it wasn't for net neutrality protections:

A sensible question is why civilized governments do not seek to deprive terrorists of unfettered access to the Internet...Sadly, here in America, limiting access to the Internet would be illegal under the euphemistic term “network neutrality,” the two-year-old experiment in federal regulation of the Internet...To its supporters, network neutrality is a bulwark of civilization. But network neutrality is also a shield for terrorists who seek to destroy civilization.

If Furchtgott-Roth was hoping to craft a missive perfectly illustrating he has no idea how any of this works, this stumbling bit of prattle was a smashing success.

So, one, what kind of person, just two days removed from such a grisly attack, could think writing anything like this was a good idea? That said, to claim that you can somehow magically prevent just "terrorists" from accessing the internet quite clearly indicates he has no idea how the internet or extremism works. Net neutrality encourages the internet as a level playing field free of the anti-competitive or editorial meddling of giant telecom conglomerates comfortable in uncompetitive markets. Furchtgott-Roth's problem isn't with net neutrality -- it's just that he thinks government doesn't censor internet content enough.

So, quite clearly on this list of things Furchtgott-Roth doesn't understand sits free speech, first and foremost:

Under network neutrality, broadband companies--such as AT&T, Charter, Comcast, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon—are prohibited from discriminating against any lawful websites or content. There is no clear distinction between lawful and unlawful websites and content. The net result is a broadband company could and likely would be sued for blocking websites housing information about recruitment and organization for ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Ku Klux Klan, or other terrorist groups. It is also illegal to block content that instructs viewers on how to manufacture explosives such as nail bombs.

So again, Furchtgott-Roth's problem here clearly isn't with the relatively basic net neutrality rules the FCC adopted. His problem is with the fact that governments and broadband providers aren't censoring internet content enough. But it's not the FCC's net neutrality rules that prohibit that: it's simply common sense. Even the large ISPs, which have said all manner of stupid things on this subject, have no problem with the anti-blocking provisions of the rules. They have zero interest in blocking specific websites, or the public relations shitshow that would occur were they to start.

Bizarrely, the author then proceeds to try and argue that gutting net neutrality rules would be a wonderful opportunity for ISPs to compete -- based on which one engages in the most creative, ham-fisted censorship of internet content:

A better approach would be to allow consumer preferences and competitive market forces for ISPs to fight against terrorism. In Israel, an ISP Internet Rimon provides filtering technology to block indecent images. A similar approach could be used in the United States to block terrorism. Different ISPs could compete on the basis of their degree of “anti-terrorist” efforts. Many individuals would be attracted to an anti-terrorist ISP. Some state and local governments might mandate purchase of such services by government institutions.

This ignores that there's little to no competition in the US broadband market, ensuring that this extremely distorted vision of competition would never materialize. Now, you can argue that if you fixed broadband competition you'd fix net neutrality, since the latter is simply a symptom of the former. But our government has long turned a blind eye to this problem at large campaign contributor behest, leaving us with the kind of anti-competitive mess we're trying to fix today. Insisting that gutting these consumer protections and dramatically ramping up censorship somehow fixes any of this is the intellectual equivalent of indigestion.

Having had a front-row seat for most of it, I've seen all manner of horrible arguments in the net neutrality debate. And while some have teetered close to this level of recklessness and absurdity (like the time Ajit Pai insisted net neutrality somehow encouraged dictators in Iran and North Korea), Furchtgott-Roth somehow managed to take things to an entirely new level. Using the Manchester bombing as a prop to justify dismantling essential consumer protections is simply grotesque, and represents a new, embarrassing low in what was already a swampy schlog of a technology policy debate.

Filed Under: censorship, fcc, free speech, harold furchtgott-roth, manchester bombing, net neutrality, terrorism

Judge Dumps Two Lawsuits Attempting To Hold Facebook Responsible For Acts Of Terrorism

from the not-how-this-works dept

Two lawsuits filed by victims of terrorist attacks against Facebook have been dismissed. Both suits alleged Facebook was complicit in acts of terrorism simply because it (subjectively) didn't do enough to discourage use of the platform by alleged terrorists.

One lawsuit (Cohen v. Facebook) plead on behalf of "20,000 similarly-situated" residents of Israel who continue to face the threat of violence at the hands of terrorist organization Hamas. The other (Force v. Facebook) also featured multiple plaintiffs but was limited to families of victims of Hamas attacks. Neither case presented legitimate complaints and both advanced novel arguments in an attempt to avoid a dismissal under Section 230.

The alternative routes to judgment worked out no better for the plaintiffs, as Eric Goldman reports. The Cohen class action presented a legal theory that couldn't even be addressed by the court due to a lack of jurisdiction. From the decision [PDF]:

the Cohen Plaintiffs do not seek redress for past actions but instead seek prospective, injunctiye relief based on their allegation that Facebook’s actions increase their risk of harm from future terrorist attacks. This claimed harm relies on multiple conjectural leaps, most significantly its central assumption that the Cohen Plaintiffs will be among the victims of an as-yet unknown terrorist attack by independent actors not before the court. The Cohen Complaint contains no factual allegation that could form a basis to conclude that those individuals in particular are at any “substantial” or “certainly impending” risk of future harm. At most, the Complaint shows a general risk of harm to residents of Israel and impliedly asks the court to extract a risk of harm to the Cohen Plaintiffs based on this risk. Without further allegations, however, the court sees no basis to conclude that the Cohen Plaintiffs “specifically will be the target of any future, let alone imminent, terrorist attack.”

Nor can the Cohen Plaintiffs rescue their claims by arguing that they suffer a present harm resulting from their fear of such attacks, as “allegations of a subjective [fear] are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or threat of a specific future harm.” While the court does not question the sincerity of the Cohen Plaintiffs’ anxieties, their subjective fears cannot confer standing absent a sufficient showing of the risk of future harm.

The Force plaintiffs did not entirely avoid a Section 230 argument, but posited the immunity does not apply to content posted outside of the United States. The court grants that this legal theory is mostly unexplored at this point, but that the plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of an extraterritorial-reliant legal theory while bringing legal action in a US court against a US-based company.

In light of its focus on limiting civil liability, the court concludes that the relevant location is that where the grant of immunity is applied, i.e. the situs of the litigation. Section 230(c)(1) suggests a number of "territorial relationships and events," which are generally divisible into those associated with the underlying claim (e.g., the location of the information content provider, the intemet service provider, or the act of publishing or speaking) and the location associated with the imposition of liability, i.e. where the intemet service provider is to be "treated" as the publisher or speaker. Given the statutory focus on limiting liability, however, the location of the relevant "territorial events" or "relationships" cannot be the place in which the claims arise but instead must be where redress is sought and immunity is needed.

With this in mind, the court concludes that the Force Action does not require an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 230(c)(1). As the situs of the litigation is New York, the relevant "territorial events or relationships" occur domestically. Accordingly, the court rejects the Force Plaintiffs argument that Facebook should be denied immunity under Section 230(c)(1).

As Goldman points out, this looks like a routine and logical application of Section 230 immunity, but if arguments like these are entertained in other courts, it could pose some serious, irreparable problems for social media platforms.

The plaintiffs essentially sought to treat Facebook as the financial guarantor of all terrorist-caused harms to all victims, regardless of what role Facebook played in causing those harms. Such an unbounded financial exposure could dwarf Facebook’s market capitalization, meaning that the theories behind these lawsuits pose an existential threat to Facebook, other social media sites, and possibly the entire Internet. Thus, the judge’s well-reasoned and clear rejection of the plaintiff’s claim is a big win for Facebook and the Internet.

This decision will be appealed by both parties. There's been no decision yet on a similar suit filed in the Ninth Circuit, but the chances of these legal theories succeeding is very slim. But it's not impossible to end up with a bad ruling or, at the very least, precedent that weakens Section 230 without removing it completely. We've seen it happen before. But so far courts haven't felt the urge to hold social media platforms directly responsible for terrorists' acts of violence and it's unlikely these two complainants are going to change that.

Filed Under: intermediary liability, liability, material support for terrorism, terrorism
Companies: facebook

This Makes No Sense: US To Ban Laptops On All Flights From Europe

from the yes,-but-wait-what? dept

Earlier this year we wrote about the nonsensical move by the Department of Homeland Security to ban laptops and tablets in the cabin on flights from a bunch of cities in the Middle East. The rumored reason was discoveries that terrorists had learned how to make bombs out of laptops. As we noted, this made almost no sense at all when you challenged any of the assumptions. But, never let logic and reason get in the way of a bit of inane security theater. Because now Homeland Security is about to announce that it's now banning laptops in the cabins on all flights from Europe (it's unclear if this will also apply on flights from the US to Europe, but it seems likely that European airports will reciprocate).

While this does answer one of the questions raised by the original ban ("why won't potential terrorists just fly out of other countries?") it still raises a host of other questions. Again: why won't this apply to flights from other countries? Or domestic flights? Or all flights? But, really, that just raises an even larger issue, which is that if you want to protect 100% of all flights 100% of the time from ever having a problem in which people might die, the answer is ground all flights and never let anyone fly anywhere ever. Problem solved. Of course, the cost of such a solution would be horrendous -- which is why we don't do it. But that's the key issue: all of these things involve tradeoffs. All too frequently, it appears that government officials -- especially those on the national security side of things -- don't care at all about the tradeoffs. They just care about blocking any possible attack no matter how unlikely or how remote the chance of such an attack might be, and without any consideration of the costs and inconveniences to everyone else. And, yes, it's reasonable to point out that a single attack would be very, very costly as well. And there's clearly a reason to protect heavily against attacks. But there's still a balance.

And there must be a better solution. If laptops are a risk factor, it's difficult to see how putting them in the cargo hold -- where there's no one to stop a fire -- is a better solution. Hell, most current airline rules require passengers to store all lithium ion batteries in carry-on luggage for exactly that reason. Putting them all in the hold would seem to increase the risk of accidental explosions and fires that might cause just as much, if not more, damage. And, of course, forcing people to give up their laptops has a secondary (but very serious) problem: for anyone traveling with sensitive information (lawyers, doctors, reporters, business execs, public officials, etc.) giving up your laptop is a massive security risk.

In other words, the "cost" of this solution is ridiculously high for a very large number of people, for whom flying to or from Europe has just become a massive inconvenience and tremendously problematic to justify given the personal risk. And for what? Vague and unclear threats about "possible" exploding laptops? I'm sure that no one wants to be on a flight with a laptop that will explode (whether on purpose or not), but there has to be a better way to tackle the problem than doing a blanket ban on laptops in the cabin. And, yes, perhaps this sounds like saying nerd harder back to Homeland Security, but this is a case where there clearly are more reasonable tradeoffs that can and should be explored, well short of inconveniencing everyone and creating a very different (but very serious) kind of security threat by forcing people to give up their laptops.

Filed Under: ban, computers, cost benefit, dhs, europe, homeland security, laptops, terrorism