Civil Liberties Board Completely Destroys Arguments For Bulk Metadata Collection: Program Is Both Illegal And Unconstitutional

from the which-will-now-be-ignored dept

As expected, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) has come out with it's quite scathing report concerning the federal government's interpretation of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. The full report is quite readable and well worth reading, no matter how familiar you are with the program. If you're not familiar, it lays out all the details. If you are familiar, it still may fill in a number of useful gaps as well. While the full recommendations and conclusions were not supported unanimously by the board, the majority did agree that not only is the program unconstitutional, but that it involves a gross misinterpretation of the law. The executive summary makes the point pretty clearly:

Section 215 is designed to enable the FBI to acquire records that a business has in its possession, as part of an FBI investigation, when those records are relevant to the investigation. Yet the operation of the NSA’s bulk telephone records program bears almost no resemblance to that description. While the Board believes that this program has been conducted in good faith to vigorously pursue the government’s counterterrorism mission and appreciates the government’s efforts to bring the program under the oversight of the FISA court, the Board concludes that Section 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the program.

There are four grounds upon which we find that the telephone records program fails to comply with Section 215. First, the telephone records acquired under the program have no connection to any specific FBI investigation at the time of their collection. Second, because the records are collected in bulk — potentially encompassing all telephone calling records across the nation — they cannot be regarded as “relevant” to any FBI investigation as required by the statute without redefining the word relevant in a manner that is circular, unlimited in scope, and out of step with the case law from analogous legal contexts involving the production of records. Third, the program operates by putting telephone companies under an obligation to furnish new calling records on a daily basis as they are generated (instead of turning over records already in their possession) — an approach lacking foundation in the statute and one that is inconsistent with FISA as a whole. Fourth, the statute permits only the FBI to obtain items for use in its investigations; it does not authorize the NSA to collect anything.

In addition, we conclude that the program violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. That statute prohibits telephone companies from sharing customer records with the government except in response to specific enumerated circumstances, which do not include Section 215 orders.

Finally, we do not agree that the program can be considered statutorily authorized because Congress twice delayed the expiration of Section 215 during the operation of the program without amending the statute. The “reenactment doctrine,” under which Congress is presumed to have adopted settled administrative or judicial interpretations of a statute, does not trump the plain meaning of a law, and cannot save an administrative or judicial interpretation that contradicts the statute itself. Moreover, the circumstances presented here differ in pivotal ways from any in which the reenactment doctrine has ever been applied, and applying the doctrine would undermine the public’s ability to know what the law is and hold their elected representatives accountable for their legislative choices.

Basically, in those four short paragraphs, the PCLOB dismantles nearly all of the arguments that people have put forth to support the bulk collection of metadata, and make it clear that the DOJ, NSA and FISC are clearly twisting the plain language meaning of Section 215 to support what is ultimately an unconstitutional program.

On that front, the report notes clearly the Constitutional issues:

The NSA’s telephone records program also raises concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We explore these concerns and explain that while government officials are entitled to rely on existing Supreme Court doctrine in formulating policy, the existing doctrine does not fully answer whether the Section 215 telephone records program is constitutionally sound. In particular, the scope and duration of the program are beyond anything ever before confronted by the courts, and as a result of technological developments, the government possesses capabilities to collect, store, and analyze data not available when existing Supreme Court doctrine was developed. Without seeking to predict the direction of changes in Supreme Court doctrine, the Board urges as a policy matter that the government consider how to preserve underlying constitutional guarantees in the face of modern communications technology and surveillance capabilities.

While the PCLOB repeatedly states it believes that the government acted in good faith, it nonetheless finds the program immensely troubling. The idea that collecting all phone metadata is okay simply is not supported by what the law itself actually says:

Notably, Section 215 requires that records sought be relevant to “an” authorized investigation. Elsewhere, the statute similarly describes the records that can be obtained under its auspices as those sought “for an investigation.” The use of the singular noun in these passages signals an expectation that the records are being sought for use in a specific, identified investigation. This interpretation is reinforced by the requirement that the FISA court make specific findings about the investigation for which the records are sought — that it is supported by a factual predicate, conducted according to guidelines approved by the Attorney General, and not based solely upon activities protected by the First Amendment when conducted of a U.S. person.

[....] The government’s approach, in short, has been to declare that the calling records being sought are relevant to all of the investigations cited in its applications. This approach, at minimum, is in deep tension with the statutory requirement that items obtained through a Section 215 order be sought for “an investigation,” not for the purpose of enhancing the government’s counterterrorism capabilities generally. Declaring that the calling records are relevant to every counterterrorism investigation cited by the government is little different, in practical terms, from simply declaring that they are relevant to counterterrorism in general.

That is particularly so when the number of calling records sought is not limited by reference to the facts of any specific investigation. At its core, the approach boils down to the proposition that essentially all telephone records are relevant to essentially all international terrorism investigations. The Board does not believe that this approach comports with a fair reading of the statute.

Moreover, this approach undermines the value of an important statutory limitation on the government’s collection of records under Section 215. The statute provides that records cannot be obtained for a “threat assessment,” meaning those FBI investigatory activities that “do not require a particular factual predicate.”201 By excluding threat assessments from the types of investigations that can justify an order, Congress directed that Section 215 not be used to facilitate the broad and comparatively untethered investigatory probing that is characteristic of such assessments. But by collecting the nation’s calling records en masse, under an expansive theory of their relevance to multiple investigations, the NSA’s program undercuts one of the functions of the “threat assessment” exclusion: ensuring that records are not acquired by the government without some reason to suspect a connection between those records and a specific, predicated terrorism investigation. While the rules governing the program limit the use of telephone records to searches that are prompted by a specific investigation, the relevance requirement in Section 215 restricts the acquisition of records by the government.

The PCLOB clearly sees through the feds' ridiculous re-interpretation of the word "relevant" as well -- calling it "untenable" and "dangerously overbroad."

The government has argued, and the FISA court has agreed, that essentially the entire nation’s calling records are “relevant” to every counterterrorism investigation cited in the government’s applications to the court. This position is untenable. Moreover, the interpretation of Section 215 adopted by the FISA court is dangerously overbroad, leading to the implication that virtually all information may be relevant to counterterrorism and therefore subject to collection by the government.

Later, the report argues that the government's interpretation "is circular and deprives the word 'relevant' of any interpretive value."

All records become relevant to an investigation, under this reasoning, because the government has developed an investigative tool that functions by collecting all records to enable later searching. The implication of this reasoning is that if the government develops an effective means of searching through everything in order to find something, then everything becomes relevant to its investigations. The word “relevant” becomes limited only by the government’s technological capacity to ingest information and sift through it efficiently.

The PCLOB also totally debunks the line trotted out by numerous NSA defenders that this program is no different than a grand jury subpoena. Not so, says the board:

To determine what might be the outer limits of a grand jury subpoena, we have examined both the cases cited by the government and others. There has never been a grand jury subpoena as broad as the FISA court’s Section 215 orders. And contrary to the government’s suggestion, the case law does not hold that the breadth of a grand jury subpoena is unlimited, but rather that a subpoena must be designed to address the circumstances of a specific investigation.

One decision, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, merely explains that district courts assessing the relevance of subpoenaed materials should not proceed “document-by-document,” but should instead evaluate whether each “broad category” of requested materials could contain possibly relevant documents. The former approach would “unduly disrupt the grand jury’s broad investigatory powers” and force the government “to justify the relevancy of hundreds or thousands (or more) of individual documents, which it has not yet even seen[.]” Often the government “is not in a position to establish the relevancy with respect to specific documents,” because “it may not know the precise content of the requested documents” and “it may not know precisely what information is or is not relevant at the grand jury investigative stage.” Accepting the “incidental” production of irrelevant documents, when measured by the hundreds or thousands, does not support the legitimacy of the Section 215 calling records program, in which the NSA potentially collects billions of records per day with full knowledge that virtually all of them are irrelevant.

It goes on to point to a number of other cases and how the government's interpretation of them is simply bogus.

It also points out that screaming "but... but... terrorism!" is no excuse either:

Finally, the heightened importance of counterterrorism investigations, as compared with typical law enforcement matters, does not alter the equation. Items either are relevant to an investigation or they are not — the significance of that investigation is a separate matter. No matter how critical national security investigations are, therefore, some articulable principle must connect the items sought to those investigations, or else the word “relevant” is robbed of meaning. Congress added a relevance requirement to Section 215 in 2006 knowing full well that the statute governs national security investigations. It cannot, therefore, have meant for the importance of such investigations to efface that requirement entirely.

There's also an interesting tidbit, noting that Section 215 was designed specifically and solely for the FBI, not the NSA -- yet it is used here by the NSA (who then may share the info with lots of other agencies):

Section 215 expressly allows only the FBI to acquire records and other tangible things that are relevant to its foreign intelligence and counterterrorism investigations. Its text makes unmistakably clear the connection between this limitation and the overall design of the statute. Applications to the FISA court must be made by the director of the FBI or a subordinate. The records sought must be relevant to an authorized FBI investigation. Records produced in response to an order are to be “made available to,” “obtained” by, and “received by” the FBI.

[....] Under the bulk telephone records program, however, the FBI does not receive any records in response to the FISA court’s orders. While FBI officials sign every application seeking to renew the program, the calling records produced in response to the court’s orders are never “made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation” or “received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” as called for by the statute.335 Instead, the FISA court’s orders specifically direct telephone companies to “produce to NSA” their calling records — thwarting congressional intentions regarding the role each agency is to play in counterterrorism efforts that involve the collection of information within the United States about Americans.

In compliance with the FISA court’s orders, telephone companies that are subject to this program transmit their calling records to the NSA. The records are not delivered to the FBI and are never passed on to the FBI by the NSA. Instead, the NSA stores the records in its own databases, conducts its own analysis of them, and provides reports to various federal agencies — including but not limited to the FBI — with information about telephone communications that “the NSA concludes have counterterrorism value.”

In fact, the PCLOB notes, the FISC orders on this program actually prohibit the NSA from giving much of the information to the FBI, despite the fact that the law is only designed to be used by the FBI.

There's another section detailing how the FISA Court more or less ignores ECPA (the Electronic Communications Privacy Act) which the bulk metadata collection program clearly violates. The report notes that the FISC more or less admits this, and then says that Congress couldn't really have meant to say what the ECPA law says.

The FISA court concluded that its orders authorizing the NSA’s program were consistent with ECPA. In reaching this conclusion, the court first determined that the terms of Section 215 and ECPA were in tension. Both statutes could not both be given “their full, literal effect,” wrote the court, because Section 215 authorizes the production of “any tangible things,” and applying the prohibitions of ECPA would limit the meaning of the word “any.”

Instead, the PCLOB gives a fairly compelling argument for why the FISC is just wrong on this:

As the FISA court acknowledged, the very statute that created Section 215, the Patriot Act, also amended ECPA “in ways that seemingly re-affirmed that communications service providers could divulge records to the government only in specified circumstances” — without including FISA court orders issued under Section 215. The fact that the same statute both created Section 215 and amended ECPA, but without adding an exception to ECPA for Section 215 orders, undermines the notion that ECPA and Section 215 are in conflict, and provides an additional basis for strictly adhering to ECPA’s prohibitions by not inferring unwritten exceptions to those prohibitions. It also demonstrates that another fundamental canon of statutory construction applies here — that the inclusion of some implies the exclusion of others not mentioned. “Where there is an express exception, it comprises the only limitation on the operation of the statute and no other exceptions will be implied.” Congress did not add an exception to ECPA for Section 215 orders, even though it amended ECPA in other ways at the same time that it created Section 215. That omission should be respected.

As for the claim that because Congress re-enacted Section 215, it clearly approves of the bizarre reinterpretation of it by the FISC and the executive branch, the PCLOB rejects this, claiming it, too, is a "novel proposition" reinterpreting the "reenactment doctrine" beyond its intended purpose. And part of that, of course, is the fact that the FISA and NSA/DOJ interpretations were all kept really secret from Congress:

The “reenactment doctrine” does not trump the plain meaning of a law, but rather is one of many interpretive tools that come into play when statutory ambiguity demands an inquiry into congressional intent. Reenactment, in other words, “cannot save” an administrative or judicial interpretation that contradicts the requirements of the statute itself. And for the many reasons explained above, any interpretation of Section 215 that would authorize the NSA’s telephone records program is irreconcilable with the plain words of the statute, its manifest purpose, and its role within FISA as a whole.

Even if Section 215 were sufficiently ambiguous to justify an inquiry into congressional intent, the circumstances presented here are unlike any in which the reenactment doctrine has ever been applied — and the differences are pivotal. First, there was no judicial interpretation of Section 215 of which Congress could have been aware in 2010 or 2011: at that time the FISA court had never issued any opinion explaining the legal rationale for the NSA’s program under Section 215, but had merely signed orders authorizing the program. Second, even if the FISA court’s orders, combined with the government’s applications to the court, are viewed as an “interpretation” of Section 215, members of Congress may have been prohibited from reading those orders and those applications (except for members of the intelligence and judiciary committees) by operation of committee rules. Thus, to apply the reenactment doctrine here, Senators and Congressmen must be presumed to have adopted an “interpretation” that they had no ability to read for themselves. Third, even if being apprised of the NSA’s program were equivalent to being made aware of a judicial interpretation of a statute, applying the reenactment doctrine is improper where members of Congress must try to comprehend a secret legal interpretation without the aid of their staffs or outside experts and advocates. That scenario robs lawmakers of a meaningful opportunity to gauge the legitimacy and implications of the legal interpretation in question. Fourth, Congress did not reenact Section 215 at all in 2010 and 2011, but merely delayed its expiration. To our knowledge, no court has applied the reenactment doctrine under a combination of circumstances remotely like this.

Oh, and then there's this:

Finally, even if Section 215 were ambiguous about whether it authorizes the NSA’s bulk collection of telephone records, and even if the reenactment doctrine could be extended to the novel circumstances presented here, doing so would undermine the ability of the American public to know what the law is, and to hold their elected representatives accountable for their legislative choices. Applying the reenactment doctrine to legitimize the government’s interpretation of Section 215, therefore, is both unsupported by legal precedent and unacceptable as a matter of democratic accountability.

In other words, no, you can't have secret laws and secret interpretations.

Moving on to the constitutional questions, the PCLOB takes a look at the 4th Amendment and the third party doctrine. Unlike many knee jerk NSA defenders, the PCLOB notes that there are significant problems with applying the infamous Smith v. Maryland ruling to the bulk metadata collection program:

[Smith v. Maryland] does not provide a good fit for the telephone records program, particularly in light of rapid technological changes and in light of the nationwide, ongoing nature of the program. The NSA’s Section 215 program gathers significantly more information about each telephone call and about far more people than did the pen register surveillance approved in Smith (essentially everyone in the country who uses a phone) and it has collected that data now for nearly eight years without interruption.441 In contrast, the pen register approved in Smith v. Maryland compiled only a list of the numbers dialed from Michael Lee Smith’s telephone. It did not show whether any of his attempted calls were actually completed — thus it did not reveal whether he engaged in any telephone conversations at all. Naturally, therefore, the device also did not indicate the duration of any conversations. Furthermore, the pen register provided no information about incoming telephone calls placed to Smith’s home, only the outbound calls dialed from his telephone.

The pen register was in operation for no more than two days. And finally, the device recorded only the dialing information of one person: Smith himself. The police had no computerized ability to aggregate Smith’s dialing records with those of other individuals and gain additional insight from that analysis.

In contrast, for each of the millions of telephone numbers covered by the NSA’s Section 215 program, the agency obtains a record of all incoming and outgoing calls, the duration of those calls, and the precise time of day when they occurred. When the agency targets a telephone number for analysis, the same information for every telephone number with which the original number has had contact, and every telephone number in contact with any of those numbers. And, subject to regular program renewal by the FISA court, it collects these records every day, without interruption, and retains them for a five year time period. Sweeping up this vast swath of information, the government has explained, allows the NSA to use “sophisticated analytic tools” to “discover connections between individuals” and reveal “chains of communication” — a broader power than simply learning the telephone numbers dialed by a single targeted individual.

To illustrate the greater scope of the NSA’s program, the pen register discussed in Smith might have shown that, during the time that Michael Lee Smith’s telephone was monitored, he dialed another number three times in a single day. That information could have simply evinced three failed attempts to reach the other number. The NSA’s collection program, however, would show not only whether each attempted call connected but also the precise duration and time of each call. It also would reveal whether and when the other telephone number called Smith and the length and time of any such calls. Because the NSA collects records continuously and stores them for five years, it would be in a position to see how frequently those two numbers contacted each other during the preceding five years and the pattern of their contact. And because the agency would have full access to the calling records of the other telephone number as well, it could examine the activity of that other number and see, for instance, whether it ever communicated with any of the same numbers as Smith over a five-year period, or what numbers it communicated with around the time of its calls with Smith. The agency could then do the same thing for every other number that Smith had communicated with in the past five years, employing what it calls contact-chaining analysis. It could then go further and analyze the complete calling records of every number that was called by any of the numbers that ever communicated with Smith — going three “hops” from the original number.

But, that's not all. The report (like many others) slams the Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith, quotes "the leading academic treatise" and even third party doctrine supporter Orin Kerr, highlighting how almost no serious scholar thinks the Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith v. Maryland makes much sense. It quotes numerous other Supreme Court justices and other courts who find the majority ruling in Smith to be profoundly nonsense, and a dangerous attack on the 4th Amendment. And then points out why all of those critics were right:

The implications of this all-or-nothing approach to privacy have grown since the 1970s, as Americans increasingly must share personal information with companies in order to avail themselves of services and products that have become typical features of modern living. Another major criticism of the third-party doctrine, which has gained increased salience in light of these developments, challenges the notion that a customer of such companies, simply by “revealing his affairs to another,” truly chooses to risk “that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” This criticism rejects the idea that conducting business that is essential to contemporary life represents a voluntary decision to lay bare the details of one’s habits to governmental scrutiny.

“For all practical purposes,” Justice Brennan observed in his Miller dissent, “the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”

Moving on to the First Amendment, the PCLOB also notes serious questions about whether or not the bulk metadata collection violates the prohibition on Congress not to pass laws that infringe on free speech and free association. Citing the NAACP v. Alabama case that clearly stated that having a government reveal groups and associations would violate the First Amendment, the PCLOB takes issue with the collection of so much metadata, that clearly reveals who people associate with:

Although the NSA’s telephone records program does not include an overt disclosure requirement of the type evaluated in such cases as NAACP v. Alabama, its operation similarly results in the compulsory disclosure of information about individuals’ associations to the government. Like the government’s collection of membership lists, its bulk collection of telephone records makes that information available for government analysis and can create a chilling effect on those whose records are being collected.

[....] By indefinitely collecting information about all Americans’ telephone calls, the NSA’s telephone records program clearly implicates the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. The connections revealed by the extensive database of telephone records gathered under the program will necessarily include relationships established among individuals and groups for political, religious, and other expressive purposes. Compelled disclosure to the government of information revealing these associations can have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.

There's much more in the report worth reading, but those are many of the highlights. Honestly, much of it could be turned into the legal briefs that could eventually be used in court against the program.

Next up, the PCLOB will be releasing a report looking at Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act and programs like PRISM that fit under it. I imagine that will be equally interesting.

Filed Under: bulk metadata, civil liberties, pclob, privacy, section 215

Federal Civil Liberties Board To Issue Scathing Condemnation Of Bulk Metadata Program And The Bogus Defenses Of It

from the another-one dept

We noted a week ago that it seemed odd that President Obama was announcing his (mostly cosmetic) reforms for the intelligence community a week or so before the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) had a chance to weigh in. As we noted, the PCLOB is the government organization that should be looking into this issue. The PCLOB had briefed the President a week or so earlier, and that may explain why he sought to get his speech out before their report came out: the report, to be released later today, clearly states that the NSA's bulk metadata collection program is illegal and should end.

In a strongly worded report to be issued Thursday, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) said that the statute upon which the program was based, Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, “does not provide an adequate basis to support this program.”

The board’s conclusion goes further than President Obama, who said in a speech Friday that he thought the NSA’s database of records should be moved out of government hands but did not call for an outright halt to the program. The board had shared its conclusions with Obama in the days leading up to his speech.

It seems clear that President Obama clearly wanted to get his speech out of the way before this report came out. The PCLOB has found the same basic thing that the President's own task force (and Judge Leon) found: that the bulk data collection on pretty much everyone's phone call data had been almost entirely useless (while violating everyone's privacy). According to the Washington Post:

“We have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the telephone records program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation,” said the report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post. “Moreover, we are aware of no instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”

The full report, which sounds like it will be well worth reading, clearly appears to recognize that the NSA and the FISA Court reinterpreted the law in secret, in a manner that directly conflicts with the plain reading of the law -- exactly what Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall have been screaming about for years:

But the board found that it is impossible that all the records collected — billions daily — could be relevant to a single investigation “without redefining that word in a manner that is circular, unlimited in scope.” Moreover, instead of compelling phone companies to turn over records already in their possession, the program requires them to furnish newly generated call data on a daily basis. “This is an approach lacking foundation in the statute,” the report said.

“At its core, the approach boils down to the proposition that essentially all telephone records are relevant to essentially all international terrorism investigations,” the report said. This approach, it said, “at minimum, is in deep tension with the statutory requirement that items obtained through a Section 215 order be sought for ‘an investigation,’ not for the purpose of enhancing the government’s counterterrorism capabilities generally.”

Importantly, unlike the task force, the PCLOB calls bullshit on the oft-repeated claim that a program like the Section 215 program would have prevented 9/11. This has been debunked multiple times, but here is a government organization doing the debunking:

The board rejected the contention made by officials from Obama on down that the program was necessary to address a gap arising from a failure to detect an al Qaeda terrorist in the United States, Khalid al-Mihdhar, prior to the 2001 attacks. Mihdhar was in phone contact with a safehouse in Yemen, and though the NSA had intercepted the calls, it did not realize at the time that Mihdhar was calling from San Diego.

“The failure to identify Mihdhar’s presence in the United States stemmed primarily from a lack of information sharing among federal agencies, not of a lack of surveillance capabilities,” the report said, noting that in early 2000 the CIA knew Mihdhar had a visa enabling him to enter the United States but did not advise the FBI or watchlist him. “...This was a failure to connect the dots, not a failure to connect enough dots.”

Second, the report said, the government need not have collected the entire nation’s calling records to identify the San Diego number from which Mihdhar made his calls. It asserted that the government could have used existing legal authorities to request from U.S. phone companies the records of any calls made to or from the Yemen number. “Doing so could have identified the San Diego number on the other end of the calls,” though, it noted, the speed of the carriers’ responses likely would vary.

The report also apparently calls bullshit on the claim made by some, including Senator Dianne Feinstein, that the program was necessary in stopping the plot to bomb the NYC subway.

I'm sure we'll have more on this report, but it's yet another condemnation of the program which the President is trying to keep going, while pretending he's ending it.

Filed Under: civil liberties, nsa, oversight, patriot act, pclob, section 215, surveillance

Suggestion To NSA Employees Who Actually Respect Civil Liberties: Do A 'Quarter Snowden With A Twist'

from the good-ideas dept

Conor Friedersdorf, over at the Atlantic, has a good suggestion for employees of the NSA who agree with Ed Snowden that their organization has gone too far and should be reined in... but who don't want to go as far as he did in releasing classified documents, and having to leave the US forever (and facing the potential of life in prison). Because even though it appears that lots of people could access the documents Snowden has leaked, very few are willing to assume the "costs" associated with being a whistleblower like that. Instead, Friedersdorf points out, there are ways to make a very strong statement, without risking a life on the run, in jail or worse. Quit and speak out.

It doesn't require leaking classified information. Nor does it violate the law. To pull off the quarter-Snowden with a twist, which requires even less than a quarter of Snowden's courage, an NSA employee need only resign their position, seek out a trustworthy journalist of their choice, and announce that while they aren't at liberty to reveal any state secrets, they believe that Congress ought to rein in the NSA immediately. "If Senators Dianne Feinstein and Ron Wyden, who are permitted to see classified information, are listening," the staffer could say, "I'd like to brief them on my concerns." At least one of those Senate Intelligence Committee members will take the plea seriously.

Yes, this would involve serious personal sacrifice. Giving up a lucrative job (and one with access to many of the world's secrets) probably isn't easy. But it's not nearly the sacrifice that Snowden made, and yet it would still have quite an impact. Oh, and if you're a sys admin like Snowden, there's a damn good chance you're losing your job anyway, so rather than wait for the pink slip, why not make a statement that doesn't involve breaking any laws, but could make a real difference?

Filed Under: civil liberties, ed snowden, nsa, quitting, speaking out, surveillance

Ft. Worth Police Department Offers *Real* Apology For Its Assistance In The NHTSA's Blood/Saliva Sampling 'Survey'

from the more-than-I-expected dept

As we noted last week, the Fort Worth Police Dept. found itself on the receiving end of lots of criticism for its participation in a "voluntary" collection of blood and saliva samples for the NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).

For one thing, having a squad of police officers flag you down and route you into a nearby parking space never feels "voluntary," no matter how easy it is to opt out once you're pulled over. For another, the paperwork signed by "volunteers" contained fine print that indicated consent had been assumed for the PD to "collect" information on the driver's state of intoxication with passive alcohol sensors.

After a local news report detailed the concerns of one citizen who consented to a breathalyzer (the NHTSA paid $50 for blood and $10 for saliva -- there was no compensation for submitting to a breathalyzer) because she felt it was the quickest way out of the "voluntary" collection, the Ft. Worth PD issued the following non-apology.

We apologize if any of our drivers and citizens were offended or inconvenienced by the NHTSA National Roadside Survey.

As I noted then, this apology was less than useless. This "apology" lays the blame at the feet of those who "felt" offended or inconvenienced by the voluntary-in-all-but-appearance sample collection. I suggested a more contrite apology that put the blame where it was due.

We apologize for the offensive and inconvenient "survey" we participated in.

I'm not suggesting the Fort Worth police chief reads Techdirt but here's the much better apology it issued via its Facebook page.

TO OUR CITIZENS:

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration hired off-duty Fort Worth Police officers to assist with the Roadside Survey by providing traffic safety and security of cash used to pay survey participants. This survey was intended to be voluntary and was conducted by NHTSA personnel.

We are reviewing the approval process for this survey’s utilization of FWPD off-duty officers not only to ensure that our policies and procedures were followed, but also to ensure that any off-duty job is in the absolute best interest of our citizens.

We realize this survey caused many of our citizens frustration and we apologize for our participation.

“I agree with our citizens concerns and I apologize for our participation. Any future Federal survey of this nature, which jeopardizes the public’s trust, will not be approved for the use of Fort Worth police.”

Chief Jeffrey Halstead

*** Please express your concern with this survey to the media relations office with the USDOT NHTSA - Kathryn Henry 202-366-6918; kathryn.henry@dot.gov

While it's too bad this moment of clarity didn't strike before the PD assisted the NHTSA in its voluntary DNA draws (which the agency claims is anonymized and yet volunteers had to sign a participation form?), it is good to see that it realizes how involuntary this looked to drivers who were flagged down by the assisting officers. It's also good to see the FWPD will steer clear of these questionable ventures in the future. Hopefully, this will also clue the PD in on how the imbalance of power between law enforcement and citizens often makes voluntary actions seem like anything but.

"Jeopardizing the public trust" is never smart, especially when the success of your work depends heavily on being perceived as trustworthy by the public. And trust isn't something that's easily earned back, not when the public perception of law enforcement as the "good guys" is steadily trending downwards.

Also of note: Chief Halstead may want to be careful about whose contact information he posts publicly. The NHTSA contact info may be publicly available but encouraging citizens to contact media relations representatives has been found to be an arrestable offense in other jurisdictions.

Filed Under: apologies, civil liberties, ft. worth police, nhtsa, police, surveys

Boston Police Department Claims Contacting Its Public Affairs Number Is A Criminal Act

from the well-thank-fuck-these-people-are-in-charge-of-'enforcing-laws' dept

Most long-term Techdirt readers will be familiar with Carlos Miller, the man behind the Photography Is Not A Crime blog (usually shorthanded to simply "PINAC"). Miller, along with several other citizen photographers, have challenged local law enforcement officials repeatedly on their baseless claims that recording them is a crime.

Miller himself has been repeatedly arrested, harassed and charged with various dubious misdemeanors in an effort to curb his First Amendment rights. Now, Miller is being charged with something much more serious, thanks to the Boston Police Department's uncontrollable urge to silence critics and shutdown photographers.

Ken White at Popehat has this handy summary of the events leading up to the BPD's decision to charge Miller with "witness intimidation," a felony that carries with it a possible 10-year sentence.

The story begins typically for Photography Is Not A Crime with a story about a Boston Police Department sergeant thuggishly assaulting a photographer recording a traffic stop. A PINAC fan and journalism student named Taylor Hardy called the Boston PD's Bureau of Public Information on its public line to ask about the story. Hardy spoke with Angelene Richardson, a spokesperson for the Boston Police Department who provides information to the media and public. When Hardy published a recording of that call, the Boston Police Department arranged for him to be charged with wiretapping. Hardy claims that he informed Richardson that he was recording the call (though he did not successfully record that part of the conversation), apparently Richardson claims that he did not.

Boston's PD has received a lot of PINAC attention lately thanks to its officers' insistence on ignoring the outcome of the 2011 Glik decision, which saw the city pay out $170,000 to a citizen after the police wrongfully arrested him for violating the state's wiretapping statutes by recording them in public. The decision sent a message to citizens and citizen photographers, but apparently that message has yet to reach the ears of the city's police officers.

Now, as to the more problematic issue as to whether or not Hardy informed the BPD's public relations person that the conversation would be recorded (Massachusetts is a two-party consent state), it ultimately shouldn't matter.

A public relations person, whose sole purpose is to interact with the public, should assume that each and every conversation it has with citizens and journalists is being recorded -- especially the latter. There's no "expectation of privacy" inherent to public relations. Also, as Miller points out, the BPD is likely recording the calls on its end (the detective charging Miller has threatened to do the same to other callers, meaning someone's gathering info in Boston) which would make the two-party question moot.

After being informed that the BPD was pursuing Hardy on wiretapping charges, Carlos Miller posted the following to PINAC.

Maybe we can call or email Richardson to persuade her to drop the charges against Hardy considering she should assume all her conversations with reporters are on the record unless otherwise stated. Her listed number is (617) 343-4520.

Maybe we can build up an entire collection of recorded conversations with her. After informing her, of course.

The BPD's response to this action -- Miller posting a publicly available contact number (something Miller has done dozens of times previously without issue) -- was to charge him with a felony.

[T]hat led to Detective Moore filing a criminal complaint against me for witness intimidation, which I received Friday and is posted below, claiming that I caused Richardson all kinds of pain and grief because I posted her publicly available work contact info on my blog.

He also threatened to charge any readers who called her, making me think that perhaps the Boston Police Department is recording all incoming calls because how else would they gather the evidence to charge my readers for witness intimidation?

Ken White says there's some intimidation happening here alright, but not the way the BPD imagines it.

Indeed — an act of intimidation is involved. But it's an act of intimidation by the BPD, which is sending a clear message about how it will handle citizen dissent.

What an accomplishment: the Boston Police Department has discovered a way to make it a crime for citizens to contact the person it designates to talk to citizens.

The BPD has managed to dig itself a colossal hole in a very short period of time and it looks as if it has no interest in relinquishing its many shovels. Ordering someone from Miami (where Miller lives) to face charges in Boston over something so legally specious as declaring the posting of publicly available numbers to be "witness intimidation" is a prime example of how far some police officers will go to avoid having to admit they screwed up.

The Boston cops featured in PINAC's multiple stories all share the same attitude -- the law is whatever they declare it is, judicial decisions and the Constitution be damned. And when forced to confront the fact that they have it completely wrong, they simply ratchet up their intimidation tactics.

Defending yourself against clearly bogus charges isn't cheap. Carlos Miller has set up an Indiegogo campaign to pay for his legal representation. He's only seeking $2,200 ($2k for the lawyer plus $200 for indiegogo fees). Two bits of good news: 1) he's cleared that with several hours left to go and 2) he seems to have found himself an excellent attorney.

David Duncan, a partner at [Zalkind Duncan & Bernstein LLP], will take on both Taylor Hardy’s case of illegal wiretapping and my case for witness intimidation for that price, which is much lower than he would normally charge for two felony cases.

He was referred to us by my friends at the Digital Media Law Project, which is a site every one of you should become familiar with because it contains a wealth of legal information regarding media law, which in this day and age, applies to every single one of us who uses the internet…

$2,000 is good start but expenses could increase significantly if Duncan is unable to get the case tossed.

But Duncan doesn’t come cheap. Most good attorneys don’t. He is charging $2,000 to attend the hearing on our behalf. Then he will charge $6,000 to attend three hearings after that if it does continue.

And that might not even include the actual trial, if it comes down to that. Nor does it include travel expenses.

Now, some people can find Carlos Miller's tactics to be a bit on the aggressive side. But even those who find he somehow crosses the line in his pursuit of strengthening the First Amendment rights of American citizens have to find the above ridiculous, at the very least. This all began with BPD officers intimidating a photographer using false claims that his actions were illegal. Now, due to the BPD's insistence on compounding its errors, a blogger in Florida is facing felony witness intimidation charges in Massachusetts.

The longer this bizarrely wrongheaded crusade against the First Amendment continues, the longer the Boston Police Dept. will have to deal with irate citizens from all over the nation contacting its public phone numbers to complain about its intimidating actions. A simple apology and an offer to drop charges would have done wonders for the PD several days ago, but now, it's far too late. Detective Moore's actions -- basically declaring that contacting BPD's public numbers is a criminal act -- have put him and those involved in a position that only allows them to actively make things worse. The bells have been rung and no amount of additional LEO blustering will un-ring them.

Filed Under: boston, carlos miller, civil liberties, police, public relations, taylor hardy, wiretapping, witness intimidation

It's Finally Dawning On Tech Companies That All This NSA Stuff Is Bad For Them

from the more-of-that-please dept

We've been arguing since the beginning of the Snowden leaks, that the tech industry should be much angrier than it is about all of this, because the fallout and blowback from this is going to impact these companies quite a bit. To date, the big tech companies have been fighting back, but it's mostly focused on the transparency issue, arguing in court that the gag orders barring them from talking about what the government has legally compelled them to do, is a violation of their First Amendment rights. And that's correct and an important fight, but we've been disappointed that the tech companies haven't supported even greater reforms and changes, including greater privacy protections. But that might be changing.

Obviously, the news of the NSA infiltrating private network links between data centers should make these companies even angrier. It appears that Google is getting there, though Yahoo still doesn't seem to realize what just happened.

However, in an interesting move that at least hints at potential further realization from the tech industry that they need to support user privacy rights, the big guys -- Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Yahoo and AOL -- have all sent a letter to Congress in support of the USA Freedom Act. In it, they once again talk up the importance of greater transparency. But, also, for the first time that I can remember, they appear to be arguing for even more:

Transparency is a critical first step to an informed public debate, but it is clear that more needs to be done. Our companies believe that government surveillance practices should also be reformed to include substantial enhancements to privacy protections and appropriate oversight and accountability mechanisms for those programs.

And, even with the letter being sent today, it was almost certainly written and approved before yesterday's revelations -- meaning that this was before they realized the NSA was trying (and succeeding) to backdoor into their networks without their knowledge. Hopefully they'll start pushing for even more significant reforms as well. Some have argued that the tech industry has been complicit in the NSA surveillance efforts, while others have suggested they were compelled, or even tricked/hacked into it. The evidence suggests a combination of all of those factors (in varying degrees across the different companies). But if they want to actually regain the trust of their users, they should stand up for the rights of their users and support the efforts to create real change and to stop illegal surveillance, rather than just increasing transparency.

Filed Under: civil liberties, nsa, nsa surveillance, reform, tech companies, usa freedom act
Companies: aol, apple, facebook, google, microsoft, yahoo

TSA Security Checks Begin Long Before Travelers Arrive At The Airport

from the more-data-stockpiling-and-careless-dissemination dept

The TSA may not be privately concerned about the average flier's desire to hijack the flight he or she is boarding, but that hasn't dissuaded it from continually ratcheting up the invasiveness of its pre-boarding procedures. Between the spilling of breast milk/baby formula and the casual groping of toddlers, attractive women and anyone with a visible medical condition, the TSA has "brusquely and barely competently invasive" nailed down.

But that's just what's going on between the airport exit and your departing flight. The New York Times reports that there's an entire level of pre-boarding screening going on well before you hit the airport.

The Transportation Security Administration is expanding its screening of passengers before they arrive at the airport by searching a wide array of government and private databases that can include records like car registrations and employment information.

While the agency says that the goal is to streamline the security procedures for millions of passengers who pose no risk, the new measures give the government greater authority to use travelers' data for domestic airport screenings. Previously that level of scrutiny applied only to individuals entering the United States…

It is unclear precisely what information the agency is relying upon to make these risk assessments, given the extensive range of records it can access, including tax identification number, past travel itineraries, property records, physical characteristics, and law enforcement or intelligence information.

At what point does someone "who poses no risk" start feeling offended the TSA is doing deep read on his or her financial and employment background? The TSA already has the PreCheck program, which allows fliers to pay money to reclaim civil liberties removed by the agency's security theater.

Those who haven't joined this select group are still receiving very thorough vetting (even when flying domestically) but without gaining any of the benefits the one benefit of extensive pre-screening: speedier passage through security. The TSA says these background checks "streamline" the process, but if so, the results are nearly imperceptible to travelers. Of course, this lack of noticeable change may be due to the TSA's bold plan to speed up things slightly sometime before 2015.

The T.S.A. has emphasized its goal of giving 25 percent of all passengers lighter screening by the end of next year, meaning they can keep their shoes and jackets on, wait in separate lines and leave laptop computers in their bags.

While we're all waiting for a one-quarter of travelers to start breezing through security, the extensive background checks will continue on all fliers, with the collected data being shared indiscriminately with other government agencies and private businesses.

Much of this personal data is widely shared within the Department of Homeland Security and with other government agencies. Privacy notices for these databases note that the information may be shared with federal, state and local authorities; foreign governments; law enforcement and intelligence agencies — and in some cases, private companies for purposes unrelated to security or travel.

For instance, an update about the T.S.A.'s Transportation Security Enforcement Record System, which contains information about travelers accused of "violations or potential violations" of security regulations, warns that the records may be shared with "a debt collection agency for the purpose of debt collection."

If you're one of those unlucky travelers who receive the algorithmically-generated "please extensively search this flier" designation (or return home from a trip to find your voicemail full of calls from collections agencies), there's not much you can do about it. There's an official "Traveler Redress Inquiry Program," but as we've noted before, it's low on functionality and long on officious uselessness.The TRIP provides minimal details in response to inquiries, if it can be bothered to respond at all. Those on no-fly lists (or those that suspect they might be) receive letters that refuse to "confirm nor deny" the inquirer's inclusion on this super-secret list.

Add the TSA to the long list of agencies gathering tons of data on Americans simply because they have the technology and the opportunity. Supposedly this invasion of privacy will pay off in an incremental speed improvement at airport security checkpoints sometime in the next year or two. The resulting payoff in increased security will continue to hover right around nil for the foreseeable future.

Filed Under: background checks, civil liberties, privacy, tsa

The Old 'Partisan' Lines Don't Fit Nicely With Modern Civil Liberties And Tech Policy Issues

from the rethinking-partisanship dept

I've said a few times in the past that, as someone who doesn't identify with any particular group on the political/partisan spectrum, I've appreciated the fact that the issues I tend to cover aren't normally considered "partisan" and can often create "strange bedfellows." Copyright, for example, isn't an issue that fits into partisan lines at all (though, unfortunately, that's because for a long time, both major parties supported ever greater maximalism -- though that may finally be changing). In fact, when issues did become partisan, it often meant that all reasoned discussion and debate (and chance for actual forward motion) went out the window. Net neutrality was a good example of that. When it first came about, the discussions concerning net neutrality weren't partisan at all, but then the Democrats embraced it, and the Republicans lined up against it, and any reasoned or nuanced discussion or debate about it seemed to vanish.

Still, some issues are historically associated with one side or the other. Things like "national security" often seem to be an issue that the traditional "right" lines up behind, while "civil liberties" is an issue that the traditional "left" lines up behind. I'm old enough to remember when being a "a card carrying member of the ACLU" was used as an insult by Republicans to smear Democrats. Obviously, there are libertarians who are often (in my view, incorrectly) associated as being on "the right," who care deeply about civil liberties, but for the most part, the general stereotype is that Republicans on the "right" lined up behind strong national security fights and were less interested in civil liberties, while the Democrats on the "left" were "weak" on national security.

So it's at least a little bizarre to see this piece in Foreign Policy Magazine talking about how the Heritage Foundation, often considered the keepers of the Republican platform, refused to publish a paper that defended the NSA's surveillance efforts as perfectly legal and constitutional. The Heritage Foundation was a big supporter of the Patriot Act, and urged that the key provisions that enabled the dragnet data collection of phone records be renewed. Even more bizarre? When Heritage refused to publish the paper, Benjamin Wittes, of the Brookings Institution -- often considered a "liberal" think tank in DC -- jumped in to publish a version of the paper instead:

Cully Stimson, a senior Defense Department official in the Bush administration who now runs Heritage's national security law program, called Benjamin Wittes, the editor-in-chief of the national security blog Lawfare and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Stimson "asked me whether Lawfare might be interested in [the papers], and I was delighted to publish them," Wittes told The Cable. "We asked Steve to consolidate them into a single paper, and there were some subsequent revisions as well because of the document release that took place in the intervening period," Wittes said, referring to the government's decision in August to declassify a large number of documents about NSA programs.

Now, there could be a few different things at work here. For example, while Brookings is traditionally considered more on the liberal end of the spectrum, Wittes has long been a full on cheerleader for the surveillance state, so it was a natural fit. Similarly, Heritage is now under the leadership of Jim DeMint, who has long been identified as being more closely aligned with the more libertarian wings of the Republican Party. So this could be simply a case where the leanings of those two individuals resulted in what might be seen as a "strange bedfellows" situation with this paper.

Alternatively, there's an argument that rather than a sort of post-partisan issue that some of us hope these kinds of issues will become, this really is an overtly partisan issue, to the point that Heritage is less eager to support NSA surveillance by the administration because it's not "their guy" in the White House, The same may be true for those on the left who are willing to support the NSA's actions (even when they protested angrily about similar, and potentially less egregious, civil liberties abuses under George W. Bush) because it's okay with President Obama in charge. If this is true, it's not just incredibly cynical and short-sighted, but it's kind of depressing at the intellectual dishonesty of it all.

While either of those scenarios may be true, I'm still hopeful that more and more of these important issues having to do with technology and civil liberties policy will be viewed as post-partisan (which is very different than "bi-partisan"), in that they're important issues that should be dealt with on their own merits, rather than if you happen to prefer the red team or the blue team. Part of the problem that many of us who focus on things like innovation and civil liberties policy have with the way the political efforts break down is that neither party comes close to representing what we're interested in. If more of these important issues that are getting attention don't fit neatly along party lines, perhaps the political landscape can be reconfigured in a more effective way to actually deal with the issues of tomorrow, rather than mere bickering about the issues of the past.

Filed Under: civil liberties, conservative, intellectual property, left, liberal, national security, partisan politics, politics, right, think tanks
Companies: brookings, heritage foundation

NSA Top Two Officials Retiring Isn't News, But Is An Opportunity To Reshape The Agency

from the but-that-won't-happen dept

There's been some recent chatter over a Reuters report highlighting that both of the top two officials at the NSA, director Keith Alexander and deputy director Chris Inglis, are retiring in the next few months. Lots of people are misreading this, believing that this is something new, and suggesting that both were either pushed out, or are doing this in response to all of the Snowden revelations. That's simply not true. Alexander's retirement has been widely reported since at least June (and has been covered in a number of other publications as well). Both retirements were planned long ago, and appear to be exactly on schedule, rather than as any reaction to things happening in the news.

This is unfortunate, as it really does seem like there should be some punishment for the widespread excesses and abuses that have been revealed by Snowden. However, what is important to recognize is that this does present a real opportunity for the President to reshape the NSA. It seems unlikely that this will happen, but the President has said that he wants to rebuild the trust of Americans in the NSA and the wider intelligence community, and the choices he makes for who will lead the NSA are a real opportunity to at least take a step in that direction. No one actually expects him to, say, pick a civil liberties activist, but there are people out there who have experience in the intelligence community and who also have shown a respect and appreciation for privacy and civil liberties. Furthermore, finding someone who can present the case for reform -- one which recognizes that "collect it all" is not just bad policy, but bad for actually finding useful information -- would be a big step forward.

Filed Under: barack obama, chris inglis, civil liberties, keith alexander, leadership, nsa, nsa surveillance, privacy, trust

NSA Director Claims He's Protecting Americans' Privacy And Civil Liberties... By Spying On Them All

from the well,-uh,-huh? dept

NSA boss Keith Alexander continues to fail at damage control in response to the Snowden leaks, but he keeps on trying. The latest is an interview conducted with the NY Times in which he continues to babble on as if no one will ever call out his more ridiculous statements:

“We followed the law, we follow our policies, we self-report, we identify problems, we fix them,” he said. “And I think we do a great job, and we do, I think, more to protect people’s civil liberties and privacy than they’ll ever know.”

Yes, by collecting pretty much every bit of data they can on everyone. That protects their privacy and civil liberties? How? By trampling the 4th Amendment? I don't think so. The whole "self-report... identify problems" claim is also hogwash. As we've noted, many of that "self-reporting" came years after the fact, and it's almost certain that plenty of other abuses have never been caught or reported.

Then there's General Alexander trying to claim he supports more transparency and that the American people need to know what's going on. I know. Stop laughing. He really said it:

“Given where we are and all the issues that are on the table, I do feel it’s important to have a public, transparent discussion on cyber so that the American people know what’s going on,” General Alexander said. “And in order to have that, they need to understand the truth about what’s going on.”

Of course, in the very same interview he insisted that this discussion that we're now having has done "significant and irreversible damage" to national security. So... he wants to have an open discussion and tell people what's going on, but solely on his own terms, and if anyone else brings up anything, we're all at risk.

He insisted that it would have been impossible to have made public, in advance of the revelations by Mr. Snowden, the fact that the agency collected what it calls the “business records” of all telephone calls, and many other electronic communications, made in the United States.

Why? This is a serious question, because it wouldn't have been impossible at all. The government could have easily said (as they're trying to now after Snowden revealed it) that they're doing this in a manner that (they believe) doesn't compromise our privacy, and it's for a good reason. And then let us have a public debate to see if people believe you or if they think you're full of it. That's what transparency is about.

The NY Times actually does a decent job in some points highlighting the ridiculousness of Alexander's answers, such as with this tidbit:

But he said the agency had not told its story well. As an example, he said, the agency itself killed a program in 2011 that collected the metadata of about 1 percent of all of the e-mails sent in the United States. “We terminated it,” he said. “It was not operationally relevant to what we needed.”

However, until it was killed, the N.S.A. had repeatedly defended that program as vital in reports to Congress.

Yup. The same way they continue to insist the telephone records are "vital" despite not actually showing how they've been necessary in stopping a single terrorist attack on the US.

At this point, you have to wonder what Alexander thinks he's accomplishing with each of these interviews or talks. It just seems like this strained, repetitive "but, really, I'm not such a bad guy, you just have to trust me!!!" exclamation over and over again that doesn't give us any reason to actually trust him. In fact, nearly all of the evidence that's come out from Snowden has actually shown (over and over and over again) why Alexander shouldn't be trusted at all.

Filed Under: civil liberties, keith alexander, nsa, nsa surveillance