TSA Asks America To LOL At Traveler Who Had $75,000 Taken From Him By Federal Agents

from the the-4chan-of-government-agencies dept

The TSA runs a fairly entertaining Instagram account, if you're the sort of person who is impressed by pictures of weapons seized from stupid passengers. That would be the extent of its social media prowess. Its blog is pretty much a 50/50 mix of Yet Another Thing You Can't Take Onboard and Blogger Bob defending the TSA's latest gaffe.

One of the TSA's official Twitter flacks tried to loft a lighthearted "hey, look at this thing we came across!" tweet. She couldn't have picked a worse "thing" to highlight, considering the ongoing outrage over civil asset forfeiture.

For those who can't see the embed, the tweet says:

If you had $75,000, is this how you'd transport it? Just asking! TSA @ #RIC spotted this traveler's preferred method

Pictured was someone's carry-on bag, opened to expose the cash contained in it.

First: should the TSA be broadcasting the contents of someone's luggage -- especially considering the contents are a large amount of cash -- along with broadcasting the airport where it was discovered and the baggage's appearance? There may not be any recognizable privacy violations here, but it's certainly bad form. And it does no favors to the person carrying it.

Second: unless the traveler was attempting to take the money out of the country without reporting it to Customs, it's none of the TSA's business how a traveler carries money from place to place. It may be careless, but it is not illegal and it is certainly not something government agencies should spend too much time obsessing over. (But of course they will, because travelers' cash can quickly become the government's cash, thanks to civil asset forfeiture.)

Third: the TSA's public interest in this member of the public's cash is flat-out unseemly. Not only does the tweet portray the unnamed person as some sort of idiot/criminal (or both!), but it led many to the obvious assumption that this cash was seized.

But, you know, LOL #otherpeoplesmoney and all that.

The foregone conclusion that this money had been seized was (momentarily) dispelled by another tweet from the TSAmedia_Lisa account.

TSA didn't seize/confiscate/take it. It alarmed the x-ray machine as an unknown and we spotted it. It's just a curiosity

So, somehow a passenger managed to walk through airport security with a large amount of cash and managed to still be in possession of it on the DEPARTURE side of the checkpoint?

No. This is AMERICA, land of the somewhat free and home of the brave drug warrior.

A followup email to the Washington Post's Chris Ingraham proved TSAmedia_Lisa's (Farbstein) response was technically true and completely disingenuous.

Asked about the incident via e-mail, Farbstein said that "the carry-on bag of the passenger alarmed because of the large unknown bulk in his carry-on bag. When TSA officers opened the bag to determine what had caused the alarm, the money was sitting inside. Quite unusual. TSA alerted the airport police, who were investigating."

It seems the police didn't just "investigate." They worked with another federal agency to take the money:

In this case, the cash was seized by a federal agency, most likely the Drug Enforcement Administration, according to Richmond airport spokesman Troy Bell. "I don't believe the person was issued a summons or a citation," he said. "The traveler was allowed to continue on his way."

So Farbstein's claim about how it was "just a curiosity" is completely bogus. Not only was the photograph and putting it on social media a questionable invasion of privacy, but then they handed it off to another federal agency to take the money... and then the TSA clearly implied the opposite on social media once the story blew up.

It's not entirely clear which "federal agency" took the money, but a good guess is that the DEA is likely in possession of this "curiosity" now, thanks to its willingness to troll mass transportation departure points in search of "guilty" money.

Also ridiculous is the airport spokesperson noting that the traveler was allowed to "continue on his way," $75,000 lighter. As if that makes everything OK? If this money is completely unrelated to criminal activity, the government has just stolen money from one of its citizens. If it is linked to criminal activity, the traveler is probably in for a world of hurt if it belonged (or was owed) to someone else. Either way, the citizen loses, the government wins and the TSA badly mishandles another social media interaction.

So, the TSA's attempt at cheery lightheartedness did nothing more than once again expose its dark, humorless center. The tweet may as well have read "If you had $75,000, you don't have it any more! Just saying! #freemoney" One of the nation's most tone deaf agencies continues to prove it simply won't be outdone in this category. And the trickle of details confirmed what everyone was thinking the moment this picture hit the internet: that the person carrying that money was last in possession of it shortly before the photo was taken. The government gets its man money and the TSA delivers the news as a punchline at the expense [pretty much literally] of some random traveler whose misfortune is the government's gain.

Filed Under: asset seizure, cash, dea, public shaming, tsa

Study: The TSA's Security Theater Troupes Missed 95% Of Smuggled Weapons And Explosives

from the security-theater dept

When it's not aggressively groping patrons, being outwitted by TSA-safe luggage, failing to understand the First Amendment, trying to expand its authority in strange and aggressive new ways or burning through taxpayer money, there's a popular narrative afoot that the Transportation Security Administration is supposed to protect air travelers and secure airports. Of course, as we've well documented, the agency is exceptionally awful at that as well, resulting in what it does being far more akin to security theater than anything resembling actual security.

The latest case in point: an internal Homeland Security Inspector General investigation of the TSA revealing massive failure on the part of the TSA across dozens of the country's busiest airports. According to a copy of the findings, undercover investigators were able to smuggle mock explosives or banned weapons through security checkpoints -- 95% of the time:

"According to officials briefed on the results of a recent Homeland Security Inspector General’s report, TSA agents failed 67 out of 70 tests, with Red Team members repeatedly able to get potential weapons through checkpoints. In one test an undercover agent was stopped after setting off an alarm at a magnetometer, but TSA screeners failed to detect a fake explosive device that was taped to his back during a follow-on pat down. Officials would not divulge the exact time period of the testing other than to say it concluded recently."

That's not just a little dysfunction, that's a wholesale systemic breakdown, and it once again raises the question of what precisely taxpayers are paying for. And while the TSA is quick to consistently insist it's making improvements every day, this is effectively the same thing that happened last year when a "red team" member was able to smuggle a mock bomb onto an airplane. This latest survey also piggybacks on earlier reports that indicate no matter how much money we throw at the TSA, it's still awful at doing its job, whether that's passenger or luggage screening:

"That review found “vulnerabilities” throughout the system, attributing them to human error and technological failures, according to a three-paragraph summary of the review released in September. In addition, the review determined that despite spending $540 million for checked baggage screening equipment and another $11 million for training since a previous review in 2009, the TSA failed to make any noticeable improvements in that time."

Great job, team! Of course, whenever you find this level of dysfunction you can usually find a dodgy money trail -- since just like nation destroying and rebuilding -- presenting the illusion of security is extremely profitable. That likely won't be getting better anytime soon, with a lobbyist for Rapiscan Systems (the company that provides the controversial X-ray scanners used in most major airports) taking a job with the House Appropriations Committee's Homeland Security Subcommittee, which oversees the TSA budget. We've been talking about Rapiscan's overly-cozy relationship with government for five years now.

Realizing how broken the TSA truly is can easily lead one down the path of worrying that there's a much thinner line between you and being wind-dispersed fertilizer than most would care to admit. But as Robert Graham points out, the fact that the TSA is horrible at its job -- combined with the fact that planes aren't exploding -- statistically suggests that bombs are a much smaller threat to airplanes than we've historically assumed:

"This leads to a counter-intuitive result that the TSA is really not stopping any danger. If guns and bombs are getting on planes, but planes aren't falling out of the sky, it must mean that they aren't a danger. I point this out because in the end, safety is an emotional thing rather than logical. No matter how much I do the math, people do not believe it. They believe bombs are a danger to airplanes in much the same way many don't believe the safety statistics compared to driving."

Note that's not to say we don't the need the hidden and not-so-hidden security apparatus that exists outside of this costly new game of make believe. But these latest findings continue to prop up the argument that the TSA is a glorified high school theater troupe playing dress up, doing little more than adding a very expensive layer of dysfunction to the already frequently-dismal air travel experience.

Filed Under: safety, security theater, tsa

TSA's Investigation Into Groping Agents Ensured They Wouldn't Be Prosecuted

from the because-of-course dept

By now, you may have heard the story about how two TSA agents at Denver International Airport were fired recently after it was revealed that they had worked out a scam by which one agent was able to grope and fondle the genitals of male passengers he found attractive. The plan involved him signalling to a colleague who was working the scanning computer. That agent would tell the computer that the individual being scanned was female, which apparently would set off an "anomaly" alert for the groin area, allowing the male TSA agent to conduct a "pat down" of that area. Leaving aside the fact that these computers even have "male" and "female" settings and it can determine an "anomaly in the genital area" if they don't match -- this kind of thing was exactly what many insisted was going to happen when the TSA put in place these advanced screening procedures. And if you think that this is the only case of it happening, well, then, you probably think the TSA doesn't rifle through and steal stuff from your luggage as well.

Now here's the thing: this only came out because the TSA agent blabbed about it to a colleague, who then reported it, leading to an investigation. Many people find it odd that the two TSA agents (who are still unnamed) merely lost their jobs, rather than got arrested for this activity. Chris Bray, over at TSA News (found via Amy Alkon -- herself no stranger to intrusive TSA searches), went and grabbed the actual Denver police report on the incident, revealing that it appears that the TSA set up its "investigation" in a manner to almost guarantee no criminal charges and that the names of the TSA agents would remain secret.

Specifically, the TSA was first told about this scheme on November 18th of 2014. First, it took nearly two months for the TSA to do anything about it, and it did not contact the police during this time. Instead, on Feburary 9th, TSA investigator Chris Higgins observed the screening area and saw the signal/button push/grope of the genitals. Higgins made no attempt to speak with or identify the victim of this assault (this is important). Instead, he just spoke with the two TSA agents who were terminated at some later time (exact date not clearly indicated). The Denver police were not told about any of this until over a month later, on March 19th, 2015, at which point they noted that without a named "victim" there wasn't much they could do.

On that same day, the inspector, Higgins, told the Denver police that he had also spoken with a deputy district attorney who had told him that without a victim, it was unlikely they could prosecute a case. It's unclear when that conversation took place, but it appears that the TSA had plenty of time to fire the TSA agents and make it basically impossible for the police to file a case before then telling the police what happened. As Bray notes, this all seems rather suspicious, as if the TSA's "investigation" was much more about covering up the TSA's misdeeds, rather than holding the agents responsible:

So in November of 2014, the TSA was warned that two of its officers were currently, actively conspiring to commit sexual assault. But the TSA did not notify the police about that anonymous tip. The Denver Police Department is the agency that regularly polices Denver International Airport; the DIA Bureau is listed on this directory.

If the TSA had notified the police about the tip in November, the police could have been watching the checkpoint to observe the groping incident that was instead witnessed by a TSA employee. But the police didn’t know about an allegation of active, current, ongoing sexual assault, because the TSA didn’t tell them.

And so an act of sexual assault occurred right in front of a TSA investigator — and the investigator let the victim walk away without approaching him and identifying him.

Then, in March 2015, the TSA informed the police of the allegation, and of the evidence of the event that a TSA investigator had personally witnessed more than a month before. But the TSA didn’t notify the police until both employees had been fired — in other words, until both participants in a scheme to commit sexual assault had been removed from the place in which they allegedly committed it.

It’s as if someone called the fire department to report a pile of cold ashes. The TSA waited to call the police until the passengers were long gone, the TSA officers alleged to have committed the crime were long gone, and the crime witnessed by a TSA investigator was more than a month old.

Isn't that convenient?

Bray asked the TSA why it didn't contact the police earlier, and received a boiler plate response about how "intolerable" the actions were, but no substantive response to Bray's actual questions.

Yes, the groping scheme is a scandal, but it seems like a much bigger scandal is how the TSA handled the case -- first allowing the criminal activities to go on for two months without notifying police, and then making sure that no one could be actually charged with a crime.

Filed Under: assault, denver, denver police, groping, prosecution, tsa

TSA Agents Outwitted By Cory Doctorow's Unlocked, 'TSA-Safe' Suitcase

from the the-skies-won't-be-safe-until-every-checked-bag-has-been-destroyed dept

Prior to the 9//11 attacks, you only had to worry about airport baggage handlers beating the hell out of your luggage or stealing your valuables. Thanks to the post-attack panic, there's a new layer of ineptitude and deceit your luggage is subjected to on its way to its destination (which may not be your destination).

Boing Boing's Cory Doctorow (or rather, his luggage) was recently subjected to the brutish charms of the Transportation Security Administration.

[T]he TSA still routinely and unaccountably destroys luggage equipped with "TSA-safe" locks, just because they can. Last week, TSA inspectors at Phoenix's Sky Harbor airport pried the locks off of my unlocked, "TSA-safe" suitcase before taping it shut again and loading it onto my London-bound flight.

Here's what Doctorow's luggage looked like after the "TSA-safe" locking mechanism outmaneuvered the TSA agent in charge of crowbar-wielding and packaging tape application.


This appears to be the luggage Doctorow "submitted" to the TSA (although Doctorow's is possibly an earlier iteration), which then handled it with all the grace and skill of two male supermodels trying to retrieve files from a computer.


The TSA should have had no trouble unlocking the suitcase (using keys, rather than physically attacking it). Rimowa's site states that its luggage features "TSA combination locks."


Bypassing it with a master key was the option the TSA was supposed to use. Instead, it just forced it open, taped it back together and handed it back to Doctorow without even a shrug of bureaucratic regret.

It did, however, respond to his legitimate complaint. If you can call it a response. First, it loads up on disclaimers. (Doctorow's interjections are bracketed.)

Thank you for contacting the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Contact Center regarding damaged or missing checked baggage locks.

TSA is required by law to screen all property that goes onboard commercial passenger airlines, including checked baggage. To ensure the security of the traveling public, it is sometimes necessary for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to inspect checked baggage by hand. Locked checked baggage [[MY BAG WAS UNLOCKED]] may cause delays due to the need for TSOs to open locked baggage by using alternative measures, including force. Please be advised that TSA is not liable for any damage to locks or bags that are required to be opened by force for security purposes. [[HOW CONVENIENT – WHY NOT?]]

Yes. The agency takes no responsibility for breaking something that was a.) unlocked and b.) even if it wasn't, had passkeys it could have used. It inexplicably mentions this unused option while explaining why it manhandled Doctorow's luggage like the world's most inept burglar.

In cooperation with private industry, TSA implemented a system under which TSOs are able to identify, unlock, and then relock certain locks using passkey sets available to TSA screeners [[AND ANYONE WITH HALF A BRAIN AND A BIT OF GUMPTION]]. TSA-recognized locks can be opened and relocked by TSOs without force and with little delay. TSA cannot, [[WHY THIS COMMA?]] guarantee that such locks will never be damaged or lost while TSOs and airline employees handle checked baggage [[HOW CONVENIENT]].

On top of being unable to perform its job without destroying luggage, the TSA is apparently unaware that URLs can be copied and pasted, rather than carelessly typed into a response email for maximum ineffectiveness.

To learn more about damaged locks, please visit www.tsa.gov\node\1428.

Just try to do what the TSA didn't and paste that not-a-URL-at-all into an omnibox. (Well, it will be automatically converted into a real URL, but that's only because web browsers are smarter than TSA Customer Service agents.) Doctorow says this indicates some sort of DOS mindset, which is its only level of scary.

So, to recap: the TSA can break your stuff, despite having the tools to do otherwise and despite having a number of luggage manufacturers specifically making passkey-compliant suitcases to prevent this sort of thing from happening and despite the suitcase being UNLOCKED THE WHOLE TIME. And the traveler's path of recourse is a mistyped URL surrounded by "not our fault" boilerplate.

The TSA will never have to pay for broken luggage. Because terrorism.

I miss the good old days when this sort of behavior was only displayed by baggage handlers searching for valuables/setting distance records in amateur luggage-tossing competitions. At least then you could find someone to hold accountable for the damage sustained.

The TSA, however, is above even the most minimal level of accountability. If its employees are outsmarted by a "TSA-safe" lock, it's your fault for not ensuring your checked luggage was already open and dumping its contents all over the conveyor belts by the time it reached the TSA's elite group of suitcase-battering counterterrorists. This entire situation (especially the TSA's "response") cleary shows that Doctorow is the guilty party here. If he truly loved America, he'd have prepared for this eventuality… or at least just taken back the taped-together remains of his $1000 suitcase and shed a tear of gratitude for all the hard work the TSA did to ensure his flight didn't get blown up/hijacked.

Filed Under: cory doctorow, homeland security, locks, luggage, tsa

TSA Waves Convicted Murderer With Explosives Experience Through Its PreCheck Lane

from the waving-through-felons-while-patting-down-toddler dept

The TSA's PreCheck program also expedites security screening for "notorious convicted felons" and "former domestic terrorists." Who knew? From the sounds of its in-depth pre-screening efforts, you would think (unnamed) convicted felons wouldn't be able to sail past the checkpoint without even slowing down, but apparently, that's exactly what happened. And it's not just any former felon/domestic terrorist, but one who was previously convicted of murder and offenses involving explosives. (via Kevin Underhill/Lowering the Bar)

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received a whistleblower disclosure alleging a sufficiently notorious convicted felon was improperly cleared for TSA Pre✓ screening, creating a significant aviation security breach. The disclosure identified this event as a possible error in the TSA Secure Flight program since the traveler’s boarding pass contained a TSA Pre✓ indicator and encrypted barcode.

The good news (such as it were) is that the TSA did not grant the unnamed felon/terrorist PreCheck approval through its laborious and intrusive application process. It also didn't wave him/her through because lines were backing up at the normal checkpoints. (This is called "Managed Inclusion" by the TSA, but it more resembles "For the Hell of It" in practice…) That ends the good news.

It did, however, use its "risk assessment rules" to determine the terrorist/felon to be of no threat. This might be encouraging news for former felons/domestic terrorists, perhaps signaling that government agencies may ultimately forgive some criminal acts and not subject former felons to additional security harassment in perpetuity. Then again, this may just be the TSA's excuse for waving someone with questionable PreCheck clearance through security because a checkmark -- and its own internal bureaucracy -- told it to.

We also determined the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) followed standard operating procedures, but did not feel empowered to redirect the traveler from TSA Pre✓ screening to standard lane screening.

The OIG recommends more "empowerment" for rank-and-file. Good luck with that. If officers don't feel empowered, it's because management has shown them that questioning the (broken and wildly inconsistent) system isn't an option. Neither is doing any independent thinking. When this officer attempted to push it up the line, he/she ran into a pretty predictable response.

[T]he TSO knew of the traveler's TSA Pre✓disqualifying criminal convictions. The TSO followed the standard operating procedures and reported this to the supervisory TSO who then directed the TSO to take no further action and allow the traveler through the TSA Pre✓ lane. As a result, TSA does not have an incident report for this event.

One of the TSA's Behavioral Detection Officers (highly-trained in the art of the mental coin toss) was also contacted by the concerned officer. And, again, no further action was taken/recommended.

In the end, a felon/terrorist boarded a plane because the TSA's bureaucratic process can't handle contradictory variables. The PreCheck approval said "yes," but the previous convictions said PreCheck approval should never have happened. The TSA deferred to the obviously incorrect checkmark on the boarding pass. And now we have the punchline to the joke that starts, "A murderer with explosives experience walks into a PreCheck lane…"

The OIG's mostly-redacted recommendation criticizing the TSA's over-reliance on fallible pre-screening processes was mostly ignored by the agency.

TSA officials did not concur with Recommendation 1. In its response, TSA said that with respect to individuals who may pose an elevated security risk to commercial aviation, theU.S. Government's approach to domestic aviation security relies heavily on the TSDB and its Selectee List and No Fly List subcomponents. TSA said, had the intelligence or national law enforcement communities felt that this traveler posed an elevated risk to commercial aviation, they would have nominated the traveler to one of these lists and prevented the traveler from being designated as lower-risk.

To which the OIG responded, "Well, that 's obviously not working because this traveler should have been automatically denied PreCheck approval."

We consider TSA's actions nonresponsive to the intent of Recommendation 1, which is unresolved and open. TSA said it relies on the U.S. Government watchlisting process to identify individuals that represent an elevated risk to commercial aviation. However, not all non-watchlisted passengers are lower-risk and eligible for TSA Pre✓. For example, TSA has established disqualifying criteria, in addition to the watchlisting process, for an applicant seeking TSA Pre✓ Application Program membership. TSA will deny membership to an applicant convicted of any of the 28 disqualifying criminal offenses or not a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident. Even though the traveler is not watchlisted, the traveler would be permanently ineligible for TSA Pre✓.

And yet, a convicted murderer has been PreCheck approved. The TSA wants to blame the rest of the government. The OIG just wants someone to use common sense, rather than never questioning a boarding pass. The OIG has a good point. The TSA claims it's shifting to a smarter, more responsive travel security, like the PreCheck program and its many Behavioral Detection Officers. But when a situation involving both arose, it left the thinking to its brainstem -- unwavering faith in databases and policy -- rather than making any move indicative of higher thought processes.

Filed Under: precheck, security, security theater, terrorism, tsa

Lawsuit: TSA Supervisor Got Traveler Arrested For Bogus 'Terroristic Threat' Charge, Lied About Incident In Court

from the obviously,-the-'T'-stands-for-'Thug' dept

Here's more evidence the TSA really isn't about keeping travelers safe. What it is about is malevolent middle-management-types fiercely guarding the borders of their microfiefdoms and arbitrarily ejecting ticket-holding serfs for any conceivable reason.

Roger Vanderklok, a distance runner who frequently flies to events around the country, had the misfortune of passing through TSA supervisor Charles Kieser's turf at the Philadelphia airport. Vanderklok faced some legitimate questions (as legitimate as any questions based on the ever-shifting TSA list of suspicious items can be, anyway) and answered them all satisfactorily.

On this day, he was headed to Miami. In his carry-on bag was a packet of PowerBars and a heart-monitoring watch. When the bag went through the X-ray scanner, the items looked suspicious to a TSA agent whom Kieser supervises.

For the next 30 minutes, screeners checked the bag several times. Vanderklok told them that a tube-shaped case in the bag contained his watch. Then he was asked if his bag contained "organic matter." Vanderklok said no, as he thought "organic matter" meant fruits or vegetables.

PowerBars, which contain milk, grain and sugar, are considered "organic matter" and can resemble a common explosive. Terrorists often use a small electronic device, like a watch, to detonate the explosive. Hence the agent's concern.

But the TSA's Charles Kieser took issue with Vanderklok's suggestion: that agents make it a bit more clear what "organic matter" entails. Keiser decided Vanderklok didn't appreciate the severity of the situation (that situation being, apparently, that the TSA makes suggestions, not the other way around). According to Vanderklok's lawsuit [pdf link], Kieser became "confrontational." Vanderklok then asked if he could file a complaint. Bad move.

Instead, Kieser summoned the Philadelphia Police. Vanderklok was taken to an airport holding cell, and his personal belongings - including his phone - were confiscated while police "investigated" him.

Vanderklok was detained for three hours in the holding cell, missing his plane. Then he was handcuffed, taken to the 18th District at 55th and Pine and placed in another cell.

He says that no one - neither the police officers at the airport nor the detectives at the 18th - told him why he was there. He didn't find out until he was arraigned at 2 a.m. that he was being charged with "threatening the placement of a bomb" and making "terroristic threats."

Vanderklok's Kafkaesque odyssey finally ended at 4 a.m., when his wife paid 10 percent of his $40,000 bail.

Kieser provided his version of the story at Vanderklok's trial -- one that was mostly lies. He claimed Vanderklok "threatened" to bring a bomb through security. He also claimed Vanderklok made aggressive arm movements and pointed his finger in Keiser's face. Unfortunately for Kieser, surveillance footage proved nearly every accusation false.

Throughout the search, Vanderklok appears calm. His laptop computer is tucked under his arms and his hands are clasped in front of him the entire time. Without any fuss, he follows TSA agents when they move from one part of the screening area to another. He even smiles a little.

Not once does he raise his hands. Not once does he point a finger in Kieser's face. If anyone is becoming agitated, the video shows, it is Kieser.

And as for the only claim that might have held up -- the "bomb threat" -- Keiser's own words on the police statement, as well as his underlings' actions, undercut that assertion as well. No agent other than Kieser appears to be the least bit alarmed by Vanderklok's alleged bomb threat. One messes with his cellphone. Another rearranges bins. No passengers are prevented from entering the area.

In his statement to the police, Kieser claims Vanderklok said "Anyone could bring a bomb through here and you wouldn't know it." That's not a threat. That's an opinion. And, given the TSA's track record on stopping airborne terrorists, the protected opinion/non-threat comes disturbingly close to being a factual statement.

The presiding judge dismissed the charges against Vanderklok "within minutes" of Kieser's statements. Kieser's testimony must have been incredibly terrible, considering the judge never even bothered to view the video evidence that contradicted most of his claims. There must have been an obvious odor of vindictiveness permeating the courtroom during the TSA supervisor's statements. And it's that same respect-my-authority-or-else attitude that's likely going to cost the TSA some money.

Vanderklok has filed a lawsuit against the agency for his wrongful arrest, one that also names the Philly police department as co-defendants. Perhaps the video clearing Vanderklok will be seen during this court battle, or perhaps the agency will just settle quickly, rather than allow Kieser to further embarrass himself. And perhaps, Kieser will finally be out of a job. But for now, he still wields a level of power that far outpaces his ability to perform his duties in a credible and responsible manner.

Filed Under: arrests, charles kieser, philadelphia, roger vanderklok, security theater, threats, travelers, tsa

Redactions To Report On TSA's Internal Security Failures Prompts Angry Response From Inspector General

from the do-what-thou-wilt,-or-mostly-don't;-that-is-the-whole-of-the-policy dept

The DHS's Inspector General has finally released a report [pdf link] on the agency's control of TSA information systems at JFK International Airport. It's been delayed several times, mainly because of (now former) TSA head John Pistole's refusal to communicate with the Inspector General's office.

This report -- which has a release date of January 16, 2015 -- was actually completed on July 22, 2014. It was turned over to the TSA's CIO for a review, which should have been concluded within 30 days. The DHS Chief of Staff asked for additional time after failing to meet this deadline. The Inspector General granted another 30 days, making the new deadline September 17.

This revised due date came and went without a response from the TSA. On October 20th, the TSA finally produced its approved version of the IG's report, but not without several redactions of supposed SSI (Sensitive Security Information). The IG formally challenged the redactions in a November memo to John Pistole. Pistole never responded. Another memo was issued in December, which was also ignored by the TSA chief.

Finally, five months after its sensitive information review, the report was returned to the IG's office. All of the challenged redactions remained.

The IG's letter, which opens up the report, expresses his displeasure at the TSA's stalling tactics and secrecy.

I am disappointed in both the substance of the decision as well as its lack of timeliness. In 2006, Congress, concerned about delays in appeals of this nature, directed the Department to revise DHS Management Directive 11056.1 to require TSA to require timely SSI reviews. Given the clear requirement for timely SSI reviews in response to requests from the public, we hoped that TSA would approach an SSI appeal from the Inspector General with similar diligence, especially because TSA was aware of our deadlines.

Now, to meet our reporting requirement, we are compelled to publish a redacted report with SSI markings and will again ask the head of TSA to overrule the SSI program office's decision.

I believe that this report should be released in its entirety in the public domain. I challenged TSA's determination because this type of information has been disclosed in other reports without objection from TSA, and because the language marked SSI reveals generic, non-specific vulnerabilities that are common to virtually all systems and would not be detrimental to transportation security. My auditors, who are experts in computer security, have assured me that the redacted information would not compromise transportation security. Our ability to issue reports that are transparent, without unduly restricting information, is key to accomplishing our mission.

So, here we have a clear case of the TSA thwarting its own oversight in order to withhold information from the public. These are the sorts of things the TSA doesn't want you to see.




The TSA believes that exposing this information (such as the locations of its unsecured areas) will create a security risk, but it doesn't explain how that would be any different from the state the areas were in when the OIG inspected them. Unless JFK's TSA staff haven't taken any steps, the issues pointed out in the report like exposing the location of these areas (and, I don't know, CLOSING AND LOCKING DOORS), shouldn't matter.

As for redacting the number of vulnerabilities found in the TSA's servers, the only plausible explanation is that every number in those blacked-out charts is higher than agency feels comfortable disclosing. Whether the number is 2 or 9 really doesn't matter. (In one total column, it's obviously a two-digit number.) It only takes one hole to compromise a system.

While the TSA managed to withhold some information, much of what's left untouched isn't exactly flattering. The TSA's "security theater" apparently extends to its internal operations. We know the TSA generally "catches" terrorists by allowing airborne passengers do all the heavy lifting. This same "work ethic" applies to securing its own systems. From the looks of what the IG found, TSA agents at JFK apparently believe internal security is someone else's job and even the most basic of controls haven't been implemented.

At JFK, TSA did not have visitor logs in any of its communication rooms to document the entry and exit of visitors to these rooms that contain sensitive IT equipment.

[...]

Fire protection, detection, and suppression controls were not present in many TSA communication rooms. Specifically, 14 of the 21 rooms inspected that contained sensitive equipment did not have fire extinguishers…

Compounding the issue of fire detection and mitigation, only 7 of 21 the rooms inspected contained smoke detectors. Smoke detectors alert the appropriate personnel of a potential fire and possible hazard.

[...]

Several TSA communication closets located in the JFK terminals contained storage items and cleaning supplies. For example, we found TSA equipment on top of an unlocked TSA telecommunication cabinet surrounded by a ladder, boxes, trash, and cleaning supplies. The ladder, boxes, and cleaning supplies are all harmful to IT equipment. Additionally, there was no sign in sheet, and non-TSA personnel used the room for equipment storage.

TSA did not have an operable uninterruptible power supply (UPS) in three communication cabinets…

A sensitive equipment cabinet located in a public area was unlocked and left open to run an extension cord to a nearby electrical outlet for power.

The door to the secure Explosive Detection Systems room, where TSA reviews x-ray images of luggage to determine if suspicious checked luggage requires additional inspection, was propped open to vent a portable air conditioning unit, violating physical security controls.

The IG makes several recommendations, most of which can be boiled down to four words: FOLLOW EXISTING DHS POLICIES.

Since this report contains inspections of every other DHS agency with operations at the JFK airport, similar faults were found for both CBP (Customs and Border Protection) and ICE (Immigrations and Customs Enforcement). However, one agency managed to pass inspection: the Secret Service.

USSS fully complied with DHS operational, technical, and management operational policies for its telecommunication room at JFK. We audited IT security controls of the USSS telecommunication room located at the JFK on-site building number 75. This location had a DHS OneNet connection and a network switch device. The telecommunications room was clean and well maintained. Visitor’s logs were also maintained. Humidity and temperature sensor readings were within DHS policy guidelines. Since, the JFK location did not have an on-site server, vulnerability scans were not applicable.

Say what you will about its inability to secure the White House, but the Secret Service -- which oversees travel of dignitaries and government officials on over 800 flights per year -- has its JFK operations locked down tight.

What we have detailed here is another security agency making an effort to thwart its oversight. The TSA managed to delay a critical report by 6 months and withhold supposedly "sensitive" information over the repeated protests of the Inspector General. In doing so, it has shown Americans who really holds the power in Washington -- and it isn't these agencies' internal and external oversight.

Filed Under: dhs, inspector general, redactions, tsa

Government Pays Up To Settle With Traveler Who Was Detained By TSA For Trying To Learn Arabic

from the you-can't-put-a-price-on-freedom,-but-$25,000-is-a-nice-start dept

In 2009, Nick George was arrested in the Philadelphia airport because the TSA seems to equate certain First Amendment activity with terrorism. George, who was flying out to California to start his senior year at Pomona College, was carrying with him two items that caught the screeners' attention: Arabic-language flash cards and a book critical of the US government. It was as ridiculous as it sounds.

After a half-hour delay at the security line, the supervisor showed up, and things turned from annoying to surreal. After looking at the book and flashcards, the supervisor asked me: "Do you know who did 9/11?" Taken totally aback, I answered: "Osama Bin Laden." Then she asked me if I knew what language Osama Bin Laden spoke. "Arabic," I replied. "So do you see why these cards are suspicious?" she finished.

The other "suspicious" item, a book critical of US foreign policy, was written by a former Secretary of Commerce who served under President Reagan -- hardly "The Anarchist's Cookbook." But it isn't the TSA's job to deploy logic or critical thinking. It's here to pretend the skies are safer with it around. Instead, the TSA brought in the Philly police, who cuffed him in the airport for carrying Osama Bin Laden flashcards and subversive literature.

The police left George cuffed for hours and refused to inform him of its reasons for detaining him. The only police officer to respond to George's question ("Why am I being held?") shrugged and flipped his query into a presumption of guilt: "I don't know. What'd you do?" Between the TSA's presumption that Arabic = terrorism and the PD's willingness to continue the ignorant farce, George was stuck in a rights-less limbo. As he points out, there's an ugliness inherent to the government's long-running security theater, one that crosses over to the law enforcement agencies who are asked to detain travelers.

It's that attitude that is so problematic. Even after searching my luggage without probable cause of a crime and finding nothing out of the ordinary, TSA agents and the police felt they had the authority to detain and then arrest me, purely on ignorant assumptions about a language spoken by 295 million people worldwide.

You can't fix stupid. You can't even get it to talk to you.

Fortunately, George now has some closure on the 2009 incident. The government has settled George's lawsuit (filed with the assistance of the ACLU), paying him $25,000 for stripping him of his rights over some foreign language flashcards and a book on US foreign policy. In addition, the settlement [pdf link] includes instructions to be delivered to the Philadelphia Police in hopes of preventing a repeat of this debacle.

The City shall communicate to Philadelphia Police Department officers assigned to the Airport the following:

Investigative detentions may be made only on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and any arrest must be based on probable cause. A referral by TSA agents is not grounds for arrest unless an officer makes a judgment of probable cause; similarly, referral by TSA agents is not grounds for detention unless an officer makes a judgment that there is reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Any detentions or arrests should be documented on appropriate police paperwork consistent with PPD Directives.

The underlying message is that the US government's airport security force isn't a very good judge of threats or illegal behavior. Rather than just take the TSA's word that a traveler is a potential threat, the police will need to assess the situation on their own and actually come up with something resembling "probable cause" before effecting an arrest.

And, of course, as is the case with nearly every government settlement, the defendants are shelling out tax dollars while taking no responsibility for their actions.

This Stipulation is not, is in no way intended to be, and should not be construed as an admission of liability or fault on the part of the United States, OHS, TSA, DOJ, FBI, the City, or their principals, agents, servants, or employees, including William Rehiel and Edward Richards, Jr., and it is specifically denied that they are liable to Plaintiff.

Oh, but it will be "construed" as an "admission of liability." If these entities had done no wrong, they certainly had the (nearly limitless) means to continue fighting George in court.

Unfortunately, the lawsuit hasn't resulted in any mandated guidance directed at the TSA. In fact, it includes a declaration from Sarah Tauber, a deputy in the TSA's "Threat Assessment Division," that basically states, "Hey, the police don't need to arrest everyone we refer to them. This is all on the Philly PD." Between this declaration and the boilerplate "NO WRONGDOING HERE" paragraph, the government allows itself room to further abuse travelers' rights and hand over other people's money to make it all go away.

Filed Under: arabic, flashcards, nick george, philadelphia police, police, tsa

The TSA Wants To Read Your Facebook Posts And Check Out Your Purchases Before It Will Approve You For PreCheck

from the ah,-now-I-understand-the-phrase-'documented-citizen' dept

The TSA is disappointed that so few Americans have opted out of its bottle-tossing, package-groping screenings by signing up for its PreCheck program. For a few years now, the TSA has been selling travelers' civil liberties back to them, most recently for $85 a head, but it's now making a serious push to increase participation. The TSA can't do it alone, so it's accepting bids on its PreCheck expansion proposal. (h/t to Amy Alkon)

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is seeking vendors for TSA Pre√® Application Expansion initiative to develop, deliver, and deploy private sector application capabilities expanding the public's enrollment opportunities for TSA Pre✓® through an Other Transactional Agreement (OTA) awarded by TSA. The Government plans to award an OTA to multiple vendors. The Government will evaluate the proposed ready-to-market solutions' application capabilities against this TSA Pre√® Expansion Initiative Solicitation and Statement of Work.

This will involve a new pre-screening process to weed out terrorists by looking through a variety of "commercial data" sources. The proposal [pdf link] is very vague on the details of what "commercial data" will be used by these third parties.

Contractors may use commercial data to conduct an eligibility evaluation (also known as pre-screening) of potential applicants. The eligibility evaluation shall include, at a minimum, validating identity and performing a criminal history records check to ensure that applicants do not have disqualifying convictions in conjunction with the TSA Pre✓® disqualifying offenses…

The proposal goes on to say something that sounds like the TSA safeguarding PreCheck applicants' privacy by standing between them and any crazy ideas third party contractors might have about "commercial data."

As a second component to the eligibility evaluation, TSA may also consider approving an option to use additional private sector processes to conduct a provisional risk assessment (based on an algorithm developed by the Contractor) for the purposes of assisting in identifying those individuals believed to pose a low risk to transportation security. TSA must approve any commercial data inputs proposed for use by contractors to include those which validate identity and determine provisional low-risk status.

More protections here:

Risk assessments may not be based on race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, age, financial status (e.g., credit ratings/scores, liens, bankruptcies, foreclosures, annual income), health records, constitutionally protected activity, or other records reflecting an individual’s socio-economic status.

So far, so good. But while the TSA has pointed out a few examples of what won't be permitted to be used to separate the threats from the travelers, it really never goes on to detail what will be permitted… at least not in the proposal itself. Those sources (and there are several) are tucked away inside the agreement boilerplate [pdf link] to be signed by winning contractors.

Here's everything that's open to inspection by PreCheck applicant screeners.

For purposes of this private sector enrollment initiative for the TSA Pre√® Application Program, “commercial data” includes: public record data, such as criminal history and real estate records produced by federal, state, and local governments; other publicly available information, such as directories, press reports, location data and information that individuals post on blogs and social media sites; and wide ranging data such as purchase information, customer lists from registration websites, and self-reported information provided by consumers that is obtained by commercial data sources such as data brokers.

So, the TSA is authorizing contractors to use social media posts in the screening process -- which, yes, are by default public but tend to generate more noise than signal when it comes to spotting the terrorists in PreCheck approval queue.

[And I suppose my Facebook page -- containing pictures I added a few months ago -- will put me in the "questionable" group.]


The TSA is looking to hire on third-party haystackers in order to pre-profile travelers. There's a lot of "public/commercial data" out there, and very little of it has any relevance to the "threat level" of potential flyers. And the part about "purchase information" is particularly disturbing, considering the DHS would really like to have access to that data.

Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson said his department will be issuing new guidance to retailers this week giving them pointers on how to spot potential terrorists among their customers by looking at what they're buying.

While saying the government cannot prohibit sales of some everyday materials, Mr. Johnson said retailers should be trained to look for anyone who buys a lot from what he described as a "long list of materials that could be used as explosive precursors."

He said it was an extension of the "If you see something, say something" campaign launched by his predecessor, former Secretary Janet Napolitano, which tries to enlist average Americans to be aware of their immediate environment.

Couple Johnson's statements with this proposal sentence (which immediately follows the "Risk assessments may not be based on…" sentence from the paragraph above), and you get an idea where this PreCheck database is headed.

Any algorithm used must receive DHS approval, which will be based upon a DHS evaluation requiring testing and review of commercial data inputs during that process.

Whatever data the contractors grab will be viewed by the DHS first, before it makes its decision to keep or discard it. And this will be in addition to the huge amount of data these two agencies already dip into to determine how many "S's" to print on your boarding pass. The TSA's role in the PreCheck program will be mainly limited to waving successful applicants through. (Something it has previously done to alleviate congestion with no apparent concern about PreCheck approval and all of its "safeguards".) So, this is really the DHS's program, one that allows it partake of third-party data hoovering and add anything it deems relevant to its databases.

That's a lot of info to turn over for shorter waits at the airport. Generally speaking, the government has little interest in your purchases and social media activities, but by applying for PreCheck, you give them the green light to go digging. Sure, most of what's there isn't necessarily private, but it's still information most people wouldn't assume the government would find to be relevant to airport security. Factor in the TSA/DHS's ever-mounting paranoia, and you've got a recipe for a slew of false positives, especially when the latter considers photography of public buildings to be "suspicious activity."

Filed Under: precheck, privacy, social media, tsa

Another Batch Of Baggage Handlers Accused Of Stealing From Luggage; Because Airport 'Security' Isn't

from the shopping-for-your-goods dept

Just last week I flew into JFK airport's terminal 4, and thankfully I only had carry-on luggage, because this morning I read that seven baggage handlers from JFK -- working in terminals 4 and 7 -- have been arrested for stealing stuff from people's luggage. And doing so without much fear of getting caught (even if they were, eventually):

According to the criminal complaints, between March 2012 and June 2014, the defendants stole Apple iPads, iPhones and MacBook computers; Samsung Galaxy phones and tablets; Dell, Toshiba and ASUS laptops; and other electronic items, as well as a pair of two-carat diamond-and-gold earrings. The complaint said the items were taken from passengers' checked luggage, and all but two of the defendants are alleged to have contacted a "fence," who actually was an undercover police officer.

The defendants named their prices, set up meetings on airport grounds or nearby, and even made promises about other items that they could steal, the complaint said.

Now, if this were a one time thing, it might not even be that noteworthy. But this seems like fairly common practice at airports. A few years ago, we wrote about TSA agents stealing iPads and stories of TSA agents and baggage handlers stealing stuff from luggage are not at all hard to find. In fact, reports from a few years ago noted that over 400 TSA employees have been fired for stealing from passnegers in the past decade.

And related stories are all over the place. Hell, back in March, another group of JFK baggage handlers were arrested. On nearly the same day, it looks like a similar theft ring involving baggage handlers at LAX was broken up. Even more recently, a similar theft ring at New Orleans' Louis Armstrong International Airport. Amateur sleuths were needed to bust up a baggage handler theft ring in Charleston, South Carolina. A WSJ article from a few years ago details a long list of baggage handler thefts from a wide range of airports.

And it's not just baggage handlers, but the TSA itself, who (we're told) is supposed to be protecting us from bad people. Here's $8,500 stolen from a bag. Here's a TSA officer stealing a computer. Here's a TSA agent swiping $36 from a passenger. A few years ago, a convicted TSA agent, who admitted to stealing $800,000 from passengers at Newark Airport in New Jersey, spoke out about just how common theft was among the TSA:

"It was very commonplace, very," said Pythias Brown, a former TSA officer at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey who admits he stole more than $800,000 worth of items from luggage and security checkpoints over a four-year period.

"It was very convenient to steal," he said.

Speaking publicly for the first time after being released from prison, Brown told ABC News his four-year-long crime spree came to an end only because he tried to sell a camera he stole from the luggage of a CNN producer on E-bay but forgot to remove all of the news networks' identifying stickers.

"It became so easy, I got complacent," Brown said.

All of this should raise a variety of questions about airport security. We're told that these people are there to protect us, but it seems that they're not able to do that. At all. Hell, as Amy Alkon points out, if it's so damn easy to take stuff out of people's bags, you know it's pretty easy to put stuff in as well. And, of course, this has been going on for years. Many of those links above are more recent, but plenty are from years past and it doesn't seem like anything has changed very much. Airport "security" remains security theater at the best of times, but it's even worse when it's actually putting people at more risk.

Filed Under: airport security, baggage handlers, jfk, security, security theater, stealing, theft, tsa