FBI, Working With Banks, Chose Not To Inform Occupy Leadership Of Assassination Plot On Its Leaders

from the gee,-thanks dept

Whatever you thought of the so-called "Occupy" movement of the past year or so, it seems clear that there has been at least a bit of overreaction to them. I mean, treating these protests, which have, by and large, been peaceful, as terrorist groups is just silly. But, as you may have seen over the past few days, that's exactly what the FBI did (as uncovered by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund (PCJF)), and they did it in a coordinated manner with both Homeland Security and privately held banking corporations. This certainly isn't the first time government organizations have allowed for the appearance of impropriety this way, but just as when DHS held a press conference from Disney's HQ, there's a certain flaunting feeling when the coordination with private companies against the public is so blatant.

All that being said, you'd at least expect the FBI, no matter what level of corporate bowing they wish to engage in, to at least keep American citizens apprised of threats against their life. Unfortunately, it would appear the FBI disagrees when the citizens in question are Occupy leadership, as they allowed a plot to murder Occupy leadership in Texas with suppressed sniper rifles go untold until a rights group dug it up.

Last week, Digital Journal reported that the documents obtained by PCJF detailed how the FBI cooperated with the Department of Homeland Security, US military and private corporations to monitor and investigate Occupy Wall Street protesters as "domestic terrorists" and "criminals." The documents prove that federal agencies are "functioning as a de facto intelligence arm of Wall Street and corporate America," PCJF said.

Thorough analyses of the documents has now revealed a heavily redacted file that clearly mentions a plan to use snipers to assassinate Occupy protesters. The names of the groups or individuals involved in the murderous plot have been redacted, so it is impossible to identify them at this time. What is known is that the FBI never alerted any of the potential victims of the danger to their lives.

We're talking heavily redacted text here, which strips out a bunch of details, but here's the text that is available.

An identified [redacted] of October planned to engage in sniper attacks against protesters in Houston, Texas, if deemed necessary. An identified [redacted] had received intelligence that indicated the protesters in New York and Seattle planned similar protests in Houston, Dallas, San Antonio and Austin, Texas. [Redacted] planned to gather intelligence against the leaders of the protest groups and obtain photographs then formulate a plan to kill the leadership via suppressed sniper rifles.

What's plain as day is that some group somewhere was plotting to murder OWS leadership in Texas. It's also clear that the FBI never bothered to inform the targets of the threats against their lives. This stands in apparent contrast to how closely they worked and coordinated with private banks to handle the OWS protests as a whole. And, remember, this is the same FBI who has put tremendous effort over the past few years into breaking up its own terrorist plots. You'd think that when it had a chance to go after actual plots to assassinate leaders of a political movement, they might, you know, actually do something and then trumpet the success in stopping a real plot. Apparently not.

So the lesson here is simple. If you're a private bank, the FBI will help you demonize non-violent protesters as "terrorists," but if you're a protester, you don't get to know that you might have an infrared dot dancing on the back of your head -- or have the FBI take it as serious as one of its own made up terrorist plots.

Filed Under: banks, fbi, foia, investigation, occupy, occupy wall street, plots

Facebook 'Likes' Considered Key Evidence In 'Terrorist' Plot

from the signal-of-intent? dept

We've written a few times about how the FBI has been doing a bang up job foiling its own terrorist plots, so we're a bit skeptical every time we see headlines of some giant "terrorist bust." Almost every time, once you dig into the details, it involves some gullible, confused suckers who had no actual connection to terrorists, but were led along by FBI agents and informers until they were "convinced" to take part in a "plot" that was entirely concocted by the FBI. The latest headline-grabbing case of "arrested terrorists" actually appears like it may have slightly more substance, however, in that they may have actually had some sort of connection to al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

That doesn't mean that there still aren't some oddities in the case, however. As a number of folks have sent over, reading through the indictment (also embedded below) shows that a significant chunk of the "evidence" seems to consist of Facebook "likes" and shared content among the accused. From the indictment:

I have reviewed several of the social media web sites for KABIR, SANTANA, DELEON, each of whom has posted radical prom jihad content on their respective pages. Additionally, portions of the social media show that DELEON and SANTANA "liked" postings on KABIR's Facebook page as early as May 2011.

Public items posted by KABIR to his social media accounts include photographs of himself, non-extremist content, radical Islamist content, and items reflecting a mistrust of mainstream media, abuses by the government, conspiracy theories, abuses by law enforcement, and the war in Afghanistan. KABIR's radical postings include videos and links to videos of Al-Qa'ida leader Anwar Al-Awlagi and his lectures, jihad--based videos regarding Afghanistan and elsewhere, videos depicting mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan and elsewhere, videos depicting terrorist training camps and related activities, videos depicting improvised explosive device attacks, and articles regarding the death of American soldiers in Afghanistan. For example, on July 6, 2012, KABIR shared a video to his public Facebook page entitled "Knights of Khorasan Islamic Emirate Operation Against an Army Base in Margha." This video, which I have reviewed, depicts a suicide bombing operation against a large base wherein the suicide- bomber drives an explosives-laden truck into a base and detonates it. The video bears the symbol of As-Sahab, Al-- Qa'ida's media wing, in the lower right corner.

KABIR has "shared" several postings with SANTANA and/or DELEON, both of whom have "liked" or commented on several other postings by KABIR, including the following:

a. On December 7, 2011, KABIR posted a video entitled "Black Flags of Khorasan: Part 2" that he later "shared" with DELEON.- (Based on my training and experience, conversations with other agents, and research of publicly available information, the black flag or banner refers to a traditional flag flown by Muhammad and later by Islamic military leaders. More recently, several jihadi groups and terrorists have adopted the black flag as a symbol for jihad and mujahideen fighters.)

b. On or about January 5, 2012, KABIR shared a link regarding negotiating with the Taliban. SANTANA "liked" the post and SANTANA and KABIR engaged in a public exchange of comments. SANTANA said, "they messed up know?" KABIR followed SANTANA's comment with a comment that appeared to include excerpts of a "Statement of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," which discussed the Taliban's desire to expel the United States from, and establish their own government in, Afghanistan. SANTANA replied to KABIR's comment by writing "Oh yea!!!!"

c. On January 5, 2012, KABIR posted a photo on his Facebook page depicting a veiled and covered woman leaning on an assault rifle. DELEON and KABIR exchanged comments on the photo wherein DELEON said "...hey bro are coming back? whats goin on? how long gona stay there?" KABIR replied "Naa.. not comin back... movin 4wd.... =D.... 1/2 way 2 my destination.. =D."

(Based on the context of this statement, including the fact that KABIR was then in Germany, I believe that KABIR intended to inform DELEON that he had commenced his journey to Afghanistan.)

d. On January 19, 2012, DELEON "liked" a shared link posted on KABIR's page of a video entitled "Dua of Sheikh Muhammad al Mohaisany masjid al haram makkah." The video, which I have reviewed as posted on KABIR's page, appears to be a prayer for the success of the mujahideen and features various photos including Al--Qa'ida leaders Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, 9/11 attacks, bloodied adults and children, and Islamic fighters. The video also calls for the liberation of Al-Aqsa, the mosque referenced in the 1998 Al-Qa'ida fatwa described above.

e. On February 13, 2012, SANTANA "liked" two shared video links on KABIR's page, including one for a video entitled "Imam Anwar al Awlaki -- A Story of Courage."

f. On May 28, 2012, KABIR posted two stories regarding the death of Al-Qa'ida leader Usama Bin Laden. DELEON "liked" both stories; SANTANA "liked" one.

g. On June 16, 2012, SANTANA "liked" a video, produced by Al--Qa'ida's media wing, As-Sahab, shared by KABIR to his Facebook page entitled "Ghuraba." This video, which I have reviewed, appears to depict life as a mujahideen fighter and includes several interviews. The video also features mujahideen fighters firing artillery.

h. On July 5, 2012, KABIR posted a photo featuring Al-Qa'ida leader Anwar Al-Awlaqi which contained a quote from Al-Awlaqi. DELEON "liked" and "shared" the photo.

i. On September 16, 2012, DELEON "liked" KABIR's shared link to a video entitled "The Truth Has Come and Falsehood has perished Part 1 Urdu." This video, which I have reviewed, is a production by As-Sahab and begins with footage of Al-Awlaqi and discusses the war in Afghanistan. The video also features current Al-Qa'ida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

On September 17, 2012 SANTANA "liked" KABIR's post of an article entitled "A Public Talk by Ustadz Abu M Jibriel AR: The Truth of The 9/11 Jihad Operation, The Plots Of The Enemies and The Zionist Conspiracy."

There is, of course, other evidence including statements made by all the defendants. For all we know they may have actually been planning attacks on US targets and the indictment is entirely appropriate. But it certainly gives pause to suggest that "likes" and "shares" on Facebook are somehow evidence of terrorist intent. It could certainly be seen as having a chilling effect for anyone who might "like" or "share" content on Facebook that is critical of the US government.

Filed Under: fbi, likes, social media, terrorism
Companies: facebook

Opportunistic Politicians Lean On The FBI And Twitter To Shut Down Terrorist Accounts

from the and-then-what?-linkedin? dept

I have no idea what it is with certain politicians that makes them believe they can somehow "curb" violence by cordoning off a section of the internet. They don't seem to realize that determined individuals will simply route around their half-assed roadblock without breaking a sweat. Even worse, they don't seem to realize that useful information on violent groups and individuals can often be gleaned from the very same lines of communication they're trying to cut.

In this case, it's very much like grandstanding politicians trying to shut down "human traffickers" like Backpages and Craigslist, failing to understand that law enforcement can use the same services to track down offenders. Rather than look for the upside of having a live feed from the enemy front (or realize the ultimate futility of their efforts), these lawmakers have chosen to throw a bunch of effort (or at least, words) behind a bad idea.

Seven House Republicans asked the FBI in September to demand that Twitter take down the accounts of U.S.-designated terrorist groups, such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Somalia's al Shabaab. The letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller was spearheaded by Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas), who said Wednesday that the recent events vindicated the request.

“Allowing foreign terrorist organizations like Hamas to operate on Twitter is enabling the enemy,” Poe said in an e-mailed statement to The Hill. “Failure to block access arms them with the ability to freely spread their violent propaganda and mobilize in their War on Israel.

Now, I'm not going to claim to be smarter than these politicians (although you're certainly welcome to make that claim for me in the comment threads), but I'm curious as to how they arrived at the conclusion that blocking Twitter accounts would somehow result in less violence committed by terrorists. One could argue that breaking down a line of communication might result in some temporary disruption, but I've got to believe that Twitter isn't the only line of communication Hamas has.

Shutting down these accounts would do little more than a) make these politicians feel better about having done something, b) annoy (and possibly provoke) already irritable and violent groups, and c) move communication anti-terrorist entities rely on to a new channel possibly unavailable to them. The downside easily outweighs the upside, because the "upside" only benefits these seven lawmakers, giving them a feeling of power and self-righteousness, which will be cold comfort to those who might actually be using these feeds to glean intelligence and help defend themselves.

Then there's this amazing sentence, which must have been composed by Poe at a cost of one IQ point per letter:

The FBI and Twitter must recognize sooner rather than later that social media is a tool for the terrorists.

Any form of information dissemination can be considered a "tool" for terrorists. Imbuing Twitter with some sort of terrorist-defeating powers is ridiculous. Berating the FBI and Twitter for aiding and abetting terrorism through inaction is even more so. This is merely a continuation of Poe's anti-Twitter obsession, which began back in September when he first penned a letter to the FBI requesting the takedown of these "terrorist" accounts, citing (of all things), Twitter's decision to block a neo-Nazi account in Germany. (The account could still be read anywhere else in the world, or even in Germany with minimal effort.)

Poe is once again attempting to use Twitter's own statement against it, but the FBI just isn't giving this group of lawmakers the one thing they need to get their way:

“Twitter maintains that it will take down any account requested by the FBI,” seven Republican members of Congress wrote to the FBI last month. “As of this writing, the FBI has not made a single request to Twitter to take an account down.”

And (once again), Poe and his co-signers are using recent events to further their own agenda.

“Not one account has been shut down, unlike on YouTube and Facebook,” Poe told the Free Beacon.

“Twitter is not going to take it upon themselves to shut them down,” which is why the FBI needs to take action, Poe said.

The FBI isn't buying it, however.

FBI Special Agent Jason Pack told the Free Beacon, “The FBI received the Congressman’s letter and will respond to it appropriately.”

One assumes Pack "responded" by tossing the angry letter into the nearest trash can, possibly running it through the shredder first. The latest missive means someone at the FBI will need to empty the trash can, but given the results of Poe's previous demands, I highly doubt Twitter will be shuttering any accounts.

Poe has also expressed his disappointment in the Obama administration for not pushing for more Twitter shutdowns.

Poe speculated that one reason the Obama administration has not pursued the issue is because terrorists’ Twitter pages are a rich vein for the intelligence community to mine.

Poe, however, said that this is not a good enough reason to give these radical actors free rein on the Internet.

“If that’s [the administration’s] only way of knowing” what terrorists are up to, “we’ve got some serious problems with our intelligence service,” Poe said.

There's Poe's problem. He views Twitter as the only thing. In his mind, it's the only source of communication for terrorists and it's the only source of intel for the intelligence community. Poe has seized on Twitter as the only problem and won't be dissuaded easily, no matter how often the FBI refuses to indulge his "social media = terror" hobby horse.

The Free Beacon's Republican slant inadvertently suggests that Poe may just be kicking around Twitter because its "best friends" with Obama.

Twitter’s Washington D.C. lobbying team is comprised of several Obama administration confidants and former Democratic Hill staffers. Adam Sharp, the site’s top government liaison, formerly served as deputy chief of staff for Sen. Mary Landrieu (D., La.). Its global public policy official, Colin Crowell, was a senior aide to Rep. Ed Markey (D., Mass.), while Twitter’s head of international strategy, Katie Jacobs Stanton, once worked with the Obama administration on new media strategies.

Since 2011, several individuals who list their employer as Twitter have donated primarily to Democrats, including the Obama campaign and Massachusetts Senate candidate Elizabeth Warren.

So... maybe it's not really about terrorism. Maybe it's just good, old fashioned partisanship sporting War on Terror clothing. No matter how you slice it, though, there's only one thing it truly is: stupid.

Filed Under: al shabaab, congress, fbi, free speech, hamas, hezbollah, ted poe, terrorism
Companies: twitter

If There Needs To Be An Investigation, It Should Be About Why The FBI Was Reading Certain Emails

from the friendly-fire dept

While some have noted the irony of General Petreaus being taken down due to online surveillance methods that he should have been aware of, the case is bringing growing attention to an issue many of us have been discussing for a while: how easy it is for law enforcement to snoop through your email. We raised the question already, but as more info comes out, the whole thing is looking that much more questionable.

Julian Sanchez keeps trying to find out exactly what legal process the FBI used to go through a variety of email accounts based on an apparently non-criminal cyberstalking claim (which was apparently brought to the FBI by a non-cyber-focused agent who had seemed to have a crush on the "victim"of the cyberstalking), and notes that there are big questions about what process was used to go through these emails and how much oversight was involved:

To Julian Sanchez, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, the real scandal over the Petraeus affair is not the extramarital sex, but the invasion of privacy.

"Law enforcement and certainly intelligence agencies have an incredible amount of ability to gather huge volumes of detailed information about people's most intimate online communications, a lot of it without requiring a full-blown warrant, a lot of it without requiring even any kind of judicial approval," Sanchez said.

Meanwhile, Chris Soghoian, working for the ACLU, highlights some of what's been revealed about the snooping. For example, FBI agents tracked down Patricia Broadwell as the email sender, even though she was using throwaway accounts, because webmail providers record the IP address from whence someone logs in -- and Broadwell didn't conceal that info. Apparently, the IP addresses were a series of hotels, and cross-checking with guest lists, it didn't take long to narrow down the only real suspect. Oh, and none of that info required judicial oversight for the FBI to get:

The guest lists from hotels, IP login records, as well as the creative request to email providers for “information about other accounts that have logged in from this IP address” are all forms of data that the government can obtain with a subpoena. There is no independent review, no check against abuse, and further, the target of the subpoena will often never learn that the government obtained data (unless charges are filed, or, as in this particular case, government officials eagerly leak details of the investigation to the press). Unfortunately, our existing surveillance laws really only protect the “what” being communicated; the government’s powers to determine “who” communicated remain largely unchecked.

He also delves into the method by which Petreaus and Broadwell communicated -- by sharing an account and communicating via "drafts" that were saved. For the head of the CIA you'd think he'd use a method that wasn't long known to be just as (if not more) insecure than regular email. Soghoian tears apart this supposedly "secret" method of communicating:

For more than a decade, a persistent myth in Washington DC, fueled by several counterterrorism experts, has been that it is possible to hide a communications trail by sharing an email inbox, and instead saving emails in a “draft” folder. This technique has been used by Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Richard Reid (the shoe bomber), the 2004 Madrid train bombers, terrorists in Germany, as well as some domestic “eco-terrorists.” This technique has appeared in federal court documents as early as 2003, and was described in a law journal article written by a DOJ official in 2004. It is hardly a state secret.

Apparently, this method was also used by General Petraeus. According to the Associated Press, “[r]ather than transmitting emails to the other's inbox, they composed at least some messages and instead of transmitting them, left them in a draft folder or in an electronic ‘dropbox,’ the official said. Then the other person could log onto the same account and read the draft emails there. This avoids creating an email trail that is easier to trace.”

The problem is, like so many other digital security methods employed by terrorists, it doesn’t work. Emails saved in a draft folder are stored just like emails in any other folder in a cloud service, and further, the providers can be compelled, prospectively, to save copies of everything (so that deleting the messages after reading them won’t actually stop investigators from getting a copy).

Ironically enough, by storing emails in a draft folder, rather than an inbox, individuals may be making it even easier for the government to intercept their communications. This is because the Department of Justice has argued that emails in the “draft” or “sent mail” folder are not in “electronic storage” (as defined by the Stored Communications Act), and thus not deserving of warrant protection. Instead, the government has argued it should be able to get such messages with a mere subpoena.

Got all that? It's even more info that the FBI may have been able to obtain without ever having to get approval from a judge. That's not to say they didn't necessarily go before a judge to get a warrant or similar tool for surveillance, but it does highlight just how much info the FBI can obtain without any real oversight, and how it's entirely possible for it to be abused -- taking a very limited situation (non-criminal online harassment) and turning it into something massive.

In fact, as the EFF's Trevor Timm notes, we should be investigating the FBI over why it was snooping through people's emails and how frequently it does this. He notes, as others have, that nothing about the origination of this case should have resulted in FBI involvement, let alone reading people's emails. Remember, early on, no one knew this had anything to do with General Petreaus or any other high ranking official:

The spark that set events in motion was a handful of allegedly harassing emails sent anonymously to Kelley, a friend of Petraeus's, which she brought to a friend at the FBI. Yet it's unclear why an investigation was ever opened, given that everything publicly known about the emails suggests they weren't illegal.

As the Daily Beast reported, they said things like "Who do you think you are? ... You parade around the base ... You need to take it down a notch." The story noted, "when the FBI friend showed the emails to the cyber squad in the Tampa field office, her fellow agents noted that the absence of any overt threats."

It seems the deciding factor in opening the investigation was not the emails' content, but the fact that the FBI agent was friendly with Kelley. (Even more disturbing, the same FBI agent has now been accused of becoming "obsessed" with the Tampa socialite, sent shirtless pictures to her, and has been removed from the case.)

Basically, it sounds like the FBI had very questionable reasons for digging all that deep into this case at all. Michael Davis, at the Daily Beast, notes that the emails were typical "cat-fight stuff," with no indication of illegal activity:

When the FBI friend showed the emails to the cyber squad in the Tampa field office, her fellow agents noted that the absence of any overt threats.

“No, ‘I’ll kill you’ or ‘I'll burn your house down,’” the source says. “It doesn’t seem really that bad.”

The squad was not even sure the case was worth pursuing, the source says.

“What does this mean? There’s no threat there. This is against the law?” the agents asked themselves by the source’s account.

At most the messages were harassing. The cyber squad had to consult the statute books in its effort to determine whether there was adequate legal cause to open a case.

“It was a close call,” the source says.

So while there's all sorts of talk of investigations into who should have known the details of what was going on at what time, no one seems to be questioning why a simple "cat fight" resulted in the FBI digging in and reading people's emails. Yet, that seems like something we should all be quite worried about.

Indeed, if there's any "benefit" to come out of this, perhaps it's that more and more people are hopefully realizing just how easy it is for the FBI to spy on people electronically.

Filed Under: david petreaus, email snooping, fbi, oversight, privacy, subpoenas, warrants

The DHS And FBI Present: You Might Be A Terrorist If... (Hotel Guest Edition)

from the glass-container-in-the-pool-area?-threat-level-upgraded-to-'orange' dept

As we seem to be told repeatedly, seeing something and saying something is perhaps the greatest duty an American citizen can perform in service to this country. It's simply not enough anymore to install an American flag in the front yard and purchase domestic vehicles. Now, every citizen should be keeping his eye out for (and on) his fellow citizens. The price of freedom may be eternal vigilance, but the price of security is endless paranoia.

To that end, the DHS and the FBI have joined forces to compile a list of oddities that might well indicate you are sleeping one paper-thin wall away from death personified (via Bruce Schneier's fine blog). 

Possible indicators of terrorist behaviors at hotels: The observation of multiple indicators may represent—based on the specific facts or circumstances—possible terrorist behaviors at hotels:

- Not providing professional or personal details on hotel registrations—such as place of employment, contact information, or place of residence.

[Place of employment? Seriously? "Alan Smithee, 123 Main Street, Anytown USA 5578H. Occupation: Death Hug Merchant."] 

- Using payphones for outgoing calls or making front desk requests in person to avoid using the room telephone.

[Payphones? Are terrorists unaware of "burners?"]

- Interest in using Internet cafes, despite hotel Internet availability.

[This seems to suggest that the Feds have already let themselves in the back door on the (sometimes prohibitively expensive) hotel wi-fi.]

- Non-VIPs who request that their presence at a hotel not be divulged.

[Let me get this straight: normal, "non-VIP" people will just have their information divulged to whoever asks, simply because they're not "important" enough to deserve privacy? Perhaps that should be posted on a sign somewhere up by the check-in desk: "All guests are created equal, but some are more equal than others."]

- Extending departure dates one day at a time for prolonged periods.

[Something only a terrorist would do. Let me give you a real life, happened-to-me example: in town to visit the famous Mayo Clinic seeking medical help for my wife. What started out as three days turned into seven days, with the stay at the hotel being extended one day at a time. Open-ended hotel stays: not just for terrorists anymore.]

- Refusal of housekeeping services for extended periods.

[This I believe. No one wants to make their own bed.]

- Extended stays with little baggage or unpacked luggage.

[Unless the staff have been instructed to do a little snooping in every room, how would anyone know how much baggage someone brought and never unpacked? No doubt this will soon make its way onto propaganda posters: "HAVE YOU PACKED ENOUGH? Traveling light is traveling with terror."]

- Access or attempted access to areas of the hotel normally restricted to staff.

- Use of cash for large transactions or a credit card in someone else’s name.

- Requests for specific rooms, floors, or other locations in the hotel.

[Close to the parking lot, ground floor. Convenience or criminal intent?]

- Use of a third party to register.

- Multiple visitors or deliveries to one individual or room.

[Ruthless cabal or post-prom drinking party?]

- Unusual interest in hotel access, including main and alternate entrances, emergency exits, and surrounding routes.

[IN CASE OF FIRE, PLEASE REMAIN IGNORANT.]

- Use of entrances and exits that avoid the lobby or other areas with cameras and hotel personnel.

[Like the one nearest your vehicle?]

- Attempting to access restricted parking areas with a vehicle or leaving unattended vehicles near the hotel building.

[During your stay at the hotel, please remain in your vehicle at all times.]

- Unusual interest in hotel staff operating procedures, shift changes, closed-circuit TV systems, fire alarms, and security systems.

- Leaving the property for several days and then returning.

- Abandoning a room and leaving behind clothing, toiletries, or other items.

[You'd think the Feds would be happy to have CLUES and EVIDENCE just laying around.]

- Noncompliance with other hotel policies.

[Ah. The handy catch-all. If the other points don't directly implicate you, then maybe something from this list will!]

So, to be a standup, non-terrorist citizen, here's what you need to do:

Pack for two weeks if you're staying for two days. Park your vehicle a safe distance away from the hotel, perhaps across the street or at another hotel. Leaving your vehicle dangerously unattended, walk directly through the main entrance with hands open and displayed in a non-threatening manner.

When registering, present as many forms of ID as possible. Be sure to mention where you work EVEN if no one asks. Brag if you have to. Hand out business cards to the staff. Let the desk clerk know that your stay here is no secret and that your room number should be given to anyone who asks, including those who don't ask. When asked if you have a room preference, answer with a bright, but unfrightening, "I've never had a 'preference' in my life! I'm easy to please and an American citizen!"

Head directly to your room, carefully avoiding eye contact with doors marked "Employees Only." Immediately unpack all of your luggage. Make several phones calls using ONLY the in-room phone. Call the front desk several times so as to avoid appearing suspicious. Return to your unattended vehicle and clone yourself using existing, but non-potentially-dangerous technology. Make no sudden movements and keep your ID and passport displayed prominently. Return one of yourselves to your hotel room, again using the front entrance in a non-threatening, flag-waving manner.

Stay in your room. Use the provided wi-fi. Avoid sites that use any form of encryption. Be careful not to stay in your room too long. When venturing out for something to eat or a non-suspicious conversation with the suspicious staff, avoid stairwells, hallways, exits/entrances, and connecting roads. On second thought, just stay in your room. This will make it easier to avoid being caught up in the middle of a personnel shift change.

If you must leave your room, smile and wave at each and every security camera. Lift your shirt to display lack of weapons, explosives or identifiable scars and tattoos. If purchasing anything from the hotel, use only credit cards, checks or DNA. Return to your room using the most surveilled route. Use the in-room phone to order room service. Turn down the delivery when it comes, stating that you're trying to keep visitors and deliveries to a minimum. Apologize for not having any cash to tip with, but explain that this lack of cash directly contributes (not monetarily, of course) to the safety of everyone in the hotel. Repeat this apology to housekeeping when they arrive, being sure to answer the door before they get to the second knock. Try to ignore their just-out-of-earshot griping about having to clean around the scattered contents of four large suitcases. Smile in a non-threatening fashion and shrug as if to say, "LOOK AT HOW MUCH I DON'T HAVE TO HIDE."

If you find that, despite your careful planning, your stay is going to be extended indefinitey, switch hotels. Pack all of your belongings carefully. Police the room for any stray socks, unused condoms or stealable toiletries. Turn the coffee maker OFF (if applicable). Leave in an unhurried fashion, but don't dawdle. Return to your attended vehicle and (most likely) dead clone. Drive to another hotel, preferably one a non-suspicious distance away and repeat the process. Once you return to your hometown, turn yourself into the nearest authorities for a thorough post-travel debriefing.

Filed Under: dhs, fbi, hotel, surveillance, terrorism

How Much Did The FBI Snoop On Email Messages To Uncover The Petreaus Situation?

from the all-for-what? dept

As you're probably aware since it's "the big story" right now, General David Petreaus stepped down last week after an FBI investigation turned up an affair he'd been having. It seems that every few hours more news "breaks" on the story, and it keeps getting more involved, with a growing number of players (and with each new revelation the story gets more and more bizarre). However, some have started wondering how and why the FBI was snooping on various emails. The original story was that it came about after Petreaus' mistress allegedly sent threatening (anonymous) emails to another woman, who reported them to the FBI. From that came a wider investigation, which supposedly may involve another General and a variety of other players. But some are realizing that this seems to show how the FBI has pretty free rein in terms of snooping on email accounts hosted online:

Under the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, federal authorities need only a subpoena approved by a federal prosecutor — not a judge — to obtain electronic messages that are six months old or older. To get more recent communications, a warrant from a judge is required. This is a higher standard that requires proof of probable cause that a crime is being committed.

But even that isn't entirely clear. Folks like Julian Sanchez have been puzzling through the timeline of events and wondering how a simple investigation into a small number of "rude" (but not illegal) emails then uncovered thousands of questionable emails involving a different general as alleged in the news that broke last night. It feels like the FBI may have taken a simple report of misconduct (which may have been driven by another love triangle issue involving an FBI agent who seemed to take the whole thing a lot more personally than makes sense) and turned it into a massive fishing expedition.

Given how fast new parts of this story keep breaking, I'm sure there are still a number of other dominoes to fall, but hopefully this actually gets people to pay attention to just how easy it is for law enforcement to snoop on people's emails these days based on next to nothing.

Filed Under: david petreaus, email, expa, fbi, snooping, warrants

FBI Continues To Foil Its Own Devised Terrorist Plots

from the sarcastic-golf-clap dept

It seems there's a new pattern showing itself every time I read a news report in which the FBI proudly announces it foiled a terrorist plot. That pattern goes something like this: hear that a huge explosion was averted and lives were saved, find out the plotter was an American citizen, find out he was under investigation by the FBI for several years, and then finally find out that it was the FBI that egged on the suspect and built his "bomb" for him. In other words, the only way these things could become less impressive is if the FBI actually decided to quit finding these loner folks to urge into violence and just built their own physical straw man to parade in front of the cameras.

This whole game of pretend law enforcement showed up at my doorstep this weekend, when the FBI announced yet another arrest of a potential terrorist, this time an 18 year old suburbanite whom the FBI (you guessed it) encouraged to try to bomb a downtown bar in Chicago.

Adel Daoud, 18, was arrested following a months-long FBI undercover investigation. He was taken into custody after he parked a Jeep Cherokee in front of the bar Friday night and walked into a nearby alley where he tried to detonate the device, court documents allege.

The bomb, which was inert and had been constructed by FBI technicians, didn't explode, according to federal authorities.

Oddly, the article notes that Daoud allegedly gave the FBI more than two dozen high profile Chicago targets to 'splode, but decided eventually on this unnamed bar instead, perhaps because they had, like, totally taken his fake ID that one time. Actually, I just made that up because I can't think of a single reason why a supposed terrorist would settle on a drinkery as their target.

Now, it is true that Daoud professed his wish to participate in jihad. It is true that he attempted to set off this pseudo bomb. He does indeed sound like a disturbed kid that needs to be dealt with in some fashion. But would he have participated in any of this without the urging of the FBI?

Perhaps more importantly, is foiling their own plots the best use of law enforcement in Chicago, a city that appears to be engaged in a concerted effort to have the most murders ever in a calendar year?

Filed Under: chicago, entrapment, fbi, terrorism, terrorist plots

Publishing Company Admits That Anonymous' UDID Data Leak Was Actually Taken From Their Database

from the the-plot-thickens dept

Last week, there was a big story in which AntiSec, a part of Anonymous, claimed to have downloaded personal info on about 12 million Apple device users from an FBI agent's computer. They released about a million UDIDs to "prove" it, claiming they had a lot more information as well. The FBI quickly denied that the evidence came from them, and Apple later insisted that it had not shared such info with the FBI either. Now, a Florida company, Blue Toad, has told NBC that an analysis of the leaked data and its own data set has made it almost certain that the data actually originated from Blue Toad's servers (whether or not it eventually got onto an FBI machine is a separate issue):

"That's 100 percent confidence level, it's our data," [Blue Toad CEO Paul] DeHart said. "As soon as we found out we were involved and victimized, we approached the appropriate law enforcement officials, and we began to take steps to come forward, clear the record and take responsibility for this.”

Apparently, Blue Toad's technology is used by tons of app publishers to help them build their own digital editions and apps -- which is why it would have access to all of this information.

The researcher who figured out that the data came from Blue Toad, David Schuetz, has pointed out that he can't say for certain if the FBI later got the same data, or where Anonymous got the data, but he does suggest that people should be skeptical of claims like that:

“It does raise questions,” he said. “I think people need to question what they see online, whether it comes from Anonymous or from a news organization or from a politician or from a corporation. You need to not take things at face value right away and jump straight to what you think it says. Somebody says, ‘Oh, this came from the FBI, everybody believes it. Well, let’s think about (it).”

Good advice.

Filed Under: anonymous, antisec, data, fbi, leaks
Companies: blue toad

FBI Denies That Hacked Apple Info Came From FBI

from the then-where-did-it-come-from dept

Earlier today, we wrote about Antisec releasing some Apple UDIDs to show that it had apparently collected info on 12 million Apple users, which it claims to have found when it hacked into an FBI's laptop. As we noted at the time, the file was called "NCFTA_iOS_devices_intel.csv," which implied that it came from the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance, a vehicle set up to allow companies to share info with the government. However, the FBI is now flat out denying that any of its laptops had been hacked or that it had the info. Antisec is, to say the least, unimpressed: The FBI's denial comes after an earlier, weaker denial, in which they just said they had "no evidence" to support the story. Now they're saying it's "TOTALLY FALSE" (all caps for EMPHASIS). And, of course, Antisec folks are reminding the FBI (and the public) that they're still sitting on 3TB of additional data from this hack -- which suggests that they're planning to release more to prove that the hack really was of an FBI machine. Either way, now that the fight is happening on Twitter, it seems time to grab some virtual popcorn, sit back and watch the fireworks.

Filed Under: anonymous, antisec, apple udids, cybersecurity, fbi, hack, privacy
Companies: apple

Hackers Get Personal Info On 12-Million Apple Users... From An FBI Laptop

from the privacy-schmivacy? dept

Much of the debate over cybersecurity legislation like CISPA and the Cybersecurity Act focused on getting more private companies to "share data" with federal government agencies, including the FBI and the NSA. As we've pointed out time and time again, beyond the basic privacy rules that the bills tended to bulldoze through, any time you increase the sharing of private data, you're only making it that much easier for hackers to access that info because you're putting it in more places -- some of which will almost definitely be insecure. In other words, even though these bills were ostensibly about "protecting" from hack attacks, by increasing the sharing of data, they'd almost certainly open up new attack opportunities and make it easier for hackers to get info.

While neither bill passed (yet), the latest example of what happens when you have widespread data sharing comes from some Antisec hackers, who claim that -- in response to a presentation from the NSA's General Keith Alexander -- they wanted to probe the security of various government agencies, including the FBI. End result? They claim to have hacked into the laptop of FBI agent Christopher Stangl, who has appeared in recruitment videos for the FBI looking to hire "cyber security experts."

The hackers claim that on his laptop, they found a csv file with:

...a list of 12,367,232 Apple iOS devices including Unique Device Identifiers (UDID), user names, name of device, type of device, Apple Push Notification Service tokens, zipcodes, cellphone numbers, addresses, etc.

The hackers have released 1,000,001 UDIDs and APNS tokens to prove they had the data, stripping out the personal info. The file they found was called: "NCFTA_iOS_devices_intel.csv" which folks at Hacker News have pointed out likely refers to the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance. According to its website, the NCFTA...

functions as a conduit between private industry and law enforcement with a core mission to identify, mitigate and neutralize cyber crime. In an effort to streamline intelligence exchange, the NCFTA will often organize SME interaction into threat-specific initiatives. Once a significant online scheme is realized and a stakeholder consensus defined, an initiative is developed wherein the NCFTA manages the collection and sharing of intelligence with the affected parties, industry partners, appropriate law enforcement, and other SMEs.

In other words, it's almost exactly what we were told we needed CISPA to enable. In fact, during the CISPA debate, we specifically pointed to the NCFTA to ask why we needed CISPA, since something like that was already possible.

And now it seems to also be showing why CISPA or other similar legislation focused on increased "sharing" of info could actually put many more users at risk, rather than protect them. When the feds are careless with the info they receive from companies, it's going to get hacked. These kinds of things just put a giant target on their back, and now we're seeing the harmful results of such sharing without effective privacy protections.

And the feds want more of this?

Filed Under: antisec, christopher strangl, cispa, cybersecurity, data, data sharing, fbi, ios, keith alexander, ncfta, privacy, udid
Companies: apple