FCC Denies It Requires Law Enforcement To Sign A Non-Disclosure Agreement With The FBI Before Deploying Stingray Devices

from the another-'agency-said/agency-said'-story dept

We know the FBI doesn't want anyone talking about Stingray cellphone snooping systems. Local law enforcement officials aren't exactly forthcoming about this information either, citing either non-disclosure agreements or the US government itself as justifications for extensive cover-ups. Now, the FCC -- which has been sort of on the sideline during these non-discussions -- has waded into it, releasing a statement that directly contradicts a document released by the Tacoma Police regarding its use of Stingray devices.

Last month, Muckrock posted a heavily-redacted (everything but the two opening paragraphs) document it obtained from the Tacoma Police Department. In it, FBI Special Agent Laura Laughlin justified all the black ink that followed by name-dropping the FCC (the same agency Harris misled in order to have its devices approved). [pdf link]

We have been advised by Harris Corporation of the Tacoma Police Department's request for acquisition of certain wireless collection equipment/technology manufactured by Harris Corporation. Consistent with the conditions on the equipment authorization granted to Harris Corporation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), state and local law enforcement agencies must coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to complete this non-disclosure agreement prior to the acquisition and use of the equipment/technology authorized by the FCC authorization.

The FCC is now saying that this is the first it's heard of being part of the Stingray secrecy process.

We do not require that state and local law enforcement agencies have to complete one or more non-disclosure agreements with the Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to acquisition and/or use of the authorized equipment. We have no documents responsive to your request.

But that's not entirely true. There is a requirement that almost exactly matches up with Agent Laughlin's claims -- one that Harris specifically requested and that the FCC granted.

As early as May 2010, Harris Corporation asked that the FCC put restrictions on law enforcement acquisition of its StingRay trackers, documents released to MuckRock by the FCC in response to another FOIA request show. Emails obtained by the ACLU of Northern California indicate that Harris made its request for licensing restrictions based on concerns from the FBI “over the proliferation of surreptitious law enforcement surveillance equipment.”

Here's the request:

To further support its request for confidentiality, Harris underscores the need for confidentiality by requesting that the Commission condition the Harris license applications as outlined below to prevent and address concerns regarding the proliferation of surreptitious law enforcement surveillance equipment:

(1) The marketing and sale of these devices shall be limited to federal/state/local public safety and law enforcement officials only; and,
(2) State and local law enforcement agencies must advance coordinate with the FBI the acquisition and use of the equipment authorized under this authorization.

This request was granted by the FCC in 2012.

There are only slight differences in what's being said by Laughlin and what was actually granted. The FCC requires (at Harris' request) that local law enforcement coordinate with the FBI before purchase and use of Stingray devices. Laughlin's statement appears to indicate that the FCC requires the signing of an NDA, but that appears to be the FBI's own inserted stipulation. Nothing explicitly states that the lack of an NDA means no Stingray purchase, at least not as far as the FCC is concerned. But it may keep law enforcement agencies from getting the FBI's go-ahead.

So, is the FCC the "good guy" in this Stingray mess? Probably not, or at least not as blameless as it would first appear. Chris Soghoian, the ACLU's principal technologist, points out that the FCC has actively pushed surveillance policies. Even if it hasn't in this case, it's quite obviously deferring to the FBI in this matter, basically stating (when you add the denial and subtract the granted stipulation), "Go ask your father the FBI." The FCC can't necessarily demand an NDA be signed before obtaining a cell tower spoofer, but it can make law enforcement route their requests through another government agency.

Filed Under: fbi, fcc, nda, stingray
Companies: harris corp.

Internal Emails Show Harris Corp. Misled The FCC On Stingray Device Usage In Order To Receive Approval

from the support-group-for-Stingray-lies-now-includes-roughly-everybody dept

Harris Corporation's Stingray cell tower spoofers are swiftly becoming synonymous with government lying. The FBI has specifically instructed law enforcement agencies to lie about the use of these products, which basically puts the agencies in the position of lying to courts when producing evidence or securing warrants.

Law enforcement agencies would probably lie anyway, even without the federal government's nudge. Many chose to read the restrictive non-disclosure agreements Harris includes as meaning they should withhold this information from local courts -- rather than simply seal the documents or redact them.

So, it comes as no surprise that the web of lies also includes lying to other federal agencies. The lies originate from Harris itself.

New documents obtained by the ACLU of Northern California appear to show the Florida-based Harris Corporation misleading the Federal Communications Commission while seeking authorization to sell its line of Stingray cell phone surveillance gear to state and local police. The documents raise the possibility that federal regulatory approval of the technology was based on bad information.

Harris says its devices are FCC-approved, but what it doesn't specify is the very limited approval it has actually received. An email from a Harris representative to FCC employees [pdf link] contains the following paragraph.

Just want to make you aware of the question below we received regarding the application for the Sting Fish. I know many of these questions are generated automatically but it sounds as if there is some confusion about the purpose of the equipment authorization application. As you may recall, the purpose is only to provide state/local law enforcement officials with authority to utilize this equipment in emergency situations.

As the ACLU points out, Stingray (or "Sting Fish") usage had long since surpassed the "emergency use only" restriction -- if that ever existed at all. Routine investigations utilize these devices all the time. Just one of several examples: when the Tallahassee police department's use of Stingrays came to light, the court noted that it had deployed the technology (without a warrant) more than 200 times, with less than 30% of the deployments being for department-labelled "emergencies."

Law enforcement agencies are secretly acquiring and deploying these devices in violation of the limited FCC approval, and have been doing so for years -- well ahead of this 2010 statement. And Harris is telling them that it's OK. The ACLU has written a letter to FCC chairman Tom Wheeler [pdf link] asking him open an investigation into the use of Stingray devices. If Wheeler obliges, the FCC is going to face a united front of zipped lips. The FBI already locks the Dept. of Justice out of its investigations. There's no chance it's going to be more obliging of a tangentially-related federal agency.

Filed Under: approval, cell phones, fcc, law enforcement, police, spectrum, stingray, surveillance
Companies: harris, harris corp.

Law Enforcement Agencies Scramble For Pricey Cell Tower Spoofer Upgrades As Older Networks Are Shut Down

from the losing-the-tech-arms-race-to-slow-moving-service-providers dept

The surveillance device that dare not speak its name (thanks, FBI!) is on its last legs… or at least one version is. Cyrus Farivar at Ars Technica reports that law enforcement agencies are moving quickly to avoid being locked out of the cell tower spoofing racket.

Documents released last week by the City of Oakland reveal that it is one of a handful of American jurisdictions attempting to upgrade an existing cellular surveillance system, commonly known as a stingray.

The Oakland Police Department, the nearby Fremont Police Department, and the Alameda County District Attorney jointly applied for a grant from the Department of Homeland Security to "obtain a state-of-the-art cell phone tracking system," the records show.

The Stingray is Harris Corporation's most infamous product. But the original version has its limitations. While the nation's cell phone carriers have largely moved on to 3G/4G networks, Stingray devices without optional upgrades haven't. All they can access is 2G, the default connection when nothing better is available. Those looking to capture cell activity on 3G and 4G networks will need to purchase Harris' "Hailstorm" upgrade… which also means they'll need to start generating paperwork and asking federal and local governments for funds. The problem with these actions is that they have the tendency to expose those in need of new capabilities.

Other locales known to be in the process of related federally-funded upgrades include Tacoma, Wash.; Baltimore, Md.; Chesterfield, Va.; Sunrise, Fla.; and Oakland County, Mich. There are likely many more, but such purchases are often shrouded in secrecy.

FOIA requests have turned up some information, but much of it is redacted and many more requests have been refused or ignored. With the federal government itself instructing local law enforcement to cover up its acquisition and use of tower spoofers, the FOIA process becomes even more of an uphill battle.

Law enforcement can't be happy to see 2G networks being switched off. When you're in the untargeted dragnet business, 2G is a willing supplier of "business records."

2G networks are notoriously insecure. Handsets operating on 2G will readily accept communication from another device purporting to be a valid cell tower, like a stingray. So the stingray takes advantage of this feature by jamming the 3G and 4G signals, forcing the phone to use a 2G signal.

What's considered a criminal act when performed by a civilian is just SOP for law enforcement. The same can be said for the fake sworn documents (warrant requests, subpoenas) obtained to cover the use of these devices. The manufacturer with the most devices in use is no better than the agencies it sells to. When approached about this scramble for upgrades, Harris Corporation borrowed the NSA's Glomar.

"We do not comment on solutions we may or may not provide to classified Department of Defense or law enforcement agencies," Jim Burke, a spokesman for Harris, told Ars.

The timeline for 2G shutoff is still vague. Verizon says "by the end of the decade." AT&T says 2017. So there's still some time for law enforcement agencies to avoid being bypassed by the slow rollout of network upgrades. But between now and then, these agencies need to put together nearly $500,000 just to stay current. And as usual, as much as possible about the process will be obscured, because otherwise the terrorists criminals win.

"Once that's disclosed then the targets of the technology will know how to avoid it," [Alameda County Assistant DA Michael] O’Connor, the assistant district attorney, told Ars. "Once the bad guys understand how to beat it then they will."

It seems like all the bad guys would need to know is that the technology exists and is being used and just stay off their cell phones. But in this day and age, being completely unconnected while away from home is untenable, if not nearly impossible. Communication is key in criminal enterprises, and the steady disappearance of pay phones doesn't leave them with many options. O'Connor completely overstates the "exposure" danger and follows it up with this:

"It can't easily be resolved—the public's right to know, the Fourth Amendment rights of people who might be subject to this kind of analysis and the needs of law enforcement to keep sources confidential especially in a day and age when the bad guys have acquired considerable technology that is turned against good guys."

One: if it can't "easily be resolved," why not err on the Fourth Amendment/public knowledge side, rather than on the cop side? Two: the bad guys' "considerable technology" isn't lapping law enforcement's. This ridiculous claim has been used as justification for warrantless cell phone searches, and it failed to move the Supreme Court justices. Pushing this narrative now just makes the pusher look like the sort of credulous rube who would put together a Powerpoint presentation on food-trucks-as-terrorist-vehicles.

The bright side here is that more paperwork is being generated… which eventually means more of the public will know their local law enforcement is scooping up their location/connection info (most likely without a warrant) at any given time and is not above killing their network to do it.

Filed Under: 2g, 3g, hailstorm, law enforcement, non-disclosure agreements, police, privacy, spoofing, stingray, tower spoofing
Companies: harris corp.

Washington Law Enforcement Hides Stingray Purchase And Use From Everyone, But It's OK Because They're Fighting Crime

from the outraged-at-the-lack-of-outrage dept

More news of secret surveillance has been uncovered, thanks to FOIA requests. Police in Tacoma, Washington have a Stingray device and have been using it, unbeknownst to pretty much everyone in the area. And it's not just a recent development. According to information obtained by The News Tribune, this dates back more than a half-decade.

Deputy City Attorney Michael Smith redacted much of the identifying information on a May 2013 invoice for the equipment, saying disclosure “would allow the identification of confidential pieces of technology.”

However, unredacted portions of those public records as well as other documents reviewed by The News Tribune indicate the Police Department has had the ability to wirelessly search neighborhoods since as early as 2008.

So, why is this information just coming out now? For one, law enforcement hasn't been particularly forthcoming. Harris has its own restrictive non-disclosure agreements to keep mouths shut, but the factor specifically cited in this article is the federal government.

Police Chief Don Ramsdell, through a spokeswoman, declined an interview request to talk about the police department’s apparent purchase of a Stingray device and associated technology. The department cited a nondisclosure agreement it has with the FBI.

So, the FBI -- a federal agency -- helped ensure that no one involved with the oversight of law enforcement and its new toys had any idea what was going on.

The people who could have provided some sort of accountability completely failed. Read this sentence and remember that these are people elected to look out for the public's interests.

News that the city was using the surveillance equipment surprised City Council members, who approved an update for a device last year…

Terrible, although some of this can be blamed on the lack of openness within law enforcement. Now, read the second half of that sentence and marvel at the undermining of the criminal justice system.

…and prosecutors, defense attorneys and even judges, who in court deal with evidence gathered using the surveillance equipment.

No one knew. No one. Prosecutors didn't know how the evidence they were using was being obtained and defense attorneys couldn't effectively challenge evidence because its origin was obscured. And if judges don't know, then it means local law enforcement lied about how they were obtaining data, either through parallel construction or simply assuming the gathering of "business records" requires no warrant.

Now that they're informed, the statements they're making are disturbing in their abject cluelessness.

“If they use it wisely and within limits, that’s one thing,” said Ronald Culpepper, the presiding judge of Pierce County Superior Court, when informed of the device Tuesday. “I would certainly personally have some concerns about just sweeping up information from non-involved and innocent parties — and to do it with a whole neighborhood? That’s concerning.”

"Concerning?" "Sweeping up information" is the only way these devices work. They can't target anything because they're not designed to. This isn't like bugging a phone. This is grabbing every record generated and searching it later for what's actually of interest. And Culpepper's "personal concerns" are also those of the public, so he'd better keep that in mind when dealing with this device in the future, rather than placing the "concerns" of law enforcement ahead of his and everyone else's.

Worse yet are the comments of city representatives, who think it's OK for the police to have a device that indiscriminately grabs connection information (and a device that they lied about) because they're the police.

City Manager T.C. Broadnax:

“I’m not in law enforcement, but it’s my impression that it assists them in doing their job more effectively, and that’s to protect the public.”

Mayor Marilyn Strickland:

“If our law enforcement need access to information to prevent crime or keep us safe, that’s a legitimate use of the technology,” she said. “We are more focused on preventing crime and keeping our community safe than getting in people’s business.”

[That "we" is supposed to be you and the public, not you and the police force.]

Councilman David Boe:

“I’ve got to find out what I voted on before I comment.”

[Why bother now?]

Another city council member conceded he was never given details on the purchase he was approving, but that it "doesn't surprise him" that law enforcement has this type of device. The cover-up was OK because it keeps investigations from being compromised. Another council member said she would need to "check with the city manager" before commenting, so we can probably just copy and paste Broadnax's "police fight crime" head nod from above.

But some of these representatives must have known. The public records trail (obtained by MuckRock) shows a memo from 2007 seeking to bypass the competitive bidding process. After the first Stingray was obtained in 2008, the city named Detective Jeffrey Shipp "Employee of the Month," citing this:

“for his work in procuring a $450,000 training and equipment grant for a cellular phone tracking system — one of only five awarded across the country. Great job!”

This money was mostly a DHS grant, and law enforcement cited the technology's usefulness to its "Explosive Ordinance Detail" as the primary reason for the acquisition. No document details how many explosive devices were detected or disarmed using the cell phone tracker. Unsurprising, considering it's being used to track drug dealers and other "normal" criminal activity.

What is also uncovered in the documents is some indication of how the Stingray's use is being concealed. Multiple warrants have been issued for cellphone records, none of which apparently refer to them being collected by a cell tower spoofer. It also looks as if pen register/trap and trace orders are being used as permission slips for dragnet collections. In both cases, law enforcement is using targeted paperwork for untargeted collections. But prosecutor Mark Lindquist says that even though he knew nothing about the device or its usage, everyone's still playing by the rules.

Prosecutors have to be able to defend evidence in court, he said. As far as he knows, local law enforcement is “playing by the rules.”

“None of this evidence has been successfully challenged by the defense, and from that, I can infer that law enforcement is doing it right,” he said. “Both prosecutors and defense attorneys will review warrants and make sure that they are valid.”

That's how you can quantify the "rightness" of evidence obtained through parallel construction? No evidence has been "successfully challenged" by the defense? That's so stupid it must be a misquote. How can you successfully challenge evidence if the paper telling you how it was obtained obscures the true source? In Lindquist's eyes, dealing evidence from the bottom of the deck is "playing by the rules."

And the police haven't been forthcoming about the disposal of incidental data. If the device has been used secretly for a half-dozen years, and everyone in an oversight position is claiming to have just heard about it now, there's very likely no minimization guidelines or policies. There are hints that irrelevant data is deleted, but there's nothing in here that says how long its retained before this happens… if it happens.

So, law enforcement buys cell tower spoofers and the FBI encourages them to hide the details. It attempts to obscure it behind some sort of counterterrorism facade (for thwarting IEDs, remember?), gaining it kudos from the city for all the money it managed to talk the DHS out of. It then hides the use from the entirety of the criminal justice system and makes its oversight bodies look like complete fools. And we're supposed to trust them not to abuse the incidental data they collect?

Filed Under: 4th amendment, fbi, oversight, police, privacy, searches, stingray, tacoma, washington
Companies: harris

Hypocrisy In Action: Stingray Maker, Who Relies On Secret No Bid Contracts, Whines About Motorola Getting A No Bid Contract

from the Motorola's-kettle-deemed-'blackest-yet'-by-pot-maker dept

Harris Corporation, the stealthy, mostly-silent company behind the cell tower spoofer known as the Stingray, is making a few louder noises now that its financial toes are being stepped on. The company muffles law enforcement agencies with restrictive terms and conditions that include broad non-disclosure clauses and a general admonishment that as much information as possible should be withheld from the public at all times. These tactics have worked out for its core business -- tower spoofers -- allowing Harris to make a whole lot of money without having to deal with FOIA fallout and citizen backlash.

Part of what makes Harris so profitable is its frequent no-bid contracts. Rather than being forced to compete with other companies, Harris' overbearing emphasis on secrecy often results in local law enforcement going "sole source," rather than expose requisitions for controversial technology to the general public. (This obviously benefits law enforcement agencies as well, which explains their readiness to bypass a more competitive, multiple-bid process.)

What little information has been pried loose with FOIA requests confirms this. Illinois State Police spent $250,000 obtaining Stingray equipment with a "sole-source" contract, most of which was paid by federal Homeland Security grants. So have agencies in northern California and Florida. In fact, the DHS has designated Harris as its sole-source provider for IMSI catchers (Stingray devices), meaning the company has a direct line to some of the deepest pockets in the law enforcement/security community.

And yet, it's attempting to portray itself as the wounded party in a recent bout of federal spending.

The Harris Corp. has become the second contractor to formally protest the FBI’s plans to award a no-bid contract worth up to $500 million to Motorola Solutions Inc., calling the bureau’s proposal to forgo competitive bidding “factually unsound, legally unwarranted and wholly unnecessary.”

The FBI gave other vendors only a couple of weeks’ notice late last month that it planned to hand the contract to Illinois-based Motorola Solutions, the company that dominates the nation’s emergency communications market, mainly to upgrade the 30-year-old two-way radio network used by thousands of bureau agents.

This in itself would be nothing more than self-interest leading to blatant hypocrisy. But considering Harris Corp. bent Motorola over in the past to secure a contract with the Army, this goes right past normal hypocrisy and into some sort of delusional netherworld where Harris floats untroubled by anything resembling a conscience or a cursory Google search.

This week, Congress’s watchdog agency, the Government Accountability Office, released its latest round of rulings on defense contracts it had been asked to overturn. Such contract disputes have gotten more and more common as defense contractors compete more and more desperately for shrinking budgets. But the Government Accounting Office is a harsh mistress: GAO overturns only 3 to 4 percent of disputed contracts. So, on Tuesday, when the agency said it upheld Motorola Solution’s complaint against the Army for improperly awarding a $2.5 million radio contract to Harris Corp., it was remarkable just for the fact that Motorola won.

The kicker here? Harris had to offer a competitor's product because its own offering didn't meet Army specifications.

At the time the Army had to make its decision, Harris’s radio had not yet been approved by the Michigan Public Safety Communications System — a requirement of the contract, and an understandable one for a facility located in Detroit. But Motorola’s had. So after deeming Harris’s original proposal unsatisfactory, the Army gave Harris wiggle room to offer the Motorola product, in essence, as a back-up in case the Harris radio wasn’t certified in time.

This should have resulted in the Army tossing the bid, but instead it cut Harris so much slack that it eventually awarded it a contract to be filled using a bidding competitor's products. Not that Motorola is spotless. It, too, has a history of attempting to lock down sole source contracts, but at least it hasn't undercut its bid competitors by re-boxing their goods.

Above and beyond the petty squabbling of government contractors with outsized senses of entitlement, there's the underlying issue of transparency and financial responsibility. Doing business with contractors who tie up agencies with restrictive NDAs and push for sole source contracts doesn't serve the public interest at all. Secrecy relegates the people funding these purchases into mere bystanders who are only informed of where their money's going months or years after the fact, often with a visit to district courts to force these entities to respect the "F" part of FOIA. Sole source means paying whatever the contractor decides is a reasonable amount, something that results in the sort of government budget horror stories that include $600 hammers and millions of dollars thrown at tools to help local law enforcement bypass the Fourth Amendment -- just as long as they remember to write "terrorism" on the requisition form.

Filed Under: no bid contract, stingray, surveillance
Companies: harris, motorola

New Emails Show That Feds Instructed Police To Lie About Using Stingray Mobile Phone Snooping

from the that's-not-how-it's-supposed-to-work dept

We've been covering the increasingly widespread use of Stingray or similar mobile phone tower spoofing equipment by law enforcement. The stories have been getting increasingly bizarre lately, starting with the news that police were claiming that non-disclosure agreements prevented them from getting a warrant to use the technology. And then, there was the recent news that the federal government was regularly stepping in to claim ownership of documents related to the technology (even when it's used by local police) in order to block them from being obtained under Freedom of Information laws. Just this morning, we wrote about some new evidence that police are claiming they need these devices to stop "weapons of mass destruction," though they then just use them to spy on people suspected of everyday crimes instead.

Late last night, the ACLU came out with perhaps the most explosive information so far: a set of internal police emails showing that the US Marshals have been instructing police to lie to courts about the use of such devices. Specifically, rather than revealing the use of the tool, they're told to just tell the court they got the information from a "confidential source." While affidavits may initially note the use of such a device, the police are told to submit a new affidavit after the fact without mentioning the Stingray, and seal the old one, so that it never becomes public. The key parts of the email are highlighted below: This is highly questionable. Just to repeat: this is the federal government loaning out equipment to spoof mobile phone towers to spy on people and then instructing (practically demanding) that the police hide or suppress this information by claiming that it came from a "confidential source" and by sealing any affidavits that accidentally mention the use of the equipment. As the ACLU notes this practice "deprives defendants of their right to challenge unconstitutional surveillance ." It also seems like a fairly straightforward due process violation. This even goes beyond "parallel construction" in which illegal surveillance is concealed by "recreating" it in other ways. In this case, you have illegally obtained evidence... and then police are just told to lie to the court about it.

This is stunningly bad.

As some legal experts are quick to note, this seems like an astoundingly stupid move by both the US Marshals and the local police who took them up on their request. That link, includes quotes from a number of legal experts interviewed by Cyrus Farivar at Ars Technica, some of whom are actually supportive of the use of Stingrays, but who note that this effort could very well be fraud on the court.

Filed Under: cell phone spoofing, fraud on the court, law enforcement, lying to court, sarasota, stingray, surveillance, us marshals

Stingray Documents Show Law Enforcement Using 'Terrorism' To Obtain Equipment To Fight Regular Crime

from the because-WMDs-but-here's-a-low-level-drug-dealer-we-busted dept

Scott Ainslie at MuckRock has pried loose a few more Stingray documents with a FOIA request. What was requested were contractual documents, which seem to be something law enforcement agencies feel more comfortable with releasing. Anything pertaining to the actual use of Stingray devices still remains heavily shrouded, thanks in no small part to the intercession of the federal government.

Still, there is some useful information to be gleaned from the responsive documents, not the least of which is the fact that the DHS will happily fund local law enforcement's surveillance technology if they cross themselves and say the word "terrorism" three time during the requisition process.

The entire purchase is itemized on the request form under "Homeland Security." Specifics are redacted, not only on the purchase order, but also the letter from the governor's office signing off on the acquisition. But a few details manage to escape the black marker. The letter from the governor's office notes that this is no normal purchase.

The Illinois State Police has issued a request for a Procurement Code exception in order to covertly purchase [redacted] from Harris Corporation for conducting covert investigations. This exception is requested so that the Illinois State Police may purchase components directly from the vendor and decrease the possibility of sensitive information being disseminated inappropriately.

And this bit of sloppy redaction allows part of what must be a very ominous sentence to be revealed:


If you can't make it out, the last three words of the redaction are "weapons of mass destruction." The letter also confirms that the purchase is funded by a DHS grant.

As is the case when agencies reluctantly provide responsive documents, many of the documents look like they were scanned in by a poorly-trained monkey with an inner ear disorder, while others are apparently scans of tenth-generation copies made by the ancient copier kept around past the point of usefulness solely for responding to FOIA requests. This helps keep much of the text from being searchable, and in some cases early on, even legible.

Other points of interest include wording in the Harris contract. As has been pointed out before, Harris ties law enforcement up with non-disclosure agreements that (supposedly) prevent them from ever revealing information like this or, indeed, seeking warrants before using the equipment. Things may have changed since 2008 (when this requisition was completed), but the wording here doesn't seem to be nearly as extreme as the interpretation provided by law enforcement agencies.

A. Publicity. Neither party will, without the prior written consent of the other party: (a) make any news release, public announcement, denial or confirmation of this Agreement or its subject matter, or (b) in any manner advertise or publish the fact of their Agreement.

This contractual language seems rather minimal as compared to what has surfaced more recently.

"The Harris (REDACTED) equipment is proprietary and used for surveillance missions," the agreement reads. "Its capabilities can only be discussed with sworn law enforcement officers, the military or federal government. This equipment's capabilities are not for public knowledge and are protected under non-disclosure agreements as well as Title 18 USC 2512."

Apparently, Harris felt added restrictions were necessary to keep the public from learning about the technology public servants were deploying against them.

This Stingray was obtained in the fall of 2008, and it appears to be the only one the Illinois State Police own. But there are documents from 2006 and 2007 showing warranty replacements and repairs to existing Harris equipment, but most likely not a cell tower spoofer.

Then there's this remarkable paragraph that's included in the letter justifying redactions, which is a masterwork of unchecked fear:

Release of the information requested would endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. Police officers, as well as the valuable and dedicated support personnel who work with them, face unknown and unpredictable dangers every day. Recent and unpredictable attacks on police officers and other criminal justice employees and their families point to an alarming trend in violence targeted directly at those persons simply because they represent law and order. Examples of violence toward law enforcement, criminal justice personnel and their families include: the shootout with a suspect in California armed with an AK47 on September 11, 2011; The murder of Maywood Police Officer Tom Wood as he had finished his shift in October 2006; Violence has not only been directed toward police officers. Damon Daniels was killed November 13, 2004 during a home-invasion robbery at the home he shared with his mother, Gery Gilbert, a secretary for the Oakland, California Police Department. In Texas, Kaufman County District Attorney Mike McLelland, his wife Cynthia, and Assistant District Attorney Mark Hasse were murdered by former Justice of the Peace Eric Williams in purported retaliation for prosecution of Williams for theft, which resulted in Williams losing his position as Justice of the Peace. Additionally, in April 2013, two members of a white supremacist prison gang were arrested for the murder of Colorado Department of Corrections head Tom Clements. Finally, consider the murder of the husband and mother of Judge Joan Lefkow. The suspect in that case, Bart Ross, was upset with Judge Lefkow because of an adverse ruling in a medical malpractice case. These are just a few incidents of violence directed at police officers, criminal justice system employees and their families.

There's no real trend here. Law enforcement is safer than it's been in 50 years. The only thing "alarming" is that the state police are using a highly-subjective fear to make supposedly "objective" redactions -- ones that weigh the public interest rather than just a handful of unrelated events scattered over a decade.

The most notable aspect of the documents is what it confirms: that law enforcement agencies are leveraging terrorism fears to acquire pervasive surveillance technology (that was initially developed for use in war zones) -- and that the DHS is more than happy to oblige them by funding the purchases. This intertwining of law enforcement and national security explains the federal government's intercession in Freedom of Information denials.

[Postscript: bonus points for anyone who can figure out why a regular DUI bust police report was included in the responsive documents (embedded below).]

Filed Under: crime, dhs, law enforcement, stingray, terrorism

Judge Tells ACLU It Can't Make The US Government Give Back The Stingray Records It Removed From A Florida Police Department

from the not-even-a-wrist-slap dept

The federal government doesn't want local law enforcement agents turning over cell tower spoofer documents. It has spent a great deal of time behind the scenes advising the agencies to withhold information from requesters, citing "security" and the fear of disclosing "methods" in defense of its actions.

In Sarasota, FL, it took a more overt route, sending US Marshals to seize responsive Stingray documents from the local police department. This time, it claimed it had "deputized" a department detective, making him part of a regional task force. As such, the records now "belonged" to the US Marshals Service and could not be turned over to the ACLU.

The ACLU responded to by filing an emergency injunction seeking to prevent US Marshals from confiscating any more SPD documents, as well as asking it to find that local law enforcement violated Freedom of Information law by handing over requested documents to the federal government.

The judge has now ruled on this motion, and almost everything about it is bad. In his decision, Judge Charles Williams found that his court had no jurisdiction over the federal agency and dismissed the case. But other concerns went unaddressed.

When Sarasota Circuit Judge Charles E. Williams issued his order dismissing the lawsuit, there was nothing about this act by the federal government to essentially abscond with documents to prevent them from potentially becoming public. In fact, the judge did not hold an appropriate hearing on the evidence, even though [Michael] Barfield [ACLU of Florida] had wanted one to resolve key issues.

The ACLU is also “mystified” because Williams included in his latest order a statement that suggests the ACLU did not “challenge as a matter of fact to the representation of the United States government as to the status of Detective Jackson.”

Williams did order the government to turn over Stingray-related applications and orders that have already been filed under seal, but did not offer to lift that seal, meaning the ACLU will be returning to court to attempt to unseal the documents. But this doesn't mean Sarasota's Stingray documents will make their way into the public domain anytime soon.

[A]ccording to Barfield, the federal government “may not comply with the order. They did not seem to think the judge could order them to do anything and even implied they could “remove the case to federal court.”

Once again, we have to ask what's in these documents. The federal government is obviously going above and beyond to ensure the information stays out of the public's hands. Maybe it's just the government's collective paranoia over "means and methods" of surveillance. Or maybe it's something more egregious, like the 200+ times Tallahassee (FL) police deployed Stingray devices without a warrant. Either way, it sends a strong signal to the constituents that the only real right they have is the right to be surveilled.

Filed Under: foia, freedom of information, mobile phone spoofing, sarasota, spoofing, stingray, us marshals
Companies: aclu, harris

Administration Helping Bury Documents Related To Local Law Enforcement Use Of Cell Tower Spoofers

from the widening-the-gap-between-'us'-and-'them' dept

The recent story about the US Marshals Service stepping in to prevent the ACLU from obtaining documents related to the Sarasota (FL) Police Department's ownership and use of cell tower spoofers is apparently not an isolated instance. According to an AP report, the US government is actively inserting itself into the "discussion" by ensuring no one gets to talk about the controversial devices.

The Obama administration has been quietly advising local police not to disclose details about surveillance technology they are using to sweep up basic cellphone data from entire neighborhoods, The Associated Press has learned.

Citing security reasons, the U.S. has intervened in routine state public records cases and criminal trials regarding use of the technology. This has resulted in police departments withholding materials or heavily censoring documents in rare instances when they disclose any about the purchase and use of such powerful surveillance equipment.

Beyond the obvious negative impact on the much-vaunted "transparency" this administration claims to personify, there's also the new disturbing level of overreach -- the US government actively interfering with state-level Freedom of Information requests. In addition to the restrictive non-disclosure agreements that law enforcement agencies must sign when purchasing Stingray devices (and these agencies' general reluctance to share surveillance equipment info with the public), the government itself is taking an active role in erecting a wall between the public and its public servants.

Interviews, court records and public-records requests show the Obama administration is asking agencies to withhold common information about the equipment, such as how the technology is used and how to turn it on. That pushback has come in the form of FBI affidavits and consultation in local criminal cases.

Harris, the largest manufacturer of cell tower spoofers, specifically directs law enforcement to consult with the FBI during the purchase process, as well as before deploying the devices. The company claims this is all above board because it's "regulated" by its status as a government contractor. That might mean something if it wasn't so closely aligned with these government agencies' desire to keep the technology secret.

And, of course, the government has used its go-to defenses to justify its secrecy efforts. Above, it mentioned "security." A supporting affadavit filed by an FBI agent in a Freedom of Information lawsuit adds another:

A court case challenging the public release of information from the Tucson Police Department includes an affidavit from an FBI special agent, Bradley Morrison, who said the disclosure would "result in the FBI’s inability to protect the public from terrorism and other criminal activity because through public disclosures, this technology has been rendered essentially useless for future investigations."

Morrison said revealing any information about the technology would violate a federal homeland security law about information-sharing and arms-control laws…

Once you strip out all the panicky trappings, the FBI is basically asserting that it, and the law enforcement agencies it's speaking in support of, should be allowed to do what they like with zero accountability. These agencies want to have the ability to collect massive amounts of data without being slowed by warrant requests or minimization processes.

These exposure fears are unfounded, and those using them to justify withholding information know this. This secrecy has been used to seal returned warrants and court orders on closed investigations, giving lie to the claim that these agencies are concerned about damaging current and future investigatons. And, realistically, the only way terrorists or criminals are going to be able to completely avoid Stingray surveillance is to not use or carry cell phones, something that seems highly unlikely. For this to be any use to them, they would have to know in advance where it's being deployed and when.

The real reason behind the collaborative burial of information is the agencies' desire to do what they want without limitations or paper trails. This sort of behavior should be an indicator of a law enforcement agency that's gone rogue, rather than an all-too-common collaborative effort between local and national government agencies.

Filed Under: cell phones, cell tower spoofing, doj, federal government, freedom of information, spoofing, stingray, transparency, us marshals
Companies: harris

Michigan State Politicians Looking Into Sheriff Department's Use Of A Cell Tower Spoofer

from the 'we-haven't-discussed-it-because-9/11' dept

More news has surfaced of cell tower spoofers being deployed without the public's knowledge. This time it's the Oakland County (Michigan) Sheriff's Department rolling out an upgraded Stingray device from Harris Manufacturing, known as "Hailstorm." The sad thing here is that the opportunity for public input presented itself pre-rollout but local politicians slept on the issue.

Oakland County commissioners asked no questions last March before unanimously approving a cellphone tracking device so powerful it was used by the military to fight terrorists.

Now, though, some privacy advocates question why one of the safest counties in Michigan needs the super-secretive Hailstorm device that is believed to be able to collect large amounts of cellphone data, including the locations of users, by masquerading as a cell tower.

“I don’t like not knowing what it’s capable of,” said county Commissioner Jim Runestad, R-White Lake Township, who has met in recent weeks with sheriff’s officials about his concerns.

Harris, as it has been noted, heads off criticism and the impertinent questions of the public by tying up law enforcement officials with restrictive non-disclosure agreements. These NDAs have proven handy for some LEOs -- particularly in Florida where officials made the case that the restrictions of the contract prevented them from seeking warrants before using the cell tower spoofer.

State politicians are now attempting to have a belated discussion of the technology's privacy implications, thanks in part to prompting by local journalists. The Michigan House Oversight Committee brought in Christopher Soghoian, policy analyst from the ACLU and former magistrate judge Brian Owsley. (Recording embedded below.)

Soghoian's concerns aren't simply about the privacy implications or the secrecy Harris has shrouded its technology in, but also the fact that there's no way to track misuse of the equipment.

What’s particularly worrisome is there is no telltale sign they’ve been used, Soghoian said: “It doesn’t leave a trace. No one would ever catch you.” That means no one would know if police misused the device or activated it without a warrant, Soghoian said.

Owsley, in his statement to the committee, noted that the first time discussion of this technology occurred in his courtroom, it was presented by law enforcement as something along the lines of a pen register. As Owsley points, all it takes in most cases to get a pen register granted is a pulse. As long as both the magistrate judge and the law enforcement official are technically alive, the pen register will be signed off on.

That law enforcement portrayed cell tower spoofing in this fashion is no surprise, since it gives them the greatest chance of securing permission to deploy it. (The NSA/FBI did the same thing in order to push through its bulk phone metadata program.) Unlike regular pen registers, however, Stingrays/Hailstorms are deployed in cases where law enforcement may not even have a known phone number. Instead, they may be working off a list of numbers potentially tied to the subject of their investigation, or are just waiting for communications to originate from a certain location.

Now that the technology is finally being questioned, representatives of the Oakland County Sheriff's Department are stepping up to defend their acquisition.

Undersheriff Michael McCabe said, “Hailstorm helps us capture fugitives from the law, people wanted for murder and rape” and can be used only with a search warrant. He said the federal Homeland Security Act bars him from discussing Hailstorm, but he elaborated at length about what it doesn’t do.

Interestingly, McCabe cites the Homeland Security Act as prohibiting discussion, rather than the manufacturer's restrictive NDA. The county also cited "homeland security" terminology in its refusal to release requested documents about the Hailstorm device.

The county denied The News’ Freedom of Information Act request, saying the information is protected by anti-terror laws and includes “investigating records compiled for law enforcement purposes that would disclose law enforcement investigative techniques or procedures.”

Law enforcement officials in one of the safest counties in Michigan are conjuring up terrorism as an excuse for deploying a questionable device, as well as to avoid having to answer any tough questions about its capabilities or usage.

Undersheriff McCabe claims the device is used to go after "people wanted for murder and rape," while simultaneously claiming the DHS won't allow the department to talk about its non-terrorist-related use. He also claims it's not used without a warrant, a statement the county itself isn't allowing anyone to verify. (Among the documents requested were returned warrants on closed cases.) The Sheriff's Department refuses to discuss the technology (other than to highlight how great it is at catching bad guys) or back up its statements with documentation and somehow expects the public to be just fine with all of this. With state politicians now looking into its Hailstorm usage, the normal combination of obfuscation and bluster likely won't keep these details secret for much longer.

Filed Under: hailstorm, michigan, mobile phones, oakland county, privacy, spoofing, stingray
Companies: harris manufacturing