Prosecutors Say Cops Don't Need Warrants For Stingrays Because 'Everyone Knows' Cell Phones Generate Location Data

from the we'll-let-you-know-when-you-have-an-expectation-of-privacy dept

Up in Baltimore, where law enforcement Stingray device use hit critical mass faster and more furiously than anywhere else in the country (to date...) with the exposure of 4,300 deployments in seven years, the government is still arguing there's no reason to bring search warrants into this.

The state's Attorney General apparently would like the Baltimore PD's use of pen register orders to remain standard operating procedure. According to a brief filed in a criminal case relying on the warrantless deployment of an IMSI catcher (in this case a Hailstorm), the state believes there's no reason for police to seek a warrant because everyone "knows" cell phones generate data when they're turned on or in use. (h/t Brad Heath of USA Today)

The whereabouts of a cellular telephone are not "withdrawn from public view" until it is turned off, or its SIM card removed. Anyone who has ever used a smartphone is aware that the phone broadcasts its position on the map, leading to, for example, search results and advertising tailored for the user's location, or to a "ride-sharing" car appearing at one's address. And certainly anyone who has ever used any sort of cellular telephone knows that it must be in contact with an outside cell tower to function.

The state's brief folds in parts of the Third Party Doctrine and the Supreme Court's 1979 Smith v. Maryland decision to make a truly terrible argument that because certain aspects of cell phones involuntarily create location data, the Fourth Amendment never comes into play.

Matt Blaze rephrases the state's argument slightly, exposing the ridiculousness of this assertion.

"People let people into their houses sometimes, therefore no warrant is needed to search houses". Or something. https://t.co/XncuaZvdwW

— matt blaze (@mattblaze) January 14, 2016

"People let people into their houses sometimes, therefore no warrant is needed to search houses". Or something.

The state follows this up by arguing that, because the use of a pen register order to deploy an IMSI catcher is not expressly forbidden by local statutes, the evidence shouldn't be suppressed.

There was no cellular tracking device statute in effect at the time. There was an order from a neutral magistrate, finding probable cause to authorize precisely what was done in this case; the closest applicable statute does not contain an exclusionary provision. Thus, the court erred in excluding evidence in this case.

All well and good, except that the only reason there was no statute in place is because local law enforcement spent years keeping its cell phone tracking devices hidden from judges and defendants, obscuring the technology through parallel construction and misleading pen register order requests. This case is no different than the hundreds preceding it. The magistrate judge signing the pen register order had no idea what the Baltimore PD was actually doing. The presiding judge in this prosecution declared the Baltimore PD's pen register request contained "material misrepresentations" on his way towards granting the suppression of evidence.

For the state to claim everything was above board and no Fourth Amendment violations occurred is rather audacious, considering it spent months dodging discovery requests related to the methods used to locate the defendant.

The request, asking for no more than what the State was compelled to disclose pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-263, sought: 1) "records, notes, and documents" relating to the Baltimore Police Department's investigation into a second suspect from the April 27, 2014 shooting; as well as 2) information "indicating how Mr. Andrews was located at 5032 Clifton Avenue."

Over two months later, on January 8, 2015, the State responded to the discovery request. The State claimed not to "possess information related to the method used to locate the Defendant at 5032 Clifton Avenue." (T1 9) This turned out to be false.

In fact, the state did not turn over its IMSI catcher-related information until mid-May 2015, more than seven months from the point it was originally requested. That's a long time to withhold information on a Hailstorm deployment the state now claims was both perfectly legal and intruded on no one's privacy.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, baltimore, cell phones, expectation of privacy, hailstorm, imsi catchers, police, stingrays, warrants

Canadian Supreme Court Says No Warrants Needed To Search Arrestees' Cell Phones

from the bucking-a-trend? dept

The US Supreme Court recently ruled -- despite panicky DOJ arguments otherwise -- that cell phones are unlike someone's pant pockets or little black book and can't be simply searched incident to arrest just because the arrestee (like nearly every American) happens to have one on their person. The decision noted that the capability and capacity of modern cell phones makes them incomparable to other items cited in previous decisions on warrantless searches.

One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.... Most people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they have read—nor would they have any reason to attempt to do so. And if they did, they would have to drag behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant in Chadwick, supra, rather than a container the size of the cigarette package in Robinson.

This description of today's smartphones is universal. The leap in technological capability and storage capacity should give any judicial system pause when considering law enforcement's general assertion that they should be able to fully search anything carried by an arrestee. Unfortunately, Canada's Supreme Court has weighed the same factors and arrived at the opposite conclusion. (via Reason)

In a crime ruling that earned it rare praise from the federal government, the Supreme Court of Canada said police may search cellphones without a warrant when they make an arrest.

Much like in the US, the impetus for warrantless searches is (and has been for quite some time) the eternal War on Drugs.

Cellphones are the bread and butter of the drug trade, the majority said in a 4-3 ruling. It said police have been given the “extraordinary power” to do warrantless searches during an arrest, under common-law rules developed by judges over centuries, because of the importance of prompt police investigations.

"Prompt police investigations" that apparently would be derailed by the "rigors" of warrant approval. These words would carry more weight if the warrant approval process wasn't generally the epitome of ease and efficiency. This also seems to ignore a crucial aspect of the issue under discussion: the arrestees affected are detained, along with all their belongings, until law enforcement decides to free them. There's plenty of time to obtain a warrant because the person and his/her cell phone aren't going anywhere. (Not to mention the fact that cell phones are the "bread and butter" of pretty much everybody, not just those in the drug trade.)

The majority echoed law enforcement's narrative of forever being behind the technological curve.

“Prompt access by law enforcement to the contents of a cellphone may serve the purpose of identifying accomplices or locating and preserving evidence that might otherwise be lost or destroyed,” Justice Thomas Cromwell wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justices Richard Wagner and Michael Moldaver.

Law enforcement personnel act as though every arrestee's cell phone contains a self-destruct switch, even though there's been very little evidence produced that even suggests this is a common occurrence. Even if true, there are ways of circumventing this while obtaining a warrant. What law enforcement agencies really want (but never say in so many words) is the opportunity to image a phone's contents without a warrant -- something that gives them access to far more data and communications than any warrantless search performed previous to the ubiquity of smartphones. Because of this, rules should be stricter, not looser.

But the majority decision ignores this, handing out a small list of stipulations that will do next to nothing to prevent abuse.

The majority said the search must be tailored to its purpose, which will generally mean that only recent e-mails, texts, photos and the call log will be available.

Define "recent." Somebody needs to because the decision does not. It simply says that only "recent" documents should be accessed. Once again, the court defers to the judgement of law enforcement officials to follow the (loose) guidelines and only access what it's permitted to… whatever that time period actually is. It could be two weeks. It could be two months. It could be everything on the phone because it's only six months old.

This stipulation narrows things down a bit, but still leaves it in the hands of officers to perform warrantless searches in accordance with the spirit of the ruling. (Because the letter of the ruling doesn't actually exist.)

Finally, the police must take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how they examined it. The notes should generally include the applications searched, the extent of the search, the time of the search, its purpose and its duration. The record‑keeping requirement is important to the effectiveness of after‑the‑fact judicial review. It will also help police officers to focus on whether what they are doing in relation to the phone falls squarely within the parameters of a lawful search incident to arrest.

Again, this is a deferral to law enforcement. The decision simply asks officers to be honest about searches and record everything accessed. Like many rulings of this type, there is no deterrent, only a handful of post facto remedies to be pursued at the violated person's expense. At best, all someone can hope for is that evidence will be excluded without an extended legal battle. But that's a very slim hope. Even in the case being addressed here, the Supreme Court declared the search violated the appellant's rights, but still refused to exclude the evidence.

The only bright spot of the majority's decision -- which is at odds with last year's Supreme Court decision stating that additional warrants were required to search computers and cell phones found on searched premises -- is the following, as highlighted by Michael Geist:

I pause here for a moment to note that some courts have suggested that the protection s. 8 affords to individuals in the context of cell phone searches varies depending on whether an individual’s phone is password-protected. I would not give this factor very much weight in assessing either an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy or whether that expectation is reasonable. An individual’s decision not to password protect his or her cell phone does not indicate any sort of abandonment of the significant privacy interests one generally will have in the contents of the phone. Cell phones – locked or unlocked – engage significant privacy interests.

So, at least there's that -- the instruction that just because someone doesn't take active measures to protect their phone's contents from others isn't an implicit suggestion that law enforcement officers are welcome to page through phones at their leisure. Of course, the lack of a warrant requirement does that for them, just so long as they remember to only look at "recent" stuff when searching an arrestee's phone. And there's a certain amount of incongruity in demanding a warrant for a cell phone found at someone's home, rather than for the one found in their pocket.

A warrant requirement is far from onerous, especially considering the wealth of information contained in most smartphones. A warrant requirement is nothing more than a nod to the changing times. People carry personal computers in their pockets and the court needs to recognize that the old rules are no longer applicable. If you can't search a person's computers, personal files and other items without one, you shouldn't be able to do so just because these all reside in someone's pockets. As it stands now, Canada's Supreme Court stands in the awkward position of demanding warrants for access to ISP subscriber info, but not for an arrestee's cell phone contents.

Filed Under: canada, cell phones, mobile phones, privacy, searches, warrants

Internal Emails Show Harris Corp. Misled The FCC On Stingray Device Usage In Order To Receive Approval

from the support-group-for-Stingray-lies-now-includes-roughly-everybody dept

Harris Corporation's Stingray cell tower spoofers are swiftly becoming synonymous with government lying. The FBI has specifically instructed law enforcement agencies to lie about the use of these products, which basically puts the agencies in the position of lying to courts when producing evidence or securing warrants.

Law enforcement agencies would probably lie anyway, even without the federal government's nudge. Many chose to read the restrictive non-disclosure agreements Harris includes as meaning they should withhold this information from local courts -- rather than simply seal the documents or redact them.

So, it comes as no surprise that the web of lies also includes lying to other federal agencies. The lies originate from Harris itself.

New documents obtained by the ACLU of Northern California appear to show the Florida-based Harris Corporation misleading the Federal Communications Commission while seeking authorization to sell its line of Stingray cell phone surveillance gear to state and local police. The documents raise the possibility that federal regulatory approval of the technology was based on bad information.

Harris says its devices are FCC-approved, but what it doesn't specify is the very limited approval it has actually received. An email from a Harris representative to FCC employees [pdf link] contains the following paragraph.

Just want to make you aware of the question below we received regarding the application for the Sting Fish. I know many of these questions are generated automatically but it sounds as if there is some confusion about the purpose of the equipment authorization application. As you may recall, the purpose is only to provide state/local law enforcement officials with authority to utilize this equipment in emergency situations.

As the ACLU points out, Stingray (or "Sting Fish") usage had long since surpassed the "emergency use only" restriction -- if that ever existed at all. Routine investigations utilize these devices all the time. Just one of several examples: when the Tallahassee police department's use of Stingrays came to light, the court noted that it had deployed the technology (without a warrant) more than 200 times, with less than 30% of the deployments being for department-labelled "emergencies."

Law enforcement agencies are secretly acquiring and deploying these devices in violation of the limited FCC approval, and have been doing so for years -- well ahead of this 2010 statement. And Harris is telling them that it's OK. The ACLU has written a letter to FCC chairman Tom Wheeler [pdf link] asking him open an investigation into the use of Stingray devices. If Wheeler obliges, the FCC is going to face a united front of zipped lips. The FBI already locks the Dept. of Justice out of its investigations. There's no chance it's going to be more obliging of a tangentially-related federal agency.

Filed Under: approval, cell phones, fcc, law enforcement, police, spectrum, stingray, surveillance
Companies: harris, harris corp.

Administration Helping Bury Documents Related To Local Law Enforcement Use Of Cell Tower Spoofers

from the widening-the-gap-between-'us'-and-'them' dept

The recent story about the US Marshals Service stepping in to prevent the ACLU from obtaining documents related to the Sarasota (FL) Police Department's ownership and use of cell tower spoofers is apparently not an isolated instance. According to an AP report, the US government is actively inserting itself into the "discussion" by ensuring no one gets to talk about the controversial devices.

The Obama administration has been quietly advising local police not to disclose details about surveillance technology they are using to sweep up basic cellphone data from entire neighborhoods, The Associated Press has learned.

Citing security reasons, the U.S. has intervened in routine state public records cases and criminal trials regarding use of the technology. This has resulted in police departments withholding materials or heavily censoring documents in rare instances when they disclose any about the purchase and use of such powerful surveillance equipment.

Beyond the obvious negative impact on the much-vaunted "transparency" this administration claims to personify, there's also the new disturbing level of overreach -- the US government actively interfering with state-level Freedom of Information requests. In addition to the restrictive non-disclosure agreements that law enforcement agencies must sign when purchasing Stingray devices (and these agencies' general reluctance to share surveillance equipment info with the public), the government itself is taking an active role in erecting a wall between the public and its public servants.

Interviews, court records and public-records requests show the Obama administration is asking agencies to withhold common information about the equipment, such as how the technology is used and how to turn it on. That pushback has come in the form of FBI affidavits and consultation in local criminal cases.

Harris, the largest manufacturer of cell tower spoofers, specifically directs law enforcement to consult with the FBI during the purchase process, as well as before deploying the devices. The company claims this is all above board because it's "regulated" by its status as a government contractor. That might mean something if it wasn't so closely aligned with these government agencies' desire to keep the technology secret.

And, of course, the government has used its go-to defenses to justify its secrecy efforts. Above, it mentioned "security." A supporting affadavit filed by an FBI agent in a Freedom of Information lawsuit adds another:

A court case challenging the public release of information from the Tucson Police Department includes an affidavit from an FBI special agent, Bradley Morrison, who said the disclosure would "result in the FBI’s inability to protect the public from terrorism and other criminal activity because through public disclosures, this technology has been rendered essentially useless for future investigations."

Morrison said revealing any information about the technology would violate a federal homeland security law about information-sharing and arms-control laws…

Once you strip out all the panicky trappings, the FBI is basically asserting that it, and the law enforcement agencies it's speaking in support of, should be allowed to do what they like with zero accountability. These agencies want to have the ability to collect massive amounts of data without being slowed by warrant requests or minimization processes.

These exposure fears are unfounded, and those using them to justify withholding information know this. This secrecy has been used to seal returned warrants and court orders on closed investigations, giving lie to the claim that these agencies are concerned about damaging current and future investigatons. And, realistically, the only way terrorists or criminals are going to be able to completely avoid Stingray surveillance is to not use or carry cell phones, something that seems highly unlikely. For this to be any use to them, they would have to know in advance where it's being deployed and when.

The real reason behind the collaborative burial of information is the agencies' desire to do what they want without limitations or paper trails. This sort of behavior should be an indicator of a law enforcement agency that's gone rogue, rather than an all-too-common collaborative effort between local and national government agencies.

Filed Under: cell phones, cell tower spoofing, doj, federal government, freedom of information, spoofing, stingray, transparency, us marshals
Companies: harris

NSA, Which Once Claimed It Needed Every Phone Record, Now Claims It Actually Gets Less Than 20%

from the is-that-supposed-to-be-comforting? dept

Ever since the first Snowden leaks about the way the NSA interpreted Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act to allow it to collect all call records from various telcos, one of the key arguments that has been made by the program's defenders is that it was necessary to have every single call record to make the important connections between terrorists. Multiple officials have argued that to find the "needle in the haystack" they need to be able to collect the whole haystack. In fact, that was part of the argument made by the few judges who have reviewed and approved this program. In the very first FISC ruling that actually analyzed the legality of the program (as opposed to earlier approvals that never bothered with an analysis), the court clearly indicated that it was necessary to collect everything:

The government depends on this bulk collection because if production of the information were to wait until the specific identifier connected to an international terrorist group were determined, most of the historical connections (the entire purpose of this authorization) would be lost. The analysis of past connections is only possible "if the Government has collected and archived a broad set of metadata that contains within it the subset of communications that can later be identified as terrorist-related." Because the subset of terrorist communications is ultimately contained within the whole of the metadata produced, but can only be found after the production is aggregated and then queried using identifiers determined to be associated with identified international terrorist organizations, the whole production is relevant to the ongoing investigation out of necessity.

That legal tapdancing aside, it basically argues that the only way this data makes sense is if the NSA has all of it. Similarly, when Judge William Pauley found the program legal late last year, he too relied on the argument that the NSA needed all the data.

And yet... it appears that they're actually not getting that much data. A new report from the Washington Post claims that the NSA is actually only getting between 20 to 30% of the data. The Wall Street Journal rushed out a quick story claiming it's actually less than 20%.

Apparently, while the NSA has gotten approvals to get data on landline calls from Verizon and AT&T, it actually hasn't yet gone after the same data from most mobile phone calls. For example, even though it gets Verizon landlines, it apparently does not collect the data on Verizon Wireless. Nor does it collect the data from T-Mobile. There are somewhat conflicting reports as to why this is, but the Washington Post piece suggests that the incident in 2009 in which FISC chief judge Reggie Walton nearly shut the whole program down over compliance failures has basically stopped the NSA from updating the program, because everywhere they look there have been more (you guessed it) compliance failures, and they're simply not set up to handle mobile phone data. Update: And some are questioning the whole claim here, noting that the orders that have been revealed do appear to request IMEI and IMSI data -- information that is only associated with mobile phones.

“It’s not simply the ability to go to the court and order some vendor to give you more records, but you have to make sure that the [agency’s collection system] is prepared and ready to take the data and meet all the requirements of the court,” the former official said. “You don’t want to turn it on and get hundreds of millions of records, only to find out that you’ve got the moral equivalent of raw sewage spilling into the Chesapeake Bay.”

The process of preparing the system can take months, said the senior U.S. official, adding that mobile calls have different data elements than land-line calls. “That’s a really detailed set of activities where we get sample data in, and we march it through our systems,” the official said. “We do that again and again and again. We put in auditing procedures to make sure it works. So before we turn on that mobility data, we make sure it works. . . . It’s very complex.”

Compounding the challenge, the agency in 2009 struggled with compliance issues, including what a surveillance court found were “daily violations of the minimization procedures set forth in [court] orders” designed to protect Americans’ call records that “could not otherwise have been legally captured in bulk.”

As a result, the NSA’s director, Gen. Keith Alexander, ordered an “end-to-end” review of the program, during which additional compliance incidents were discovered and reported to the court. The process of uncovering problems and fixing them took months, and the same people working to address the compliance problems were the ones who would have to prepare the database to handle more records.

Basically, there have been so many compliance problems that the NSA has had to work overtime to try to fix their systems and prepare for an influx of mobile phone data. The Wall Street Journal version of the report says that part of the problem is the NSA can't figure out how to strip location data from mobile phone data, and because collecting that information might lead to compliance issues, they haven't been able to figure out how to do it without running into more trouble down the road.

But fear not, surveillance state lovers, the NSA is getting ready and its goal is to get back to collecting nearly every phone record from every phone provider. Once the systems are in place, they appear to fully intend to send over some requests to the FISA court to get all those mobile operators to comply as well. One hopes that, this time, with so much more awareness of what's going on, at least one of those mobile operators will fight back.

Either way, this whole thing actually shows just how ridiculous the NSA's claims are that it absolutely needs all this data to keep us safe. The very fact that this report is coming out in both the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal at nearly the same time suggests a stupid sort of PR attempt on the part of the NSA, which seems to think that after months of insisting they need it all, they can now placate people by saying "well, we really only collect about 20% of the data (though we're hoping to collect it all)." Not only does this actually highlight the widespread compliance problems with this data, it further shows that the argument that somehow collecting it all is necessary to keep us safe is just completely wrong.

Filed Under: bulk metadata, cell phones, compliance issues, location data, mobile phones, nsa, phone records, section 215, surveillance

If You're Going To Illegally Seize Citizens' Cell Phones, At Least Make Sure You're Grabbing The Right Ones

from the all-officers-involved-are-ordered-to-attend-'Remedial-Rights-Infringement dept

When cops behave badly, many suddenly develop an acute case of unconstitutional stage fright, often resulting in the immediate confiscation of any cameras/cell phones in the vicinity. If it's going to come down to "our word against yours," it helps immensely to have any contradictory "words" spirited away by Narrative Control, a branch of law enforcement that handles all cop "publicity rights," as well as providing new interpretations and reimaginings of existing statutes.

Sometimes it works. The offending footage vanishes into the ether, resulting in a narrative standoff between the Upstanding (if Overenthusiastic) Officer of the Law and the Obviously Crazy and Dangerous Person Who Should Really Be Doing a Little Hard Time.

Other times, the smash-and-grab fails, and the citizens retain their footage, providing a more rounded narration that often reverses the roles. (Upstanding [if Overenthusiastic] Citizen v. Obviously Crazy and Dangerous Law Enforcement Officer Who Really Shouldn't be Allowed to Abuse Anything Other Than a Demeaning Desk Job.)

Sometimes, though, the (attempted) confiscation of offending footage results in a surprising amount of schadenfreude. These moments occur altogether too infrequently, but when they do, a good time is had by all not attempting to confiscate damning footage.

First off, via Photography is not a Crime, comes the brief but surprisingly satisfying story of bullying tactics backfiring.

New York City police officers arrested a woman who was video recording them from a public sidewalk as they conducted some type of “vehicle safety checkpoint.”

The officers apparently stole a memory card from a camera, which turned out to be the wrong one, allowing us to view the video.

In the Youtube description, under the headline, “You stole the wrong SD card,” Christina Gonzalez said her boyfriend was also arrested.

"We were arrested while filming an NYPD checkpoint on a bridge between a soon to be gentrified Bronx and a quickly gentrifying Harlem. We were charged with OGA, DisCon, and resisting arrest. I was holding a bag of yarn in one hand and a canvas in the other. My partner had food in his hands when he was tackled. Even though their violent actions were unjust, we did not resist. Simultaneous with our “arrests”, the checkpoint was closed down.

We were held for 25 hours."

If you'll notice, both principals were charged with OGA (Obstructing Governmental Administration), in addition to the usual cop standbys, disorderly conduct and (of course) resisting arrest. The thing is, they weren't obstructing anything, at least not according to the NYPD's own Patrol Guide.

a. A person remaining in the vicinity of a stop or arrest shall not be subject to arrest for Obstructing Governmental Administration (Penal Law, Section 195.05) unless the officer has probable cause to believe the person or persons are obstructing governmental administration.

b. None of the following constitutes probable cause for arrest or detention of an onlooker unless the safety of officers or other persons is directly endangered or the officer reasonably believes they are endangered or the law is otherwise violated:

(1) Speech alone, even though crude and vulgar
(2) Requesting and making notes of shield numbers or names of officers
(3) Taking photographs, videotapes or tape recordings
(4) Remaining in the vicinity of the stop or arrest

Even if they were doing all of the above, it still wouldn't add up to OGA. So, that's a BS charge, as is the "resisting arrest," but the latter seems to be tacked on to any arrest that occurs without any real crime being committed. It's an offshoot of "contempt of cop, " which basically means that not immediately shutting up and doing what you're told is the same as resisting arrest.

Among all the fake crimes, a real crime did take place -- an NYPD officer (allegedly) stole a memory card, most likely in hopes of "detaining" the offending footage permanently. But he grabbed the wrong one and now the actions of these officers is on public display and spreading around the web.

That's illegal seizure FAIL #1. The second story comes courtesy of a lawsuit filed against the Galveston (Texas) police department. It starts out ordinarily enough. (Sidebar: there's something horribly wrong with the system if I can state something is "ordinary" and have it contain the following events.)

Jarrett Anthony Neu sued Galveston in Federal Court.

Neu claims that Galveston police arrested him at 4:45 p.m. on March 11, without a warrant, at a Galveston apartment complex. He claims they lied about it in the police report. He claims they subjected him not only to threats, intimidation, insult and humiliation, but severe and cruel physical abuse and punishment by both physical beating and the repeated unnecessary and unwarranted deployment of a less-than-lethal Taser weapon on plaintiff. Plaintiff, who suffers from a pre-existing cardiac ailment, suffered permanent and debilitating injuries as well as permanent disfigurement and scarring at the hands of these police officers.

Someone should get rid of that "less-than-lethal" modifier attached to "Taser." It's been proven multiple times that it can be lethal, if deployed against a person with the "right" ailments or simply deployed repeatedly until the arrestee has sufficiently "stopped resisting." (In these cases, the word "resisting" is often interchangeable with the word "breathing.")

At some point during this "exchange of viewpoints" (or whatever the correct PD terminology is), the police noticed an impartial observer was recording the whole thing for posterity. So, they made the usual move to responsibly collect all evidence, especially the damning kind.

During this police administered beating, officers realized that a citizen was filming the beating via cell phone and the officers involved without a legal reason seized (the wrong) cell phone.

E for effort, guys. You almost had it. And without a warrant! Now, the Galveston PD has a cell phone, but the plaintiff's lawyer has the cell phone.

Counsel for plaintiff has the cell phone that recorded the beating.

It would be nice to think the Galveston PD is kicking themselves for blowing a simple, illegal seizure of someone's phone, but if the plaintiff's story is anything to go by, they're probably kicking someone else.

Filed Under: cell phones, police, seizure

Driving While Yakking Laws Looking More And More Like 'Help The Gov't Make Money' Laws

from the funny-how-that-works dept

As mentioned, while I don't think it's safe for most people to drive while on a mobile phone, I'm a bit skeptical of laws that explicitly forbid driving while yakking. Very few of them seem actually focused on improving safety on the roads -- but they do appear to be a way for state governments to make some extra cash. In California, where the fines were not that big originally, it looks like it's about to get a lot more expensive to drive while talking with you mobile phone held up to your ear (you can still drive while yakking hands free -- despite some studies showing that can be just as dangerous). The politicians involved even admitted that this was more or less the plan all along. Get the law passed by keeping the fines really low, wait a few years, and then jack up the fees. I'm all for making the roads safer, but it's not clear that this law actually does that.

Filed Under: cell phones, driving, laws

Mobile Phones Suck... But Isn't It Amazing That They Exist?

from the everything's-amazing-and-nobody's-happy dept

By now, hopefully, you've seen that clip of comedian Louis CK on Conan O'Brien's show (the old, old one) which went kinda viral, where Louis talks about how "everything is amazing and no one is happy": It's hilarious and oh-so-true. I'm reminded of it because of David Boaz's post over at the Cato @ Liberty blog, where he talks about how amazing it is to think how far phone communication has come in the past three decades:

When I was a kid in the 1960s and we came back from a visit to my grandmother's, my mother used to call my grandmother, let the phone ring twice, and then hang up. It was important for my grandmother to know that we'd arrived home safely, but long-distance telephone calls were too expensive to indulge in unnecessarily. When I entered Vanderbilt University in 1971, my parents had to decide whether to pay for a telephone in my dorm room. They decided to do so, but most of the thoroughly upper-middle-class students on my floor did not have phones. Phones cost real money back then. Then came the breakup of the AT&T monopoly in 1984. Phone technology and competitive service provision exploded. In 1982, Motorola produced the first portable mobile phone. It weighed about 2 pounds and cost $3995. Within a very few years they were much smaller, much cheaper, and selling like hotcakes.

Today there are some 4.6 billion mobile phones in the world, and counting, or about 67 per every 100 people in the world. The newer ones allow you to carry in your hand more computing power than the computers that put Apollo 11 on the moon.  You can cruise the internet, find your location with GPS, read books, send texts, pay bills, process credit cards, watch video, record video, stream video to the web, take and send photos -- oh, and make phone calls from just about anywhere. Unimaginable just a few years ago.

But the point of the post is to question why some are now putting together an event about "Why Your Cell Phone is So Terrible," pointing out that it's a bit silly to complain when you compare it to what we had.

It's a really good point -- but I have to admit I can see both sides to this argument. It's the very fact that, even when we do amazing things, we can still see the faults with it and that drives us to keep improving and to keep innovating. It's the very "culture of improvement" that drives growth and innovation. So, while I can agree that it's sometimes a shame how much we feel a sense of entitlement towards making things better when those amazing things didn't even exist just a few years ago, it's hard not to sympathize with the feeling of wanting things to be even better.

And, by the way, I'm not alone in seeing both sides of all this. That Louis CK video at the top? The one where he mocks the guy sitting next to him on an airplane for getting upset that the WiFi in the sky suddenly stopped working? Yeah, he later admitted that it wasn't someone sitting next to him, but himself getting pissed off at the WiFi not working, even though he didn't even know in-flight WiFi existed until he got on the airplane. So yes, everything is amazing, and no one's happy... but maybe that's a good thing.

Filed Under: cell phones, complaining, louis ck, mobile