Bernoulli disks were technically floppies (they contained a flexible magnetic disk). Here's a fun examination of them, for those of us who consider this sort of thing "fun": https://youtu.be/TpqiahBKX7w
"The fans like music because they agree with the creator's message"
This is a very shaky assumption. Lots of fans of particular music are fans despite not agreeing with the message. Lots of fans of particular songs don't even understand what the songs are actually saying (e.g. "Born to Run", "Every Breath You Take", etc.)
Almost nobody uses "Luddite" correctly anyway, so it typically has no more meaning than just calling someone "bastard" or something.
The historical Luddites were not anti-technology. They were reacting to a particular use of particular technology that they viewed as threatening their livelihoods.
Wow, a Daily Mail article that isn't actually that far off. I'm actually surprised.
But the article is talking about the SS7 hack, not cell phones. And the SS7 hack is only possible because of poor security on the part of the telecoms.
It does not have anything to do with being able to track the whereabouts of cell phones. The cold, technical fact is that if your cell phone can't send a radio signal out, it cannot be tracked. There's literally nothing to track in that situation.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
The Constitution does actually grant the government some powers (it's mostly the Bill of Rights that restricts it). One of those powers is the ability to regulate international trade.
ITAR is a set of regulations that falls squarely under that umbrella.
I'm not sure what you mean here, or what advice I gave that you consider unsound.
Let me be very specific: the government cannot intercept and modify a large number of shipments of equipment, no matter how much they might want to -- so this isn't being done as a blanket policy.
If you ship you phone via parcel service, the government will not even know to intercept your package unless they're already keeping a very close eye on you, specifically. When I say that if you're in that select group of people, you'll know, I mean that either/or:
1) You are engaging in activity that you know is likely to be of exceptional interest to the government. Large scale crime, espionage, journalists covering very sensitive stories, working for a foreign embassy, etc.
2) Intercepting your packages will not be the only thing the government is doing with you. You will be under surveillance from many different angles. Enough so that it borders on certain that you'd notice something was up.
If you're just a regular Joe, even one that is on the bad side of the government for whatever reason, they aren't going to waste a very limited resource such as intercepting parcels on you. At worst, they'll go with actions that are less expensive, like temporarily seizing your phone from you and slipping some spyware on it.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
Yes, regulations have the force of law and considering them to be identical is often a reasonable approximation. However, they are not really the same thing and often the differences can be important.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
There is no Constitutional problem with ITAR that I can think of. What would be the Constitutional argument against it?
(Just to be clear, I think the ITAR classification of crypto is a really bad thing, but that's different than whether or not there's a Constitutional problem.)
They are a security issue. Not as bad of one as when Windows had autoplay turned on by default, but it's still a pretty big deal.
The main security problem with handing out thumb drives in a bulk way is that people will trust them, and are likely to go ahead and open risky documents or run programs they find on them.
If the drive they have is the one given out, that's probably OK. But there's no way to be sure that's the case. If I'm handing out hundreds of drives to people attending an event, there are plenty of opportunities for hackers to leave identical-looking drives sitting around, to surreptitiously swap out good drives for bad, etc.
In fairness, it is entirely possible to prevent these sorts of searches (on Android phones, anyway. I don't know about iPhones). It does take extra knowledge and effort, though.
In this case, you can replace the lock screen with any of a number of alternatives, some of which allow you to remove the ability to make even 911 calls if the phone is locked.
No need for a list. I'm talking about people that the government thinks may be spies, might be important terrorists, might be engaged in very large crime efforts, etc. If you're someone that is incurring such suspicion, you're very likely to know it.
This is misleading. Crypto is not considered a munition by any US law.
It is considered a munition by ITAR (International Traffic in Arms regulations), but that only comes into play when in imports and exports. It has nothing to do with what US citizens can possess and use.
Yes, I think you're right. I would take it a bit deeper, though.
Military training consists of a whole lot more than just learning how to use the equipment. It also includes things like what sort of force is appropriate under what circumstances, focused conditioning to make it more likely to keep your head when under fire, how to appropriately handle the presence of civilians, identify friend & foe, etc.
It's a whole package deal, and is the sort of overall training that police don't get. I think the notion that giving them military equipment, even if trained on that equipment, is fundamentally flawed.
Of course I'm aware. However, they don't (and can't) do this in a blanket kind of way. You'd have to be someone they have a particular, and great, interest in -- and if you are, you probably know or reasonably suspect it.
If you are someone in that category, then your entire security game must be stepped up across the board anyway, and you shouldn't be using any cell phones except for burners that you only keep for a short period of time.
On the post: John Oliver's Story On Campaign Music And Copyright Is... Wrong
Re: Re: Confusing "legal" with "right"
On the post: Verizon Buys Yahoo In $4.8 Billion Attempt To Bore The Internet To Death
Re: Bernoulli
On the post: John Oliver's Story On Campaign Music And Copyright Is... Wrong
Re: Confusing "legal" with "right"
And it does count.
"The fans like music because they agree with the creator's message"
This is a very shaky assumption. Lots of fans of particular music are fans despite not agreeing with the message. Lots of fans of particular songs don't even understand what the songs are actually saying (e.g. "Born to Run", "Every Breath You Take", etc.)
On the post: Appeals Court Rejects Silly Case Against Google Over Search Results Summary
Re: Re:
The historical Luddites were not anti-technology. They were reacting to a particular use of particular technology that they viewed as threatening their livelihoods.
On the post: Ed Snowden And Bunnie Huang Design Phone Case To Warn You If Your Phone Is Compromised
Re: Re: Re: Aluminum Foil Hat Conversation
But the article is talking about the SS7 hack, not cell phones. And the SS7 hack is only possible because of poor security on the part of the telecoms.
It does not have anything to do with being able to track the whereabouts of cell phones. The cold, technical fact is that if your cell phone can't send a radio signal out, it cannot be tracked. There's literally nothing to track in that situation.
On the post: Former Homeland Security Advisor: Tech Companies Have The Burden Of Proving Harm Of Backdoored Encryption
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
ITAR is a set of regulations that falls squarely under that umbrella.
On the post: Wall Street Journal Reporter Hassled At LA Airport; Successfully Prevents DHS From Searching Her Phones
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
Let me be very specific: the government cannot intercept and modify a large number of shipments of equipment, no matter how much they might want to -- so this isn't being done as a blanket policy.
If you ship you phone via parcel service, the government will not even know to intercept your package unless they're already keeping a very close eye on you, specifically. When I say that if you're in that select group of people, you'll know, I mean that either/or:
1) You are engaging in activity that you know is likely to be of exceptional interest to the government. Large scale crime, espionage, journalists covering very sensitive stories, working for a foreign embassy, etc.
2) Intercepting your packages will not be the only thing the government is doing with you. You will be under surveillance from many different angles. Enough so that it borders on certain that you'd notice something was up.
If you're just a regular Joe, even one that is on the bad side of the government for whatever reason, they aren't going to waste a very limited resource such as intercepting parcels on you. At worst, they'll go with actions that are less expensive, like temporarily seizing your phone from you and slipping some spyware on it.
On the post: Former Homeland Security Advisor: Tech Companies Have The Burden Of Proving Harm Of Backdoored Encryption
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
On the post: Former Homeland Security Advisor: Tech Companies Have The Burden Of Proving Harm Of Backdoored Encryption
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
(Just to be clear, I think the ITAR classification of crypto is a really bad thing, but that's different than whether or not there's a Constitutional problem.)
On the post: Yes, The Democratic National Committee Flat Out Lied In Claiming No Donor Financial Info Leaked
Re: Re: Re: Re: Politicians not lying would be real news...
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Re:
On the post: DNC Comms Guy Mocked Story Saying DNC Is Bad At Cybersecurity; Revealed Because DNC Is Bad At Cybersecurity
Re: Are thumb drives really a security issue?
The main security problem with handing out thumb drives in a bulk way is that people will trust them, and are likely to go ahead and open risky documents or run programs they find on them.
If the drive they have is the one given out, that's probably OK. But there's no way to be sure that's the case. If I'm handing out hundreds of drives to people attending an event, there are plenty of opportunities for hackers to leave identical-looking drives sitting around, to surreptitiously swap out good drives for bad, etc.
On the post: Daily Deal: The A-to-Z Programming Language Bundle
Re:
On the post: Court Says Cop Calling 911 With Suspect's Phone To Obtain Owner Info Is Not A Search
Re:
In this case, you can replace the lock screen with any of a number of alternatives, some of which allow you to remove the ability to make even 911 calls if the phone is locked.
On the post: Former Homeland Security Advisor: Tech Companies Have The Burden Of Proving Harm Of Backdoored Encryption
Re: Re: Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
Fair enough. I was drawing a distinction between regulations and law that isn't really relevant in this situation.
Nonetheless, it only applies to imports and exports, and has nothing to do with what citizens can possess and use.
On the post: Wall Street Journal Reporter Hassled At LA Airport; Successfully Prevents DHS From Searching Her Phones
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re:
On the post: Former Homeland Security Advisor: Tech Companies Have The Burden Of Proving Harm Of Backdoored Encryption
Re: The question that first comes to mind is:
This is misleading. Crypto is not considered a munition by any US law.
It is considered a munition by ITAR (International Traffic in Arms regulations), but that only comes into play when in imports and exports. It has nothing to do with what US citizens can possess and use.
Also, the ITAR restrictions themselves were relaxed years ago, but certainly not eliminated. To the best of my knowledge, there has been only a single instance of someone being sanctioned under ITAR in over a decade: http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/107-about-bis/newsroom/press-rele ases/press-release-2014/763-intel-subsidiary-agrees-to-750-000-penalty-for-unauthorized-encryption-e xports
On the post: Administration's One-Year Experimentation With Reining In Police Militarization Apparently Over
Re: Re: Re: Need
Military training consists of a whole lot more than just learning how to use the equipment. It also includes things like what sort of force is appropriate under what circumstances, focused conditioning to make it more likely to keep your head when under fire, how to appropriately handle the presence of civilians, identify friend & foe, etc.
It's a whole package deal, and is the sort of overall training that police don't get. I think the notion that giving them military equipment, even if trained on that equipment, is fundamentally flawed.
On the post: Wall Street Journal Reporter Hassled At LA Airport; Successfully Prevents DHS From Searching Her Phones
Re: Re: Re: Re:
If you are someone in that category, then your entire security game must be stepped up across the board anyway, and you shouldn't be using any cell phones except for burners that you only keep for a short period of time.
On the post: Texas Governor Latest To Ask For A 'Hate Crime' Law That Covers Attacks On Cops
Re: If you can't earn respect, then instill fear.
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