Algorithm Might Protect Non-Targets Caught In Surveillance, But Only If The Government Cares What Happens To Non-Targets
from the something-it-has-yet-to-show dept
Ashkat Rathi at Quartz points to an interesting algorithm developed by Michael Kearns of the University of Pennsylvania -- one that might give the government something to consider when conducting surveillance. It gauges the possibility of non-targets inadvertently being exposed during investigations, providing intelligence/investigative agencies with warnings that perhaps other tactics should be deployed.
Rathi provides a hypothetical situation in which this algorithm might prove to be of use. A person with a rare medical condition they'd like to keep private visits a clinic that happens to be under investigation for fraud. This person often calls another family member for medical advice (an aunt who works at another clinic). This second person's clinic is also under investigation.
When the investigation culminates in a criminal case, there's a good chance the patient -- a "non-target" -- may have their sensitive medical information exposed.
If the government ends up busting both clinics, there’s a risk that people could find out about your disease. Some friends may know about your aunt and that you visit some sort clinic in New York; government records related to the investigation, or comments by officials describing how they built their case, may be enough for some people to draw connections between you, the specialized clinic, and the state of your health.Even though this person isn't targeted by investigators, the unfortunate byproduct is diminished privacy. This algorithm, detailed in a paper published by the National Academy of Sciences, aims to add a layer of filtering to investigative efforts. As Kearns describes it, the implementation would both warn of potential collateral damage as well as inject "noise" to make accidental exposure of non-targets minimal.
For such cases where there are only a few connections between people or organizations under suspicion, Kearns’s algorithm would warn investigators that taking action could result in a breach of privacy for selected people. If a law were to require a greater algorithmic burden of proof for medical-fraud cases, investigators would need to find alternative routes to justify going after the New York clinic.
But if there were lots of people who could serve as links between the two frauds, Kearns’s algorithm would let the government proceed with targeting and exposing both clinics. In this situation, the odds of comprising select individuals’ privacy is lower.Potentially useful, but it suffers from a major flaw: the government.
Of course, if an investigation focused on suspected terrorism instead of fraud, the law may allow the government to risk compromising privacy in the interest of public safety.Terrorism investigations will trump almost everything else, including privacy protections supposedly guaranteed by our Constitution. Courts have routinely sided with the government's willingness to sacrifice its citizens' privacy for security.
It's highly unlikely investigative or intelligence agencies have much of an interest in protecting the privacy of non-targeted citizens, even in non-terrorist-related surveillance -- not if it means using alternate (read: "less effective") investigative methods or techniques. It has been demonstrated time and time again that law enforcement is more interested in the most direct route to what it seeks, no matter how much collateral damage is generated.
The system has no meaningful deterrents built into it. Violations are addressed after the fact, utilizing a remedy process that can be prohibitively expensive for those whose rights have been violated. On top of that, multiple layers of immunity shield government employees from the consequences of their actions and, in some cases, completely thwart those seeking redress for their grievances.
The algorithm may prove useful in other areas -- perhaps in internal investigations performed by private, non-state parties -- but our government is generally uninterested in protecting the rights it has granted to Americans. Too many law enforcement pursuits (fraud, drugs, terrorism, etc.) are considered more important than the rights (and lives) of those mistakenly caught in the machinery. If the government can't be talked out of firing flashbangs through windows or predicating drug raids on random plant matter found in someone's trash can, then it's not going to reroute investigations just because a piece of software says a few people's most private information might be exposed.
Thank you for reading this Techdirt post. With so many things competing for everyone’s attention these days, we really appreciate you giving us your time. We work hard every day to put quality content out there for our community.
Techdirt is one of the few remaining truly independent media outlets. We do not have a giant corporation behind us, and we rely heavily on our community to support us, in an age when advertisers are increasingly uninterested in sponsoring small, independent sites — especially a site like ours that is unwilling to pull punches in its reporting and analysis.
While other websites have resorted to paywalls, registration requirements, and increasingly annoying/intrusive advertising, we have always kept Techdirt open and available to anyone. But in order to continue doing so, we need your support. We offer a variety of ways for our readers to support us, from direct donations to special subscriptions and cool merchandise — and every little bit helps. Thank you.
–The Techdirt Team
Filed Under: algorithm, michael kearns, non-targets, privacy, surveillance, targets, warrants
Reader Comments
Subscribe: RSS
View by: Time | Thread
"Something that will tell us when we might violate someone's privacy? What possible use is that?"
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: "Something that will tell us when we might violate someone's privacy? What possible use is that?"
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Because Terrorism...
The target might have attended a house of worship that our expansive 17 degrees of guilt connections show that you must be a terrorist. It doesn't matter that to average people the connection is ridiculously tenuous, we have a connection and put them on our secret list.
The target might share a name with a Congressman, because just a name alone is enough to get on the secret list.
The target might fall under 1 of 100 other scenarios where an innocent person is entangled & is left to deal with that fall out with no help.
They don't care about the people they claim to protect, they care about the large production numbers that get them coverage and headlines.
So what if we out you having AIDS, we stopped corruption.
So what if we out you getting hormone therapy for gender reassignment, we stopped corruption.
This is the system that bent over backwards to justify throwing a flash bang into an occupied crib, they don't care about the lives they ruin... only the headlines they imagine they will get for winning.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
So can anyone demonstrate how any of the mass surveillance programs have benefited public safety? Has one instance of terrorism been prevented due to mass surveillance? Has one violent criminal been apprehended due to mass surveillance having been the key in breaking the case?
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
That's a fair trade for the mass violations of rights and privacy, right? /s
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
See how many lives were just saved? The bad guys are everywhere!
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re:
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
What's a "non-target"?
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Re: What's a "non-target"?
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
rights
Those rights are not granted by the gov't, but are inalienable, endowed to us by our creator, and supposed to be protected by the constitution agaist an abusive gov't
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
No such thing as a non target in this day and age. Everyone is a target.
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
I think that should be rewritten as follows:
"... not if it means using alternate (read: "more work") investigative methods or techniques."
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
100%
Its always nice when there is no need to post the obvious in response to an article about "responsible government".
Exactly - that.
---
[ link to this | view in chronology ]
Drug smuggling and collateral damage
[ link to this | view in chronology ]