The Court now finds that the interests of justice require default judgment as the only effective remedy. Motion Defendants willfully failed to comply with the Court’s discovery orders. Lesser sanctions would be ineffective. Indeed, the Court balks at Motion Defendants’ suggestions to allow Johnson additional discovery, impose more monetary fines, or again push back the litigation calendar. (Doc. 171, p. 3.) Been there, done that—to no avail. Motion Defendants have made clear their refusal to comply with discovery orders, and they “richly deserve[] the sanction of a default judgment.” See Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1542. Their willful disregard of discovery orders has prejudiced Johnson and brought this action to a standstill for eighteen months. Motion Defendants’ obstreperous conduct warrants the sockdolager of default. See Nat’l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643 (“[T[he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions must be available to the district court in appropriate cases.”); Adolph Coors, 777 F.2d at 1543; (upholding default judgment when the defendants refused to turn over crucial documents from the get-go, claiming privilege, and the district judge “exhibited great sensitivity” to the defendants’ concerns)

Johnson’s testimony about the mental anguish she suffered from the Copyright Infringement Action was credible. Specifically, Johnson testified about the lack of sleep, diminished enjoyment in various hobbies, and overall worry about the litigation and its consequences on her life. The Court finds that Johnson, as an individual unfamiliar with the legal process, credibly suffered emotional harm from the Copyright Infringement Action. But as Johnson did not seek medical treatment and her symptoms have abated, the Court finds a minimal award for these damages appropriate. Thus, the Court awards Johnson $12,500.00 for these damages.

Here, Johnson has presented facts sufficient for the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants knowingly misrepresented copyright infringement to YouTube. Specifically, the verified Complaint avers that: (1) on multiple occasions, PWM/New Destiny “willfully, knowingly[,] and materially” made § 512(f) misrepresentations to YouTube that Johnson’s videos were infringing PWM’s copyrights... (2) “PWM did not hold a valid copyright registration or certificate to the content contained in [Johnson’s] videos at the time of the misrepresentations” ... and (3) the material posted on Johnson’s YouTube channel “was used lawfully in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 107 of the Copyright Act”—the fair use doctrine.... These allegations suffice to support a § 512(f) claim. See Curtis, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1199 (finding that a § 512(f) claim was adequately pleaded where plaintiff “repeatedly alleged that [d]efendants knew that the takedown notices contained false infringement allegations”); see also Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154–55 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine . . . is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.”).

Injury is a critical element of a § 512(f) claim.... As such, Johnson must allege that the purported misrepresentations proximately caused her damages.... In the Malicious Prosecution Action, the Court found that Johnson failed to state a § 512(f) claim because “each factual allegation related to Johnson's damages stem[med] from the prosecution of the Copyright Action rather than the removal of her videos from YouTube.” ... Here, Johnson again asserts damages stemming from prosecution of the Copyright Action in her Complaint, but she also cites damages resulting from the termination of her YouTube channel.... Thus, Johnson has sufficiently pled the existence of an injury caused by the misrepresentations.