Why Isn't There A Central Database Of E-Voting Problems?

from the seems-like-a-no-brainer dept

For many years, we've been reporting on stories of e-voting malfunctions, mainly from Diebold/Premier, ES&S and Sequoia. For a sampling of such stories click on any of the following links: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. And that's just the first 25 I found (there are lots more), and only cover stories that I actually covered. I'm sure plenty more glitch-infused elections have happened. Given all these glitches and errors, and a seeming lack of followthrough to make sure they don't happen again, a group is asking Congress to authorize a public national database of e-voting election problems.

The really scary part is that the researchers who wrote the report note that many of the problems are repeats -- a problem happens in one location, but another voting district uses the same machines configured in the same problematic way in another election, totally unaware of the problems it will cause. It's still amazing that after nearly a decade of examples of problems with e-voting, just how little has been done to fix these machines.

Filed Under: database, e-voting, problems
Companies: diebold, es&s, premier, sequoia

Justice Department Decides To Break Up E-Voting Company

from the how-about-just-opening-the-source-code? dept

As was rumored at the end of last year, the US Justice Department has decided to break up Election Systems & Software (ES&S), the dominant e-voting provider in the country. You may recall that just a few months earlier, ES&S (who has a long and troubled history of inaccurate, buggy and insecure e-voting machines) had purchased the remains of Diebold's e-voting business for just $5 million. Of course, Diebold also had a long and troubled history of inaccurate, buggy and insecure e-voting machines, so the two made a perfect match. In both cases, the companies relied on security by stonewalling -- insisting that nothing was wrong, despite lots of proof to the contrary, and refusing to let third party security experts ever look at their machines. Rather than breaking up the companies, why don't the feds just require that any e-voting machine use open source software that can be tested by anyone?

Filed Under: antitrust, e-voting, justice department
Companies: diebold, es&s, premier

Justice Department May Unwind Diebold E-voting Sale To ES&S

from the but-why? dept

After getting hammered publicly for having e-voting machines that didn't work well and had serious security problems, Diebold tried sell off its e-voting division for years with no luck. It then tried to change its name to Premier, hoping people wouldn't realize it was Diebold. In the end, Diebold finally found a buyer in ES&S, the other large player in the market. Between them they own 70% of the US market, apparently. And that's leading to some concern. The Justice Department is apparently looking into the deal to see if it should be unwound, out of fear that ES&S will jack up prices.

Honestly, I don't see what the value is in unwinding the deal. Then you'll have two awful e-voting companies with terrible track records with security and accuracy, rather than one. Instead, why aren't we focusing on requiring truly open solutions so that we actually verify that an e-voting system is both secure and accurate?

Filed Under: anti-trust, e-voting
Companies: diebold, es&s, premier

Diebold Finally Dumps E-Voting Division... But Sells It To Equally Problematic ES&S

from the that-makes-it-better? dept

Ah, Diebold. One of the "big three" e-voting providers out there, its name was the first one that got associated with the problems of e-voting machines, despite problems being found across the board in players in that space. I could never understand why the company continued to fight and deny problems with its machines after so much evidence was presented against them. The smart move would have been to admit that the machines had problems, work with security experts to solve them, and come out with better, safer machines. But that's not what happened. Instead, it stonewalled, denied problems, mocked those who exposed security flaws and kept pushing out questionable machines. Eventually, the stories got so bad, that Diebold realized it was having a seriously negative impact on its other lines of business (including ATMs), so it renamed the e-voting division "Premier Election Solutions" (as if people would forget) and went about trying to sell the thing off -- though, for years it couldn't find any takers.

It took a while, but Diebold has finally found a buyer. ES&S has purchased Diebold's e-voting business for a mere $5 million plus some outstanding revenue. In classic Diebold fashion, the company has announced that it "would not be answering questions about the sale" -- because that's how you go about rebuilding trust.

Meanwhile, it's not like ES&S is any better. It, too, has had massive problems with its e-voting machines, while the company has a history of stonewalling attempts by gov't officials to review their code. Oh, and there's this: company memos showed that the company knew about some of the problems with its voting machines that were used in elections. And the most fun of all? When we questioned why e-voting companies didn't allow independent security researchers to examine machines, an ES&S employee showed up in our comments to call us all idiots.

Now, with the combined ES&S/Diebold/Premier, a ridiculous large percentage of the country's e-voting machines now belong to one company, with an amazingly long family tree of faulty machines and a history of attacking anyone who points out those flaws.

Filed Under: e-voting, merger
Companies: diebold, es&s, premier

Ohio Finds All E-Voting Machines In The State Had Serious Flaws

from the no-surprise-there dept

Earlier this year, California found all sorts of problems with e-voting machines used in the state. Now, Ohio, home to some of the more controversial stories surrounding presidential elections, has also found serious flaws in every e-voting machine used in the state. It's the usual stuff that has been pointed out for years: it was easy to pick locks on the machines, introduce fake votes, and load up dangerous unauthorized software onto the machines. Not much new there -- just another confirmation. What's much more interesting is the reaction of the firms involved.

First up is "Premier Election Solution," who you probably would recognize better under its old name: Diebold. The company changed its name a few months ago, hoping people would no longer associate Premier with all of the ridiculously bad history associated with Diebold. A Premier official said that all of the problems noted in the report have been fixed in its new machines. While that's a better response than Diebold's typical response of trashing any researcher who points out a flaw or cracking jokes about the flaws, it's one of the few times we've ever seen Diebold/Premier admit that older machines actually did have significant flaws. Of course, the few times that's happened in the past, it's always come with the same sort of "but everything is fixed now!" clause. And... every time a Diebold/Premier representative says something along those lines, it's only a matter of months until new flaws are announced. So, given Diebold's history, it's pretty difficult to take the company's word that all the flaws have now been fixed.

Even worse, though, is the response of ES&S, who has become even more Diebold-like in its responses to various problems found in its machines. On the Ohio report, ES&S responded: "We can also tell you that our 35 years in the field of elections has demonstrated that Election Systems and Software voting technology is accurate, reliable and secure." Note that this doesn't actually respond to any of the specific criticisms in the report. As for that history, let's take you back to a few of ES&S's greatest hits: this is the company that was caught providing uncertified software to California, while also failing to disclose foreign manufacturing partners (as required by federal law). It's also the company responsible for the well-known case in Florida where thousands of votes went missing and the election in Texas where votes were counted three times. And, of course, let's not forget the internal memos at ES&S which showed the company knew about problems with its software, while publicly stating that the machines were perfectly fine. So, sorry, ES&S, you can try to pretend those things didn't happen, but the history you point to hardly shows that your machines are "accurate, reliable and secure." It shows a company that will say anything to avoid admitting that its machines have problems.

Filed Under: e-voting, ohio
Companies: diebold, es&s, premier