Inspector General's Report On Investigation Of Trump Campaign Finds More FISA-Related Abuse By The FBI

from the and-if-the-FBI-does-this-to-the-big-people,-imagine-what-it-does-to-the-little-p dept

The Inspector General's report [PDF] on the FBI's investigation into Russia's connection to the Trump election campaign has been released. In the 480-page report, there's enough to satisfy both sides of the argument. Those who believe the investigation was never politically-driven will have their hunches confirmed. Those that believe there's a concerted Deep State effort targeting Trump will find just enough in it to affirm those beliefs as well.

The Inspector General behind the report, Michael Horowitz, has never been afraid of calling bullshit on the numerous agencies he oversees. These agencies, on the other hand, do everything they can to thwart his investigations, so if anything crucial seems to be missing from this report, you can probably blame the FBI.

The report clears the FBI of any wrongdoing, at least as far as the "politically-driven" allegations. The IG concluded the FBI did things badly, but did not do them for anti-Trump reasons.

That being said, the more disturbing aspects of the report deal with the FISA court and the FBI's casual abuse of its surveillance authorities. Not much is known about the FBI's domestic surveillance efforts -- at least not those authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. While the FBI routinely performs "backdoor" searches of domestic communications harvested by the NSA's foreign-facing surveillance efforts, we have yet to see an actual FISA affidavit from the FBI.

The affidavits reviewed by IG Horowitz involved the surveillance of Carter Page, hat-wearer and foreign policy advisor for the Trump campaign. The super-secret process has rarely been this closely examined before. What it shows is the FBI playing fast and loose with its surveillance powers. Here's Charlie Savage's take for the New York Times:

[T]he inspector general found major errors, material omissions and unsupported statements about Mr. Page in the materials that went to the court. F.B.I. agents cherry-picked the evidence, telling the Justice Department information that made Mr. Page look suspicious and omitting material that cut the other way, and the department passed that misleading portrait onto the court.

Here's what the report says:

Our review found that FBI personnel fell far short of the requirement in FBI policy that they ensure that all factual statements in a FISA application are "scrupulously accurate." We identified multiple instances in which factual assertions relied upon in the first FISA application were inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by appropriate documentation, based upon information the FBI had in its possession at the time the application was filed.

The FBI was so interested in keeping Carter Page under surveillance that it manipulated the facts it had to better fit the actions it wanted to take. In the FBI's initial wiretap application, the agency cherry-picked info from informants to find anything that might possibly suggest Carter Page was the connective tissue between Donald Trump and the twice-convicted Paul Manafort. When it came time for the wiretap renewal, the FBI chose to withhold new information that contradicted some of the original probable cause it had supplied to the FISA court on its first application.

This is just the FBI adding onto its not-so-proud tradition of misleading the FISA court. As far back as 2002, the FISA court was already complaining about the FBI's "inaccurate affidavits." Not much seems to have changed. If this report is any indication of the FBI's general approach to submitting affidavits, agents are massaging weak correlations into something approaching probable cause and continuing this abusive editing process for every renewal. The procedures introduced following the FISA court's 2002 criticism don't appear to be having much of an effect.

The FBI will get yet another chance to start acting like a trustworthy government agency. More pressure is being placed on it from its oversight. The Inspector General's office says another audit is underway -- this time to determine just how often the FBI fudges facts on FISA applications.

Given the extensive compliance failures we identified in this review, we believe that additional OIG oversight work is required to assess the FBI's compliance with Department and FBI FISA-related policies that seek to protect the civil liberties of U.S. persons. Accordingly, we have today initiated an OIG audit that will further examine the FBI's compliance with the Woods Procedures in FISA applications that target U.S. persons in both counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.

These findings will be of considerable public interest, but given how much secrecy surrounds FISA court proceedings, it's unclear when, or if, we'll ever see this report. So far, nothing seems to be making the FBI handle its considerable power more responsibly. The FISA court isn't adversarial. Few people criminally charged as the result of FISA-ordained surveillance have the opportunity to challenge this evidence in court. The worst thing that can happen to the FBI is periodic benchslaps by FISA judges. And the opinions and orders containing these benchslaps generally aren't cleared for public consumption until years after the fact. That's not much of a deterrent.

There's a Deep State problem out there, but it's not politically-motivated. It's not the FBI vs. politicians it doesn't like. It's the FBI vs. Americans it wants to place under surveillance via a court supposedly interested in the gathering of foreign intelligence. Ordinary domestic surveillance produces paper trails that must be turned over in trial courts. FISA surveillance does not, which is why the FBI loves having this option.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, fbi, fisa, fisa court, fisa warrants, fisc, inspector general, oversight, surveillance

FISA Court Finds The FBI Is Still Violating The Fourth Amendment With Its Abuse Of NSA Collections

from the no-surprises-here dept

The NSA isn't the only agency to abuse its surveillance powers. The FBI's ability to access unminimized data harvested by the NSA has resulted in abuse after abuse, as the FBI loves to use the massive data haul to perform "backdoor searches" of its domestic targets.

This concern has been raised repeatedly, most notably by Sen. Ron Wyden, who has been calling out surveillance abuses for years -- specifically calling out these backdoor searches and hinting (strongly) that they are much more prevalent than most people believed. Nothing much has been done about it, other than multiple federal agencies suggesting they too should be put on the ever-growing list of entities with access to the NSA's multiple collections.

A FISA Court opinion released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) details even more abuse of the NSA's Section 702 collections by the FBI. When you give an agency the power to dig into massive amounts of data with minimal oversight, abuses will happen. But this goes further than "inadvertent" collections or erroneous access of unminimized data. This ruling [PDF] -- first reported on by the Wall Street Journal -- shows the FBI treats sensitive collections as its personal playground.

The October 2018 court ruling identifies improper searches of raw intelligence databases by the bureau in 2017 and 2018 that were deemed problematic in part because of their breadth, which sometimes involved queries related to thousands or tens of thousands of pieces of data, such as emails or telephone numbers. In one case, the ruling suggested, the FBI was using the intelligence information to vet its personnel and cooperating sources. Federal law requires that the database only be searched by the FBI as part of seeking evidence of a crime or for foreign-intelligence information.

In other instances, the court ruled that the database had been improperly used by individuals. In one case, an FBI contractor ran a query of an intelligence database—searching information on himself, other FBI personnel and his relatives, the court revealed.

The partially-redacted, 138-page opinion makes it clear the FBI has frequently abused its access to the NSA's surveillance collections, which include emails, phone numbers, and a host of other digital detritus. Using collections authorized only to be used for national security purposes to perform security reviews of FBI personnel is obviously contrary to the intention of the program -- a purpose that is always reiterated loudly any time someone suggests surveillance should be curtailed. This opinion vindicates Wyden's incessant demands the FBI come clean about its backdoor searches. Wyden argued the FBI abused this power frequently. This opinion makes it clear the FBI abuses its "backdoor" access to domestic data constantly.

The weirdest thing is the Trump DOJ argued in court the program the FBI abused cannot be modified without harming the security of the nation. Yep, the administration that claims the "Deep State" is out to get it showed up in court to argue the Deep State should not have its power curtailed.

The court rejected this faulty premise. It also pointed out how severely any misuse of this power contains the potential to harm dozens, if not thousands, of people. Considering the breadth of the collection, running a single improper search returns hundreds, if not thousands, of records the FBI has no business retrieving. Using the database to vet employees or perform natsec vanity searches does not comply with the restrictions on the FBI's searches, which are only supposed to return data related to criminal activity (and then only certain crimes) and/or foreign intelligence information.

As usual, Sen. Ron Wyden was the first to go on record criticizing the FBI and its backdoor searches following the release of the FISA opinion.

Last year, when Congress reauthorized Section 702 of FISA, it accepted the FBI's outright refusal to account for all its warrantless backdoor searches of Americans. Today's release demonstrates how baseless the FBI's position was and highlights Congress' constitutional obligation to act independently and strengthen the checks and balances on government surveillance. The information released today also reveals serious abuses in the FB's backdoor searches, underscoring the need for the government to seek a warrant before searching through mountains of private data on Americans. Finally, I am concerned that the government has redacted information in these releases that the public deserves to know.

Wyden makes good points. And they're points he's made for years. Unfortunately, the FBI continues to do the stuff it shouldn't and the public has to read between the redactions in an (often vain) attempt to see what's being done to them in the name of "national security."

The abuses will continue until Congress or the FISA Court decide they've seen enough. While both entities have chastised agencies with access to NSA collections, neither have taken any action that will head off future misuse of surveillance databases in the future. We're a reactionary nation when it comes to surveillance abuse and that's just not going to prevent future abuses. But that's the nature of the national security beast. No one's allowed to know what's going on until after everything bad has happened.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, backdoor searches, fbi, fisa court, fisc, nsa, odni, ron wyden, vanity searches

Federal Court Says NSA PRISM Surveillance Good And Legal Because The Gov't Said It Was Good And Legal

from the 'those-DOJ-guys-are-real-straight-shooters' dept

Three years after its inception, a prosecution involving possibly unlawful FISA-authorized surveillance, hints of parallel construction, and a very rare DOJ notification of Section 702 evidence has reached a (temporary) dead end. The defendants challenged the evidence on multiple grounds -- many of which weren't possible before the Snowden leaks exposed the breadth and depth of the NSA's domestic surveillance.

The federal judge presiding over the case -- which involved material support for terrorism charges -- has declared there's nothing wrong with anything the NSA or FISA Court did, so long as the surveillance was authorized and possibly had something to do with national security. (via FourthAmendment.com)

First, the defendants -- all accused of providing material support to Al Qaeda (remember them?) -- asserted the constitutionality of the NSA's upstream collections should be revisited in light of the Snowden leaks. The court [PDF] says these more-recent exposures are no reason to upset the precedential apple cart.

Controlling precedent decides this issue. In 2005, the Sixth Circuit rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to FISA's procedures. The court explained in Damrah that the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge lacked merit, as "FISA has uniformly been held to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Damrah has not been overturned or altered in light of the public disclosures regarding PRISM and upstream collections. And consequently, Damrah forecloses Defendants' constitutional challenge.

So, to add this all up: leaked documents from 2013 onward, exposing routinely-abused programs that massively expanded following the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, mean nothing when stacked up against a 2005 case predating the NSA's admissions of surveillance abuse and the exposure of the FBI's backdoor searches of domestic communications.

Furthermore, the court declares -- based on documents provided by the government directly to the court, but not to the defendants (in ex parte hearings) -- the FISA-authorized surveillance was on the up-and-up because the government provided documents declaring the FISA-authorized surveillance was on the up-and-up.

The court is sympathetic to those on the other side of the deck it helped stack, but only barely.

I recognize the challenge faced by a defendant in making a substantial preliminary showing that a FISA application contains a false statement when the defendant does not have access to the application. But the threshold burden exists nonetheless. [...] And here, Defendants have failed to satisfy that burden.

Oddly, the court then decides, after pulling from a 2005 decision and ignoring every FISA-related development since then, that previous domestic surveillance violations by the FBI have no bearing on this case.

The Government's errors from more than a decade ago [referring to a 2004 IG report about post-9/11 surveillance] do not amount to a substantial preliminary showing that an application for FISA collection relevant to this case contains a false statement which was knowingly or recklessly made and necessary to the finding of probable case.

Yes, this is true. These are not comparable things. But with the defendants unable to review the FISA applications, they're left with the judge's take as guided by government submissions -- submissions the defendants are also unable to review or even argue.

As for the Fourth Amendment challenge to Section 702 surveillance generally, the court says there's really no Fourth Amendment issues as this does not apply to "aliens in foreign territory." The court goes even further, though, suggesting the collection of communications outside of the country does not even require a warrant, even if it "inadvertently" sweeps up Americans' communications during the process.

Since the court has also unilaterally decided it can -- unaided by anyone but the government -- decipher the government's FISA-related submissions, there are no due process violations even if the defendants are prevented from viewing, analyzing, or rebutting the claims made by the government during these ex parte sessions. In the end, there's nothing left for the defendants to do but appeal, which will certainly happen what with the court dismissing out of hand the evidence provided by multiple leaked documents and documents officially released by the Director of National Intelligence. To buy the government's claims of above-board surveillance in secret court sessions and declare those NATSEC Kosher seems like a very close-minded move that grants the government more deference than documents the government released publicly itself shows it has earned.

Filed Under: 4th amendment, fisa, fisa court, fisc, mass surveillance, nsa, prism, privacy, surveillance

Another Batch Of FISA Court Docs Confirms The NSA Frequently Abuses Its Collection Powers

from the violating-the-law-on-the-regular dept

More evidence of the NSA's abuse of its surveillance powers has surfaced, thanks to a FOIA lawsuit by the EFF. To date, the EFF has secured 73 FISC opinions as the result of this lawsuit and is still fighting for the release of six opinions the government has chosen to withhold entirely.

One of the opinions released to the EFF shows the NSA's frequent assertions about proper minimization, careful deployment of surveillance techniques, and supposedly robust oversight are mostly false. The NSA abuses its powers and withholds evidence of its abuses from the FISA court, undermining the system of checks and balances meant to keep the agency in line.

The opinion [PDF] embedded below is just one of several recently acquired by the EFF, but it still shows plenty of surveillance power abuse by the agency. Aaron Mackey of the EFF summarizes the contents of the order:

The opinion, the date of which is redacted, orders the deletion of materials the NSA collected without court authorization. The opinion recounts how after the court learned that the NSA had exceeded an earlier issued surveillance order—resulting in surveillance it was not authorized to conduct—the government argued that it had not actually engaged in unauthorized surveillance. Instead, the government argued that it had only violated “minimization procedures,” which are restrictions on the use of the material, not the collection of it.

Judge Hogan, who served on the FISC from 2009-16 and was its chief judge from 2014-16, expressed frustration both with the government’s argument and with its lack of candor, as the court believed officials had previously acknowledged that the surveillance was unauthorized. The opinion then describes how the surveillance failed to comply with several provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in collecting the intelligence.

Much of the opinion is redacted, leaving only sentence fragments for readers to parse. But even these fragments manage to produce a decent depiction of apparently long-running program abuses by the NSA. What the court called "unauthorized electronic surveillance," the government claimed was only a violation of minimization procedures. Even if the court was willing to cede this argument to the government (and it wasn't), the court goes on to point out that the NSA had done nothing to address this violation of minimization procedures.

The government has undertaken, but not completed, a process to identify and destroy [redacted], such that the effects of having acquired [redacted] have not been completely eradicated.

A little further on, the court makes it clear repairing minimization procedures does not excuse prior unauthorized collections, nor would it make similar collections legal in the future.

It has been understood from the inception of FISA that minimization procedures could include limitations on what communications may be acquired from surveillance directed at an otherwise authorized facility. When the government disregards such a limitation, thereby acquiring communications in excess of what the order authorizes, those acquisitions constitute unauthorized electronic surveillance…

And it appears the NSA again withheld info from the court, preventing it from doing its job properly.

[T]he Court was deprived of an adequate understanding of the facts known to NSA and, even if the government were correct that acquisition [redacted] was authorized, a clear and express record of that authorization is lacking.

This is only one of several FISA court documents discussing unauthorized collections. The stockpile of FOIAed documents indicates the government has rarely used its collections programs correctly. The history of the NSA's interactions with the FISA court is littered with references to over-collection and agency obfuscation. This is more of the same from an agency that claims to be precisely and thoroughly controlled by external and internal oversight. The FISA court documents don't align with the NSA's narrative. Instead, they show an agency willing to ignore the law and mislead the court to engage in surveillance its oversight has never authorized.

Filed Under: abuses, fisa court, fisc, foia, nsa, surveillance
Companies: eff

Brief To FISA Court Says The Presumption Of Openness Should Apply There, Too

from the it's-a-court,-not-a-wing-of-the-NSA dept

The court system belongs to the people. That's what a "presumption of openness" means. It's a public system, accessed by the public or by representatives of the public. With rare exception, documents filed with the court system should be made available for viewing by the public.

The FISA court, which oversees a multitude of surveillance programs and national security investigations is a closed book. Until very recently, it operated in total darkness, much like the agencies seeking its approval for surveillance. The Snowden leaks changed that, moving it very slightly closer to a presumption of openness.

The Director of National Intelligence -- nodding towards transparency in a mostly self-serving way -- has begun to declassify orders and rulings from the FISC. But a majority of FISC documents released by the ODNI haven't come from this hesitant step towards transparency. They've been forced out the government's hands by numerous FOIA lawsuits.

Access to court documents shouldn't have to be litigated, even in the FISA court. That's the argument being made by Georgetown professor Laura K. Donohue in her FISA court brief [PDF]. The long, very interesting brief covers a number of issues and government arguments, but it all boils down to public access as a presumption, rather than a grudging concession after a courtroom loss in a FOIA case.

Her brief note the FISA court controls the documents submitted to it and the orders/opinions it issues. When it decides its subservient to surveillance agencies and their national security assertions, the system of checks and balances is thrown out of whack. That's what's happened over the 40 years the court has been in operation. Government agencies and a number of administrations have decided it does not have the discretion to handle the release of court documents.

This is obviously wrong. Donohue's brief sets the stage with a dismantling of the government's opacity arguments -- all designed to override the court's inherent authority to control the release of court documents. [Paragraph breaks added for readability.]

FISC has inherent supervisory authority over its own records and therefore exercises non-statutory jurisdiction over all common law and First Amendment public rights of access. Each of the... arguments offered by the response brief to the contrary fails.

First, the jurisprudence establishes that no statutory cause of action is required for the court to exercise its inherent powers. The court with original jurisdiction over the case oversees all contemporaneous and future motions for access to records. None of the myriad inherent powers cases at issue rely on a separate, statutory cause of action. The FISC would have to rule against the Supreme Court, every circuit, and four prior decisions of the FISC, to find for the government…

There's plenty of precedent to be had but the government wants to ignore it. Instead, it would rather funnel access through the FOIA process so it can retain complete control over documents filed in court, claiming the court's power for itself. But the government also wants it both ways and will "allow" the FISC to control court documents if it seems like a better route for an FOIA denial.

FOIA cannot serve as a substitute for judicial action as it does not (because it cannot) create a cause of action for records held by the judiciary. That statute focuses exclusively on agency records. Regardless of whether the executive branch happens to have judicial records in its files, as the Supreme Court has held, courts retain jurisdiction over their own documents.

The government response brief is further in tension with two arguments that the government has elsewhere raised. In both district court and at the FISC, it has argued that even under FOIA, FISC opinions are still subject to the FISC's control, suggesting that the court does, in fact still retain jurisdiction. Perhaps more concerning, the government has gone into district court and argued that because the FISC is a specialized court, the district court should not exercise jurisdiction over FISC records-an argument at odds with the argument it advances in its representations to this court, where it suggests that (non-specialized) district courts have jurisdiction over FISC documents.

The presumption of openness and disclosure should include the FISA court. The American public has a right to know what the government's doing with its money and its tacit approval. If there are national security concerns, they must be explicitly detailed rather than broad-brushed across a stack of documents. The FISC should ensure the government doesn't cut corners on its redaction paperwork.

And that's the very reason redacting exists. The government could allow the release of documents as soon as they're redacted (after making their case in court) to protect national security interests. Opening up the FISA court doesn't mean exposing a long list of surveillance means and methods. It simply means treating the FISA court like any other federal court where documents and dockets can be viewed by the public to better educate themselves on legal processes, issues, and government activities. Considering the NSA's long history of abuses, the more eyes on the process the better, especially when its oversight has devolved into a partisan point-scoring exercise.

The never-before-seen release of FISA warrant affidavits should be the tip of the iceberg. There's a lot the court oversees and it's doing it with almost no assistance from the outside. This leaves it at the mercy of the agencies seeking its approval. That's not the way the system should work.

Filed Under: court system, fisa court, fisc, openness, transparency

DOJ Readying Warrants In Carter Page Investigation For Public Release

from the giving-the-Republicans-what-they-may-not-want dept

For the first time since the FISA court opened for national security business, the DOJ is considering declassifying FISA warrant applications. The documents are linked to the FBI's surveillance of former Trump campaign aide, Carter Page. Both sides of the political aisle have asked for these documents, which is something you'd think they'd have wanted to see before issuing their takes on perceived surveillance improprieties.

Devin Nunes -- following the release of his memo -- sent a letter to the FISA court asking it to clear the warrants for public release. The court's reply, penned by Judge Rosemary Collyer, pointed out two things. First, the FISA court had never released these documents publicly, nor was it in the best position to do so. It is only tasked with determining whether or not surveillance is warranted and to what restrictions it must adhere. It does not have the innate power to declassify documents, nor can it arbitrarily decide what documents have gathered enough public interest to outweigh the government's perpetual demands for secrecy.

The court did point out this release could be achieved much faster if Nunes directed his question to the DOJ, which does have the power to declassify its own investigation documents. It doesn't appear Devin Nunes has approached the DOJ but litigants in an FOIA lawsuit have, and they're looking at possibly obtaining the documents Devin Nunes requested from the FISA court.

The government is considering an unprecedented disclosure of parts of a controversial secret surveillance order that justified the monitoring of former Trump campaign aide Carter Page.

Responding to a legal challenge brought by USA TODAY and the James Madison Project, Justice Department lawyers Friday cast the ongoing review as “novel, complex and time-consuming.”

“The government has never, in any litigation civil or criminal, processed FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) applications for release to the public,” Justice lawyers wrote in a five-page filing.

The filing [PDF] notes that the President's unilateral decision (over the DOJ's objection) of releasing the Nunes memo has forced it to reverse some of its Glomar declarations in ongoing FOIA lawsuits, since it's impossible to maintain a stance of non-confirmation and non-denial when the White House is handing out confirmation left and right.

The DOJ has asked for four months to review the documents before returning to the court with its final answer on public release. There will probably be further delays from this point, as the DOJ will need the FISA court to officially unseal documents before it can turn these over to the litigants. It notes the plaintiffs are not happy with this timetable, but points to the presumed complexity of a task it has never undertaken previously as the reason it needs 120 days before the litigation can move forward.

This administration continues to break new grounds in inadvertent transparency. However, the release of these documents may further undermine the Nunes Memo narrative, so legislators and White House officials hellbent on using the FISA court to score political points should be careful what they wish for.

Filed Under: carter page, devin nunes, doj, fbi, fisa court, fisc, warrants

Nunes Demands Copies Of FISA Docs About Steele Dossier Warrants; Court Suggests Taking It Up With The FBI

from the god-I-so-hope-Nunes-takes-it-up-with-the-FBI dept

Having already released the memo purportedly showing surveillance abuses committed by the FBI, the legislators behind the release are now getting around to asking for documents to back up the memo's assertions. Bob Goodlatte and Devin Nunes have both asked the FISA court for the paperwork they probably should have looked at before writing and releasing the memo.

Nunes has asked for "transcripts of relevant FISC hearings" related to the FISA warrants predicated largely on assertions made in Steele dossier. Goodlatte has asked applications and orders for the same warrants. The FISA court has replied with two letters stating basically the same thing: thanks for the weird (and inappropriate) question, but maybe take this up the FBI. (h/t Zoe Tillman)

From the letter [PDF] sent by Judge Rosemary Collyer to Devin Nunes:

The Court appreciates the interest of the House Intelligence Committee in its operations and public confidence therein. Before 2018, the Court had never received a request from Congress for documents related to any specific FISA application. Thus, your requests -- and others I have recently received from Congress -- present novel and significant questions. The considerations involve not only prerogatives of the Legislative Branch, but also interests of the Executive Branch, including its responsibility for national security and its need to maintain the integrity of any ongoing law enforcement investigations.

While this analysis is underway, you may note that the Department of Justice possesses (or can easily obtain) the same responsive information the Court might possess, and because of separation of powers considerations, is better positioned than the Court to respond quickly. (We have previously made clear to the Department, both formally and informally, that we do not object to any decision by the Executive Branch to convey to Congress any such information.)

The response [PDF] to Goodlatte pretty much says the same thing. Both letter close with a little bit of shade-throwing.

I expect that [the DOJ and FBI's] handling of your requests will inform the Court as to how the Executive Branch perceives its interests and will assist us in our consideration of the full range of issues…

This seems to suggest the FISA court has noticed (how could it not) the contentious relationship between the FBI and the White House and wants to see how the DOJ handles its end of the paperwork requested by the legislators before proceeding. It also implies the court thinks the White House will sidestep its obligations to preserve the integrity of national security-related obligations if it thinks it can score some political points. If the court really felt like laying on the snark, it might have mentioned the utility of viewing underlying documents before releasing a "damning" memo, rather than attempting to find justification for the memo's accusations after the fact.

Filed Under: bob goodlatte, devin nunes, doj, fbi, fisa application, fisa court, fisc, nunes memo, rosemary collyer, steele dossier

Devin Nunes Releases Memo That Doesn't Show The Surveillance Abuses He Hypocritically 'Cares' About

from the owning-the-libs-by-pretending-to-do-his-job dept

House intelligence oversight leader Devin Nunes released his supposed bombshell Friday. The Nunes memo was supposed to contain info showing the FBI had engaged in a questionable, politically-motivated investigation of Trump staff. How this news was supposed to be shocking was anyone's guess. Anyone who has followed the FBI's activities since the days of J. Edgar Hoover already knows the FBI engages in questionable, politically-motivated investigations. The only new twist is the FISA court's involvement and the use of secretive surveillance powers to collect domestic communications.

The FBI responded by noting the memo [PDF] contained "material omissions of fact." What's contained in the memo likely provides rhetorical ammo to those who believe Trump and his advisors did nothing wrong during the run-up to the election. But it will only provide limited support. What's contained in the memo are accusations the FBI sought (and obtained) FISA warrants to surveill one-time Trump advisor Carter Page. The FBI -- according to the memo -- used the dubious Christopher Steele dossier to buttress its allegations. It apparently continued to do so even after it knew the Steele dossier had been paid for by the Democratic National Committee.

The memo notes this interception was not performed under Title VII, which covers the recently-renewed Section 702 collection powers. This surveillance was performed under Title I -- a more "traditional" FISA process in which the government seeks probable cause-based warrants from the FISA court, much like law enforcement officers seek warrants from magistrate judges.

The memo suggests the FBI should have dropped the investigation -- or at least given the FISA court heads up -- once it became apparent the Steele dossier was politically compromised. But the FBI continued to ask for renewals and these requests were approved by law enforcement officials Trump and most of the Republican party no longer care for. The list includes James Comey (fired), Andrew McCabe (resigned), Sally Yates (fired), and Rod Rosenstein (who Trump would apparently like to fire).

The memo also points out that Christopher Steele was "terminated" (as a source) by the FBI for disclosing his relationship with the agency to the press. Steele also apparently stated he was very interested in preventing Trump from winning the national election. There's also mention of a conflict of interest: a deputy attorney general who worked with those pursuing an investigation of Carter Page was married to a woman who worked for Fusion GPS, the research group paid by the DNC to dig up dirt on Trump.

This all seems very damning at first blush. The Nunes memo is the party's attempt to derail the FBI's ongoing investigation of the Trump campaign and its involvement with Russian meddling in the presidential election. But there's a lot missing from the memo. The facts are cherry-picked to present a very one-sided view of the situation.

The rebuttal letter [PDF] from Democratic legislators is similarly one-sided. But adding both together, you can almost assemble a complete picture of the FBI's actions. The rebuttal points out Christopher Steele had no idea who was funding his research beyond Fusion GPS. It also points out the dirt-digging mission was originally commissioned by the Washington Free Beacon, a right-leaning DC press entity.

It also points out something about the paperwork needed to request a FISA warrant. To secure a renewal, the FBI would have to show it had obtained evidence of value with the previous warrant. If it can't, it's unlikely the renewal request would be approved by FBI directors and/or US attorneys general. The multiple renewals suggest the FBI had actually obtained enough evidence of Carter Page's illicit dealings with the Russians to sustain an ongoing investigation.

Beyond that, there's the fact that Devin Nunes -- despite spending days threatening to release this "damning" memo -- never bothered to view the original documents underlying his assertions of FBI bias. In an interview with Fox News after the memo's release, Nunes admitted he had not read the FBI's warrant applications. So, the assertions are being made with very limited info. Nunes apparently heard the Steele dossier was involved and that was all he needed to compile a list of reasons to fire current Trump nemesis Robert Mueller... disguised as a complaint about improper surveillance.

It's this complaint about abuse of surveillance powers that really chafes. Nunes throttled attempts at Section 702 reform last month and now wants to express his concerns that the FBI and FISA court may not be protecting Americans quite as well as they should. Marcy Wheeler has a long, righteously angry piece at Huffington Post detailing the rank hypocrisy of Nunes' self-serving memo.

Because Nunes and others ― up to and including House Speaker Paul Ryan ― claimed to be motivated by a concern about civil liberties, it was generally assumed the privacy community would join the clamor. But those of us who’ve been through several surveillance fights with these posers know the reality is far more complex. Ultimately, two principles are at issue: the rule of law and privacy. In both instances, Nunes and Ryan are on the wrong side of the issue.

[...]

A mere three weeks ago, Nunes and Ryan were happy to have Americans surveilled with no evidence whatsoever of wrongdoing. Back then, Ryan backed suspicionless, warrantless searches of Americans as a necessary trade off. “This [bill] strikes the balance that we must have between honoring and protecting privacy rights of U.S. citizens, honoring civil liberties, and making sure that we have the tools we need in this day and age of 21st century terrorism to keep our people safe.”

Today, however, when a former Trump campaign adviser is at issue, Nunes and Ryan have discovered the due process they personally refused for so many Americans.

This isn't Devin Nunes' first ride on the surveillance hypocrisy merry-go-round. Just like Dianne Feinstein on the other side of the political aisle, Nunes doesn't give two shits about domestic surveillance unless it's being used against him and his. Somehow, Nunes believes libertarians and anti-surveillance progressives will join him in his excoriation of the FBI and its alleged abuse of domestic surveillance powers. But he's not going to win any converts. The hill Nunes has chosen to die on with this memo is this: the law should protect the powerful from questionable snooping. It has nothing to say about the marginalized groups targeted most frequently by security agencies and law enforcement.

Every single privacy activist I know cares about privacy in significant part to ensure the rule of law and to prevent the arbitrary exercise of justice to focus just on select groups like Muslims or Chinese-Americans, rather than those who pose the greatest risk to society, like people allegedly doing Russia’s secret bidding. Yet the actions of Ryan and Nunes reverse that, using a sham concern for civil liberties as a way to prevent themselves, their associates, and the president from being subject to the rule of law like the rest of us would be.

Moving beyond that, there's the damage done to the FBI by the president and the party that follows him. Trump proclaimed himself a "law and order" president and stated he would always have law enforcement's back. But he's spent most of his time in the White House battling the FBI and DOJ, hoping to make investigations into his campaign's questionable relationship with Russia vanish. He wasted no time alienating the FBI simply because its former director wouldn't give him a pledge of loyalty.

Now, with Nunes releasing a completely unredacted memo, the FBI will suffer even more harm. The agency now knows its sources might be exposed for purely political reasons. Very few people will work with the FBI knowing their names might be splashed all over documents released voluntarily by intelligence oversight committee members. This administration has made it clear no one is safe from public disclosure, even as it does everything it can to shut down unauthorized leaks. Again, the hypocrisy is undeniable. While every administration desires to control the narrative, few have been this transparent about their motives.

There should be no rush to lionize the FBI and the officials Trump has discarded because of perceived lack of loyalty. The FBI is no better than it was before Trump took office. It's no champion of civil liberties and it is in the wrong position to pretend to speak truth to power simply by continuing to exist. Abuse of surveillance powers is a very real thing and the FBI remains one of the worst offenders. The memo is Nunes photoshopping a bunch of smoke over a small, ordinary flame and claiming it's photographic evidence of the FBI's antipathy towards Trump. If abuse occurred under Nunes' watch, then it should be called out. But laying bare the details of an ongoing investigation just to score political points is a terrible abuse of Nunes' oversight powers.

Filed Under: devin nunes, fisa, fisa court, fisa warrant, russia, russia investigation, surveillance

Intelligence Director Says Gov't Can Demand Encryption Backdoors Without Having To Run It By The FISA Court

from the keeping-secrets-from-the-secret-court dept

A set of questions from Senator Ron Wyden -- directed at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence -- have finally received answers. The answers [PDF] were actually given to the Senate oversight committee in July but have just now been made public.

Zack Whittaker of ZDNet has taken a look at the answers the ODNI provided and found something that indicates the government can not only compel the creation of backdoors, but can do so without explicit approval from the FISA court.

The government made its remarks in July in response to questions posed by Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), but they were only made public this weekend.

The implication is that the government can use its legal authority to secretly ask a US-based company for technical assistance, such as building an encryption backdoor into a product, but can petition the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to compel the company if it refuses.

In its answers, the government said it has "not to date" needed to ask the FISC to issue an order to compel a company to backdoor or weaken its encryption.

The government would not say, however, if it's ever asked a company to add an encryption backdoor.

The way this process works is the agency requesting the backdoor or other compelled assistance runs the request by the FISA court. This process does not ask the FISA court to approve the method used, nor does it provide the court with details on the assistance sought. All the FISC determines is whether or not compelled assistance is necessary.

The ODNI maintains it has never asked for compelled decryption or the installation of backdoors… at least not under this authority. If it has, there'd be little in the way of a paper trail to prove it. The FBI, as part of the Intelligence Community, appears to be more interested in securing the help of US courts -- something that would prove far more useful in the long run, considering its domestic focus.

This information comes at a critical time. The surveillance wing of the government wants Section 702 (and related authorities) renewed at the end of this year -- unaltered and with at least a half-decade before the next chance of reform. So far, its two Congressional oversight bodies have been compliant with the IC's wishes. Serious reform efforts have been dumped by both House and Senate judiciary committees, leaving only those authored by longtime surveillance state cheerleaders in the running. With limited oversight and an easy way to route around FISA roadblocks, Section 702 reform is badly needed if we have any hope of the next decade being less filled with Fourth Amendment violations than the last one.

Filed Under: backdoors, compelled assistance, encryption, fisa court, fisc, odni, ron wyden